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ABSTRACT 
 
Trevor Erlacher: The Furies of Nationalism: Dmytro Dontsov, the Ukrainian Idea, and Europe’s 
Twentieth Century 
(Under the direction of Donald J. Raleigh) 
 
 
 
 Using the biography of diplomat, publicist, editor, ideologue, and literary critic Dmytro 
Dontsov (1883-1973) as a framework, this dissertation places Ukrainian integral nationalism—
an authoritarian rightwing doctrine that subordinates individual, class, and humanitarian interests 
to those of the nation—into its broader regional, cultural, and intellectual historical contexts, 
from its roots in late imperial Russia to the early Cold War in Canada. As the “spiritual father” of 
this ideology, Dontsov’s formative experiences in the Russian-Ukrainian and Polish-Ukrainian 
borderlands, his cosmopolitan interests and aspirations, and his transnational life path were 
paradoxical yet necessary factors in the development of his worldview and its resonance in 
Ukrainian politics and literature. He progressed from heterodox Marxism, to avant-garde 
fascism, to theocratic traditionalism, cultivating a literary circle to forge new national myths, 
radicalizing a generation of Ukrainian youth, and influencing Ukrainian thought and culture to 
this day. Despite the ruptures in his politics and the contradictory sources of his ideology, a 
continuum of what I term “iconoclastic authoritarianism” and “cosmopolitan ultranationalism” 
links Dontsov, the young socialist, to Dontsov, the elderly mystic.
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INTRODUCTION 
 
The subject of Ukrainian nationalism, previously obscure outside of Eastern Europe, 
moved to the center of the world’s attention in the wake of Ukraine's 2014 Maidan Revolution. 
Named after Independence Square in central Kyiv, this pro-Western, liberal-democratic upheaval 
ousted an unpopular authoritarian regime loyal to Moscow, prompting Russia's annexation of the 
Crimea in March and a Russian-Ukrainian war in the Donbas region. Insisting that the revolution 
was a coup d’état by Ukrainian “fascists” backed by Western powers, the Kremlin’s international 
propaganda machine justified these aggressive interventions by invoking the specter of Nazism 
and the Ukrainian collaborationist groups of World War II: namely, the protofascist Organization 
of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN), founded in 1929, and its military wing, the guerrilla Ukrainian 
Insurgent Army (UPA), which from 1943 to 1949 engaged in the largest internal struggle against 
Soviet power in the country’s history. Although the Russian media lavished the self-proclaimed 
descendants of the OUN and UPA with attention out of all proportion to their power—they were 
but a small faction of a much larger demonstration—this strand of Ukrainian nationalism does 
represent a symbolically potent force in Ukrainian culture and politics. Many of them have 
volunteered to fight in eastern Ukraine, joining paramilitary battalions or the official armed 
forces, and carrying on what they consider a long tradition of defending Ukraine from perennial
Russian aggression. Typically reimagined by their sympathizers as beleaguered democrats 
resisting the evils of both Nazism and Stalinism in Ukraine, the UPA and the OUN have 
provided many Ukrainians with an effective countermythology to the largely (though not 
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entirely) Russocentric Soviet myth of the Great Fatherland War (i.e. the Nazi-Soviet conflict in 
World War II, from June 1941 to May 1945). Indeed, the symbols, slogans, songs, and heroes of 
the OUN and UPA were present in the vast crowds that drove the Maidan Revolution, during 
which the rightwing political party Vseukrains’ke ob’iednannia “Svoboda” (All-Ukrainian 
Union “Freedom”) and the paramilitary group Pravyi sektor (Right Sector) successfully 
promoted the use of the nationalist watchword: “Slava Ukraini! Heroiam slava!” (“Glory to 
Ukraine! Glory to the heroes!”). But these groups found Ukrainian society at large to be 
disinterested in the personality cult of Stepan Bandera (1909-1959), the most prominent and 
divisive of the OUN’s leaders. The radical rightwing ideology and violence of latter-day 
“Banderites” has frightened or embarrassed most of Ukrainian society.1 Yet, with rightwing 
nationalism ascendant throughout the region—from the Law and Justice Party in Poland, to 
Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán’s “illiberal democracy,” to Putinism and the upsurge in 
irredentist Russian nationalism—Ukrainian politics could conceivably follow suit, abandoning 
hard-won rights, liberties, and cosmopolitan aspirations for the sake of wartime cohesion, self-
reliance, xenophobia, authoritarianism, militarism, and iron discipline. 
Ukraine’s Europe-oriented politics and the Kremlin’s anti-Western reaction have brought 
about a resurgence of interest in the history, contents, and modern carriers of the OUN’s 
ideology, usually termed “integral nationalism”—an authoritarian rightwing doctrine that 
                                                
1 Although tokens of the latter have worked their way into Ukraine’s government, Svoboda, Pravyi sektor, and other 
far rightwing organizations performed quite poorly in the parliamentary and presidential elections that followed the 
Maidan Revolution. As of 2017, there is nothing even remotely resembling a genocidal “fascist junta” in Kyiv, and 
no reason to suppose that one is just over the horizon. Apart from the general malaise of corruption produced by the 
regime of ousted president Viktor Yanukovych (1955-), the motivating force behind the Maidan Revolution and the 
Russo-Ukrainian conflict was not Ukrainian nationalism or nefarious Western meddling in Russia’s “near abroad,” 
but Ukrainian attitudes shifting away from a preoccupation with survival, security, stability, and identities (typical of 
post-Soviet Russian society) toward a desire for self-expression, new values, and modernization along “European” 
lines. Yaroslav Hrytsak, “Ignorance Is Power” Ab Imperio 3 (2014): 218-28. On the life and personality cult of 
Stepan Bandera, see Grzegorz Rossoliński-Liebe, Stepan Bandera: The Life and Afterlife of a Ukrainian 
Nationalist: Fascism, Genocide, and Cult (Stuttgart: Ibidem-Verlag, 2014). 
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subordinates individual, class, and humanitarian interests to those of the nation.”2 Still, for all the 
controversy and mystique surrounding it, the strand of nationalism that connects the OUN to the 
marginal yet dangerous militias of post-Maidan Ukraine remains understudied and poorly 
understood. What were the foundational beliefs of the OUN, its affiliates, and its successors? 
How, when, and where did these ideas originate and evolve? Who articulated them, and on the 
basis of what precedents?  
 This study—a contribution to the cultural and intellectual history of Ukrainian integral 
nationalism, from its roots in the late nineteenth century to the early Cold War—seeks to address 
these questions. It places Ukrainian integral nationalism into its broader regional, cultural, and 
intellectual historical contexts, using the biography of the journalist, editor, diplomat, publicist, 
ideologue, and literary critic Dmytro Dontsov (1883-1973), the chief progenitor of this ideology, 
as a framing device. Dontsov represents an ideal case study for comprehending Ukrainian 
integral nationalism because he stood at the forefront of its conceptualization and dissemination, 
and embodied its concerns and values. His long, itinerate life intersected with prominent figures 
of Eastern European history in over a dozen cities across the globe, from the southeastern 
Ukrainian town of Melitopol’ to Montreal, Canada. Both mirroring and anticipating broader 
changes in the Ukrainian national movement, Dontsov turned from the far left to the far right in 
the course of World War I and its revolutionary fallout, simultaneously yet independently 
crafting an ideology akin to Italian Fascism. Like many Ukrainian integral nationalists, he 
                                                
2 The early theorist and historian of nationalism Carlton Hayes coined the term “integral nationalism” for the 
militant, expansionist ideologies of nations in possession of independent statehood (such as Nazi Germany or 
Imperial Japan). Hayes considered it the opposite of “Risorgimento nationalism,” which he applied to stateless 
nations struggling to build an independent, liberal nation-state (such as nineteenth-century Poland or Italy). The 
sense in which I am using the term is different: following the convention established in much of the literature on the 
OUN, my definition of “integral nationalism” is broader, applicable to both state and stateless nationalities, and 
derived from the earlier formulation of French royalist Charles Marraus (1868-1952), for whom nationalisme 
intègrql meant placing the nation above all other values and obligations. Carlton J. Hayes, The Historical Evolution 
of Modern Nationalism (New York: R.R. Smith, Inc., 1931). 
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gravitated toward German National Socialism (Nazism) during the 1930s then distanced himself 
from it after World War II, crossing the Atlantic and converting to pious, strictly anti-Communist 
positions. Dontsov personified the Ukrainian exile experience, positioning himself as a leading 
representative of the many thousands of émigrés unable or unwilling to live in the Soviet Union, 
and an ambassador for Ukrainian interests throughout Europe. A prolific, polyglot writer, he 
exerted a major influence on the non-Soviet Ukrainian elite and public as an editor of and 
contributor to literary and political periodicals in Kyiv, Vienna, St. Petersburg, Prague, and 
L’viv—cities teeming with avant-garde cultural and political experimentation in the early 
twentieth century.3 He shaped Ukrainian politics and literature in multiple capacities: as student 
radical in Kyiv and St. Petersburg and a participant in the Revolution of 1905; as international 
antitsarist propagandist and secret agent of the German Foreign Office in Switzerland during 
World War I; as diplomat and information minister of the Central Powers-backed Ukrainian 
State (also known as the Hetmanate) in 1918; as “conservative revolutionary” ideologue, cultural 
critic, and editor of the leading literary and political journal4 of the interwar Ukrainian 
emigration; as pro-National Socialist journalist in wartime Berlin, Prague, and Bucharest; and, 
finally, as professor of Ukrainian literature at the University of Montreal during the early years 
of the Cold War. Progressing from heterodox Marxism, to avant-garde fascism,5 to theocratic 
                                                
3 Carl E. Schorske, Fin-de-siècle Vienna: Politics and Culture (New York: Vintage Books, 1981); Jacques Le Rider, 
Modernity and Crises of Identity: Culture and Society in Fin-de-siècle Vienna (New York: Continuum, 1993); Irene 
Rima Makaryk, and Virlana Tkacz, eds., Modernism in Kiev: Kyiv/Kyïv/Kiev/Kijów/Ḳieṿ : Jubilant Experimentation  
(New York: University of Toronto Press, 2010); Mark D. Steinberg, Petersburg Fin De Siècle (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 2011); and Katerina Clark, Petersburg, Crucible of Cultural Revolution (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1995). 
 
4 Literaturno-Naukovyi Visntyk (Literary-Scientific Herald, 1922-32), revived under Dontsov’s sole discretion as 
Vistnyk (Herald, 1933-39). 
 
5 Throughout this work, “fascism” as a generic phenomenon is lowercased while the specifically Italian original is 
uppercased. 
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traditionalism, Dontsov expounded a philosophy of will power, “creative violence,” idealism, 
and fanaticism, cultivated a literary circle to give it aesthetic content,6 and inspired a generation 
of Ukrainian youth to pursue national revolution by any means necessary. 
Dontsov’s part-Marxist, part-Nietzschean worldview was an artifact of the pan-European 
“crisis of reason,” which provided fertile ground for the proliferation of rightwing extremism 
well before opposition to the spread of Bolshevism gave it a bête noire and a model of 
organization.7 He cast Ukraine as the decisive combatant in a worldwide clash between the 
“progressive” Occident and the “reactionary” Orient—between “European civilization” and 
“horde-like Muscovy” (i.e. Russia). Valorizing willpower over rationality and decrying 
pacifistic, internationalist values, Dontsov’s incendiary prose inspired generations of Ukrainians 
to violent action, above all through their participation in the OUN and UPA. In addition to the 
insurrections, assassinations, terrorism, ethnic cleansing, racism, and espionage generally 
associated with the latter groups, however, Dontsov’s work also fostered a rich tradition of 
defiant Ukrainian prose and poetry. Ukrainian nationalists ever since have regarded him as one 
of their “spiritual fathers” and strived to put his ideals into practice.  
 But how and why did Dontsov become a “conscious” Ukrainian and a nationalist at all in 
a time and place (late imperial Russia) when the majority of ethnic Ukrainians were peasants 
disinterested in national politics and identities, and when even moderate forms of Ukrainian 
nationalism had yet to command a mass following, remaining the purview of a small and 
suppressed intelligentsia? Up to World War I, activist Ukrainian intellectuals remained in Phase 
A of Miroslav Hroch’s account of nation creation: researching the “apolitical” cultural 
                                                
6 That of the so-called Vistnykivtsi, including the poets, novelists, and essayists Olena Teliha, Yevhen Malaniuk, 
Yurii Lypa, Oleh Ol’zhych, Leonid Mosendz, Yurii Klen, and others. 
 
7 J. W. Burrow, The Crisis of Reason: European Thought, 1848-1914 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000). 
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foundations of national unity in language, folklore, and history to be invoked by a larger cadre of 
activists in Phase B—converting increasing numbers of the target ethnic group to nationalist 
causes—and Phase C—a fully developed social movement made of up of a variety of political 
parties embracing the majority of the nation.8 Much of the existing literature on Dontsov has 
implicitly assumed that the radical brand of Ukrainian nationalism for which he is known today 
was somehow nascent from birth, destined for realization as a natural reaction to certain events, 
and closed to revision thereafter. This ahistorical, essentialist approach to the question cannot 
account for what motivated the founder (not to mention the followers) of Ukrainian integral 
nationalism to embrace the ideas and identities that he did when he did, despite the many easier 
options available to him. To grasp the appeal and meaning of Dontsovism, one must think about 
the young Dontsov, not retrospectively, as a Ukrainian integral nationalist in the making, but 
contextually, as a traveler proceeding along a tortuous road punctuated by forks and pitfalls, 
unaware of what lay ahead and inclined to forget or embellish what lay behind. Similarly, one 
must view the mature Dontsov not as the unwavering prophet of a new worldview that he 
proclaimed himself to be, but as a seeker of knowledge and fame amid a surfeit of would-be 
prophets, constantly adapting to historical forces beyond his control and powers of prediction. 
Dontsov’s personal, professional, and intellectual journey took a serpentine course through the 
most catastrophic chapters of Ukrainian and world history.  
 
Historiography 
Much of the scholarship on Dontsov has treated his identity in essentialist, teleological 
terms as immutable, innate, or inevitable, either retrospectively ascribing to him an unchanging, 
                                                
8 Miroslav Hroch, Social Preconditions of National Revival in Europe: A Comparative Analysis of the Social 
Composition of Patriotic Groups Among the Smaller European Nations (New York: Cambridge University Press, 
1985). 
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heroic (or demonic) Ukrainianness and a stable nationalist ideology, or dismissing him altogether 
as a “typical representative of the imperial Russian intelligentsia,”9 depending on the author’s 
political commitments. This approach—though favorable to the creation of unifying myths or 
cautionary tales—effaces the complexity of human thought and development. Ukrainian 
commentators who oppose Dontsov’s ideology have tended to downplay his influence, regarding 
him as an embarrassing, possibly Russian-influenced anomaly in Ukrainian intellectual history. 
To the extent that they have acknowledged his relevance and studied him, their assessments of 
his role in Ukrainian politics and literature since the 1920s have been overwhelmingly negative. 
The resulting scholarship is simultaneously defensive and condemnatory, yet unwilling to 
analyze Ukrainian integral nationalism on its own, constantly changing terms to sympathize with 
the individuals who earnestly believed in it, however discomfiting that might be. By contrast, 
Dontsov’s admirers, despite writing a great deal more about him than his detractors do, have 
resisted discussing unsavory aspects of his life and work, tending to exaggerate his importance 
and philosophical originality, and showing little interest in the ideologically inconvenient or 
irrelevant vagaries of his personality and intellectual journey. The normative Ukrainian 
nationalist account of Dontsov downplays the non-Ukrainian and cosmopolitan elements that 
shaped his worldview and overlooks the fluidity of his (national) identity, his racism and anti-
Semitism, the mercuriality of his beliefs and values, his crises of faith, and other impurities. The 
product is an icon of the unwavering “prophet of the national idea” who realized the evils of 
Marxism and virtues of romantic nationalism in an irreversible, crisis-born conversion 
experience. Dontsov propounded a cast-iron worldview, telling Ukrainians what they needed to 
                                                
9 Omeljan Pritsak, “V. Lypyns’kyj’s Place in Ukrainian Intellectual History,” Harvard Ukrainian Studies 9, no. 3 
(December 1985): 245-62. 
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hear when they needed to hear it and jolting them into the nationalizing mainstream of modern 
Europe, away from the totalitarian barbarism of the Soviet “prison of nations.”  
Typological disputes have dominated the literature on Dontsov and his ideology, which 
he termed “active nationalism” (chynnyi natsionalizm) and presented most comprehensively in 
his 1926 book Natsionalizm (Nationalism). Should he be categorized as fascist, integral 
nationalist, both, or neither? Is Dontsov totalitarian or antitotalitarian? Modernist or 
traditionalist? Are there any fundamental, ideational continuities underlying the drastic shifts in 
his thought, or was Dontsov a chameleon or opportunist? Commentators have answered these 
questions depending upon the contexts in which they wrote, their national and political identities, 
their moral evaluations of Dontsov and his influence, and the aspects of his career upon which 
they have chosen to focus. Debates about Dontsov and his legacy are often also debates about 
Ukrainian nationalism as a whole. Those who have endeavored to salvage Dontsov or the 
nationalist movements he inspired from historical ignominy have tended to deny that his 
ideology can be categorized as totalitarian, fascist, racist, or anti-Semitic. Others have stopped 
short of dismissing Dontsov as a fascist, preferring the less inflammatory term “integral 
nationalist” or “authoritarian rightist,” which leaves him open to both sympathetic and negative 
assessments. Still others have taken the existence of interwar Ukrainian fascism under Dontsov’s 
tutelage as proof that Ukrainians really are and have always been “normal” Europeans, even 
during their period of statelessness.10 Some scholars insist that Ukrainian statelessness, and its 
corollary liberationist tendencies, make Dontsovism, at worst, an instance of protofascism 
directed against an intolerably oppressive status quo. According to this interpretation, 
totalitarianism and fascism should be applied only to state ideologies, not movements aimed at 
the attainment of statehood. Commentators hostile toward Ukrainian nationalism in general, and 
                                                
10 Kost Bondarenko, “Fashyzm v Ukraini. Do istorii problemy,” Ukrains’ki varianty 2 (1997): 74-82.  
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its interwar varieties in particular, have asserted that Dontsov and his doctrine were neither 
original nor independently Ukrainian phenomena, but abject puppets of the fascist and 
imperialist powers to Ukraine’s west.       
Ukrainian socialist scholars—both Soviet and non-Soviet—began writing about Dontsov 
in the late 1920s, shortly after he achieved celebrity status in interwar eastern Galicia, grounding 
their censure of his ideas in Marxism. Soviet writers also had to take into account the 
occasionally conflicting political requirements of the Soviet state and Leninism, including 
Moscow’s desire to undermine interwar Poland by promoting Ukrainian nationalist and 
separatist sentiments in Galicia, while carefully controlling or repressing them inside Soviet 
Ukraine. In early Soviet discourse, however, Dontsov was beyond the pale even if he was a thorn 
in Warsaw’s side. Soviet critics categorized Dontsov’s “active nationalism” as “petit-bourgeois 
nationalism” or, more polemically, “fascism.” Following the then common Marxist interpretation 
of this term as late capitalism baring its true, antidemocratic nature, this account maintains that 
fascist parties and movements appear when the bourgeoisie and petite bourgeoisie, fearing 
proletarian revolution, enter a crisis, dismantle parliamentary and electoral institutions, appeal to 
the basest national egoism of the masses, and utilize police and paramilitary groups to attack 
leftists and organized workers. The raison d’être of fascism—its rhetoric about revolution and 
social welfare notwithstanding—is to protect the capitalist status quo. Soviet authors were likely 
to denounce any form of anti-Communism as fascism or petit-bourgeois nationalism. Since 
Dontsov was not only fervently anti-Communist, but anti-Russian as well, their assessment of 
him and “active nationalism” was extremely negative.11  
                                                
11 Representative works in this vein include: Volodymyr Ievdokymenko, Krytyka ideinykh osnov ukrains’koho 
burzhuaznoho natsionalizmu (Kyiv: Naukova dumka, 1967); Volodymyr Ievdokymenko, “Reaktsiina sutnist’ 
ideolohii ukrains’koho burzhuaznoho nationalizmu,” Filosofs’ka dumka 1 (1974): 94-104; Volodymyr 
Ievdokymenko, Burzhuaznyi natsionalizm — zapeklyi voroh internatsional’noho iednannia trudiashchykh (Kyiv: 
  10 
Most Soviet works on the subject of Dontsov’s brand of Ukrainian nationalism, tending 
to be more propagandistic than scholarly, offer little of interest to biographers. There were, 
however, several exceptions prior to the early 1930s.12 Denouncing Dontsov’s ideology as 
fascism in the epithetical, nonacademic sense of the term was de rigueur for Soviet writers, but 
some expressed original ideas on the subject. Volodymyr Iurynets’s 1926 review of 
Natsionalizm, for example, examines the influence of the radical French philosopher Georges 
Sorel and the Polish Marxist Stanisław Brzozowski on Dontsov, challenging the assertion by 
other Soviet authors that his ideology lacked a theoretical foundation, labeling him an “extreme 
fetishist of the state.”13 After World War II, the Soviet annexation Western Ukraine and the 
pacification of the UPA insurgency there, the subject of radical Ukrainian nationalism became 
something of a taboo in Soviet discourse, broached only to blacken it and insist on its 
foreignness to genuine Ukrainian life. The quality of Soviet literature criticizing Dontsov and his 
thought degenerated into simplistic caricatures of the man as a translator of Hitler’s Mein Kampf 
into Ukrainian, a hireling of the imperialist West with no ideas of his own, and a cheap 
propagandist of no relevance to “real” (i.e. pro-Soviet) Ukrainians anywhere. Soviet Ukrainian 
academics nevertheless recognized Dontsov, whose ideas they considered to be the theoretical 
________________________ 
Politvydav Ukrainy, 1976); Iuryi Rymarenko, Burzhuaznyi natsionalizm ta ioho ‘teoriia’ natssia (Kyiv: Naukova 
dumka, 1974); Klym Dmytruk, Bezbatchenyky. Pravda pro uchast’ burzhuaznykh natsionalistychnykh i tzerkovnykh 
iiearkhiv u pidhotovtsi napadu fashists’koi Nimechchyny na SRSR (L’viv: Kameniar, 1972); Klym Dmytruk, Zhovto-
blakytni bankroty (Kyiv: Dnipro, 1982). On the subject of Ukrainian integral nationalism in late Soviet discourse 
and propaganda, see Trevor Erlacher, “Denationalizing Treachery: The Ukrainian Insurgent Army and the 
Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists in Late Soviet Discourse, 1945-85,” REGION: Regional Studies of Russia, 
Eastern Europe, and Central Asia 2, no. 2 (2013): 289-316. 
 
12 See Ie. Hirchak, “Khvyl’ovyzm ta dontsovshchyna,” Zakhidna Ukraina 2 (1930): 47-52; M. Motuzak, “‘Zovsim 
novoho type ukraintsi’ (Do orhanizatsiino-ideolohichnykh ta prohramovykh osnov ukrains’koho fashyzmu),” 
Bil’shovyk Ukrainy nos. 7-8 (1929), 70-79, and no. 9, 70-81; S. Tudor. “Bellua sine capite. “Literaturno-naukovyi 
vistnyk,” L’viv (January-June 1931), in S. Tudor, Tvory: V 2-kh tomakh. vol. 2 (Kyiv: AN URSR, 1962), 330-39.  
 
13 V. Iurynets’, “Novyi ideolohichnyi manifest ukrains’koho fashyzmu,” Bil’shovyk Ukrainy 2-3 (1926), 61-87, 72. 
More recent scholarship, discussed below, disputes this claim. 
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basis of the OUN and UPA, as enough of a threat to warrant dozens of philippics. After the 
1920s, Soviet authorities strictly regulated access to Dontsov’s publications, which were 
available only to Communist Party members with special clearance, or, perhaps, in the form of 
illegally produced and circulated copies (samvydav/samizdat).        
Mykhailo Sosnov’skyi, a co-founding member of the OUN(B)-controlled Canadian 
League for the Liberation of Ukraine (Liga vyzvolennia Ukrainy, LVU), executive of the World 
Congress of Free Ukrainians from 1969 to 1971, and personal associate of Dontsov’s, wrote the 
first biography of the latter shortly after his death in the spring of 1973. Despite its biases and 
shortcomings, Sosnov’skyi’s 1974 study remains one of the most comprehensive treatments of 
Dontsov’s life and thought to date. His evaluation of the ideologue’s impact is largely favorable, 
albeit with certain reservations. “In Ukrainian life,” Sosnov’skyi writes, “a situation existed that 
needed a ‘doctor’ with the psychology and talent of Dontsov. Dontsov’s appearance was a 
historical inevitability (zakonomirnist’).”14 “Active nationalism” was a necessary response to the 
failure of attempts to build an independent nation-state during the Ukrainian revolution (1917-
1921), entailing a wholesale rejection of the nineteenth century and its idols—democracy, human 
rights, liberalism, socialism, and egalitarianism.15 While Dontsov did not simply copy fascism, 
his ideology shared certain elements with it, including voluntarism (a philosophical doctrine that 
asserts the primacy of will over reason), elitism, striving for the ‘spiritual rebirth’ of society (the 
“palingenetic myth”),16 the Führerprinzip (leadership principle), the call for an “initiative 
                                                
14 Mykhailo Sosnovs’kyi, Dmytro Dontsov, Politychnyi portret: z istorii rozvytku ukrains’koho natsionalizmu 
(Toronto: Trident International, 1974), 259. 
 
15 Ibid., 168. 
 
16 On the concept of “palingenetic ultranationalism,” see Roger Griffin, The Nature of Fascism (New York: 
Routledge, 1993).  
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minority,” the creation of a stronger “new man,” and action for its own sake.17 Such ideas were 
not so much an outgrowth of Dontsov’s individual psychology and intellectual choices but an 
unavoidable by-product of the European zeitgeist for which neither he nor his followers can be 
held responsible. Without Dontsovism, however morally repugnant one might find it, 
Sosnovs’kyi implies that the Ukrainian nation may have failed to survive the staggering brutality 
of the twentieth century. Portraying Dontsov as a typical European and a political imperative, 
Sosnov’skyi cites the French integral nationalist thinkers of Action Française—Maurice Barrès 
and Charles Maurras—as Dontsov’s closest analogues. “Under their influences,” Sosnovs’kyi 
writes, “the doctrine of fascism, including Dontsov’s doctrine of ‘active nationalism,’ formed.”18 
Sosnovs’kyi pays insufficient attention to the more immediate influences on Dontsov from 
Russian, Polish, Jewish, and Germanic sources, treating his conversion to radical Ukrainian 
nationalism as a foregone conclusion, teleologically predestined by European reality and 
Ukrainian exigency. Consequently, he reads Dontsov’s mature ideology and fiercely pro-
Ukrainian identity backward into his prenationalist youth, seeking out its roots everywhere and 
assuming the naturalness of the ideologue’s eventual position. There is little room in 
Sosnovs’kyi’s account for a discussion of the contingency, nuance, flux, and multivalence in 
Dontsov’s intellectual biography, or for an acknowledgement of the contradictions, impurities, 
paradoxes, and lapses in faith and judgment that the founder of Ukrainian integral nationalism 
exhibited. Dontsov becomes the avatar of a foundation myth who unwaveringly propounded 
certain ancient and self-evident truths rather than the idiosyncratic and all-too-human seeker that 
                                                
17 Sosnovs’kyi notes that Dontsov’s ideology matches Ernst Nolte’s definition of fascism. Ibid., 256. Nolte defined 
fascism as “anti-Marxism [that] seeks to destroy the enemy by the evolvement of a radically opposed and yet related 
ideology by the use of almost identical and yet typically modified methods, always, however, within the unyielding 
framework of national self-assertion and autonomy.” Ernst Nolte, The Three Faces of Fascism (London: Weidenfeld 
& Nicolson, 1965), 20-21. 
 
18 Sosnovs’kyi, Dmytro Dontsov, 289. 
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he was. Sosnovs’kyi thinks of Dontsov’s Ukrainianness and nationalist ideology as things 
essential, ineluctable, and inherent to him, but these were acquired characteristics, subject to 
revision in the course of his existence, that developed alongside seemingly contradictory ideas, 
feelings, and identities (cosmopolitanism, socialism, exile, and assimilation).          
Other historians of the Ukrainian diaspora weighed in more critically on Dontsov and his 
legacy, sometimes working from expressly ideological premises in the politically charged 
atmosphere of the Cold War era. Ivan Lysiak-Rudnyts’kyi, for example, made clear his 
preference for the monarchist conservative ideology of Viacheslav Lypyns’kyi and his followers 
(particularly Osyp Nazaruk—one of Dontsov’s most avid contemporary critics), over and against 
the demagogic voluntarism of “active nationalism.” Initially, Lysiak-Rudnyts’kyi argued that 
Dontsovism was genetically distinct from Fascism and Nazism, staking out a position close to 
that of American historian John Armstrong, whose work on collaborationism draws parallels 
between the Hungarian, Croatian, Slovakian, and Ukrainian cases during World War II.19 Later 
in life, however, Lysiak-Rudnytskyi switched positions, writing: “with the whole of his authority 
[Dontsov] directed Ukrainian nationalism down the fascist channel.”20  
The Ukrainian-American historian and political scientist Alexander J. Motyl published 
the first English-language monograph on Dontsov and the intellectual origins of the OUN, The 
Turn to the Right, in which he rejects the fascism label for Dontsov and his followers on the 
grounds that “fascism was a way of organizing a state, while Ukrainian Nationalism was a way 
                                                
19 Armstrong was the first to label the OUN “integral nationalist,” but largely overlooked Dontsov’s influence on the 
organization. John Armstrong, Ukrainian Nationalism, 1939-1945 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1955); 
“Collaborationism in World War II: The Integral Nationalist Variant in Eastern Europe,” Journal of Modern History 
40, no. 3 (September 1968): 196-410. 
 
20 Ivan Lysiak-Rudnyts’kyi, Istorychni esei, vol. 2 (Kyiv: Osnovy, 1994), 251-5, 2493. 
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of attaining a state.”21 Whereas the state preceded the nation in Italian Fascist thought, the nation 
necessarily enjoys primacy over the state in Dontsov’s conception. Whether one accepts this line 
of reasoning or not, the book’s ten-year scope, ending in 1929, the year of the OUN’s founding, 
leaves this organization’s actual period of existence untouched. As Motyl acknowledges, 
Dontsov and elements within the OUN fell under the influence of Nazism in the course of the 
1930s. Though Motyl concludes that “Ukrainian Nationalism was as organically Ukrainian a 
phenomenon as any other political current of the 1920s,”22 he (like Sosnovs’kyi) exaggerates the 
influence of French integral nationalism on Dontsov and the OUN, and almost entirely ignores 
the preceding Polish, Zionist, German, and Russian strands of radical nationalism with which 
they had direct contact. Motyl astutely notes Dontsov’s counterintuitive Yankophilia in the 
1920s, describing the latter’s stated preference (as late as 1929) for the US model of what he 
called a “conservative democracy” made up of “free individuals,” properly restrained and 
directed by the “moral tyranny of the majority.”23 (Dontsov thus applauded precisely what the 
British philosopher John Stuart Mill decried as the most insidious enemy of liberty in his 
celebrated essay On Liberty.) Motyl contends that Dontsov’s democracy was not totalitarian, and 
not even authoritarian.24 Yet, although Dontsov occasionally flirted with the ideal of Anglo-
American classical liberalism in 1920s, his decidedly antilibertarian, majoritarian understanding 
of it would strike most Americans as odd, and in any case not applicable to the untutored and 
intemperate Ukrainian peasantry, such as it was. What Dontsov admired in the United States 
                                                
21 Alexander J. Motyl, The Turn to the Right: The Ideological Origins and Development of Ukrainian Nationalism, 
1919-1929 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1980), 166. 
 
22 Ibid., 173. 
 
23 Ibid., 66, 74-75, 82. 
 
24 Dmytro Dontsov, “Dukh amerikanizmu,” LNV 98, no. 4 (1929): 357-71, 362.  
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citizenry of his imagination (he relied on Alexis de Tocqueville’s mid-nineteenth-century work, 
Democracy in America, which, ironically, singled out Russia for praise too) was the same thing 
that he admired in the Bolshevik activists or Mussolini’s Blackshirts: iron discipline, high 
energy, mobilization capacity, esprit de corps. Given the less-than-ideal circumstances in places 
such as Ukraine, Italy, Germany, and Russia, Dontsov reasoned, extensive state intervention was 
needed to do what American society achieves through collective self-mobilization. His rumored 
liberalism, exaggerated and short-lived, was a moot point. Taking a dim view of the ideologue, 
Motyl attributes Dontsov’s remarkable success swaying the nationalist youth and veterans of 
interwar Galicia to the poverty of Ukrainian political thought at the time.  
Polish scholars have been particularly active in counteracting the often uncritically pro-
OUN/UPA, pro-Dontsov historiography of governmental and nongovernmental Ukrainian 
nationalists. But Polish commentators bring their own perspectives, and of course, biases to the 
subject. Wiktor Polishchuk’s forays into the matter convey palpable outrage. He asserts that 
Dontsov’s ideas predominated in the OUN’s ideology, cult of the nation, apotheosis of violence 
and war, territorial expansionism, racism, amoralism, elitism, and dictatorial authoritarian 
tendencies.25 Weighing in on the label debate, Polishchuk’s reasoning—that since fascism is a 
form of integral nationalism, the converse, every instance of integral nationalism is also an 
instance of fascism, and hence the OUN and Dontsov were fascists—is a logical fallacy 
(affirming the consequent, or the confusion of necessity and sufficiency).26  
Polish historians Tomasz Stryjek and Roman Wysocki have produced more 
dispassionate, evenhanded analyses of the subject. Stryjek periodizes Dontsov’s intellectual 
                                                
25 Wiktor Polishchuk, Doktryna D. Doncowa — tekst i analiza (Toronto: Poliszczuk, 2006); Wiktor Polishchuk, 
Żródła zbroni OUN i UPA (Toronto: Poliszczuk, 2003), 10-12. 
 
26 Zaitsev, Ukrains’kyi integral’nyi natsionalizm, 38-39. 
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evolution in the following manner: 1) the nation as an agent of progress—Ukraine as a cause of 
revolution (1913-1914); 2) the nation as a state—Ukraine as a part of Mitteleuropa (1914-1918); 
3) the nation as a historical task—Ukraine as the bastion of Europe (1921); 4) the nation as 
will—Ukraine as a manifestation of the force of nature (1922-1933); 5) the nation in the plan of 
‘fascism’—Ukraine as Sturm und Drang (1933-1939); and 6) the nation as a duration 
(tryvannia)—Ukraine as a conglomerate of races (1939-1950s).27 Stryjek sees opportunism in 
these vicissitudes. Dontsov jumped from one position to the next in search of the ideas that, at 
any given moment, carried the most social and political purchase. Thus, for example, Dontsov 
supported fascism as a European force capable of destroying Bolshevism “using Bolshevik 
methods” and thus liberating Ukraine.28 Stryjek accepts the designation of Dontsov’s nationalism 
as “integral” because “nationalism of his type consists of the recognition of the nation as a 
singular value that cannot be subordinated to any restrictions, which is to say the kind [of value] 
without which no other values can emerge.”29  While Stryjek acknowledges that there is “no 
basis to deny that Dontsov [was] a supporter of fascism, but one cannot forget that this was an 
eastern- or east-central-European fascism and that Dontsov was a popularizer of an idea and not 
an actor in the fascist movement in Ukraine.”30 In the years following Hitler’s rise to power, 
Stryjek argues, Dontsov and the OUN drifted toward Nazism, but remained integral nationalist 
until 1941, when both fully embraced fascist ideas (with the latter engaging in genocidal 
                                                
27 Tomasz Stryjek, Ukraińska idea narodowa okresu międyzwojennego: Analiya wybranych koncepsji (Wrocław: 
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behavior) only to back away from them in 1944 and thereafter.31 Instead of comparing Ukrainian 
integral nationalism to Nazism, Roman Wysocki focuses on its relation to Polish integral 
nationalism, juxtaposing the intellectual and political biographies of the chief theorists of these 
two movements—Dontsov and Roman Dmowski (1864-1939), the leader of the Polish National 
Democracy (Endecja) movement. Wysocki makes a compelling and well-researched case for the 
former’s sizable debt to the latter.32      
The L’viv-based historian Oleksandr Zaitsev and a leading expert on Ukrainian integral 
nationalism has challenged both the blinkered partisanship of the pro-Dontsov and pro-OUN 
camp, and the sententious, accusatory scholarship of opposing Ukrainians, Poles, Russians, and 
Westerners. Zaitsev’s research recognizes the presence of both liberationist and totalitarian 
elements in Ukrainian integral nationalism, which he divides into Dontsov’s “active nationalism” 
and the OUN’s “organizational nationalism” (as well as the “creative nationalism” of the lesser 
known Front of National Liberation, led by Dmytro Paliiv). Emphasizing the sacralization of 
politics and palingenetic myth-making at the center of Ukrainian integral nationalist thought, 
Zaitsev describes the ideology and movement as a secular religion in the making. Following the 
custom, Zaitsev intervenes in the typological debate, but proposes a new category: “ustashism” 
(from the Croatian Ustaša, a radical nationalist group that collaborated with the Nazi occupation 
of Yugoslavia). Zaitsev defines ustashism as “revolutionary integral nationalism developing 
under conditions of perceived foreign oppression and using violence for the purpose of national 
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liberation and for creating an independent authoritarian state.”33 Ustashism differs from fascism 
so long as it is stateless but transforms into fascism in cases where it achieves statehood.34 
Zaitsev reads Dontsov’s project as the creation of a national mythology—an “ersatz religion” 
showing Ukrainians their origins in a golden age, their unity as an organism, their Europeanness 
and role as a bulwark against the chaotic forces of the Orient (i.e. Russia), their civilizing 
mission, the division of humanity into superior and inferior types (and the natural right of the 
former to rule to the latter), and the coming apocalypse—a holy war against the forces of 
darkness.35 The great drawback of Zaitsev’s account is that it ends at the beginning of World War 
II, when this idea was finally put to the test. 
Zaitsev considers Fascism and Nazism to have been the chief influences on Dontsov in 
the 1920s and 1930s, respectively. Dontsov openly embraced the label, albeit with reservations 
and only “for the lack of a better word.” At other times he denied that “active nationalism” was 
synonymous with fascism, even while praising Mussolini, Hitler, and other fascist leaders of the 
era. He thought of fascism, Zaitsev contends, as the negation of allegedly harmful influences on 
European civilization—socialism, pacifism, cosmopolitanism, and so on. Ultimately, Zaitsev 
echoes Motyl’s argument that Dontsov’s concern—creating an independent state—was 
fundamentally different from that of Italian Fascism—expanding and reorganizing an already 
existing one. Zaitsev cites the nonbiological, nonracial character of Dontsov’s anti-Semitism as 
evidence that he cannot be classified as a Nazi either. Instead, the ideologue was, as historian 
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Mykhailo Chuhuienko has argued, a “conservative revolutionary” or a “literary protofascist” in 
favor of a “third way,” neither liberal nor Marxist.36 (Viewed through this lens, the radically 
antiliberal Italian esotericist and ultra-traditionalist Julius Evola [1898-1974] bears a particularly 
strong likeness to Dontsov.) Zaitsev does not accept Chuhuienko’s dismissal of claims that 
Dontsovism is “totalitarian” thanks to its traditionalism and repudiation of the “rational-
technocratism of utopian Communism,” writing that “dogmatism, fanaticism, and creative 
violence” “elitism, antipathy toward ‘partisanship,’ sympathy toward fascist regimes . . . and, 
finally, a conception of nationalism as a modern religion gave Dontsov’s worldview expressly 
totalitarian features.”37 Zaitsev regards Dontsov’s role in shaping the OUN as crucial, but not 
canonical. More important, perhaps, was his radicalization of the generation of Galician youth 
who joined the OUN in large numbers between 1929 and the outbreak of war. Dontsov hewed to 
the anti-Semitic line until the end of World War II (and, more privately, until the end of his life), 
but the Bandera faction of the OUN charted a more liberal, ethnically tolerant course in its 1943 
program, which Dontsov sharply criticized.38                 
In addition to accusations of anti-Semitism, totalitarianism, and fascism, one of the 
central controversies in the historiography on Ukrainian integral nationalism concerns the 
relationship between and comparison of Dontsov and the OUN. To what extent did Dontsov 
provide the OUN with its ideology at different stages in its development, before and after the 
1940 schism between the older, more cautious followers of Andrii Mel’nyk (1890-1964) and the 
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younger, more militant devotees of Stepan Bandera? If the official ideology of the OUN 
significantly differed from “active nationalism,” was one more radical, totalitarian, or racist than 
the other? In her dissertation on Dmytro Dontsov, Ukrainian scholar Iryna Shlikhta regards 
Dontsov as a democratic thinker at heart who proposed national dictatorship only as a bridge to 
an Anglo-American style republicanism.39 She acknowledges his significant ideological sway—
though chiefly on matters of rhetoric and abstractions—among the leaders and rank and file of 
the OUN’s factions until the final years of World War II, but argues that he cannot be held 
responsible for the organization’s antidemocratic outlook prior to 1943. Dontsov had always 
maintained his distance from the organization (some thought irresponsibly), which had its own 
official ideologues, but he became a scapegoat for many Ukrainian nationalists eager to escape 
their politically suspect pasts after the war, but he retained his supporters and admirers despite 
the changing times.40  
Canadian scholar Myroslav Shkandrij, by contrast, argues that the OUN, though laboring 
under morally questionable Dontsovist premises, charted a decidedly more moderate course, in 
part because OUN members were the ones charged with realizing nationalist ideals and programs 
in practice, and thus faced the severe repercussions for illegal or subversive actions.41 Privileged 
and sheltered by his position as a bystander engaged in purely intellectual work (with the 
complicity of the Polish authorities, whom he refrained from antagonizing), Dontsov could 
afford to take more extreme and uncompromising positions on the desired social and political 
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41 Myroslav Shkandrij, Ukrainian Nationalism: Politics, Ideology, and Literature, 1929-1956 (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 2015). 
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order of the prospective Ukrainian state and on the means permissible in attaining it. Shkandrij 
implies that Dontsov himself is largely to blame for the corruption of interwar Ukrainian 
nationalist youth and Ukrainian literature. The postwar disavowal of Dontsov among his former 
protégés and the OUN becomes a tale of a liberal-democratic awakening and redemption in 
Shkandrij’s telling, while Dontsov and Dontsovism becomes an aberration relegated to the dark 
days of the 1920s and 1930s, when the inexperience of youth and the humiliation of defeat left 
Western Ukrainians and Ukrainian émigrés morally and intellectually defenseless against the 
temptations of unfettered hatred and desperate remedies.  
 
Iconoclastic Authoritarian, Cosmopolitan Ultranationalist  
My study highlights flux and contingency, as well as the contradictions, paradoxes, and 
ambiguities that defy the easy categorization of individuals and their beliefs across time.42 It 
seeks to contextualize Dontsov and Dontsovism diachronically, placing his words, actions, and 
associations in their early and mid twentieth-century contexts, and using his publications and 
correspondences to reconstruct the social, political, and intellectual environments within which 
he developed and disseminated his ideology. It thus offers a portrait, not only of Dontsov, but 
also of the people who surrounded him, the spaces he inhabited, the ideas that inspired him, and 
the institutions with which he associated himself. Situating the extremism of Dontsov and his 
followers against this backdrop, I aim to grasp the roots and resonance of his thought in 
Ukrainian society, and to put it into dialogue with radical right- and leftwing ideologies, regimes, 
                                                
42 As literary scholar Benjamin Harshav has put it: “To be sure, individuals often embrace ideologies or various 
beliefs, and some of them hold to them for a long time. Yet, in principle, it would be more appropriate to see the 
individual as an open semantic field through which various tendencies crisscross: some of them are involuntary and 
some he himself embraced and helped formulate, some become dominant and others merely hover in the field of 
consciousness. We are dealing here with sensibilities and attitudes, which are fuzzy and ambivalent and not as 
systematic and consistent as ideologies would like to be. Individuals, even highly articulate ones, are often 
undecided on various matters, inconsistent, compromising between opposite ideas, changing their position with 
time.” Benjamin Harshav, Language in Time of Revolution (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984), 53-54. 
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and movements elsewhere in turn-of-the-century, interwar, and postwar Europe. What shaped 
Dontsov’s worldview and evolution? How did his worldview relate to contemporary intellectual 
and political currents, such as Ukrainophile populism, Russian pan-Slavism and Eurasianism, 
Italian Fascism, German National Socialism, Bolshevism, Zionism, and Wilsonian liberalism? 
How were his ideas received internationally and domestically at different historical moments? 
What does his career and intellectual development tell us about Ukrainian nationalist culture? To 
what extent did his ideas continue to influence the political culture of the Ukrainian diaspora, and 
what impact did they have upon official and unofficial Soviet Ukrainian discourse after 
Stalinism? What relevance do Dontsov and Dontsovism hold for post-Soviet and post-Maidan 
Ukraine? More broadly, what might his intellectual biography tell us about European 
nationalisms that became mass movements relatively late, during the tumult of the first half of 
the twentieth century?     
 Despite the ruptures in his politics and the contradictory sources of his ideology, a 
continuum of what I term iconoclastic authoritarianism links Dontsov, the young socialist 
activist, to Dontsov, the elderly ultraconservative mystic. He tailored his message to appeal to 
and promote the “authoritarian personality,” and exhibited many attributes of it himself. 
Although he was not thinking in these exact terms, Dontsov’s martial notion of the “new” 
“strong man” with the “stone heart and burning faith” needed to carry out a merciless war for 
Ukrainian national liberation celebrates the extraordinary violence and unflinching discipline of 
which this personality type is capable.  
The psychological traits of the authoritarian personality, as described by Theodor Adorno, 
Else Frankel-Brunswick, Daniel Gevinson, and Nevitt Sanford in the classic sociological work 
The Authoritarian Personality, include a rigid conception of identities (“stereotypy”), 
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“superstition,” “authoritarian submission” to the powerful, “authoritarian aggression” against the 
weak, “conventionalism,” obsessive prudery, contempt for empathy and sentimentality (“anti-
intraception”), a fixation on “power” and “toughness,” “anti-intellectualism,” “destructiveness,” 
“cynicism,” and a tendency to scapegoat the “inferior” minorities in one’s midst rather than face 
one’s own anxieties and shortcomings (“projectivity”).43 Possession of an authoritarian 
personality, Adorno et al assert, predicts an individual’s likelihood of becoming anti-Semitic and 
fascist, which they sought to measure using the “F-scale.” The “democratic personality”—which 
they originally termed the “revolutionary personality” in line with their Marxist roots before 
deferring to the pressures of their American publishers—represents the healthy antipode of the 
authoritarian.  
Critics of the study have objected that the political right does not have a monopoly on 
authoritarian pathologies. Deploying a stock concept of Freudian psychoanalysis, Adorno et al 
attribute the authoritarian personality to the Oedipal complex, wherein suppressed homosexual 
tendencies lead to patricidal hostility, which is suppressed in turn out of the fear of punishment 
(castration, humiliation) by the father, which produces an exaggerated obedience to and 
idolization of him and of authority figures in general.44 The anxious authoritarianism produced 
by repressed sexual impulses gives irrationality free reign, empowering political ideologies, like 
                                                
43 Theodor Adorno, Else Frankel-Brunswick, Daniel Gevinson, and Nevitt Sanford, The Authoritarian Personality 
(New York: Harper and Row, 1950). 
 
44 Ibid., 192. There were numerous attempts to diagnose fascism, as well as Communist or liberal-capitalist varieties 
of authoritarianism, as a kind of mass neurosis on the basis of a synthesis of Marx and Freud, blaming the ego- or 
superego-driven repression and oppression of desire (libidinal energy) for the observed perversions of modern 
individuals in the first place. Two of the most influential works in this vein are Herbert Marcuse, Eros and 
Civilization (London: Routledge, 1987) and Wilhelm Reich, Die Massenpsychologie des Faschismus (New York: 
Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 1933). (The latter—an Austrian from Eastern Galicia (in modern-day Western 
Ukraine)—was expelled from the Communist Party of Germany for his criticisms of the Soviet regime in the same 
book.) Other philosophers and psychologists have gone further, aiming to dethrone the Oedipal complex itself 
(along with the edifice of psychoanalysis and institutional psychiatry): see Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, Anti-
Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia (New York: Penguin, 2009); and Michel Foucault, The History of Sexuality 
Volume 1: An Introduction (London: Allen Lane, 1979).    
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Dontsov’s, that rely on mysticism, emotionalism, and fantasies of salvific, cathartic violence. 
The point here is not to take a (probably inadvisable) plunge into “psychohistory,” but to 
describe the personal (as opposed to political) factors in the appearance and growth of Ukrainian 
integral nationalism. In any event, the source material relating to his childhood is too scarce for 
anything more than speculation. I will not hazard an Oedipal diagnosis, but simply note that 
Dontsov’s father and mother died before he reached puberty, depriving him of the usual familial 
authorities at an early age, and there is no reason to suppose that he resented his outward 
conformity to heterosexual norms. We can only surmise the adult Dontsov’s actual beliefs and 
feelings imperfectly; his inner psychology cannot be disentangled from his published views and 
public personae. Nevertheless, the concept of the authoritarian personality, treated as a Weberian 
“ideal type,” is descriptively and analytically useful.45 It closely matches Dontsov, both as a 
public intellectual—that is, a body of texts bearing his name or imprimatur—and as a flesh-and-
blood human being.  
 But the match is an idiosyncratic one; iconoclastic tendencies—that is, open antagonism 
toward all sorts of received authorities—tempered Dontsov’s authoritarianism. However much 
he regarded power and hierarchy as the keys to salvation, Dontsov played the role of a 
consummate gadfly more than once in his life. His rebellious gravitation toward the illegal, 
revolutionary, non-Russian left during his first thirty years shows an early penchant to defy state 
                                                
45 An ideal type is a hypothetical abstraction—a subjective fiction—intended to make sense out of the seeming 
chaos of social reality, which cannot be studied in the positivistic, objective way that the natural sciences permit. 
The validity of an ideal type in the fields of sociology, economics, and history is a question of interpretive adequacy. 
By contrast, the natural sciences generate causal laws that correspond with observed reality. The latter are 
encumbered in qualitatively different ways by epistemological problems of perspective and bias. Weber argues that 
the historian or social scientist must be self-conscious and publicly forthright about the value commitments and 
subjectivities they bring to their research and analysis. So, in the spirit of intellectual integrity, I confess to having an 
aversion to many of Dontsov’s ideas and beliefs, but nevertheless strive to produce a nonpartisan and clear-sighted 
account of them. Max Weber, “Objectivity in Social Science and Social Policy” and “The Meaning of ‘Ethical 
Neutrality’ in Sociology and Economics,” in E. A. Shils and H.A. Finch, eds., The Methodology of the Social 
Sciences (New York: Free Press, 1949).   
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authority and culturally hegemonic convention, even if it was in the name of a new authority and 
ostensibly older, more legitimate traditions. Unwilling to surrender himself to party discipline 
and always hostile toward the reigning intellectual and political authorities in Ukraine, he could 
not tolerate ideological deviation and other displays of insubordination and disloyalty among his 
followers. Dontsov and his wife Mariia never had biological children, but they became parental 
figures to the younger generation of nationalist writers who rallied around their journal, Vistnyk. 
The ideologue became a “spiritual father” to his closest acolytes—sons and daughters who either 
grew to regard him as a stifling patriarch, asserted their independence, faced his wrath, and 
turned against him, or remained loyal to the guru and his teachings even to the point of 
martyrdom. In short, Dontsov permitted himself to be an individualist, a rebel, a dissenter, and a 
wanderer, but decried this unmoored, fractious condition in his fellow countrymen, browbeating 
subordinates into conformity with his vision and publicly savaging apostates.  
 Again, Dontsov reserved the right to modify his ideological program whenever and 
however he saw fit, dropping former beliefs and allegiances like so many discarded snakeskins, 
but conviction breaks in his thought do not indicate opportunism or a lack of rigor so much as a 
lifelong conviction that the national interests of Ukraine, however defined, trumped moral or 
intellectual concerns in changing historical contexts. He readily sacrificed logic and consistency 
for the sake of emotive impact or political expedience, vulgarized the ideas of the writers whom 
he invoked to fit the rhetorical needs of the moment, and moved chameleon-like between 
political, cultural, and philosophical trends. In practice, Dontsov took to heart Nietzsche’s 
dictum—“the will to a system is a lack of integrity”46—but that did not stop him from 
advertising his major works as a coherent “worldview” (Weltanschauung) built upon stable 
                                                
46 Friedrich Nietzsche, The Anti-Christ, Ecce Homo, Twilight of the Idols, and Other Writings, edited by Aaron 
Ridely and Judith Norman (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 159. 
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philosophical foundations. The latter varied considerably from one decade to the next: from the 
conventionally Russo-Marxian atheism, materialism, positivism, and anticlericalism of 
Dontsov’s 1910 work, Shkola a relihiia (The School and Religion), to the amoralism, vitalism, 
and voluntarism of his 1926 magnum opus, Natsionalizm (Nationalism); from the Social 
Darwinian “democracy” of the peasantry and petite bourgeoisie found in his 1921 monograph 
Pidstavy nashoi polityky (The Foundations of Our Politics), to the theocratic traditionalism and 
anthropological racialism of Dukh nashoi davnyny (The Spirit of Our Antiquity) (1944). Dontsov 
followed the intellectual fashions of contemporary Europe closely, amassing the foreign names 
and quotations that he marshaled to impress and bewilder his readers into submission. He rarely 
grappled with the substance of the chic Western and Russian concepts that he injected into 
Ukrainian politics, and generally had little to offer that was novel and positive. Instead, Dontsov 
was most effective as a critic and a denigrator, especially of subjects closer to home. His 
jaundiced yet incisive attacks on Russian imperialism (both tsarist and Bolshevik) and on the 
shibboleths of nineteenth-century Ukrainian populism show a familiarity with the subject matter 
that can come only from personal experience and a fascination born of suppressed affinity. 
Dontsov loathed what he knew best and knew best what he loathed.  
 This intellectual restlessness manifested itself even when it came to core philosophical 
and epistemological paradigms, such as positivism and antipositivism (or neo-Romanticism). As 
a youth Dontsov adhered to the positivism of the Russian fin de siècle, a doctrine that hoped to 
supersede “theological” and “metaphysical” thinking with a materialist account of nature and 
society as one in the same, subject to identical laws, and capable of being improved upon by 
enlightened intellectuals. Cocky, atheistic, and anti-Romantic—not unlike a Ukrainian Bazarov, 
the quintessential “nihilist” of Russian literature, as depicted in the famous 1862 novel Fathers 
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and Children by Ivan Turgenev—Dontsov attacked and ridiculed Christianity, patriotism, and the 
state and educational institutions sustained by them as a rebellious student activist. There was no 
place for blind faith, effete sentimentality, or the raptures of patriotism in the universe according 
to this austere brand of positivism and “scientific socialism.”47 However, as far as Dontsov’s 
generation of aspiring intellectuals was concerned, positivism had already become a creed of the 
Russian and Ukrainian intelligentsias’ proverbial “fathers,” hence banal and hackneyed. Thus, 
breaking with the classical Marxism of his youth, Dontsov joined the “revolt against 
positivism”—a continent-wide rejection of the nineteenth century’s conviction that scientific 
achievements guaranteed human progress. The fantastic technologies and disenchanting 
bureaucracies of the modern world seemed only to expand the destructive capacity of the beast in 
man. Mechanized warfare, social dislocation, industrial exploitation, crumbling empires, 
scattering nationalities, and urban rot left Dontsov and many of his contemporaries cynical and 
pessimistic about modernity and its prospects. Despairing at the “nihilism” and “decadence” of 
the times, which allegedly deprived people of authenticity, nobility, and stability, they yearned 
for a golden age and sought the untimely values and baptismal fire that would usher in a total 
rebirth on the basis of something lost and elemental. Like others, Dontsov turned to ancient 
myths, medieval polities, forgotten creeds, blood, soil, race, and caste. Still, he habitually fell 
back into positivist habits, cherry-picking theories from the natural and social sciences to buttress 
his claims. (The clearest instance of this wavering was his formulation of a pseudoscientific, 
Nazi-inspired, racialist definition of the Ukrainian and neighboring nations during the 1930s and 
                                                
47 Richard Pipes, Struve, Liberal on the Left, 1870-1905 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1970), 295-96. The 
“Legal Marxist” cum liberal nationalist Kadet Petr Struve, Russian philosopher Nikolai Berdiaev, and others dealt 
with the contradiction between romantic nationalism, the vaunted cure for a perceived crisis of meaning, and 
positivism by positing a dualism of transcendental (spiritual) and empirical (political) realms. To the extent that 
Dontsov acknowledged such a contradiction, he failed to grapple with it on the same philosophical level, wavering 
between positivism and romanticism as it suited the moment.  
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1940s.) Dontsov assailed the purported idols and mores of the preceding generations of the 
Ukrainian and Russian intelligentsia, as well as the Russian Empire and its literature, which his 
family and upbringing had taught him to revere, but he never escaped this patrimony, 
recapitulating it despite himself in novel ways. He took part in the perennial sons’ rebellion 
against the fathers (who were, in their time, also iconoclastic), but did so in the name of 
forefathers, authorities, and traditions that were older still.  
 The “ethno-symbolist” theory of nationalism, which, in contrast to “modernist” accounts 
of nationalism, regards the premodern symbols, myths, historical memories, and homelands of 
named ethnicities as a sine qua non of nationalisms and nation-states (which are, all the same, an 
almost entirely post-1789 phenomenon), best corresponds with Dontsov’s case and the Ukrainian 
experience in general. John Armstrong, one of the pioneers of ethno-symbolism (as well as the 
historiography of Ukrainian integral nationalism), highlights the importance of the longue durée 
for the emergence of modern nations, arguing that centuries-old “mythomoteurs”—the 
constitutive myths that imbue ethnic groups with a sense of self-conscious collective purpose—
drive processes of semiotic exclusion and agglomeration based on ways of life (nomadic or 
sedentary), religions, imperial polities, laws, and languages.48 Another leading proponent of 
ethno-symbolism, Anthony D. Smith, argues that modernist theories of nationalism, such as the 
industrialization thesis of his mentor Ernst Gellner, tend to define “nation” and “nationalism” as 
                                                
48 Armstrong draws on the insights of social anthropologist Frederik Barth, claiming that the group-forming 
boundary is more durable than the attitudes and perceptions of the members it encloses. He thus understands 
ethnicity and nationality phenomenologically as a cluster of moving sentiments, ascriptions, and self-ascriptions 
organized into mythic, symbolic, and communicative structures that constitute interdependent ethnic groups. 
Moreover, as Barth explains, “categorical ethnic distinctions do not depend on an absence of mobility, contact and 
information, but do entail social processes of exclusion and incorporation whereby discrete categories are 
maintained despite changing participation in the course of individual life histories”—an observation demonstratively 
borne out in Dontsov’s case. John A. Armstrong, Nations before Nationalism (Chapel Hill: University of North 
Carolina Press, 1982); Frederik Barth, Ethnic Groups and Boundaries: The Social Organization of Culture 
Difference (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 1969), 9.  
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synonymous with the canonical Western European cases (Britain, France, Germany, etc.), and 
consequently suffer from a partial, Eurocentric perspective.49 Chronically afoul of the state (or 
states) it lacks and representing an almost entirely pre-industrial population, Ukrainian 
nationalism would not have survived if it did not refer to an already existing ethnie, as Smith 
terms it, including a collective proper name (Ukrainian), a myth of common ancestry (the early 
East Slavs and Kyivan-Rus’), shared historical memories (especially of the early modern 
Cossack Period), a common culture, an associated homeland, and a sense of solidarity or kinship 
among sufficiently large swaths of the population or at least its elites. Ethnies, too, are 
discursively constructed “myth-symbol complexes,” but they are necessarily prior to nations and 
nationalisms (in extreme cases by millennia). Also emphasizing the long-term cultural precursors 
to nationalist movements, John Hutchinson insists on the distinction between “political” 
nationalism, which seeks statehood (and, by extension, membership in the international 
community of nation-states), and “cultural” nationalism, whose chief concern is not statehood, 
but the moral regeneration of an ethnic community and its metamorphosis into a self-sufficient 
nation. He observes that cultural nationalist intellectuals play a key role in defining and 
reconstructing ethnic communities through the revival of ancient myths, symbols, and memories, 
sometimes working in parallel with political nationalism, at other times, especially on the heels 
of failed attempts at state-building, representing an alternative to it.50 Such intellectuals appear in 
times of crisis and can point the way toward the cultural, social, and political renewal of ethnic 
groups. Additionally, cultural nationalists’ regard humanity as “infused with a creative force 
                                                
49 For a succinct statement of his life’s work on the subject, see Anthony D. Smith, Ethno-symbolism and 
Nationalism: A Cultural Approach (New York: Routledge, 2009). Ernest Gellner, Nations and Nationalism, 2nd ed. 
(New York: Cornell University Press, 2009). 
50 John Hutchinson, The Dynamics of Cultural Nationalism: The Gaelic revival and the Creation of the Irish Nation 
(London: Unwin and Allen, 1987). 
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which endows all things with an individuality,” and the nation as “the product of its unique 
history, culture, and geographical profile,” irrespective of its accidental and nonessential 
possession of a state. To the cultural nationalist, the nation is an organic entity with a living 
agency and personality. As such, according to Hutchinson, the nation thrives or dies according to 
natural laws and primal urges, with or without legal sanction, and depends upon the episodic 
injection of vigorous youthful rebellions and the retrenchments of ageing traditionalists to 
regenerate itself in perpetuity.51  
This conception of nationalism strongly resonates with how Dontsov perceived his life 
and work and the historic purpose to which he felt himself called—bringing about the spiritual 
rebirth of the Ukrainian nation through the “recovery” of time-honored myths, symbols, 
memories, institutions, and moralities.52 In reality, Dontsov and his coterie understood from 
reading Sorel that they had to create, or at least reimagine, these myths and traditions. 
Paradoxically, the outward form of their traditionalism took inspiration from iconoclastic, avant-
garde literary conceptions, such as expressionism and futurism, and modernist philosophy 
(vitalism, voluntarism, phenomenology, etc.).   
 Drawing on the integrated East-Central European framework pioneered by Omer Bartov, 
Eric Weitz, and others in Shatterzone of Empires, my study grapples with Dontsov’s ideology as 
it was shaped by conditions in the ethnically diverse borderlands between competing, mutually 
radicalizing powers—first the Russian, German, and Austro-Hungarian empires, then the Soviet 
Union and Nazi Germany. Bartov and Weitz define “borderlands” as “both zones of coexistence 
                                                
51 John Hutchinson, “Cultural Nationalism and Moral Regeneration,” in John Hutchinson and Anthony D. Smith, 
eds., Nationalism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994).  
 
52 “Ukraine still does not exist, but we can create it in our souls. A nation does not need objective preconditions to 
extort from history its claim to statehood. . . . We must re-awaken the idea of supremacy of one ethnic group on one 
specific territory—an aspiration which has come down from our ancestors and which they wished to leave to their 
progeny.” Dmytro Dontsov, Khrestom i mechem, Tvory (Toronto: Liga Vyzvolennia Ukrainy, 1965), 394-95. 
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and multiethnicity, and of violence and devastation” where “the entwining of the domestic and 
the international” is “a defining feature . . . precisely because this is where competing empires, 
national movements and states, and profound social grievances met and intersected with a 
population characterized by great diversity.”53 Dontsov’s home region, the Russian-Ukrainian 
borderlands of southeastern Ukraine, was certainly a borderland in this sense.54 Similarly, prior 
to the Second World War, western Ukraine (the eastern halves of the historic provinces of Galicia 
and Volhynia) was a quintessential borderland. As the epicenter of Ukrainian integral nationalism 
and Dontsov’s base of operation during his most productive years, western Ukraine also gave 
rise to ideologies and movements determined to turn it into a fortress of ethnic homogeneity, 
bound by absolute borders and purged of “hybridity” (i.e. the amalgamation of the colonizer with 
the colonized). Dontsov’s experiences at these points of interethnic and intercultural contact, 
overlap, hybridization, contestation, forced and voluntary assimilation, made him painfully 
aware of the problems of nation and empire in an era when Europeans were stretching both 
concepts to their limits.  
 Coupled with reliance upon European support in the struggle against Russian 
imperialism, Ukraine’s demographic and geopolitical situation forced Dontsov and his followers 
into the roles of transnational actors with extensive exposure to a host of imagined “others.” 
Moreover, the metropoles that Dontsov inhabited—St. Petersburg, Kyiv, L’viv, and Vienna—
were diverse provincial, national, or imperial capitals, and as such nurtured an explosive mélange 
of cosmopolitanism, modernism, traditionalism, and nationalism in the early twentieth century. 
                                                
53 Omer Bartov and Eric D. Weitz, eds., Shatterzone of Empires: Coexistence and Violence in the German, 
Habsburg, Russian, and Ottoman Borderlands (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2013), 8, 
154. 
 
54 Hiroaki Kuromiya, Freedom and Terror in the Donbass: A Ukrainian-Russian Borderland, 1870s-1990s 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998). 
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Dontsov’s writings contain a profound tension between local and cosmopolitan identities typical 
of intellectuals engaged in the imagining of national spaces and communities fragmented by 
colonial practices (in this case, cultural Russification and the autocracy’s intensive exploitation 
of Ukrainian agriculture for the sake of industrialization in Moscow and St. Petersburg).55 His 
extreme devotion to a postimperial Ukrainian (and European) identity compensated for the 
humiliation he experienced as a national minority growing up in the late Russian Empire.  
 He was loath to admit it and repeatedly attacked for it, but the style and substance of his 
thought betrayed the influence of Russia’s potent, illiberal traditions rather than those of Western 
Europe, whose democratic and rationalist values he ultimately rejected.56 Despite his exaltation 
of the Ukrainian village and its traditions, Dontsov urged his compatriots to adopt the industrial, 
authoritarian, militant features of modernity that he found lacking in the rural, “anarchic,” and 
passive Ukrainians. Ukraine’s status as a historically stateless, largely peasant nation speaking a 
denigrated language exacerbated Dontsov’s tangible feelings of inferiority as a product of the 
Russian-Ukrainian borderlands.57 He tried to resolve this dilemma by rhetorically 
                                                
55 Dominic Boyer and Claudio Lomnitz, “Intellectuals and Nationalism: Anthropological Engagements,” Annual 
Review of Anthropology 34 (2005): 105-20. Scholars have recently begun to regard Ukraine as fertile terra nova for 
postcolonial analysis, but Dontsov’s vision of national liberation, given its abhorrence of “hybridity” is better 
understood as anticolonial and reactive. Dontsov promoted the national (and, eventually, racial) purity that he 
himself felt he lacked, railing against the assimilation of Ukrainians into the “ethnic chaos” of the Russian Empire 
and its successor, the Soviet Union. He desired not only the expulsion of Ukraine’s perceived Russian and Jewish 
“occupiers” and “exploiters,” but also the purging of Russian and Jewish habits from Ukrainians’ psyches. Janusz 
Korek, ed., From Sovietology to Postcoloniality: Poland and Ukraine from a Postcolonial Perspective (Huddinge: 
Södertörns högskola, 2007).   
 
56 Generally speaking, liberalism barely took root in the Russian Empire, in an attenuated form at that, and was 
perpetually assailed from both the stronger forces to its right and left. Laura Engelstein, Slavophile Empire: Imperial 
Russia’s Illiberal Path (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2009). 
 
57 I should add that Dontsov embraced the idea that Ukraine was a borderland—between two civilizations, two racial 
topographies, and two ideas—which was part of why it was so important to both Europe and Russia. Dontsov’s 
geopolitics (unlike the OUN’s prior to World War II) considered the Polish-Ukrainian borderland a distant second in 
terms of importance. The problem was that this borderland status imperiled and corrupted the country; an existential 
threat that could be overcome only through full incorporation into Europe.  
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Occidentalizing Ukraine and setting it in opposition to a hyper-Orientalized Russia,58 but the 
effusion of foreign words and phrases in Dontsov’s often excessively ornate prose—replete with 
vitriol, snobbery, and sarcasm—betrayed the insecurities of a merchant’s son from small-town, 
Russified Ukraine.  
 Dontsov strived to raise his cultural capital and fashion a heroic Ukrainian subjectivity 
for himself, but failed to break free from the dominant Russian and Western epistemes. As a 
result, he tended to disparage everything Ukrainian in favor of foreign models, which opened 
him up to the criticism that his ideology was devoid of “genuinely Ukrainian” content.59 Citing 
the “preemptory nature of his judgments, intolerance, and the creation of new utopias,” the 
Ukrainian journalist Bohdan Olamchuk would later charge that Dontsov was racially and 
spiritually Russian—a “cross between Rasputin and a Tatar Khan” or “a Ukrainian Lenin à 
rebours.”60 The allegation of affinity for the late imperial Russian milieu, with its idiosyncratic 
blend of endemic anticosmopolitanism, dour positivism, state authoritarianism, and ethnic 
pluralism, dogged Dontsov throughout his life. He angrily denied accusations that he was under 
any kind of Russian influence, but his national and political identity had not been a foregone 
conclusion. Irrespective of whether his family was of Ukrainized Russian or Russified Ukrainian 
stock, his father and two older brothers identified as Russian: unlike them, Dontsov chose to be 
                                                
58 The practice was typical of both cosmopolitan and nationalistic Eastern European and Russian émigré intellectuals 
and artists of the twentieth century. Natasha Kovacevic, “Anticommunist Orientalism: Shifting Boundaries of 
Europe in Dissident Writing,” in Costica Bradatan and Serguei Alex Oushakine, eds., In Marx’s Shadow: 
Knowledge, Power, and Intellectuals in Eastern Europe and Russia (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2010), 131-54. 
 
59 Some commentators have even argued that Dontsov was in fact a “Ukrainophobic” provocateur, responsible for 
inculcating an “inferiority complex” in Ukrainians. Volodymyr Shelukhin, “Chomu intelektualy ta pravoradykaly 
proty Dmytra Dontsova? Zamist’ dyskusii,” Krytyka (February 6, 2016). 
http://krytyka.com/ua/community/blogs/chomu-intelektualy-ta-pravoradykaly-proty-dmytra-dontsova-zamist-
dyskusiyi [accessed May 19, 2016]  
 
60 Quoted in Marco Carynnyk, “Foes of Our Rebirth: Ukrainian Nationalist Discussions about Jews, 1929-1947,” 
Nationalities Papers 39, no. 3 (2011): 315-52, 319. 
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Ukrainian, and experienced that choice as a conscious, subversive conversion entailing grave 
responsibilities and challenges. However much he hated Russian hegemony, his ideology owed a 
sizable intellectual debt to Russian thinkers—particularly to the Slavophiles and Pan-Slavists 
with their attacks on Western civilization, materialism, science, democracy, liberalism, socialism, 
and modernity. Well before Benito Mussolini or the French integral nationalist Maurice Barrès 
appeared in Dontsov’s writing, Fyodor Dostoevsky, Konstantin Leontiev, Nikolai Danilevsky, 
Dmitry Merezhkovsky, and Vasilii Rozanov exerted a key influence on his worldview (and the 
provocative manner in which he exposited it).61 In the process of exposing and combatting these 
authors as the propagandists of Russian messianism and the enemies of Europe, Dontsov 
internalized their philosophies, but turned them back against the great eastern expanse from 
which they (and he) had originated.  
Dontsov’s avowedly pro-Ukrainian teachings denigrated longstanding Ukrainian political 
traditions—from Cossack constitutionalism to the libertarian socialist populism of Ukrainian 
political philosopher Mykhailo Drahomanov (1841-1895)—which were pacifistic, federalist, and 
liberal to the point of anarchism. Instead, Dontsov’s views bore a stronger resemblance to those 
of prior activists who insisted upon the unity of the “Great and Little Russian branches of the 
Russian nation.” They grouped around publications like the initially liberal-democratic but 
ultimately anti-Semitic, conservative-monarchist journal Kievlianin (The Kievan). This modern 
form of Russian nationalism, with its advocacy of a centralized, patrimonial state to advance the 
collective interests of Orthodox East Slavdom (“Holy Rus’”), developed alongside Ukrainian 
                                                
61 Distilling this characteristically Russian style of thought to its essence, philosopher Mikhail Epstein describes a 
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Ideocracy: The Platonic Drama of Russian Thought,” in Bradatan and Oushakine, In Marx’s Shadow, 13-36. 
 
  35 
nationalism in Right-Bank Ukraine as a government-sponsored reaction to the threat of Polish 
separatism over the course of the nineteenth century.62 Rejecting the generally tolerant stance 
toward ethnic minorities of the earlier imaginers of the Ukrainian nation, Dontsov inadvertently 
sided with the “truly Russian” “Little Russians,” who regarded mercantile Jews and Catholic 
Poles as parasitic communities to be suppressed or removed from the Russian Empire’s western 
borderlands through state intervention. Dontsov moved ethnic Russians to the top of the list of 
groups allegedly oppressing and exploiting Ukrainians on their own soil, but embraced a statist, 
xenophobic worldview closer to protofascist Russian nationalist movements (such as the Black 
Hundreds and the Union of Russians) than to anything coming from contemporary Ukrainian 
intellectual circles. Although he was mired in an imperial Russian discourse rife with anti-
Semitic and anticosmopolitan tropes, Dontsov’s life and politics also exhibit striking parallels 
with early Jewish nationalism, particularly in the figure of the renowned Zionist militant 
Vladimir (Ze’ev) Jabotinsky (1880-1940)—another Russified, Europhile journalist from 
southern Ukraine, who also came from the fringes of the ethnic community which he claimed to 
love and represent, yet often despised and berated, and who also developed into a cosmopolitan 
ultranationalist during the first two decades of the twentieth century.63    
There is an apparent contradiction between Dontsov’s patently cosmopolitan aspirations, 
lifestyle, interests, and even values on the one hand, and his virulently nationalistic politics on 
the other. A polyglot world traveler who spent the greater part of his life outside of Ukraine, 
often publishing in languages other than Ukrainian, he nonetheless insisted upon the dire need 
                                                
62 Faith Hillis, Children of Rus’: Right-Bank Ukraine and the Invention of a Russian Nation (Ithaca: Cornell 
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63 I borrow the phrase and concept “cosmopolitan ultranationalist” from Michael Stanislawski, who applies it to the 
mature Jabotinsky. Michael Stanislawski, Zionism and the Fin de Siecle: Cosmopolitanism and Nationalism from 
Nordau to Jabotinsky (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001), 203-38. 
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for Ukrainians to speak “pure” Ukrainian and live in a unified Ukraine, quarantined from a 
hostile outside world in a war of all against all. He also demanded concrete action from his 
adherents, regarding the cloistered musings of effete intellectuals as a waste of time. Of course, 
Dontsov was a publicist, not the “nationalist of the deed” that he exhorted his countrymen to 
become, but he inspired tens of thousands to militancy, activism, crimes, and sacrifices. His life 
as an urbanite intellectual striving to export national zeal to Ukrainian peasants a world away 
should not be dismissed as farce or hypocrisy. It was, after all, the deracination, powerlessness, 
and loneliness wrought by political exile that fueled the fire of his nationalist convictions and 
resentment. Like his followers in the Ukrainian diaspora, Dontsov compensated for the severing 
of his physical connections to the fatherland with a creed of perfect spiritual and moral devotion 
to it.  
In this way, Dontsov’s personal tragedy is typical of the exile experience.64 Edward 
Said’s portrait of the exile is particularly useful for understanding Dontsov’s psychology, beliefs, 
and style. Exile, according to Said, means painful estrangement from home and heritage and 
solitude in an alien culture, but it can also be a potent source of inspiration, perspective, and self-
awareness. Nationalism, by contrast, promises the comfort of belonging—it soothes the wounds 
of exile with fantasies of triumph and restoration, but contains the pitfalls of insularity, 
fanaticism, callousness, distrust toward outsiders, and rigidly binary thinking. Nationalism is 
born in exile, which is unbearable without it. Under conditions of exile and diaspora, 
cosmopolitanism and nationalism are complementary yet antagonistic ideas (or ideals) and 
bodies of practices that coexist in a creative, dialectic tension.65 Diverse, international networks 
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of intellectuals, politicians, institutions, and activists made Dontsov’s work possible. He hoped to 
return Ukraine to the fold of “Europe”—a cosmopolitan, supranational idea—but his notion of 
Europe was a continent strictly divided into ethnically homogenous nation-states—an 
archipelago of islands-unto-themselves.  
From start to finish and left to right, Dontsov’s oeuvre is a bricolage of contradictory 
ideas and values, but the iconoclastic authoritarianism of his personality, thought, and career was 
an abiding trait, simultaneously nimble and strict, capable of synthesizing extreme and disparate 
notions into new political dogmas. It shaped both his cosmopolitanism and his nationalism, 
which reinforced one another in the crucible of exile. Constellations of influence and experience 
molded the mature Dontsov’s radical formulations and reformulations of Ukrainian nationalism 
and Ukrainianness, which were not latent in him from birth, waiting to be activated by some 
traumatic event or epiphany, but contingent, context-driven, and subject to review. Deracinated 
time and again by choice or force of circumstance, the ideologue meandered through identities 
and political programs, cobbling together a fiefdom of devoted authors and revolutionaries in the 
first half of the twentieth century. As he aged, however, his mind and persona inevitably ossified, 
leading many, his erstwhile closest followers among them, to regard the man as a living vestige 
from a dark and bygone era. His authoritarian megalomania produced resentment, while his 
cosmopolitan intellectualism inspired accusations of hypocrisy. The younger generation of 
Ukrainians in whom Dontsov had done so much to cultivate a spirit of collective rebellion 
against their nation’s oppressors either perished during the war, following the integral nationalist 
imperative of violent struggle and self-sacrifice to the end, or rebelled against the former master 
himself, who could no longer change with the times quickly enough.    
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Sources  
Apart from the voluminous published, republished, and sometimes bowdlerized writings 
of Dontsov and the contributors to the journals he edited or worked for, including reportage, 
feuilletons, monographs, and speeches, this dissertation examines the contents of various 
archival collections. Chief among these is the Dontsov Archive, held in the Polish National 
Library in Warsaw, which contains the personal and official papers and extensive correspondence 
of Dontsov and associated individuals and institutions up to 1939. The extant record for the 
period of World War II is considerably slimmer, not only because of the general chaos of those 
years, but also owing to the sensitive and controversial nature of Dontsov’s activities in Nazi-
dominated Europe; given his willingness to expunge inconvenient facts from his past and legacy, 
Dontsov either destroyed or failed to preserve much of what he wrote during the war, apart from 
his work in his short-lived journal Batava (Phalanx), based in Bucharest, Rumania, and the book 
that emerged from this endeavor, Dukh nashoi davnyny (The Spirit of Our Antiquity). With 
regard to the latter it is essential to read the first edition in 1944 to get a sense of what Dontsov 
was thinking as he moved between Prague, Berlin, Bucharest, and other cities of Hitler’s would-
be empire because he sanitized the postwar republications of these and related works, removing 
pro-Nazi and anti-Semitic comments. Between 2014 and 2016 the Dmytro Dontsov Scientific-
Ideological Center—a Ukrainian nationalist think tank based in Drohobych, Ukraine—published 
a ten-volume collection of Dontsov’s works. Faithful to the first editions, the collection is 
valuable to researchers despite the agenda of its creators.66 
The second large repository of Dontsov’s papers (over twenty-five boxes worth) is held 
in the Library and Archives of Canada (LAC) in Ottawa and mostly consists of letters, notes, 
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articles, newspaper clippings, immigration documents, and miscellany from his last thirty years.  
I consulted other archival collections dedicated to Dontsov’s associates (his wife, key literary and 
political collaborators, and others), and to key organizations (affiliated periodicals, the OUN, and 
other political formations [SVU, USDRP, UDKhP, etc.]), which are kept at the Central State 
Historical Archives of Ukraine in L’viv (TsDIAL), the Central State Historical Archives of 
Ukraine in Kyiv (TsDIAK), the Central State Archives of the Supreme Bodies of Power and 
Government of Ukraine (TsDAVO), and the Central State Archives of Public Organizations of 
Ukraine (TsDAHO).
  
 
 
 
CHAPTER 1: THE ROOTS OF UKRAINIAN INTEGRAL NATIONALISM: 
DMYTRO DONTSOV’S FORMATIVE YEARS, 1883-19141 
 
 
 
“Every revolutionary ends by becoming either an oppressor or a heretic.” 
—Albert Camus2 
 
 
The setting of Dmytro Dontsov’s youth was the final, tumultuous decades of the Russian 
Empire—a state that the future ideologue of Ukrainian integral nationalism grew to loathe from 
an early age. Hailing from southeastern Ukraine, Dontsov devoted his twenties to the 
underground Marxist left. As a university student in St. Petersburg he participated in the 
Revolution of 1905, which led to the establishment of the First Duma (a legislative assembly of 
delegates from across the empire). The Social Democrats, including Dontsov, and other socialists 
and liberals successfully mobilized to push for the introduction of universal male suffrage in 
December of that same year, but these victories were short-lived. In accordance with the Russian 
Constitution of 1906 promising expanded civil liberties and popular representation, reformers 
intended the Duma to serve as a check on the power of the autocracy. Reaction soon dashed such 
hopes for a more liberal and democratic Russia, however, as Prime Minister Petr Stolypin’s 
Coup of June 1907 dissolved the Second Duma and launched a campaign against liberals, 
radicals, and national minorities as critics and enemies of the state. This coincided with an 
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Cambridge University Press. Trevor Erlacher, “The Birth of Ukrainian ‘Active Nationalism’: Dmytro Dontsov and 
Heterodox Marxism before World War I, 1883-1914,” Modern Intellectual History 11, no. 3 (November 2014): 519-
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intensification of “Russification”—a policy that Tsar Nicholas II’s predecessors, Alexander II 
and Alexander III, had envisioned as the transformation of the multinational Russian Empire into 
a more centralized, culturally and linguistically “Russian” state. Accordingly, Stolypin’s 
crackdown was particularly aggressive on the empire’s ethnically and religiously diverse western 
frontier, including much of Ukraine, Poland, and the Baltic, where authorities arrested and 
prosecuted political dissidents by the thousands. The atmosphere created by the increasingly 
fragmented and violent electorate to which these events gave rise left its mark on Dontsov, who 
was among those targeted and imprisoned during the autocracy’s retrenchment—a brush with 
authority that taught him to fear and resent Russian power. Dontsov fled for Austria-Hungary in 
1908. From safety abroad, he observed and commented on the death throes of imperial Russia, 
from the assassination of Stolypin in 1911, through Russia’s disastrous experience in World War 
I, to the February Revolution of 1917.  
Dontsov’s reaction to the interceding conflicts, coups d’état, and revolutions in Central 
and Eastern Europe left him with a philosophy seemingly antithetical to his former Marxism 
already by the time of the 1921 publication of Pidstavy nashoi polityky (The Foundations of Our 
Politics)—the first monographic exposition of Dontsov’s new worldview after his nationalist 
volte-face.3 He had witnessed the downfall of the autocracy and the birth of a fragile, yet 
independent, Ukrainian nation-state. But the latter’s collapse under the pressure of Russian-
Bolshevik invasions between 1918 and 1922 confirmed his view, first expressed in 1913,4 that 
the free development of the Ukrainian people would remain impossible under the “chauvinistic” 
aegis of Moscow. Dontsov also came to believe that Ukraine’s independence could not be 
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achieved and maintained through the weak-willed governance of the all-too-tolerant 
“Ukrainophiles”—the liberal-minded, populist scions of Ukrainian national resistance in the late 
Russian and Austro-Hungarian empires. Disillusioned with the scientific pretensions and utopian 
promises of Marxism, Dontsov replaced materialism with idealism, determinism with 
voluntarism, pan-Slavic federalism with Ukrainian separatism, and the international struggle of 
the toiling classes against the bourgeoisie with an imagined civilizational conflict between the 
enlightened, progressive West and despotic, reactionary Russia. He named his doctrine “active 
nationalism” (chynnyi natsionalizm), conventionally described as a Ukrainian form of “integral 
nationalism”—a genus of authoritarian rightwing ideology that subordinates individual, class, 
and humanitarian interests to those of the nation.        
Near the end of his life, Dontsov claimed to have espoused the same belief system from 
the outset of his political career at the turn of the twentieth century, simply making logical 
improvements to his original worldview of fanatical commitment to the “Ukrainian idea” along 
the way.5 Yet his publications prior to the World War I present a different picture: that of a far-
leftwing activist, journalist, and publicist for the cause of internationalist socialism.6 If Dontsov’s 
retrospective assessment of his own ideological trajectory is to be taken seriously, then there 
must be an underlying continuity between his early period on the extreme “left” and his 
subsequent career on the extreme “right.” Tracking Dontsov along the conventional left/right 
political spectrum, this change of heart seems like an impetuous leap, but to his mind it was a 
minor reorientation, necessitated by circumstance yet not preclusive of his longstanding radical 
convictions.   
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What accounts for Dontsov’s wartime political shift from Social Democratic 
internationalism to extreme nationalism? Political scientist Alexander Motyl asserts that Dontsov 
developed his worldview independently of outside influences, which merely affirmed opinions 
that he had already developed.7 It is nevertheless difficult to believe that Dontsov’s ideological 
about-face owed nothing to an external, intellectual catalyst or the zeitgeist of early-twentieth-
century Europe. Historian Frank Golczewski’s attribution of the mature Dontsov’s amoral 
nationalism to a “vulgarization” of Friedrich Nietzsche’s concept of the “will to power” 
represents a step in this direction, but it ignores the younger Dontsov’s adherence to Marxism, 
within which he had developed his lifelong ethical and political prejudices well before 
Nietzschean language—let alone citations of Nietzsche—appears in his oeuvre.8 According to 
Dontsov’s chief biographer to date, Mykhailo Sosnovs’kyi, the mature Dontsov “did not free 
himself from the effects of assimilated socialist ideology, the Marxist understanding of social 
phenomena, and the problems of the Marxist method, which were . . . clearly reflected in his later 
work and in the ideology of ‘active nationalism’ in particular.”9 Moreover, “[in] condemning the 
Ukrainian socialist movement for its ideational connections to Russian socialism, Dontsov 
[nevertheless continued to] positively evaluate western European socialism for a long time.”10 
Sosnovs’kyi points to Dontsov’s adherence to the fundamentals of Marxism for years after his 
break with Ukrainian Social Democracy, arguing that Dontsov’s contempt for Bolshevism and 
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the Russia-oriented Ukrainian leadership is more accurately attributed to anticolonialism and 
Russophobia than a rejection of socialism per se. Historian Oleksandr Zaitsev concurs with 
Sosnovs’kyi on the importance of Marxism in the young Dontsov’s thought, noting its closeness 
to Bolshevism-Leninism as compared to the federalist socialism of his Ukrainian comrades.11 
But the process by which this worldview transmogrified into “active nationalism” remains 
unclear.  
As Sosnovs’kyi suggests, Dontsov’s anti-Russian sentiments likely found roots (or at the 
very least confirmation) in the Marxist canon.12 It is equally plausible, however, that Dontsov’s 
personal antipathy toward Russia and Russians, which he began airing somewhat earlier, just 
before World War I, fueled his eventual hostility toward Marxism. After 1917 Dontsov 
associated Russians with the particularly vulgar (as he saw it) form of Marxism that the 
Bolsheviks used to cynically rebrand Russian imperialism as “socialist internationalism” and the 
tsarist autocracy as a “dictatorship of the proletariat.” An examination of Dontsov’s formative 
years is key to understanding how he went from seeing his Ukrainian identity and pro-Ukrainian 
politics as compatible with Marxism and the interests of progressive Russians, to rejecting both 
Marxism and Russian civilization as corrosive influences on Ukraine and Europe as a whole.   
This chapter places the young future ideologue into two contexts. The first is geographic, 
including Dontsov’s home region of “New Russia” (Novorossiia) (modern-day southern and 
eastern Ukraine), and the cities of St. Petersburg, Kyiv, Vienna, and L’viv. Following Dontsov’s 
journey through these places in the first three decades of his life, I elucidate the development of 
his national and political identities, emphasizing their contingency in relation to his personal 
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experience. I argue that Dontsov chose, more or less consciously, to be “Ukrainian” rather than 
“Russian” (or “Little Russian”), and saw socialism and anti-imperialism as the logical corollary 
of this choice. The consequences of his decision—imprisonment and exile to East-Central 
Europe—embittered him against the Russian state, and convinced him of his own and all 
Ukrainians’ natural and rightful place in Western civilization. These two attitudes shaped 
Dontsov’s increasingly orientalist (though not yet racist) views on Russia, while his closeness to 
the latter, through family and upbringing, made his rejection of it a personal and emotional 
matter.  
The second context is intellectual: namely, the fin-de-siècle “crises” of Marxism and 
reason throughout Europe. Dontsov understood the world through the language, concepts, and 
logic of a turn-of-the-century Marxism that had become riddled with “heterodoxies.” Applying 
his own increasingly “heretical” version of Marxism to an analysis of contemporary events, 
Dontsov adumbrated key components of “active nationalism” in his polemics with fellow 
Marxists well before World War I. Dontsov associated what he considered to be the “wrong” 
kind of Marxism, which favored empires over nations as a matter of course, with Russians, 
whom he came to view as inveterate imperialists regardless of their professed political values, 
liberal, socialist, or conservative. The “right” kind of Marxism, by contrast, was “European” and 
recognized the legitimacy of national communities as agents of historical progress.  
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Figure 1.1. Ukraine’s guberniias on the eve of World War I. Source: 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ukraine_during_World_War_I  
 
Becoming Ukrainian in “New Russia”   
Dmytro Dontsov was born in Melitopol’, Tavriia Governate, in southeastern Ukraine—or 
“New Russia” (Novorossiia) as the imperial authorities called it—on August 17 (O.S.), 1883. 
The year was an otherwise eventful one in the history of ideas, rich with significance for the 
future “apostle of Ukrainian separatism”:13 Marx died in the spring, leaving his legacy to the 
stewardship of Engels; Mussolini, the future duce of Italian Fascism, was born (just eighteen 
days before Dontsov); and Nietzsche authored Book One of his posthumously earth-shattering 
Thus Spoke Zarathustra. But Dontsov began his life far from these ideas, on the fringes of 
Europe and the frontier of the Russian Empire. As its name suggests, Dontsov’s home region of 
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New Russia, a province stretching from the Donbas to the Dniester river, was a self-consciously 
colonial project on the model of New England, New Spain, or New France. Imperial Russian 
armies conquered the region in the late eighteenth century, displacing the Zaporizhian Cossacks, 
the last Ukrainians to possess a state of their own, the Hetmanate. The Russian tsars, from 
Catherine II to Nicholas II, sought to tame this “wild, Asiatic” terrain from St. Petersburg, 
introducing the norms and practices of the modern European state as they understood it. This 
meant the enforcement of Russian political, economic, and cultural hegemony in an increasingly 
multicultural borderland. The discovery of coal and iron in the eastern parts of New Russia, the 
Donbas region, prompted an influx of migrant workers to the sparsely populated area from as far 
as Britain to participate in the growing mining and steel industries.  
At forty-eight years of age, Dontsov wrote about his youth there: “I was born in Tavriia, 
and spent the first seventeen years of my life in a country that one might call our America, an 
ethnographic mix of Ukrainians, Poles, Jews, Bulgarians, Germans, Greeks, Turks and 
Russians.” His family, he adds, was “Tavriian, that is, mixed.”14 There were German and Italian 
colonists on his mother’s side. His friends from the age of three were the children of the 
Winnings, a Scottish family that rented a house on his father’s land. In the Dontsov home library, 
the future ideologue read Goethe, Schiller, Hugo, Dickens, Cervantes, and Maupassant in 
Russian translations, falling in love with foreign literature, as well as the Ukrainian writers 
Gogol and Storozhenko. Dontsov recounted these cosmopolitan roots in a letter to Ievhen 
Malaniuk (a prominent Ukrainian poet and devotee of Dontsov’s in the 1920s and 1930s) dated 
September 13, 1931. He was specifically responding to the Ukrainian émigré historian and 
political activist Dmytro Doroshenko, who had accused him of being “under Russian 
influences.” Many of Dontsov’s other critics concurred that he was a “typical Russian 
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intelligent.” It was a characterization that plagued his career in Eastern Galicia (in today’s 
Western Ukraine, a majority-Ukrainian region of interwar Poland), and it clearly touched a 
nerve, perhaps because he saw the inconvenient truth in it. “Where are the Russian influences?” 
he demanded: “The only Russian influences could have come from [my] Jewish comrades in 
secondary school. I belonged for a short time to a self-education group, but quickly gave it up 
because one of the girl members had a vile hooked nose, and another colleague always smelled 
of onions.”  
But Dontsov’s denial of the Russian influence on his development, replete with snide 
anti-Semitic stereotypes indicating what he saw as the combined Russian and Jewish threat to 
Ukraine, is difficult to believe. The process of Russification had left a clear mark on the public 
and private worlds of Dontsov’s childhood in Melitopol’. Ukrainians comprised some 70 percent 
of the surrounding rural population, but the Russian language, culture, and government 
predominated in urban life, generating interethnic tension and resentment in an environment 
comparably free (because distant) from authority, but prone to violence.15 Dontsov recalled the 
hostility between the Ukrainian and Russian students at his school in Melitopol’, where he and 
his friends derogatorily referred to the latter as “katsapy” (from the Ukrainian word for “goat,” a 
reference to the beards worn by Muscovite men before Peter I). Still, among each other they 
typically spoke Russian. This was the case in Dontsov’s home too, though everyone also spoke 
fluent Ukrainian. Although Dontsov was loath to admit it, the Russian-Ukrainian divide cut right 
through his own family, which included a Russian father, a Ukrainian mother, two older Russian 
brothers, and two younger Ukrainian sisters. The latent ultranationalist and his siblings had to 
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choose their national identity from the two available options, accepting personal responsibility 
for the political consequences of their conversion one way or the other.    
The Dontsovs were an upwardly mobile and relatively privileged, albeit provincial, 
family with political ambitions. Dmytro’s father, Ivan Dmitrevich Dontsov, was born in Russia’s 
neighboring Voronezh region in 1840, but sought the nascent opportunities and relative freedom 
of the “New Russia” frontier and became a citizen of Melitopol’ in the 1870s. Ivan and his wife, 
Efrosin’a Iosifovna, together owned 1,500 desiatinas (4,125 acres) of land, but he disliked 
farming, choosing instead to sell agricultural machinery for a living. Ivan Dmitrevich rose to 
prominence as a successful local merchant, and owned a few homes for rent in town. Melitopol’ 
society elected him to the city duma (congress) in 1873. He served for two years in this capacity 
without salary, then left for Berdiansk (a port city on the nearby Sea of Azov), probably in order 
to elude amassed enemies or unpaid taxes.16 In the winter of 1878 Ivan Dontsov returned to 
Melitopol’ and was elected to the zemskii sobor (land assembly) of the surrounding uezd 
(county), serving as a juror and engaging in charity work before returning to the city duma. Ivan 
Dontsov was appointed mayor (gorodskoi golova), but collapsed in the street and died of an 
apparent heart attack on the eve of his inauguration on April 11, 1894. Efrosin’a Iosifovna, 
Dmytro Dontsov’s mother, succumbed to illness the following year.         
Dontsov’s parents died early, when he was just eleven years old, leaving him, his two 
older brothers—Sergei and Vladimir—and two younger sisters—Elena and Ekaterina—
orphaned. They inherited over 550 acres of land each, but their deceased father’s more than 500-
ruble debt in unpaid taxes proved burdensome. During this time, Dmytro grew close to his 
mother’s stepfather, a German colonist, who stepped in as the Dontsov children’s guardian and 
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reportedly exerted an important influence on the development of his and his younger sisters’ 
“national consciousness” as Ukrainians.17 By contrast, Vladimir and Sergei adopted, or 
maintained, Russian identities. The latter remained loyal to the tsarist state and followed a more-
or-less conventional, apolitical career path. More pragmatic and responsible than his two 
brothers, Sergei oversaw the care for his younger sisters, about whom less is known, despite the 
troubles he faced in business and finance. In one noteworthy episode he participated in a small, 
regional landowner’s congress near Melitopol’ in 1906, where, thanks to his swarthy complexion 
and jet-black hair—features that his brother Dmytro shared—an anti-Semitic mob mistook him 
for a Jew and rudely forced him to leave. Sergei Dontsov studied at the Imperial technical school 
in Moscow, served in the military, earned an engineer-mechanic’s diploma, and rose to the high-
ranking post of “deputy chairman” (tovarishch predsedatel’) in the imperial Office of 
Horticulture until 1917.18 
  
Figure 1.2. Dmytro Dontsov’s older brother Sergei. Source: Kumok, “Tri Brata,” 62. 
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18 Kumok, “Tri brata,” 62. 
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Figure 1.3. Dontsov’s hometown of Melitopol’, Tavriia guberniia, Russian Empire (view of 
Vorontsovs’kaia Street).  
 
Vladimir Dontsov’s path offers a more interesting comparison to Dmytro Dontsov’s. A 
lifelong Russian Bolshevik, the former wrote a brief autobiography recounting his Communist 
credentials as a supporting document for a 1935 petition for a personal pension from the Soviet 
government.19 In it, he describes his involvement in Russian Social Democratic politics from an 
early age. Expelled from the Technological Institute in St. Petersburg for “taking part in student 
disturbances” in 1896, Vladimir, an intermittent student and a draft-dodger, was repeatedly 
arrested for his radical leftwing political activities. He moved to Berlin in 1901 where he studied 
the natural and social sciences and participated in student circles before returning to Russia, 
illegally so as to avoid mobilization in the event of a Russo-Japanese war, in the summer of 
1904. Failing to find a revolutionary group to serve in Kyiv, he set off for Sevastopol in Crimea, 
                                                
19 State Archive of the Russian Federation (GARF), f. A539, op. 4, d. 3478.  
  52 
where he joined the Russian Social Democratic Workers Party (RSDRP). He was arrested in 
connection with a port workers’ strike, but released in the spring of 1905 and sent back to 
Melitopol’, which he was forced to flee to avoid arrest for participating in a self-defense 
organization during a Jewish pogrom (testimony that suggests he was not interested in Russian 
[or Little Russian] nationalism, which was notoriously anti-Semitic at this time). Vladimir fled to 
Geneva, smuggled weapons back into the Russian Empire, was arrested again and exiled to 
Siberia in the winter of 1906. Then he claims to have escaped and bounced around the cities of 
the empire participating in the disintegrating revolutionary underground before settling in 
Geneva, where he would remain until 1920. He finished his law degree there, took an active part 
in the Russian Marxist emigration, and collaborated extensively with Lenin during World War I. 
Volodymyr Levyns’kyi, a Galician Ukrainian socialist and staunch critic of Dmytro Dontsov, 
recalled how the latter introduced him to his brother Vladimir during the war, expressing his 
surprise that Vladimir “considered himself a moskal” (a pejorative Ukrainian term for 
“Russian”), and “spoke Russian, but was quite unable to in Ukrainian.” Moreover, Levyns’kyi 
notes, “he had a keenly negative attitude toward pro-Ukrainian politics (ukrainstvo).20“  
Dmytro Dontsov followed in his older brother’s footsteps, joining the Marxist 
underground in the Russian Empire despite the considerable risks, but his identity as a Ukrainian 
patriot, and, somewhat later, his Russophobic, anti-Semitic, and anti-Communist views, set him 
apart from his brother, who remained a Russian Marxist with reportedly anti-”Ukrainian” views 
for the rest of his life. Dmytro Dontsov might have done the same, but by the time he was 
eighteen he had chosen the Ukrainian camp, and set about proving his Ukrainian-ness like an 
eager neophyte. Still, his education remained typically “Russian.” In 1900, Dontsov moved to St. 
                                                
20 Volodymyr Levyns’kyi, Ideoloh ukrainsk’oho fashyzmu: zamikty do ideolohii Dmytra Dontsova (L’viv: 
Nakladom Hromads’koho holosu, 1936), 12-13. 
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Petersburg, completed his classically focused secondary education at a gymnasium in Tsarskoe 
Selo, and enrolled at Petersburg University to study law.21 In his recollection, Ukrainian cultural 
and political life was much more vibrant in St. Petersburg than it had been in Ukraine, 
particularly among students.22 He obtained books from Eastern Galicia abroad, and his readings 
of the renowned poets Taras Shevchenko and Lesia Ukrainka attracted him to Ukrainian 
nationalism.23 Dontsov recalled his firsthand experiences with Russian chauvinism during this 
time: “Everyone who had the chance to move in Russian student circles at the beginning of the 
twentieth century knows the kind of toxic venom of intolerance with which these circles are 
infected . . . The intolerance of Russians toward other nationalities is especially astonishing . . 
.”24 Despite the imperious attitude of his Russian peers, Dontsov was not immune to Russian 
influences. The peculiar environs, mood, and cultural and political ferment in St. Petersburg 
clearly left their mark on him. According to historian Mark D. Steinberg, melancholy, despair, an 
obsession with decadence and civilizational decline, apocalyptic visions, and deep anxieties 
about urban modernity filled the air of fin-de-siècle St. Petersburg.25 Dontsov expressed himself 
using similar terms and imagery throughout his life, castigating his readers for their fallen nature 
and gloomily predicting the worst, up to and including Armageddon.26 The St. Petersburg that 
Dontsov knew was also the setting of the “Silver Age” of Russian poetry, renowned for its 
                                                
21 Sosnovs’kyi, Dmytro Dontsov, 62-67. 
 
22 Ibid. 
 
23 Dmytro Dontsov, Rik 1918, Kyiv (Toronto: Homin Ukrainy, 1954), 36. 
 
24 Dontsov Dontsov, Kul’tura prymityvizmu (Holovni pidtsavy rosiis’koi kul’tury) (Cherkasy: Vydavnytstvo 
Dontsovykh, 1918), 11. 
 
25 Steinberg, Petersburg Fin de Siècle.  
 
26 Late in life Dontsov wrote, in all seriousness, about Soviet Russia as the “forces of the anti-Christ,” “the 
Apolcalyptic Dragon,” “the Great Satan,” and so on. See chapter 6. 
 
  54 
bizarre and provocative experiments in literature, philosophy, sex, and politics. Leading 
intellectuals of this milieu, such as Dmitrii Merezhkovskii, Vasilii Rozanov, and Nikolai 
Berdiaev, wrote vivid, stylistic texts that ranged from ascetic Christian mysticism to erotic blood 
rituals and the occult, from ecstatic revolutionary prophesies to incendiary anti-Communist 
tracts. The approach, subject matter, and style of Dontsov’s writing from the 1920s to the 1960s 
betrays their influence, and their names and ideas permeate his most impactful work, 
Natsionalizm.27 Not unlike the luminaries of the Russian Silver Age, Dontsov belonged to a 
generation of seekers profoundly dissatisfied with their moral, creative, and intellectual 
inheritance. In both cases a kind of subversive (occasionally self-aggrandizing) religiosity filled 
the void. The goal was a new gospel that would bring rebirth, purification, and liberation, even 
(or especially) if it entailed a baptism by catastrophe. Dontsov did not evolve along these lines 
until the mid-1920s, but the cultural scene of turn-of-the-century St. Petersburg planted seeds 
that would blossom into the apostolic pretensions of his later work.    
It was here in the Russian Empire’s northern capital that Dontsov became a founding 
member of the Ukrainian Social Democratic Labor Party (USDRP) in 1905. The USDRP’s 
platform attempted to accommodate the varied demands of the “nationally conscious” Ukrainian 
socialists who comprised its ranks. They demanded recognition from their counterparts in the 
Russian Social Democratic Labor Party (RSDRP) as the sole representatives of the ethnically 
Ukrainian proletariat. The RSDRP did not assent to this, denying to the USDRP the status that it 
had previously granted to the Jewish Bund and the Latvian and Polish Social Democrats. The 
maximal demands of the USDRP included an independent Ukrainian state, but they contented 
themselves with calls for federation with Russia on the condition of national autonomy. Closer to 
the Menshevik than to the Bolshevik faction of the RSDRP, the USDRP advocated the 
                                                
27 Dmytro Dontsov, Natsionalizm (L’viv: Nove zhyttia, 1926). 
  55 
organization of socialist parties along national lines and did not support the establishment of a 
dictatorship of the proletariat under the prevailing socioeconomic conditions of imperial Russia. 
Characteristically attracted to extremes, however, Dontsov advocated a platform closer to the 
Bolsheviks on everything but the national question for the USDRP.28 Lenin vigorously opposed 
the USDRP’s program, regarding it as a manifestation of divisive “bourgeois nationalism” even 
if it did purport to represent the interests of an oppressed and colonized peasant nation.29  
In the wake of Stolypin’s coup and ensuing crackdown on radicals and national 
minorities, many of the USDRP’s members fled to the majority ethnically Ukrainian province of 
Eastern Galicia, which was then a part of the relatively liberal Austro-Hungarian Empire. 
Dontsov followed suit, but only after a number of encounters with the imperial Russian police. 
Tsarist authorities had arrested Dontsov once for participating in a pro-Ukrainian demonstration 
at the university the previous year, during the 1905 Revolution, and he was fearful of future run-
ins with the police, but he continued to work in the semilegal Ukrainian Marxist press. Having 
served a short sentence in the Lukiianivs’ka prison camp in Kyiv, Dontsov was granted amnesty 
in November 1905. He returned to Petersburg only briefly before settling in Kyiv, where he 
began collaborating with Symon Petliura, a future leader of the Ukrainian People’s Republic, 
which existed intermittently between 1917 and 1921. Dontsov contributed news and editorials to 
the Ukrainian socialist newspaper Slovo (The Word) and the liberal, Moscow-based Russian-
language journal Ukrainskaia zhizn’ (Ukrainian Life)—both under Petliura’s editorship—and 
propagated the USDRP’s ideas among Kyiv’s laboring population.30    
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Kyiv left a deep impression on the young writer. A major hub of trade and industry in the 
empire, early-twentieth-century Kyiv’s cityscape and inhabitants were modernizing rapidly. 
Kyiv became a Mecca of avant-garde theatre, music, painting, early film, and literature for 
Russians, Ukrainians, Jews, and Poles alike. A sense of exuberance and “jubilant 
experimentation” distinguished the distinctly Ukrainian modernism that emerged there from its 
Western counterparts.31 Ukrainian artists and intellectuals drew inspiration from the folkways of 
the Ukrainian countryside and Kyiv’s ancient past—a process that they experienced, not as a 
confrontation with the “Other,” but as a reclamation of the “Self.”32 Similarly, Dontsov acquired 
a lifelong fascination with and admiration for the medieval polity of Kyivan-Rus’, which he 
considered the true heart of Slavic Orthodox civilization, antithetical to the Russian impostors, 
whether “barbaric,” “Tatar” Moscow, or imitative, artificial St. Petersburg.    
Dontsov was arrested again in 1907, and after eight months’ imprisonment in Kyiv 
escaped abroad to L’viv in the Austro-Hungarian Empire on April 12, 1908. These experiences 
left Dontsov brimming with resentment for the imperial Russian state, but not for Russians per 
se, which after all included his own father and siblings. He regarded himself, not unreasonably, 
as an “orthodox” Marxist and a committed internationalist, and strongly opposed reformist (as 
opposed to revolutionary) tendencies in his party, as well as Ukrainian nationalism, the idea of 
Ukrainian political independence, and religion. In a 1909 letter to Andryi Zhuk, a USDRP 
member and future competitor on the Ukrainian nationalist intellectual scene, Dontsov wrote:  
I personally consider . . . an ‘independent Ukraine’ absurd. We are Social Democrats, and 
our organ [the newspaper Pratsia (Work)—T.E.] is Social Democratic. And this means 
that it has social revolution as a goal (not the ‘growth’ of capitalism into socialism), and 
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class political struggle (not ‘cooperation’ of the classes) as a means. Whoever accepts 
these precepts is one of ours.33  
 
Dontsov’s pro-Ukrainian identity and politics, as he understood it, made his struggle against the 
tsarist autocracy, Russian imperialism, and capitalism all the more radical, adding an 
anticolonial, but never nationalistic element. Moreover, socialism was the mainstream of pro-
Ukrainian politics in the Russian Empire at this time. In part this was because calling oneself 
“Ukrainian” (as opposed to “Ruthenian” or “Little Russian”) already constituted a subversive act 
and a potential threat to the state, which was unwilling to accommodate alternate East Slavic 
nationalities; in part because the ethnic Ukrainian population coincided with the rural peasantry 
of the various regions they inhabited, and as such felt uniquely exploited by the state and the 
socioeconomically distinct nationalities of the city—Russians, Poles, and Jews. The declining 
fortunes of his own family and harassment by the police for voicing pro-Ukrainian opinions 
made Dontsov’s conviction that the autocracy discriminated against Ukrainians personal. The 
arrests and emigrations of him and his brother burdened the young Dontsovs financially, forcing 
them to sell whatever land they had managed to salvage from their father’s debt collectors. In 
1908 the court ordered Dontsov to sell a developed plot of land to settle a 4,000-ruble debt; by 
1916 the Dontsovs’ inheritance was gone.34 Leaving the oppressive conditions in the Russian 
Empire for the multicultural cities of East-Central Europe, Dontsov, though still a doctrinaire 
Marxist, discovered and absorbed challenging new ideas—a cosmopolitan experience that would 
paradoxically engender extreme nationalism.   
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Figures 1.4-5. Mug shots of Dontsov, 1907. Source: Serhii Kvit, “Dmytro Dontsov u knyzhkakh 
unikal’nykh zhandarms’kykh fotohrafiiakh,” Ukrains’ka pravda (February 8, 2012).     
 
Becoming a Heretic in East Central Europe 
During his second incarceration in Kyiv, Dontsov had developed a chronic illness 
(probably tuberculosis), which he sought in 1908 to remedy in Zakopane—a resort town in the 
Tatras Mountains on what is today Poland’s southern border. Here, Dontsov became acquainted 
with the leading theorist of Ukrainian conservatism and originator of the “statist school” of 
Ukrainian historiography, Viacheslav Lypyns’kyi. Although the latter was the same age, he 
clearly influenced Dontsov, drawing him into the Ukrainian monarchist movement during World 
War I and setting him on the path to the authoritarian, elitist, and traditionalist worldview for 
which he is known today. The two eventually broke off ties in 1926, but in the polemics leading 
to their break Lypyns’kyi reminded Dontsov of his earlier rejection of the idea of Ukrainian 
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independence, which the former was advocating by 1908 while the latter yet considered anything 
beyond a federation of the Russian and Ukrainian nations “naive.”35  
 
Figure 1.6. Viacheslav Lypyns’kyi. Source: Internet Encyclopedia of Ukraine  
 
Later in 1908, Dontsov moved to Vienna, where he studied economics, law, and history 
at Vienna University until 1911. The environs of early-twentieth-century Central Europe, and 
Vienna in particular, shaped the young journalist. In Carl Schorske’s telling, Vienna was at the 
epicenter of the crisis of European values that preceded World War I—a continental rejection of 
liberalism, rationalism, and universalism—an assault on the most essential doctrines of the 
Enlightenment.36 Vienna’s “post-Nietzschean” cultural and intellectual climate, Schorske argues, 
provided the irrationalist and voluntarist content for this unique proliferation of antiliberal ideas 
and movements, but it was the anxiety and resentment generated by the disintegrative 
encroachment of industrial modernity that provided its original impetus. In the political sphere, 
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the declining social status and rising economic insecurity of Austria’s agrarian, aristocratic, and 
artisan classes—to which Dontsov had belonged in Russian Ukraine—drove them into the hands 
of the stridently nationalistic alternatives offered by Georg Ritter von Schönerer’s Pan-
Germanism, Theodor Herzl’s Zionism, and Karl Lueger’s Christian Social party. Rejecting the 
individualism, natural rights, and secularism of preceding generations, this “politics in a new 
key” struck at the heart of classical liberalism—the rational, freely willing ego. Similarly, in the 
realm of science, Sigmund Freud and his school of psychoanalysis challenged the self’s 
purported supremacy over instinct, pointing to the decisive power of the sub-rational, 
unconscious mind in determining all human behavior.37 The resultant “ahistorical culture”—
Vienna’s “collective oedipal revolt” against the preceding generations’ values—was both the 
crucible for an outpouring of bold innovations in art, music, literature, and architecture, and a 
prelude to the catastrophes of the twentieth century.  
The Christian Socials—who displaced the Liberals as the predominant party in Viennese 
and Austro-German politics in 1897 and remained so until its replacement by the Austrian Social 
Democrats at the end of World War I—certainly left a mark on Dontsov’s generation of East 
Central European radicals, blending “emancipatory” petit-bourgeois populism, “socialistic” (or 
at least anti-industrialist) urban and welfare policies, Christian conservatism, aesthetic 
radicalism, German nationalism, and anti-Semitism into a dynamic cultural, social, and political 
movement that bested Marxists at their own game. They opposed the utopian, rationalist, and 
anticlerical thinking of the Enlightenment, and used rhetoric designed more to trigger emotional 
responses than to convince intellectually. And yet, as historian John W. Boyer observes, the 
Christian Socials and the Social Democrats, despite representing opposing class and cultural 
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agendas, “tended toward sameness” in the “mythically cosmopolitan and ethinically 
‘universalist’ yet hermetically sealed world of fin-de-siècle Vienna.”38 Both sides switched focus 
to the Kulturkampf (culture struggle) between nation and nation, town and country, bourgeoisie 
and proletariat, becoming more ideologically rigorous and uncompromising.39 These features of 
Christian Socialism and Social Democracy in Austria prefigured or paralleled Dontsov’s 
thinking in crucial ways.  
Not unlike Dontsov’s transformation into a Ukrainian and a socialist at once during the 
Russian Revolution of 1905, the attainment of universal male suffrage in 1905-7 in late imperial 
Austria was an explosive moment in the merging of socialism and nationalism, as well as the 
rapid diffusion of the latter among social nonelites and the politicians who claimed to represent 
them.40 Like their Russian counterparts, Austrian Social Democrats, mostly Czech and German 
speakers from the empire’s most industrialized regions, had their first major electoral 
breakthrough as a unified multiethnic party in the elections of May 1907, but they interpreted the 
victory in national terms, as vindication of their claim to represent their respective nations 
despite their principled internationalism.41 Through grassroots radicalism, mass demonstrations, 
rousing orations, and real or symbolic violence, the expansion of the voting franchise 
emboldened and empowered workers to wrest their national identity from the grip of the 
bourgeoisie and endow nationalism with a radically different cultural, social, and political 
content. Austrian Social Democrats developed an image of the authentic, committed nationalist 
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as a proletarian, not a member of the middle classes with which nationalism was generally 
associated. After 1907, however, the leftwing working-class populism of Austrian German and 
Czech Social Democrats and workers increasingly favored national autonomy over international 
centralism, splitting up the party and affiliated trade unions into national sections. They did not 
abandon the idea that the working classes of all nations were cooperating in the pursuit of 
common revolutionary goals against the ruling classes of their respective ethnicities, but by 1911 
the Czech autonomist faction broke with the predominantly German “all-Austrian” faction and 
began contesting local and parliamentary seats. The Austrian Social Democratic leader Otto 
Bauer (1881-1938)—a major influence on Dontsov, as we shall see—blamed the disastrous rift 
on the inadequacy of legal protections, representation, and cultural autonomy for Austria-
Hungary’s national minorities as distinct political bodies. As historian Jakub S. Beneš observes, 
“the Czech-German split set the tone for other cases of national friction in the socialist workers’ 
movement of Austria-Hungary,” including between the Poles and Ukrainians (Ruthenians) in 
Eastern Galicia.42  
Dontsov expressed great fondness for prewar Vienna, but made L’viv his hometown until 
World War II. Situated in the foothills of the Carpathian Mountains, L’viv (or Lemberg, as it was 
known to the Austrian state), the administrative capital of Eastern Galicia, looked the part of a 
provincial Habsburg city. At its center stood the town hall, surrounded by the market square, 
cobblestone streets, cafes, cathedrals for the Orthodox, Catholics, Uniates, and Armenians, a fine 
opera house, and a large synagogue (destroyed during the Holocaust). L’viv was an island of 
urban diversity and imperial cosmopolitanism in a sea of relatively impoverished Ukrainian 
villages and Jewish shtetls. Of the city’s three largest groups, Poles outnumbered Jews, who 
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outnumbered Ukrainians. Prior to World War I, they generally settled their conflicts in peaceful 
deference to the imperial police, courts, and parliament (the end of the Habsburg Empire 
radically changed the dynamic, opening the way to interethnic violence). The greater rights and 
liberties afforded to national minorities under Austrian rule made L’viv attractive to Ukrainians 
from the Russian Empire. Eastern Galicia enjoyed a reputation as the Ukrainian “Piedmont”43—a 
place where Ukrainians could do the collective political and cultural work necessary for the 
liberation from tsarist tyranny of their conationals to the east. Dontsov hoped to find such a place 
in his newly adopted empire. In his search for novel ideas, opportunities, and collaborators, he 
did not limit himself to fellow Ukrainians, but took advantage of Austria-Hungary’s polyphony 
of nation-building projects. Dontsov was especially interested in the Polish movement because it 
was more developed than the Ukrainian one, yet closely related to it and therefore instructive.  
Accordingly, the maverick Polish Marxist philosopher Stanisław Brzozowski had the 
strongest impact on Dontsov after the two met in Vienna in 1908.44 According to West Ukrainian 
literary critic Mykhailo Rudnyts’kyi:   
It was none other than Brzozowski who begat the famous critic and publicist Dmytro 
Dontsov. Word for word, Dontsov followed the very same evolution as Brzozowski—
from a passionate Marxism to a no-less-passionate nationalism and traditionalism—
constantly borrowing, in his own name, the ready quotes, images, and thoughts already 
found in the tenets of Brzozowski’s ‘lectures.’45     
 
In Brzozowski one finds the most immediate inspirations for Dontsov’s later attitudes on ethics, 
nationality, and the primacy of will, ideas, and power in human history. Brzozowski’s major 
works, published between 1901 and his death in 1911, anticipated the antipositivist cultural turn 
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in Marxist thought first represented by Georgi Lukacs and Antonio Gramsci46, offering a version 
of Marxist heterodoxy suffused with subjectivism, antinaturalism, and idealism that drew heavily 
on Nietzsche, as well as the French philosophers Georges Sorel and Henri Bergson. This entailed 
a rejection of the natural sciences as the sole, objective, and superior foundation of the social 
sciences, and a newfound fascination with “irrational” emotions, such as nationalism, as well as 
speculation about the intangibles of humanity, the “spirit” and “vital force” within groups and 
individuals. Although Brzozowski originally was one of the most effective and outspoken 
opponents of the integral nationalist, anti-Semitic National Democratic Party (Endecja) in the 
world of Polish socialism, in 1908 he avowed: “Je suis nationaliste et presque national-
démocrate.” At the same time, he expressed his disdain for the leftwing patriotic Polish Socialist 
Party (PPS), which he considered impotent and sanctimonious: “[The PPS] favors what I think 
are the most abominable features of European socialism: it is optimistic, altruistic, Beecher-
Stowe-like.” Advocating a “tough historical realism” that approached Dmowski’s doctrine of 
“national egoism,” Brzozowski declared, “the worst government of one’s own is better than the 
best alien rule.” He felt the Endecja should be praised for “maintaining, albeit in reactionary 
forms, the postulate of national independence, as well as representing, sincerely and deeply, the 
instinct of national self-preservation.”47 Brzozowski’s Marxian Realpolitik entered Dontsov’s 
repertoire almost unchanged.  
As early as 1909, Dontsov was also expressing a principled amoralism—which he would 
only later build around a “realistic” assessment of geopolitics as a zero-sum struggle between 
                                                
46 Andrzej Walicki, Stanisław Brzozowski and the Polish Beginnings of “Western Marxism” (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1989). 
 
47 Stanisław Brzozowski, Listy, ed. M. Sroka, vol. 1 (Krakow: Wydawnictwo Literackie, 1970), 660; Brzozowski, 
Listy, vol. 2, 236; Stanisław Brzozowski, Legenda Młodej Polski: Studia o strukturze duszy kulturalnej (L’viv: 
Nakładem B. Połonieckiego, 1910), 106.  
 
  65 
nations in which sheer power served as the final arbiter of all struggles. In a speech to the 
Galician Ukrainian Students’ Congress in June 1909 entitled Shkola a relihiia (The School and 
Religion), later published as a separate brochure, Dontsov first presented this view in a typically 
Marxist antireligious diatribe. In it, he embraces the classical Marxist tradition of rejecting the 
notion of a universal moral order in favor of historicizing moral codes and sentiments vis-à-vis 
the mode and relations of production within a given epoch. “There are the ethics of Aristotle’s 
era, the ethics of serfdom, the ethics of the capitalist era, the ethics of cannibals, the ethics of 
these and other classes,” he writes, but Social Democrats know no “general-human 
(zahal’noliuds’koi) ethics.”48 Taking a manifestly Nietzschean stance, he writes in favor of 
“Kampfeslust” (the love of struggle), expressing contempt for easy forgiveness and the average 
Christian laborer’s lack of a sense of his own dignity:  
Above all, the ethics of obedience, slavish patience, non-resistance to violence, love for 
enemies and other asinine virtues, the ethics that considers the renunciation of everything 
earthly the highest virtue—an asceticism that teaches the working masses to bear in 
silence, without protest, their misery, and to believe in a reward in heaven—this ethics, in 
the existing social conditions, is damaging for the working masses.49  
 
Dontsov argues that religion is incompatible with science and socioeconomic 
emancipation, extols the virtues of rationalism, and ridicules superstition. (Dontsov’s take on the 
Russian Orthodox and Catholic Churches—”like comparing el Diablo and Beelzebub!”—50is 
noteworthy in light of his later view that the former is immeasurably worse than the latter, which 
has allegedly exerted a beneficent influence on European civilization.) In place of all this, 
Dontsov prescribes the “British genius” Charles Darwin and the ruthless ideology of Social 
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Darwinism (albeit with a leftwing slant). The brochure’s introduction, written by fellow USDRP 
member Mykola Zalizniak, notes that Dontsov places “truth” above “nationality”; while 
advocating the Ukrainization of the Austro-Hungarian Empire’s schools and universities in 
Eastern Galicia, he sees it as a question of “form,” not “content” (zmist). Although Dontsov 
would eventually reject atheism as a betrayal of nationalism in the mid 1920s, advocating the 
union of church and state and a proudly medieval conception of Christianity, he did so, 
Sosnovs’kyi argues, to meet the demands of practical politics, and never abandoned the belief 
that moralities are binding only to the extent that they are useful for a particular aim in a 
particular context.51        
Classes and nations with conflicting interests would, therefore, ascribe to different 
conceptions of right and wrong, and disputes between them could not be settled by reference to a 
common moral framework. Just as the proletariat could rely only upon its own strength and the 
force of arms to secure its well-being against antagonistic classes, so too would Ukrainians fail to 
attain national sovereignty through appeals to abstract notions of justice. Having returned to 
L’viv in 1911, Dontsov took a particular interest in the controversy surrounding the 
establishment of a Ukrainian national university in L’viv, which was opposed by the city’s 
politically dominant Poles. He declared: “These paper resolutions about the rights of the nation 
become a fact only insofar as a given nation possesses the requisite energy and will to life. 
Moreover, the history of the struggle for a Ukrainian university proves for the hundredth time 
that in politics it is the argument of force, not the force of argument, that matters.”52 Similarly, 
according to Brzozowski, Poland had a “right” to exist only insofar as it had the martial 
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wherewithal to assert itself against other, hostile nations; and it could hope to achieve that 
strength only by harmonizing its national movement with its workers’ movement: “To argue that 
the workers’ movement can be independent of the nation’s life and destiny is to say that it does 
not matter what range of forces and means of action it has at its disposal.”53 Dontsov later came 
to fully share Brzozowski’s views on nationality, and the central role of ideas, will, and power in 
human history, but only after he had become convinced, in 1913, that a war between the German 
and Russian worlds was fast approaching.   
Prior to 1913, Dontsov rejected the idea that the whole of Ukrainian society should be 
united on a national basis, and favored what he considered to be an incompatible proletarian 
solidarity. In 1910 he wrote: “The ideology of all-Ukrainian politics (vseukrainstva)54 is the most 
hostile outrage to the proletarian movement. We will be certain that, in the struggle of Ukrainian 
society for national liberation, the Ukrainian proletariat acts not under the blue-yellow banner of 
all-Ukrainian nationalism, but under the red flag of revolutionary social democracy.”55 Holding 
to an essentially federalist position, Dontsov believed that “the overthrow of absolutism [would 
take the form of] a democratic Russia with an autonomous Ukraine.”  To his fellow USDRP 
members Dontsov argued:  
We should always and everywhere explain to the proletarian Ukrainian masses that our 
position on the national question emanates from our firm, principled commitment to the 
interests of the Ukrainian proletariat; we should struggle against the chauvinism of 
certain groups of Russian and Polish society, [and] also against ‘all-Ukrainian 
nationalism’ and the consequence of its essence, against the attempt to obscure the class 
consciousness of the Ukrainian working class, against its hostility toward social 
                                                
53 Stanisław Brzozowski, Idee: Wstęp do filozofii dojrzałości dziejowej (L’viv: Nakł. Księgarni Polskiej B. 
Połonieckiego, 1910), 225.  
 
54 Like the term ukrainstvo, vseukrainstvo refers to Ukrainian nationalism in the broadest, value-neutral sense, with 
the addendum that it is explicitly inclusive of Ukrainians living in both the Russian and Austrian Empires. 
 
55 Dmytro Dontsov, “Na cherzi: Do pytannia pro nashu natsional’nu polityku,” Pratsia 1 (L’viv, 1910), 5-8. 
 
  68 
democracy, against its unprincipled, one-sided, and chauvinistic infatuation 
(zasliplenist’).56 
 
Dontsov still seriously believed in the possibility of mutual aid and coordination between the 
USDRP and the RSDRP, on the condition that the latter assent to the federalist principle and the 
“national organization of the proletariat,” as the Mensheviks advocated.57  
Strategic considerations rather than principle determined the Bolshevik faction of the 
RSDRP’s official position on the national question in the Russian Empire. On the one hand, they 
recognized in their program the political importance of guaranteeing the empire’s national 
minorities right to self-determination. On the other, they exhibited a classical Marxist preference 
for large, centralized polities and “historical nations,” which they expected to survive into the 
socialist future, swallowing up doomed “unhistorical nations” and smaller, decentralized states 
through a global process of political, economic, and cultural homogenization. Once the 
conditions for socialist revolution had become ripe, Lenin thought, nationalism could be only a 
reactionary impediment to class consciousness and proletarian solidarity. But prior to that point, 
nationalism ought to be regarded as progressive wherever it encouraged industrial growth. 
Convinced that the conditions for socialism had in fact appeared—even in backward tsarist 
Russia—Lenin argued that only proletarian internationalism was appropriate for socialist parties, 
and accordingly opposed the Jewish Bund, the USDRP, and other Marxist revolutionary 
organizations that claimed to represent a particular national group. Lenin and Josef Stalin—the 
Bolshevik faction’s Georgian authority on the nationalities question—nevertheless adopted a 
conciliatory policy of granting “national self-determination” to the “oppressed nationalities” of 
the Russian Empire, which they regarded as too “backward” to be fully disabused of their 
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nationalist sentiments. Their intention, however, was for the right of nations to secession and 
self-determination to be granted only after the revolution had been carried out, and even then, 
only on the condition that it is the “progressive” will of a given nation’s proletariat—a logical 
impossibility insofar as Lenin and Stalin believed that nationalism could serve only the 
bourgeoisie that had called it into existence.   
Lenin and Stalin crafted their solution to the national question in explicit opposition to 
the theories of leading Austro-Marxist Otto Bauer, who argued that nationalist sentiments had 
persisted among industrial workers despite Marx’s prognosis, that nationalism would therefore 
play an important role in the proletarian revolution, and that Marxists needed to develop a more 
sophisticated understanding of nationalism and its potential uses.58 Bauer also eschewed the 
concept of the “unhistorical nation,” citing as examples the Serbs and Czechs—countries that 
Marx and Engels had predicted an expanding Germany would inexorably assimilate. For Bauer, 
nationality was not simply a “false consciousness” malevolently inculcated into the proletariat by 
the bourgeoisie, but a “real” and “legitimate” force for historical change that was not likely to 
disappear anytime soon, if ever. Nations, Bauer maintained, emerged, not through the subterfuge 
of capitalists, but from breeding circles of kindred blood (Blutsgemeinschaft), representing 
communities with a common past, a common character (Charaktergemeinschaft), and a common 
destiny. Nations preceded and transcended merely economic associations. Socialism, Bauer 
argued, would herald the full flowering of national differences on free and equal terms, not their 
inevitable withering away. He thus regarded any struggle for the principle of nationality on the 
part of the exploited classes to be inherently revolutionary. Adumbrating crucial aspects of what 
Dontsov would later dub “active nationalism,” the Austrian Social Democrats under Bauer’s 
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leadership made theoretical and practical modifications to Marxist historical materialism, placed 
greater focus on the power of culture and emotion, embracing mythic narratives of heroism and 
redemption, rousing orations, and symbologies.59 Combatting the destruction of cultures, the 
fragmentation of communities, and the other social ailments of modernity, Austrian Social 
Democrats sought not only to “revolutionize minds,” but also to emotively and emotionally bind 
the broad masses to their movement. They considered ethnic ties and national ideas essential for 
the cultivation of working-class solidarity and functioning modern democracies. Beneš describes 
this phenomenon as an “aestheticization of politics in the sense of a collective Gesamtkunstwerk 
(total work of art),” and a “civilizational critique rooted in undogmatic and unorthodox Marxism, 
a ritualized canon of celebrations and commemorations, and an emotion-laden ‘poetic 
politics.’”60 Despite the anticlericalism and atheism of classical Marxism, Austrian workers’ 
spiritual beliefs and sentiments pervaded the Social Democratic movement, which harnessed 
them to develop a quasireligious, national, and working-class popular political culture, 
promoting messianic ideas of social and national liberation.61 Social Democratic leaders such as 
Bauer challenged economic determinist explanations of national conflict, highlighting the power 
of popular (national) cultures, emotions, and religiosity to shape history. Instead of opposing the 
“embourgoisment” of workers through national false consciousness, he advocated the 
proletarianization of nationalism.62          
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Dontsov first expressed his admiration for Bauer’s thought, which he extensively 
incorporated into his subsequent writing on Marxism and nationalism, while writing for 
Ukrainskaia zhizn’.63 Prior to his gradual break with the USDRP over the course of the First 
World War, Dontsov preferred to direct his accusations of hypocrisy, ignorance, and evil 
intentions concerning the Ukrainian question against Russian liberals rather than Social 
Democrats, chastising them for their “unforgivably feebleminded” understanding of the 
problem.64 In another article published in Ukrainskaia zhizn’, Dontsov argued that Russian 
liberals, despite their high-minded, constitutionalist rhetoric, had plans to use Ukrainian souls 
and soil as a bargaining chip to win Polish loyalty and build a “neoslavist” bulwark against 
Germany.65 For their part, the Polish bourgeoisie depended on Russia’s might to defend them 
against the presumably more aggressive assimilatory policies of the German Empire. Dontsov 
cites Roman Dmowski’s La question polonnaise (The Polish Question) and Myśli powoczesnego 
polaka (Thoughts of a Modern Pole) as evidence of Polish nationalism’s “Russophilia” and 
intentions of reclaiming and Polonizing the historical provinces of Eastern Galicia and Volhynia 
(modern-day western Ukraine), which had been parts of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. 
Russian liberals, Dontsov alleges, regularly indicated their willingness to relinquish these regions 
to a reconstituted, autonomous Poland in exchange for Polish cooperation in the struggle against 
Germany. They exhibited an “imperialist tendency” and desire to achieve a “mononational” 
(odnonatsional’ne) government through the centralization, homogenization, and regimentation of 
________________________ 
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the national cultures, laws, and markets of the Russian Empire. He accused them of suffering 
from the “infection of nationalism,” signaling his disapproval, even as late as 1912, of 
nationalism as such. All of this led Dontsov to conclude that the achievement of Russian 
liberalism’s dream of a constitutionally governed Russian Empire would actually leave 
Ukrainians worse off than they already were: at the mercy of a bourgeois-capitalist regime ruled 
by Ukraine’s two greatest national enemies.  
Ukrainskaia zhizn’ published a letter to the editor from Vladimir (Ze’ev) Jabotinsky 
(1880-1940), the renowned Zionist writer and activist from Odessa, who sharply disagreed with 
Dontsov’s prediction that the Russian liberals would soon become openly hostile to the 
movements of the non-Russian nationalities of the empire, and would therefore fail to gain their 
support, losing control of the imperial periphery.66 He argued that the Kadets would not do so for 
many years to come, when national minorities finally began taking their place at the helm of 
cultural and political life in the regions where they predominate. Jabotinsky doubted that this 
would happen for a long time to come—a position that later proved to be false, when the 
Provisional Government chose to fight the movements for national autonomy and outright 
secession that appeared in the wake of the February Revolution, alienating its potential allies 
among the non-Russians and thereby hastening its own downfall in late 1917. He agreed, 
however, that the national question would not be resolved peacefully until purportedly 
progressive Russians accepted and defended the equality and right to national self-determination 
of all the empire’s peoples. Like Dontsov, with whom he typically disagreed,67 Jabotinsky noted 
that the “Lands beyond the Moscow River” (Zamoskvorech’e) dreaded the word “nationalism,” 
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thinking it outmoded in Europe, when in reality it was ascendant—the wave of the future.68 He 
doubted Dontsov’s prediction that Ukrainians would soon begin clamoring for greater 
independence, but urged the latter to intensify their own and others’ national movements in 
imperial Russia:  
We nonnatives (inorodtsy) . . . have had the responsibility foisted upon us to prove what 
we have known for ages and what all political parties in Russia will sooner or later be 
forced to recognize: that the nationality question in this empire is primary, not secondary. 
Moreover, it is the most important of all problems, much more important than the 
agrarian or labor questions. For us nonnatives, the entire liberation movement, the whole 
prospect of Russia’s renewal, has meaning and value only to the extent that it brings us 
national freedom.69  
 
If anything, Jabotinsky’s position was more radical than Dontsov’s at this point, and had been 
since at least 1903, when he began propounding an anthropological theory of nationalities as 
racial types, calling for the break up of all the world’s empires into their national components, 
decrying the assimilation of minority groups (especially of the Jewish diaspora) and the mixing 
of blood.70  
The biographic and intellectual parallels between Jabotinsky and Dontsov are striking. 
Idiosyncratic yet iconic, controversial and influential, they both represent the most radical 
versions of their respective nationalisms. At the same time, they were perhaps the most 
cosmopolitan, Europeanized, internationally savvy, and (ironically enough) Russified thinkers 
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that Zionism and Ukrainian nationalism ever produced.71 Both were the sons of “New Russian” 
merchants who had died young. Both had formative experiences in the cosmopolitan metropoles 
of the Russian Empire (Odessa and St. Petersburg, respectively) and of Europe (Rome and 
Vienna), but chose to deny the imperial Russian identities open to them, especially to Dontsov, 
for whom religious conversion presented no obstacle. Speaking of religion, both were largely 
indifferent or hostile to it until after they had evolved toward militant nationalism, at which point 
Judaism and Christianity (respectively) became cornerstones of their ideologies and political 
prescriptions. Jabotinsky and Dontsov both struggled to reconcile their cosmopolitan desire to 
join the European family of nations with their loathing of multinational polities and the 
intermingling of cultures and blood that they engender. Both embodied the extremes to which the 
dialectic tension between cosmopolitanism and nationalism could go. Both struggled to rid their 
respective nations of passivity, hybridity, and defeatism in the face of colonial oppression. Yet 
both approved of instances of colonialism or imperialism that seemed to favor the establishment 
of an independent Ukraine or Zion (Israel).72 Their political philosophies promoted martial 
discipline and social hierarchies, unflinching violence against the nation’s internal and external 
enemies, racial and civilizational purity. The construction of an independent Ukraine or Zion was 
a life-and-death imperative for Dontsov and Jabotinsky, and both saw the need for a revolution in 
consciousness and a new type of person—harder, crueler, and single-mindedly zealous—to carry 
out this struggle to a victorious conclusion.  
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As of 1912 Dontsov was well settled in L’viv, establishing himself as a publicist at the 
center of Galician Ukrainian cultural and political life, and adopting a new, cosmopolitan, 
Central European identity. Dontsov’s relationship with Mariia “Mariika” Bachyns’ka (1891-
1978), whom he married in L’viv’s main Orthodox Dormitian Church on May 27, 1912, 
accelerated his acculturation westward. The pair had met in Vienna as students in 1909. Mariia’s 
father—Mykhailo Bachyns’kyi, a Uniate Greek-Catholic priest and poet—opposed her marriage 
to Dontsov. The reasons for Mykhailo’s disapproval of the union are unclear, but likely had 
something to do with the fact that Dontsov was an outsider from Russia, Orthodox by birth and 
atheist by choice, and therefore morally suspect. Mariia evidently defied her father’s wishes, 
however. The couple’s early romance was quite affectionate. They exchanged amorous postcards 
coordinating discreet meetings in L’viv and the small Galician town of Drohobych throughout 
1910.73 The two wedded immediately after Mariia’s father’s death in 1912. The ceremony was 
held in the Orthodox Dormition Church in central L’viv. Mariia Bachyns’ka-Dontsova, as she 
came to be known, belonged to a wealthy and prominent Western Ukrainian family with noble 
and priestly roots. She was well educated and fluent in German, a skill that would later prove 
invaluable to the diplomatic and publicistic work that she and Dontsov collaborated on from 
World War I to the late 1930s. Mariia was a pro-Ukrainian activist, writer, and a public 
intellectual in her own right. A feminist, she also headed the Soiuz Ukrainok (Union of Ukrainian 
Women), the largest Ukrainian women’s rights organization of the interwar period from 1926 to 
1927. Her talents, connections, and access to the Bachyns’kyi family fortune would make it 
possible for Dontsov to reach a much wider audience with his ideas during the interwar period, 
while their marriage confirmed him as a “Central European,” despite his eastern, Russian origins. 
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Figure 1.7. Mariia Bachyns’ka-Dontsova, Dmytro’s first and only wife. Source: Dzvinka 
Vorobkalo, “‘Mystetstvo dlia nastii’ vs ‘Mystetstvo dlia mystetstva,’” zbruc.eu. 
http://zbruc.eu/node/60625 [accessed March 10, 2017]   
 
Hereafter Dontsov began to transition away from a belief in “the nation as an instrument 
of progress” and “Ukraine as an agent of revolution” toward “the nation as the state” and 
“Ukraine as a part of Mitteleuropa,” according to historian Tomasz Stryjek’s periodization.74 
Dontsov chose to write “Central Europe” in German for a reason: if the common interest that 
bound the Polish Endecja and Russian liberals together in their conspiracy to annihilate the 
Ukrainian nationality were the threat of a German Drang nach Osten, then the Germanic world 
would be a natural ally to Ukrainians in their struggle against Poland and Russia, with its “Drang 
nach Westen.”75 This is precisely the conclusion that Dontsov arrived at in 1913 and defended, 
through the two World Wars, for the remainder of his career. Dontsov regarded his own pro-
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German orientation and Germanocentric prescriptions for Ukrainian geopolitics as an affirmation 
of “Western civilization” and its values, which, he alleged, stood in glaring opposition to the 
chaotic “oriental despotism” of “horde-like Muscovy.” Even as a protectorate and colony of 
Berlin or Vienna, Dontsov believed, Ukraine would fare better than it had under Russian 
hegemony because the West championed democracy, socialism, and the free development of 
individuals and nations. He nevertheless expected the German and Austrian empires to be 
interested in annexing Ukraine not out of altruistic concern for the rights of the people living 
there, but out of their own interests as expanding states in a geopolitical contest with Russia.  
Dontsov first expressed this idea in his brochure, Moderne moskvofil’stvo (Modern 
Moscophilia), a bold and original work when it appeared in 1913. The publication of Modern 
Moscophilia secured his fame and notoriety in L’viv among politically active Ukrainians and 
Russians. It sparked widespread controversy and derisive accusations of “Mazepism” 
(mazepynstvo)76—a term that derives from the name of the Ukrainian Hetman Ivan Mazepa, who 
famously sided with the Swedes against Peter I during the Great Northern War in an abortive 
attempt to assert the Ukraine’s independence from Russia. After Russian Constitutional 
Democratic Party leader Pavel Miliukov read it, for example, he warned the Duma on February 
19, 1914: “Again we see the germination of separatist sentiments, [and] I present to you 
Dontsov’s brochure as evidence. To you I say: fear him! If you continue your politics, Dontsovs 
will not be numbered by the ones and tens, but by the hundreds, thousands, millions.”77 Placing 
Ukraine at the center of an age-old conflict between European civilization and “Muscovy,” 
Dontsov contended that the latter has exerted and continues to exert the most pernicious 
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influence on Ukrainian politics and culture. For Dontsov, Moscophilia was “the widespread 
[condition] among certain quarters of our intelligentsia of boundless reverence for Russian 
civilization and an astonishing dependence upon domineering and progressive Russian circles.” 
“This dependence,” he argued “does not allow the Ukrainian movement to leave the diaper and 
stand on its own feet, [and] weakens its strength of resistance in the struggle against alien 
forces.”78 Slavish, colonial imitation of Russia in the realms of culture and politics laid over 
Ukrainian society like a “thick, heavy fog,” emaciating its national vitality. Dontsov especially 
reproached Ukrainians for their “national hermaphroditism”:  
Our duty is to discard on the side of theory analytic-cultural-sentimental ukrainstvo and 
to outline a clear program of Ukrainian politics that relies upon an analysis of the nature 
of national movements [and] of national relations within Russia, [and that] is free from 
the influence of those alien concepts that are undesirable to us and do not correspond to 
our needs. Ukrainstvo—even [of the] philistine (mishchans’ke) [sort]—needs a new 
orientation!79  
 
Dontsov directed his attack against the Ukrainian liberal-democrats and “bourgeois nationalists” 
of the “philistine camp,” whom he accused of having sold out Ukrainian society for petty 
economic gains. Still writing as a representative of the Ukrainian “Marxist intelligentsia,” 
Dontsov did not extend his opprobrium to fellow Social Democrats.80   
 Dontsov wasted no time in drawing up a radical new political program for the Ukrainian 
movement that made “separation from Russia” its central motto. He presented it in a speech to 
the Second All-Ukrainian Students’ Congress in L’viv, July 1913, entitled, “Suchasne politychne 
polozhennia natsii i nashi zavdannia” (The Present Political Situation of the Nation and Our 
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Tasks), which he published later that year in a separate brochure.81 Several Ukrainian authors on 
the left had conceived of Ukrainian independence prior to 1913, but they dissented from the 
mainstream of the Ukrainian national movement, which, prior to the Fourth Universal of the 
Central Rada,82 was overwhelmingly committed to a federalist reorganization of imperial 
Russia’s nationalities and did not contemplate separatism. Arguing from Marxist premises, the 
West Ukrainian radicals Viacheslav Budzynovs’kyi and Iulian Bachyns’kyi both made cases for 
an independent Ukrainian nation-state within the Austrian-Galician context as early as 1891.83 
The more conservative Ukrainian political activist Mykola Mikhnovs’kyi’s brochure Samostiina 
Ukraina (Independent Ukraine), published in 1900, called for an independent Ukrainian nation-
state on the legal and historical grounds of the provisions of the Treaty of Pereiaslav. (The Treaty 
of Pereiaslav (1654) created the Ukrainian Cossack Hetmanate, and placed it under the military 
protection of imperial Muscovy in exchange for political fealty to the Russian state.) Prominent 
Ukrainian poet, scholar, and publicist Ivan Franko’s “Poza mezhamy mozhlyvoho” (Beyond the 
Limits of the Possible), published the same year, made a fervent plea for the dream of Ukrainian 
independence, however far-fetched, that clearly anticipated the older, radically idealistic 
Dontsov’s worldview.84   
Dontsov’s focus on geopolitics and a concrete political program that did not make 
appeals to justice or the utopian possibilities of an unforeseeable future, but to Realpolitik, set his 
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speech apart from these precedents. In “The Political Situation of the Nation,” Dontsov 
advocates Ukrainian separatism, not independence (samostiinist’), which he regarded as 
impossible under the prevailing circumstances. The speech was nevertheless exceptionally 
radical in its call for Ukraine’s complete severance from Russia. Foreseeing an inevitable and 
fast-approaching war between Russia and the Germanic world, Dontsov believed that he had 
identified an opportunity for Ukraine to enter the orbit of the “civilized West” as a protectorate 
of the Austrian Empire. Dontsov regarded the latter as patently more amenable to the idea of 
Ukrainian autonomy, especially since this would entail a dramatic enfeeblement of Russia’s 
geopolitical position. To Dontsov’s mind, Ukraine’s alignment with Mitteleuropa against Russia 
in the coming conflict could serve as a practical first step on the path to total independence: “We 
must fulfill our task faithfully and to the end, remembering that history knows no instance, where 
an enslaved nation liberated itself from under a foreign yoke with only its own forces.”85 
Dontsov distinguished his own “realism” from the “provincialism” of his compatriots, who 
foolishly place their trust in Russian liberalism’s noble-sounding lip service to “national self-
determination.” He dismissed the latter as mere subterfuge, designed to obscure the inherently 
colonialist, anti-Ukrainian aims of the Russian bourgeoisie, insisting that his analysis took into 
account only “objective conditions,” and snubbing his opponents’ “hypocritical” talk of rights.     
Dontsov set out to provide a “scientific,” “nonutopian,” and Marxist justification for his 
program of Ukraine’s separation from Russia in his 1914 article, “Engels, Marx and Lassalle on 
‘Unhistorical Nations.’” Marx and Engels themselves, as Dontsov was well aware, had never 
expressed anything but disdain for Ukrainians, expecting that they would perish along with the 
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other “reactionary peoples” of the Slavic East in the great revolutionary conflagration to come.86 
The Ukrainians—as an “unhistorical nation” of smallholding peasants on the wrong side of 
progress—were destined for extinction. Against this view, Dontsov proffered a Marxist account 
of the interceding half-century of historical development and escalating national movements 
among the Slavic nationalities of East-Central Europe, arguing that the opinions of Marx and 
Engels concerning the national question east of the Danube had ceased to be applicable and 
ought to be relegated, in the spirit of Marxism, to their historical context (i.e. the mid-nineteenth 
century). Their beliefs, Dontsov maintained, were “already long ago refuted by history—some 
by such general recognized socialist authorities as K. Kautsky, O. Bauer, and Franz Mehring—
others again by Marx and Engels themselves.”87 The Ukrainian nation did have a future as an 
independent entity, but for no other reason than its own strength and will to survive, as 
determined by the “historical process”: 
[The] widely disseminated sentimental-high-minded (santymental’no-prekrasnodushnyi) 
view of national rights recognizes a ‘right to self-determination’ for every nation, [and] 
even for every half-cultured tribe. This quasi-liberal view found an extremely harsh 
evaluation from the quarter of Marx and Engels, who approached the national question 
from an entirely different, healthy criterion. . . . As we’ve already seen, our authors 
subordinate the business of liberating unhistorical nations to the interest of the great, 
civilized peoples. Only those national movements that did not collide with the 
revolutionary strivings of the great nations obtained placet [an affirmative vote—T.E.]. 
Hence this Quos ego!—thrown by Engels against the Balkan ‘boys’ (khlopchakiv), who 
were so inconsiderate as to not be taken in by this highest principle. . . . All told, [we 
have] arrived at a modification of the initial starting point with which the national 
strivings of modern nations were evaluated: [it is] not their conformity or divergences 
from high civilizational interests, but only their revolutionary or reactionary role in the 
historical, irrespective of anything else; the standard became: is a given national 
movement in favor of civilization or not? Are the problems that it will necessarily create 
colliding with the direction of historical development?88 
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Dontsov’s answer to this question as it concerns Ukraine is a resounding “no,” and he castigates 
Russian socialists for using the concept of the “unhistorical nation” to combat national 
movements within the empire “in the name of defending their own hitherto position.”89 History 
alone would be the judge, and the signs pointed to the Ukrainian national movement’s 
confluence with the trends of European democracy. Dontsov argued that this conclusion 
followed from a Marxist analysis of the prevailing situation and was already conceived by some 
of the most respected names in Marxism:  
When speaking about the views of Marx and Engels on unhistorical nations, it would be 
desirable if Russian Marxists who do not want to consider these modifications of [Marx’s 
and Engels’s] views—which they themselves and their great disciples made in their 
lifetimes—paid attention to the method that guided our authors in the problems of interest 
to us. Then they would see that uncritically repeating in the twentieth century that which 
Marx and Engels wrote and said on the national question in the second half of the 
nineteenth means lowering oneself to the role of a scholarly parrot; to be faithful not to 
the spirit of their science, but only to their letters.90     
 
Despite his best efforts to demonstrate his fealty to Marxist orthodoxy, Dontsov’s publications 
on the eve of the First World War stirred up much controversy among Russian and Ukrainian 
Social Democrats, who widely censured his call for the separation of Ukraine from Russia as a 
discordant “heresy”—a betrayal of the international workers’ movement. Russian liberals and 
conservatives, for their part, heaped unmitigated scorn upon Dontsov in the press.91    
The USDRP leader, future prime minister of the short-lived Ukrainian People’s Republic 
(UNR), and Ukrainian émigré writer, Volodymyr Vynnychenko, claimed that Dontsov’s 
subsequent “enmity toward Ukrainian socialism was not a principled, but personal matter,” and 
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that he “obviously harbored a deep hatred for socialists,” alleging that Dontsov was expelled 
from the party for “betrayal” (zrada) for having published in the conservative anti-Ukrainian 
Russian newspaper Russskie vedomosti.92 But the USDRP’s records do not indicate that Dontsov 
was ever accused of this offense and dismissed from the party, and there is no evidence that he 
submitted anything to this journal.93 Dontsov did publish some Ukraine-related pieces in the 
liberal, pro-business Russian paper Utro Rossii (Dawn of Russia), but under his own name and 
largely in order to make ends meet under the difficult circumstances as an exiled Ukrainian 
student in 1911. (He received several small payments from Utro Rossii that fall.)94 It is unclear 
whether Dontsov left the party willfully or was excommunicated from it, but the ease and speed 
with which his erstwhile comrades publicly turned against him left him with a lifelong distrust 
and contempt for Ukrainian socialists as conformists, opportunists, and cowards. Nevertheless, 
some Ukrainian socialists voiced their sympathies for him: in 1913 Petliura wrote him a letter, 
half-jokingly (yet presciently) reassuring Dontsov that he would one day become “the editor of a 
journal made especially for you, where you will have a free hand to express whatever heresies 
and reject whatever native sanctities you like.”95  
Russian liberals and Marxists commented on the controversy as well. Lenin entered the 
fray both as a defender and a detractor of Dontsov’s speech, “The Present Political Situation of 
the Nation”:  
For a long time, mention has been made in the press and from the Duma rostrum . . . of 
the absolute indecency, the reactionary character and the impudence of statements made 
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by certain influential Kadets (headed by Mr. Struve)96 on the Ukrainian question. A few 
days ago we came across an article in Rech’, the official organ of the Constitutional-
Democratic Party, written by one of its regular contributors, Mr. Mikhail Mogilianskii, an 
article that must not be ignored. This article is real chauvinist badgering of the Ukrainians 
for “separatism.” . . . Mr. Mikhail Mogilianskii himself points out that at the All-Ukraine 
Student Congress in L’vov some Ukrainian Social Democrats, Ukrainian émigrés from 
Russia, also spoke against the slogan of political independence for the Ukraine; they 
spoke against the Social Democrat Dontsov, who proposed the resolution on “an 
independent Ukraine” that was adopted at the congress by a majority of all present 
against two. It follows, therefore, that there is no question of all Social Democrats 
agreeing with Dontsov. But the Social Democrats disputed the matter with Dontsov, put 
forward their own arguments, discussed the matter from the same platform and attempted 
to convince the same audience. Mr. Mikhail Mogilianskii lost all sense of elementary 
political decency when he hurled his coarse invective drawn from the lexicon of the 
Black Hundreds against Dontsov and against the entire congress of Ukrainian students, 
knowing full well that it was impossible for his opponents to refute the views of Rech’, 
that it was impossible for them to speak to the Russian audience from the same platform 
and just as resolutely, openly and freely.97   
 
Thus, despite Lenin’s characterization of Dontsov’s worldview as “quasi-democratic” 
“nationalist philistinism,”98 he offered him a patronizing defense by way of an attack upon 
Russian liberals for their display of contempt for Ukrainian national aspirations, accusing them 
of having spurned the right of national self-determination that Lenin himself regarded as a mere 
tactical concession.   
Dontsov harbored no illusions about the RSDRP’s or the Kadets’ magnanimous 
intentions, and accordingly denied that the right to self-determination existed or mattered. 
Ukraine would be free and independent, not because democratic Russians would benevolently 
permit it do so, but because impartial circumstances were militating in favor of Ukrainians and 
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against the imperial Russian regime. Lenin misunderstood Dontsov’s speech when he accused 
him of having placed the Ukrainian nation before the international proletariat.99 Dontsov started 
from the premise that the most salient enemy of labor, progress, and democracy was the 
autocratic Russian Empire and the tyrannical “Muscovite” civilization more broadly. Ukraine’s 
separation from Russia would therefore serve the cause of revolution throughout the “spiritually 
socialistic” West by crippling the reactionary menace to the East. He regarded as purely 
secondary the benefits that would accrue to Ukraine itself as a result of its historically necessary 
secession westward. Thus, for Dontsov, the interests of ukrainstvo and those of the proletariat 
were identical in practice, but the latter still held primacy.         
Increasingly isolated within his own party and confined to exile in West Ukraine, 
Dontsov began moving in different circles and publishing in different venues between the 
summers of 1913 and 1914. He penned a scathing rejoinder to Mogilianskii and published it in 
Shliakhy (Pathways)—the L’viv-based journal of the nationalistic Ukrainian Students Union 
between 1913 and 1917.100 He responded to his critics at the USDRP organ, Dzvin (The Bell)—a 
publication to which he had previously made numerous contributions. Dontsov’s move from 
“democratic” newspapers such as Ukrainskaia zhizn’ (Ukrainian Life), Nash holos’ (Our Voice), 
Slovo (The Word), and Dzvin to an outfit like Ukrains’ka khata (Ukrainian House) further 
signaled his ongoing estrangement from the USDRP. Under the editorship of the antipopulist 
Ukrainian literary critic Mykola Ievshan, the monthly Ukrains’ka khata promoted a new national 
liberation ideology for Ukraine based upon a blend of Nietzscheanism, antimaterialism, 
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antipositivism, individualism, Occidentalism, voluntarism, aristocratism, neoromanticism, and 
the purging from Ukrainian culture of any “external,” but especially Russian, influences.101   
It was from this new milieu in L’viv that Dontsov published his ripostes—
“Dzhentl’menam iz Dzvonu” (To the Gentlemen from The Bell) and “Z privodu odniei eresy” 
(On the Subject of a Single Heresy), among others—to the Ukrainian liberal and Social 
Democratic press in Kyiv. He summarizes the charges against him as follows: 
What have my opponents hurled at me? Firstly—this ‘heresy’ is a utopia based upon 
assumptions that cannot be calculated in advance. Secondly—it is antidemocratic and 
anti-Marxist; thirdly, it can only pull us away from real, useful work. Thus speak my 
countrymen, those—living yet again by the utterance of the second priest of Rada—
who102 ‘sit like a mouse beneath the broom,’ [and] for whom looking out onto the wide 
world from [behind] this broom is a dangerous utopia.103   
 
Dontsov then contended that his program was, in fact, far less “utopian” than those of his 
opponents because it took into account geopolitical developments beyond the faltering Russian 
Empire, reminding them of the centrality of the Western proletariat in any properly Marxist 
political program. Ukraine’s separation from Russia, Dontsov maintained, was a strategy in the 
spirit of Marxism, even though it may take the outward form of “national conservatism,” because 
it would serve the cause of revolution throughout Europe by dismembering the reactionary 
Russian state. Recalling his thesis in Modern Moscophilia, Dontsov accused his Ukrainian 
opponents of base, “provincial” subservience to Russian liberalism and antidemocratic 
imperialism. He asserted that his own ideas fell within the mainstream of contemporary Marxism 
from Engels to Max Weber, charging his detractors with the sin of isolation from the historical 
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and intellectual trends in Europe, and a bevy of other deviations from Marxist orthodoxy.104 In 
the final analysis, both camps to the dispute were at least partly correct: Dontsov’s ideas on the 
eve of the First World War were indeed becoming more nationalistic and antidemocratic, but 
then so were those of Marxists throughout Europe.   
 
Nationalism and Marxism in the Late Russian and Austro-Hungarian Empires 
In order to understand the roots and meanings of Dontsov’s “turn to the right,” which was 
not atypical for radicals of his generation, it is necessary to take a broader view. Benito 
Mussolini, the Belgian politician Henri de Man, and the German racial theorist Ludwig 
Woltmann, among others, followed similar life paths. Like Dontsov, they started out on the 
Marxian far left, became disillusioned with it, then embraced ideologies that preserved the goal 
of revolution, but rejected the ethics of democratic egalitarianism and insisted on the primacy of 
the irrational in humanity. At root the shift consisted of an adjustment to classical Marxism’s 
theory of “historical materialism” that allowed revolutionaries to make appeals to the tenacious 
national-patriotic sentiments of industrial laborers. This revision permitted them to place the 
mobilizing “false consciousness” of national identity in the service of their struggle against 
capitalism, imperialism, and “bourgeois values.” By ascribing historical change in the realms of 
law, art, religion, philosophy, and science to the economic base or the “mode and relations of 
production” rather than “mind” or “spirit,” Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels claimed to have “put 
Hegel on his feet.” Until then, they argued, Hegel had been “standing on his head,” propounding 
an idealistic inversion of the true, objective dialectic of progress. Heterodox Marxists of the turn 
of the century took one step further and stood Marx on his head, producing a neo-Hegelian 
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idealism alloyed with the vision of revolutionary socialism.105 This ideology was equipped to 
harness the “irrational,” however defined, in the service of the “rational” (i.e. the international 
workers’ movement).  
Historian Zeev Sternhell considers this “antimaterialist revision of Marxism” the short-
term intellectual (as opposed to long-term cultural) basis of “fascist ideology,” tracing it back to 
the works of Sorel.106 Most instances of integral nationalism by the above definition, including 
the Ukrainian, would fit easily into Sternhell’s broad category of “fascist ideology” as a 
synthesis of nationalism and socialism (although he excludes Nazism due to its privileging of 
biologistic racism over German nationalism). Sternhell does not go as far as historian A. J. 
Gregor, who considers fascist ideology a variant of Marxism. Instead, fascism was the 
consequence of a particular, nationalism-infused revision of Marxism by the radicals of late-
nineteenth-century France, from which it spread to the rest of Europe. Sternhell’s account goes a 
long way toward explaining why (former) revolutionary leftists first articulated the ostensibly 
far-rightwing ideology of fascism, but his diffusionist model is inadequate given the 
independence, idiosyncrasies, and simultaneity of the protofascist ideas and movements of East-
Central Europe and Russia, which followed their own logic of development and reacted to 
problems unique to the region. The reactionaries and revolutionaries of imperial Russia and 
Austria were inventive and sophisticated in their adumbrations of fascist ideology, not simply 
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imitating French fashion. Indeed, as Faith Hillis shows, the rise of the radical, antiliberal right in 
fin-de-siècle France originally owed much to Russian sources.107 
Nevertheless, for most of Europe’s long nineteenth century, nationalism and liberalism 
went hand in hand. The first generations of French, German, and Italian nationalists were liberals 
who saw national self-determination and individual freedom as complementary and analogous. 
Similarly, early Polish, Russian, and Ukrainian nationalists—despite overlapping and conflicting 
understandings of what people, territories, and histories their respective nations encompassed—
108often shared liberal critiques of the Russian autocracy and socioeconomic injustice. 
Consequently, the imperial Russian state and its conservative backers approached even Russian 
nationalism with extreme caution. Reacting to the failed Polish uprisings of 1830 and 1863 
against Russian rule, the tsarist regime nevertheless felt the need to incorporate those aspects of 
modern nationalist ideology that would allow it to mobilize a loyal population on a mass scale in 
defense of the empire. The “official nationalism” of the Russian Empire first propounded under 
Nicholas I (1825-55) had as much to do with political tsarism and Orthodoxy as it did with 
Russian language and ethnicity. It imagined all Orthodox East Slavs, emphatically including 
“Little Russians” (i.e. Ukrainians) and Belarusians, as branches of a single “Russian” nation, 
whose purportedly simple, morally pure peasant folk had long suffered exploitation and 
oppression by Polish barons and Jewish merchants. Supporters of this idea deployed the concept 
of “Rus’, holy and indivisible” in the hopes of resolving the tension between Russia as a 
cohesive nation and Russia as a multinational empire. They opposed any form of Ukrainian 
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separatism, but claimed to be protectors and promoters of the unique and imperiled “Little 
Russian” culture. From the 1860s on, Russian officialdom increasingly supported a growing 
movement of Little Russian activists in Right-bank Ukraine whose politics moved in the 
direction of aggressive xenophobia, violent anti-Semitism, and discriminatory, tsarist, 
patrimonial statism—the origins of the early-twentieth-century protofascist Black Hundreds 
movement.109 Russians were thus among the first Europeans to synthesize the mass mobilization 
politics of the socialist and liberal left with the right’s rejection of democratic, cosmopolitan, and 
bourgeois values. Though Ukrainian nationalism emerged from the same milieu, its 
champions—from the libertarian socialist thinker Mykhailo Drahomanov to the populist 
historian Mykhailo Hrushevs’kyi—were committed to liberal, progressive, and federalist 
platforms throughout the imperial period. Under the influence, rather, of the Little Russian 
activists, Dontsov belonged to the first generation to break with this tradition.110  
Precedents and analogues for Ukrainian integral nationalism appeared in late-nineteenth-
century partitioned Poland while Dontsov was still in gymnasium. Despite the ultimate 
divergence of their rhetoric and practice, the PPS and the Endecja emerged from common circles 
in the 1880s and shared a commitment to both national and social emancipation.111 Both camps 
had grown weary of the previous generation’s “Warsaw positivism”—a long-term national 
liberation program that emphasized the evolutionary development of Polish society and culture 
through “organic work” rather than doomed revolutionary “action.” As Marxists, the PPS kept 
the liberal positivists’ faith in linear progress, but they rejected what they saw as the materialist 
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fatalism and failure to appreciate the mobilizing power of national sentiment in Rosa 
Luxemburg’s party, the Social Democracy of the Kingdom of Poland and Lithuania, which broke 
away from the PPS in 1893. The PPS’s most important early leader, but subsequently 
nonsocialist nationalist dictator of the Second Polish Republic (1918-1939), Józef Piłsudski, saw 
the path to Polish independence in military struggle against the Russian autocracy alongside the 
other oppressed nationalities of the empire, including Ukrainians. By contrast, the Endecja under 
Roman Dmowski’s leadership directed its efforts against the German Empire and the threat of 
Germanization rather than against Russia and Russification. Unlike Piłsudski, Dmowski 
envisioned an ethnically homogeneous Poland, backed by Russia, and did not sympathize with 
the national aspirations of Ukrainians, whom he regarded as fated for double assimilation by the 
more powerful Russians and Poles. Historian Brian Porter argues that the social Darwinian 
Endecja’s “abandonment of historical time” in favor of a synchronic, nonteleological conception 
of the world, wherein nations struggled for survival in an eternal present, is what ultimately 
separated it from the PPS.112 A close follower of Polish politics, Dontsov later embraced a 
similar blend of pessimism about the future with veneration of “the deed.”113  
The modern European phenomenon of antirational illiberalism that Sternhell calls the 
“anti-Enlightenment tradition” reached its apogee in the course of Dontsov’s lifetime.114 At the 
same time, the self-consciously positivist and rationalist tradition of “orthodox” Marxism was in 
the throes of a closely related moral, political, and philosophical crisis. Under Engels’s influence 
the tradition of “classical Marxism” turned into a coarser economic determinism, grounded in 
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Darwinian evolutionary theory.115 Soon after the death of Engels in 1895, Marxist theorists Josef 
Dietzgen and Karl Kautsky both made attempts to elaborate a collectivist, “proletarian,” 
“scientific” ethics of Marxism on the basis of popular Darwinian watchwords: the “struggle for 
survival,” the “survival of the fittest,” and “progressive evolution,” all of which would soon find 
a prominent place in future fascisms and Dontsov’s own “active nationalism.” The national 
question weighed heavily upon debates within the early-twentieth-century Social Democratic 
circles of Central and Eastern Europe. In this regard, the incorporation of Darwinian 
anthropology into Marxism that Engels had first initiated would have significant consequences. 
Coming to grips with the social structures of primitive man, many Marxists—both “orthodox” 
and “revisionist”—came to believe in biologically determined categories of identity that existed 
prior to and outside of class.116 Tribes, races, and nations—inasmuch as they were manifestations 
of human evolution through genetic inheritance—seemed no less rooted in material reality than 
classes, and therefore had to be taken into consideration and explained by the “science” of 
Marxism.   
During the decade prior to Dontsov’s journalistic debut in 1905, only Rosa Luxemburg 
among the major figures of early-twentieth-century Marxism in Eastern Europe held to the 
position of “national nihilism” that Marx and Engels had first hinted at in The Communist 
Manifesto. Luxemburg opposed any intrusion of national politics, sentiments, and identities into 
the international workers’ movement. The members of the PPS were among her most adamant 
opponents. Kazimierz Kelles-Krauz mounted a particularly strong case for the compatibility of 
Polish national aspirations with Marxism. Kelles-Krauz held that nationalism’s political salience 
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rendered socialism realizable only within democratic nation-states.117 He rejected the distinction 
between “historical” and “unhistorical” nations, as Dontsov later would, and predicted the 
disintegration of Europe’s multinational empires into their national components. Echoing the 
French political philosopher Georges Sorel—a key influence on Dontsov’s thinking—Kelles-
Krauz believed in the importance of “historical myths” as the justification and mobilizing 
impetus behind national and social upheavals. Sorel had supported Kelles-Krauz’s motion, 
subsequently struck down, to place Polish independence on the agenda at the Second 
International. Kelles-Krauz argued that industrial capitalism created and was in the process of 
creating nations and national languages (including Ukrainian), not destroying them, and he 
insisted upon the power of ideas and culture to shape history.118 Kelles-Krauz died in 1906 and 
does not appear in Dontsov’s antebellum works, but his arguments anticipated Dontsov’s own 
attempts to reconcile Marxism with national identity.  
Well before socialist parties across Europe caved under the pressure of nationalism in the 
summer of 1914, violated their former ideals, and voted in favor of their respective states going 
to war, Dontsov had also arrived at the conclusion that, under the prevailing conditions, 
socialism could manifest itself only within a national framework. Simultaneously and 
independently following a path of intellectual development similar to those of Benito Mussolini 
and Vladimir Lenin, Dontsov came to believe that only a disciplined vanguard of “professional 
revolutionaries”—an “initiative minority”—could inspire the masses to carry out their historic 
mission. Whereas the late Marx and Engels had argued that the “working men have no country,” 
and could therefore be expected to spontaneously revolt in global solidarity on the basis of their 
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common class interests, Dontsov’s generation of Marxian radicals had grown cynical about the 
efficacy of appeals to an omnibus “universal human welfare,” and began doubting the 
explanatory power of economic reductionism. Too impatient to continue passively waiting for 
the crisis and death of capitalism to materialize, the new breed of radical to which Dontsov 
belonged began looking for the keys to a better future in mass culture and charismatic leadership, 
rather than the purportedly immutable laws of historical materialism.   
 
Conclusion: The Fervor of the Convert and the Narcissism of Small Differences 
By 1914, Dontsov had gained a reputation for staking out extreme, emotive positions and 
presenting them, orally and in writing, with a captivating intensity. His early life in the Russian-
Ukrainian borderlands left him with a combative mentality and seething resentment in search of 
an outlet. Unlike the Galician Ukrainians whom Dontsov addressed in his articles and speeches 
on the eve of World War I, the young nationalist from Tavriia had experienced his Ukrainian 
identity as if it were a religious conversion. To become a Ukrainian in the Russian Empire, 
Dontsov felt, was to join a minority faith besieged by official and unofficial forms of 
Russification, which denied the existence of Ukrainians as anything more than confused or 
traitorous Russians. His closeness to the “Russian camp” by blood and upbringing made the 
decision to break with it in favor of a Ukrainian, European identity especially acute for him; he 
spent the rest of life emphasizing anything that might set him and his chosen nationality apart 
from the Russian world that he had left behind in disgust. In this regard, Dontsov exhibited 
hallmark symptoms of the “narcissism of small differences”—a concept Freud coined in 1917 
meaning “the phenomenon that it is precisely communities with adjoining territories, and related 
to each other in other ways as well, who are engaged in constant feuds and ridiculing each 
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other.”119 Accordingly, Dontsov abhorred few things more than the national “hybridity,” 
“hermaphroditism,” and “schizophrenia” of Ukrainians vis-à-vis Russia, and made it his mission 
to exorcise them of everything “Muscovite.” Dontsov’s liminal origins may have made him feel 
particularly well qualified to render such diagnoses and prescriptions for Ukraine.  
Most contemptuous of all to Dontsov were the Ukrainians who recognized their 
nationally oppressed status, but refused to acknowledge the Russian people, and not just the 
Russian autocracy, as their enemy. All Russians, no matter their politics, were guilty of this 
colonial, assimilatory, and condescending attitude toward Ukrainians. Russian liberals, socialists, 
and conservatives alike negated the selfhood and agency of Ukrainians as such. Dontsov’s older 
brother Vladimir dismissed his Ukrainian identity as illegitimate: if anti-Ukrainian opinions 
could divide their own families, then what should Ukrainians expect from distant politicians, the 
Miliukovs and Lenins who spoke disingenuously of the “right to national self-determination?” 
Dontsov had become convinced that Russian hegemony would lead to the spiritual and cultural 
death of the Ukrainian people, so in order to survive Ukrainians must spurn Muscovy and 
embrace Europe.  
Dontsov met World War I with the Marxist conviction that morality inhered in the 
historical process itself—that the winners of history were, ipso facto, the rightful winners of 
history, or at least the only ones worthy of consideration. The “natural rights” of individuals, 
nations, and classes—much bandied about by the adherents of liberalism—struck Dontsov as 
inconsequential illusions. Human beings were nothing more than the expendable raw material by 
which progress is achieved. No god could be counted upon to guarantee the salvation of 
humanity, captive to deterministic laws beyond its control, but an ineluctable process of 
                                                
119 Sigmund Freud, Civilization, Society, and Religion: Group Psychology, Civilization and Its Discontents, and 
Other Works in Penguin Freud Library, ed. Albert Dickinson, vol. 12 (London: Penguin, 1991), 131, 305. 
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biological and socioeconomic evolution ensured that groups and individuals would kill or 
enslave one another until the end of history, when the dialectic of class struggle, coupled with the 
advancement of the means of production, would finally resolve itself into communism. In the 
interim, all morality is provisional—tolerable only insofar as it hastens the arrival of this final, 
blessed state. An astute follower of the latest deviations from classical Marxist theory, Dontsov 
believed that national identities and formations could be utilized toward this telos, particularly if 
they were arrayed alongside the peoples of Europe—the epicenter of universal progress—in a 
crusade against the Russian Empire—the quintessence of reaction. He placed Ukraine at the 
center of this historic confrontation. If Ukraine aligned itself with (Central) Europe, then it had a 
place in the future and the construction thereof; but if Ukraine remained within Russia, then it 
would drown to death in the “all-Russian” sea, reduced to an appendage of the “undifferentiated 
Muscovite horde” and abused as a battering ram against the revolutionary occident. These basic 
geopolitical, philosophical, and ethical ingredients of “active nationalism” were all present in 
Dontsov’s thought before his complete apostasy from Social Democracy in the following years. 
His Marxism—like that of so many of his contemporaries—contained the seeds of its own 
destruction qua fascism.
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CHAPTER 2: “THE GÖTTERDÄMMERUNG OF UKRAÏNOPHILIA”: 
DMYTRO DONTSOV AND THE ENTANGLED EASTERN FRONT, 1914-1918 
 
 
Dontsov’s political activities and writings, from the outbreak of the First World War in 
August 1914 to the defeat of the Central Powers in the winter of 1918-19, reveal a decisive 
rupture in his thinking. The intervening storm of steel put his prewar notions of geopolitics, 
international conflict, and revolution to the test. From émigré propagandist, researcher, and 
journalist in the secret employ of the German Foreign Office, to ambassador and head of the 
press bureau and telegraph agency of the German-backed Ukrainian State (or Hetmanate), 
Dontsov was an influential participant in the various efforts to build and govern a Ukrainian 
nation-state known collectively as the Ukrainian Revolution.1 Initially, he placed his trust in the 
peace process, the rule of international law, historic treaties, and the strength and beneficence of 
Berlin, Vienna, and the German-speaking public of Central Europe toward Ukrainians’ 
aspirations to self-government, but the defeat of the Central Powers and the slow death of 
Ukrainian independence in its infancy convinced him of the need for a new strategy and 
worldview. The First World War and its catastrophic aftermath on the Eastern Front left Dontsov 
more warlike, authoritarian, and statist, setting him on the path to becoming the “spiritual father” 
of Ukrainian integral nationalism and preparing the ground for the widespread acceptance of this 
and similarly militant ideas in Ukrainian politics and society.  
                                                
1 One of the best overviews of the subject remains John S. Reshetar, The Ukrainian Revolution, 1917-1920: A Study 
in Nationalism (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1952). 
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Three interrelated aspects of World War I transformed the Ukrainian national movement 
and the ethnos that it sought to mobilize, decisively shaping Dontsov’s thought in the process:  
1) It was a “total” war, or at least the first attempt to sustain one. The common objective 
of the belligerent states and their generals, secondary to victory, was the perfection of a new kind 
of warfare, mechanized and all-encompassing, capable of harnessing and directing the energy of 
entire nations for the purpose of war and its corollary—the survival, empowerment, and 
expansion of the state. Ideally, total war makes no distinction between combatants and 
noncombatants, regarding everyone it encounters as an acceptable target.2 On the Eastern Front, 
total war subjected civilian populations to previously unthinkable levels of violence and 
dislocation. The clash of the Central Powers and Imperial Russia meant mass mobilization, food 
rationing, grain requisitions, famine, forced labor, martial law, pogroms, refugee migrations, 
ethnic cleansing, surveillance, propaganda, espionage, and the militarization of societies and 
ethnic relations in Eastern Europe. The practices and consequences of total war unwittingly 
furnished the seeds of the belligerents’ own destruction, offering their internal enemies—
nationalists and socialists alike—the weaponry, technical knowledge, and hardened, 
megalomaniacal mentalities necessary to carry out revolutions against the once formidable 
empires.3 Just as the old regimes vainly hoped to marshal the “furies of revolution” for the 
                                                
2 The first theorist of total war was General Erich Ludendorff—leader of the German war effort from August 1916 
to October 1918. A radical nationalist and proponent of the “stab-in-the-back” legend attributing Germany’s defeat 
to leftist treachery on the home front, Ludendorff advocated the mobilization of the nation’s entire physical and 
moral force. During the First World War he was one of the chief advocates of a German civilizing mission in the 
East to include state-building in Lithuania, Kurland, much of present-day Belarus, and Poland (together comprising 
military-government under Ludendorff’s direction known as “Ober Ost”), as well as Ukraine, at Russia’s expense. 
Erich Ludendorff, Der totale Krieg (Munich: Ludendorffs Verlag, 1937). 
 
3 Numerous recent works have explored the complicated interplay of the mobilizing and disintegrating experience of 
the First World War, imperial collapses, social revolutions, civil wars, and nation building along the Eastern Front. 
See Aviel Roshwald, Ethnic Nationalism and the Fall of Empires: Central Europe, Russia and the Middle East, 
1914-1923 (London: Routledge, 2001). On the “Russian” case, see Jon Smele, The “Russian” Civil Wars, 1916-
1926: Ten Years That Shook the World (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015); Joshua Sanborn, Imperial 
Collapse: The Great War and the Destruction of the Russian Empire (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014); Mark 
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business of war, so too did veterans of the conflict apply their transformative combat experiences 
to the business of revolution, forging modern national and supranational identities and political 
communities through conscription and collective violence.4 The war paved the way for grandiose 
ideologies of state power and militarism throughout Central and Eastern Europe.5 It also created 
national audiences traumatized, brutalized, and radicalized enough to embrace this new, more 
visceral, emotive, and violent mode of politics in large numbers.6 This includes Ukraine, a 
country made “modern” in the image of the first total war, and Dontsov’s doctrine of Ukrainian 
“active nationalism,” whose tutelage was the conflict and the chaos it engendered.7 
2) The Great War on the Eastern Front was a cataclysmic event in the already 
“entangled” histories of Russia, Germany, Austria-Hungary, and the lands between them.8 
________________________ 
von Hagen, “The Great War and the Mobilization of Ethnicity in the Russian Empire,” in Barnett R. Rubin and Jack 
Snyder, eds., Post-Soviet Political Order: Conflict and State Building (London: Routledge, 1998), 34-57; and Eric 
Lohr, Nationalizing the Russian Empire: The Campaign Against Enemy Aliens During World War I (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2003). 
 
4 See, for example, Joshua Sanborn, Drafting the Russian Nation: Military Conscription, Total War, and Mass 
Politics, 1905-1925 (DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 2003). 
 
5 The Bolsheviks infamously created “War Communism” out of a synthesis of ideology and pragmatism in high-
stress wartime circumstances, but the East European nationalists who opposed them changed in an analogous way, 
developing what Erich Lohr has termed “war nationalism.” The radically intolerant ideologies propounded by the 
Dontsovs and Dmowskis of this period can be thought of as crisis-driven “events,” immanent and experiential, 
rather than the results of a long-term evolution. Erich Lohr, “War Nationalism,” in The Empire and Nationalism at 
War, ed. Eric Lohr, Alexander Semyonov, and Mark von Hagen (Bloomington: Slavica Publishers, 2014), 91-108. 
On the importance of contingency to the theory nationalism, especially as it relates to the experience of the First 
World War in Eastern Europe, see Rogers Brubaker, Nationalism Reframed: Nationhood and the National Question 
in the New Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), chap. 1: “Nation as Form, Category, Event.” 
6 As Myroslav Shkandrij remarks, the macabre content and aggressively affective style of Dontsov’s postwar writing 
is a good example of what Dominick LaCapra calls “traumatic writing or post-traumatic writing in closest proximity 
to trauma.” Shkandrij, Ukrainian Nationalism, 83; Dominick LaCapra, Writing History, Writing Trauma (London: 
Johns Hopkins University Press, 2001), 23. 
 
7 George O. Liber, Total Wars and the Making of Modern Ukraine, 1914-1954 (Toronto: University of Toronto 
Press, 2016), Chaps. 2-3. 
 
8 I refer here to a method in comparative history that attempts to go beyond the binary opposition of two 
traditionally “national” narratives or perspectives. On histoire croisée (entangled histories) see Michael Werner and 
Bénédicte Zimmermann, “Beyond Comparison: Histoire Croisée and the Challenge of Reflexivity,” History and 
Theory 45, 1 (February 2006): 30-50. For an introduction to the entangled histories of Russia, Germany, and Eastern 
Europe during this period, see Mark von Hagen, “The Entangled Eastern Front in the First World War,” in The 
Empire and Nationalism at War, 9-48; Michael David-Fox, Peter Holquist and Alexander M. Martin, eds., 
  100 
Mutually interdependent and interconnected at every level, this reciprocal influence only grew 
with the intensification of the Russo-Germanic rivalry that culminated in the First World War. 
The borderlands between Russia and Germany paid the heftiest price because they served both as 
a battleground for the encounter and as a (perceived) tabula rasa for unsparing utopia-builders. 
Russians and Germans competed for supremacy over the patchwork of largely agrarian 
ethnonational communities of Poles, Ukrainians, Belarusians, Jews, Lithuanians, Latvians, and 
Estonians between them, learning from one another’s blunders and successes, exchanging 
methods of colonization, nation-building, and nation-dismantling.9 Although the smaller 
nationalities caught in the middle were sometimes the hapless pawns of this confrontation, they 
also played an active role within it, taking one side, opposing both sides, or playing each off the 
other, all the while developing under the influence of the same interimperial transfers.10 Dontsov 
was both a product and an agent of this Russian-German entanglement, as were the organizations 
and fledgling Ukrainian nation-states that he served. As we have seen, before 1914 he had begun 
to attribute Ukraine’s agonizing “hermaphroditism” to an oppositional binary—Asiatic Muscovy 
vs. (Romano-) Germanic Europe, barbarism vs. civilization. In course of the First World War, he 
found practical, well-funded opportunities to rid Ukraine of the former and fortify it with the 
latter, proposing that Ukraine join Mitteleuropa—the goal of an autarkic political and economic 
________________________ 
Fascination and Enmity: Russia and Germany as Entangled Histories, 1914-1945 (Pittsburgh: University of 
Pittsburgh Press, 2012); Phillip Ther, “The Transnational Paradigm of Historiography and Its Potential for Ukrainian 
History,” in Georgiy Kasianov and Phillip Ther, eds., A Laboratory of Transnational History: Ukraine and Recent 
Ukrainian Historiography (Budapest: Central European University Press, 2009), 81-114. 
 
9 Alexander V. Prusin, The Lands Between: Conflict in the East European Borderlands, 1870-1992 (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2010). 
 
10 “Historical destiny placed Eastern Europe between Russia and Germany. Hence, the most popular form of East 
European traveling is to escape either from the Russians to the Germans, or from the Germans to the Russians.” Yuri 
Andrukhovych and Andrzej Stasiuk, Moia Evropa: dva esei pro naidyvnishu shastynu svitu (L’viv: Klasyka, 2001), 
100-1. 
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union of Central and Eastern European nations under German hegemony.11 Accordingly, 
Ukrainization entailed Germanization as well as de-Russification. The same logic applied to 
Bolshevism, which Dontsov came to regard as an insidious reincarnation of Russian imperialism, 
distilled to its demonic essence. Nevertheless, Russian ideas, practices, political culture, and 
literature continued to define him at least as much as German ones did. Ukrainian political 
culture, by contrast, repulsed Dontsov because it was too servile toward “Muscovy.” Unlike the 
Russians and the Germans, Ukraine’s would-be leaders were too meek, moderate, and decadent 
for the business of making war and revolution.         
3) World War I was bound up with the national and social revolutions that racked Central 
and Eastern Europe, offering political exiles new “arenas of action” as propagandists, spies, 
saboteurs, diplomats, warlords, and statesmen.12 It also disrupted and militarized the previously 
peaceful, though by no means idyllic, relations among the diverse and intermixed ethnic and 
confessional groups of the borderlands between Russia and the Central Powers—a process that 
encouraged and enabled nationalists to rally support behind more radical, even genocidal, 
programs for independent statehood.13 Fatally weakened by the strains of war and the very 
national and social movements that they had promoted in hopes of destroying their enemies from 
within, the old monarchies disintegrated one by one amid the chaos of 1914-1918. The principle 
of national self-determination, in either its Wilsonian or Leninist formulation, triumphed by 
default, catapulting radicalized East Central European nationalists, whose demands had 
previously been limited to cultural autonomy, into positions of power. 
                                                
11 Tomasz Stryjek regards Dontsov’s notion of Ukraine as a part of Mitteleuropa as one of the central features of this 
period (1914-1918) of his ideological evolution. Stryjek, Ukraińska idea, 123-59. 
 
12 Roshwald, Ethnic Nationalism, chap. 5. 
 
13 Prusin, The Lands Between, Chaps. 2-3. 
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During the First World War, Dontsov briefly headed the Union for the Liberation of 
Ukraine (Soiuz Vyzvolennia Ukraine, or SVU) at the conflict’s outset, and then worked for the 
League of Russia’s Foreign Peoples (die Liga der Fremdvölker Russlands, or LFR). Think tanks 
comprised of non-Russian nationalist émigrés from the Russian Empire, both organizations 
operated with the resources and under the aegis of the German and Austro-Hungarian Foreign 
Offices. Increasingly antisocialist, anti-Russian, and pro-German, Dontsov damaged his 
reputation among the leftwing federalist old guard of the Ukrainian national movement—the 
“Ukrainophiles”—who remained loyal to the Russian Empire. They declared themselves the 
leaders of an independent Ukrainian People’s Republic in late 1917, but soon faced a losing war 
with the Bolsheviks and turned to the Central Powers for assistance. In exchange for the 
Ukrainian People’s Republic’s (UNR) promises of food, the German and Austro-Hungarian 
Imperial armies marched into the Ukrainian heartland and occupied the country, from the 
Donbas in the east to Galicia in the west. In late April 1918 the German authorities moved to 
install a more compliant, authoritarian, and efficient vassal regime in Kyiv, assisting in the 
orchestration of a coup d’état by Hetman Pavlo Skoropads’kyi and his supporters, the 
“Hetmanites”—a radicalized group of conservative Ukrainian nationalist monarchists that had 
recently accepted Dontsov into the ranks of its leadership. Subordinated to the military 
governorship of the Imperial German Army, the Hetmanate’s purpose was to assist the 
exploitation of Ukraine for the Central Powers’ ongoing war effort, but it was also expected to at 
least appear sovereign, independent, and popular among its subjects. Having already cultivated 
alliances with sympathizers of the Ukrainian national movement in Central Europe during the 
war, Dontsov assumed responsibility over the Hetmanate’s press and telegraph agency, half-
hearted Ukrainization efforts (intended to give the regime a broad base of support), public 
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relations, and international diplomacy. Dontsov was tasked with managing the Hetmanate’s 
strained relationship with the Ukrainian intelligentsia and peasantry, the Germans and Austrians, 
and the nascent Russian Soviet state to the north. Skoropads’kyi’s declaration of Ukraine’s 
federation with a restored “White” Russia, shortly after the defeat of the Central Powers in 
November 1918, precipitated Dontsov’s break with the Hetman and the Hetmanites. He returned 
to life as an émigré activist in Central Europe in early 1919, as civil war again engulfed Ukraine. 
 
The Ukrainian National Movement at the Outset of the First World War  
 
War arrived in August 1914, a year after Dontsov had predicted its approaching 
inevitability. The conflict presented an opportunity for the realization of the geopolitical strategy 
outlined in his speech, The Political Situation of the Nation and Our Tasks—the creation of a 
self-governing Ukrainian crownland under the aegis of the Habsburg dynasty that would 
permanently repel the Russian imperialist menace to Central Europe and restore to Ukrainians 
the blessings of freedom and progress unique to European (as opposed to Russian) civilization. 
Such ideas did not find a receptive audience among the leaders of the Ukrainian movement in the 
Russian Empire during the first weeks of the First World War. Even as the Russian authorities 
revived pre-1905 bans on publications in Ukrainian, the editors of Ukrainskaia zhizn’ (Ukrainian 
Life)14 assured its readers of the unwavering loyalty of the Ukrainian population to the Russian 
state and army, dismissing fears of “the so-called ‘Austrian orientation’,” championed by 
Dontsov, as a “myth.”15 The leaders of the Ukrainian national movement in imperial Russia 
remained loyal subjects of Petrograd until the revolutions of 1917. Even then they remained, by 
                                                
14 The Russian-language, Moscow-based periodical for which Dontsov wrote before the war. 
 
15 Dmytro Dontsov, “Voina i ukrainsti,” Ukrainskaia zhizn’, no. 7 (August 12, 1914): 3-7. 
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and large, proponents of an East Slavic federation comprised of autonomous, democratically 
governed Ukrainian, Belarusian, and Russian republics. This included the Ukrainian populist 
historian Mykhailo Hrushevs’kyi (1866-1934)—one of the future presidents of the UNR. 
Hrushevs’kyi left his professorship at Lwów University and returned to Kyiv in November 1914, 
breaking with his colleagues in Galicia who had taken pro-Austrian, anti-Russian positions. The 
Russian authorities repaid the professor’s loyalty by promptly exiling him to Siberia for the 
duration of the war. Dontsov’s former mentor Symon Petliura and the Ukrainian Social 
Democrat, writer, and activist Volodymyr Vynnychenko (1880-1951)—both of whom later 
occupied leading positions in the UNR—also avoided taking pro-independence positions until 
1918, when the Soviet-Ukrainian War forced the Central Rada to declare Ukraine’s 
independence outright.16  
Dontsov disparaged Hrushevs’kyi, Petliura, and Vynnychenko as the high priests of 
“Ukrainophilia” (ukrainofil’stvo)—the purportedly stifling blend of pacifism, federalism, 
socialist internationalism, excessive focus on cultural (as opposed to political) matters, and, most 
damaging of all, trust in the good intentions of Russian liberals and leftists. Ukrainophilia, 
Dontsov felt, had crippled the Ukrainian national movement for decades, but the new conflict 
portended its Götterdämmerung (or “twilight of the gods”)17—i.e. the end of the illusion that 
Russian liberals or socialists had any sympathy for the national aspirations of Ukrainians, or that 
Ukraine’s salvation would come in the form of democracy. Despite the Ukrainophiles’ loyalty to 
                                                
16 Wiktor Sukiennicki, East Central Europe during World War I: From Foreign Domination to National 
Independence (Boulder: East European Monographs, 1984), 111-15, 485-97. 
 
17 A reference to Richard Wagner’s famous 1876 opera of the same title, later parodied by Friedrich Nietzsche as 
Götzen-Dämmerung, oder, Wie man mit dem Hammer philosophirt (Twilight of the Idols, or, How to Philosophize 
with a Hammer) (1889). 
 
  105 
the Russian state, Pavel Miliukov and the other Kadets of the Duma attacked even modest 
demands for Ukrainian cultural autonomy as a “dangerous and damaging affair for Russia.”  
  
Figure 2.1. Dmytro Dontsov in middle age. Source: Internet Encyclopedia of Ukraine. 
As Dontsov saw it, this proved the need for a new approach that would place Russian liberals in 
the same camp as Russian rightwing nationalist Anatoly Savenko (1874-1922) and his 
followers.18 A love of Ukraine was not sufficient alone; a hatred of the “Great” and “Little” 
Russians who opposed its independence was also needed.   
Austrian Ukrainian leaders, by contrast, were more likely to support the excision of the 
much larger territory of prewar Russian Ukraine from the Romanov Empire and the 
simultaneous creation of a new Ukrainian state within the Dual Monarchy (preferably including 
East Galicia, though the relatively powerful Polish minority living there also claimed it). They 
tended to be more culturally and politically conservative, and thus less likely to support socialist 
reforms in agriculture and industry. These differences plagued efforts to create a unified 
                                                
18 Dmytro Dontsov, “Götterdämmerung ukrainofil’stva,” Ukrains’ka khata, no. 3-4 (1914) in Vybrani tvory, vol. 1, 
186-89. 
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Ukrainian political force of east and west throughout the crisis. In general, the Ukrainians were 
less organized on their own turf and less popular on the world stage than the Poles, who 
benefited from the energetic international diplomatic efforts of the integral nationalist leader 
Roman Dmowski, as well as the military acumen of Józef Piłsudski, the future president (and 
eventual dictator) of the Second Polish Republic. Seeking to bridge the divide between the 
Western and Eastern Ukrainians, Dontsov joined fellow exiles from Russia in Austria who 
combined the platforms of national independence with populist land reform, insisted that tsarism 
was Ukraine’s greater enemy, and turned to the Central Powers for help.  
The German, Ottoman, and Austro-Hungarian empires proved to be cautiously interested 
in exploiting the Ukrainian question to undermine their common Russian enemy. Initially, 
Germany’s official war aims in the east recognized the status quo antebellum as legitimate and 
desirable, but entered a state of flux, ambiguity, and radicalization in the course of the conflict.19 
Military and political successes on the Eastern Front bred hubris and a growing acceptance of 
ambitious schemes for eastward expansion and colonization, especially after the downfall of the 
Russian autocracy in March 1917.20 Only after the Russian war effort began collapsing under the 
                                                
19 This was Imperial Chancellor Bethmann Hollweg’s position until 1916, when he assented to the goal of annexing 
the Baltic countries from Russia, thus strengthening Germany, ostensibly, for the sake of European security. Oleh S. 
Fedyshyn, Germany’s Drive to the East and the Ukrainian Revolution, 1917-1918 (New Brunswick, Rutgers 
University Press, 1971), 18-20. 
 
20 The radical annexationist programs of the German far right envisioned the mass expulsion of the non-German 
inhabitants of “Western Russia” (i.e. the former territory of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth) to the east, to be 
replaced by German colonists. The poet and historian Adolf Bartels—an exponent of the Deutschvölkischer 
movement (a highly anti-Semitic fringe party and predecessor to Nazism)—published an influential memorandum 
on the question in 1914. “We need all the land up to the Dvina and Dnieper, and up to the Black Sea; we must push 
Russia into Asia and set up the possibility of a German State a hundred million strong.” Adolf Bartels, Der 
Seigespreiss (Westrussand deutsch) (Weimar: n.p., 1914), 16.  
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weight of revolution and civil war, and the UNR had appeared, did Berlin begin the ad hoc 
formulation of plans for a Ukrainian state under German “protection.”21  
Prior to this point, the collaboration between Ukrainian nationalists and German and 
Austrian officialdom gave rise to various schemes, from the formation and indoctrination of 
Ukrainian military units drawn from the POWs of the Russian army, to direct military 
intervention in the Ukrainian heartland and the construction of a Ukrainian client state. Dontsov 
took part in virtually all of these plots, which were the beginnings of an asymmetrical yet 
mutually exploitative German-Ukrainian partnership—chiefly comprised of rightwing activists 
with a shared hostility toward Russians, Poles, Bolsheviks, and Jews—that would last until at 
least the Second World War.22 Dontsov, who was by this point an experienced journalist, an 
aspiring ideologue and publicist, and a consummate Austrophile and Germanophile, leapt at the 
chance to make his case for a Ukrainian nation-state to the circles of power in Vienna, Berlin, 
and the other cities, as well as the reading publics of the Entente and neutral countries. Dontsov 
prepared and researched his geopolitical, historical, legal, and moral arguments for Ukrainian 
liberation from “Russian despotism,” broadcasting them to as many politicians, academics, 
officers, soldiers, journalists, and students as he could reach with the resources at his disposal. 
He joined diplomatic networks of activists and publicists from the stateless nationalities of 
Central and Eastern Europe, who gathered on the neutral territory of Switzerland to petition all 
the belligerent powers for the best possible outcome for their respective nations at war’s end.   
 
The Union for the Liberation of Ukraine 
                                                
21 On the improvised, opportunistic nature of the German gambit on Ukrainian independence see Fedyshyn, 
Germany’s Drive to the East, 254-62. 
 
22 Frank Golczewski, Deutsche und Ukrainer, 1914-1939 (Paderborn: Schöningh, 2010). 
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Dontsov put his ideas into action in the first days of the war by becoming a founding 
member of the Union for the Liberation of Ukraine (Soiuz vyzvolennia Ukrainy, SVU), a 
nationalist organization of socialist Ukrainian exiles from the Russian Empire dedicated to using 
the war to create a Ukrainian nation-state. Andrii Zhuk (1880-1968),23 Mykola Zalizniak (1880-
1950),24 Roman Smal’-Stots’kyi (1893-1969),25 and Oleksandr Skoropys’-Ioltukhovs’kyi (1880-
1950)26 were among its leading members. Dontsov had met Zhuk and Zalizniak, along with the 
future leader and founder of the veterans’ Ukrainian Military Organization (UVO) and the OUN, 
Colonel Ievhen Konovalets’ (1891-1938), as law students in L’viv before the war. All four 
shared a faith in the Dual Monarchy’s power to liberate and unite the two Ukraines at Russia’s 
expense. The Union’s opening congress took place in L’viv in August 1914, but the Russian 
invasion and occupation of East Galicia forced it to relocate headquarters to Vienna. Judging 
from its style and wording, Dontsov almost certainly drafted the first anonymous appeal of the 
SVU “To the Ukrainian People in Russia,” declaring the Austrian military, “which our hundred 
thousand Galician brothers” serve, a liberator of the Ukrainian people.27 Dontsov and the SVU 
                                                
23 Like Dontsov, Zhuk was a founding member of the USDRP exiled to Galicia in 1907. The party expelled him in 
1912 for holding increasingly nationalistic views and acting on his own initiative to publicize the Ukrainian cause in 
Europe as secretary of the Ukrainian Information Committee. He cofounded the SVU in Vienna and directed its 
publications. He served the Hetmanate government and the UNR’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Vienna from 1918 
to 1920. 
 
24 A Socialist Revolutionary activist and diplomat, Zalizniak shared Dontsov’s hometown of Melitopol’ in Tavriia. 
He participated in the Brest-Litovsk negotiations as a representative of the UNR, serving in its embassy in Finland, 
and founded a Ukrainian Information Bureau in Stockholm, Sweden, in spring 1918.  
 
25 A scholar and politician from the southwestern Ukrainian town of Chernivsti (then a part of Romania), Smal’-
Stots’kyi represented the UNR’s government-in-exile after his time working for the SVU. For the latter he worked 
as an organizer and teacher of Ukrainian POWs in Germany.  
 
26 A political activist and historian Skoropys’-Ioltukhovs’kyi emigrated from Kyiv to L’viv before the Revolution of 
1905, where he represented the Revolutionary Ukrainian Party (RUP) abroad. He returned to Russia in 1907 to 
participate, illegally, in the elections to the Second Duma, but was arrested and exiled to Siberia. He fled from there 
back to Austria, where he joined the SVU and converted to liberal Ukrainian nationalism. He returned to Ukraine to 
serve in the UNR and the Hetmanate.  
 
27 “Do ukrains’koho narodu v Rosii,” Vistnyk Soiuza Vyzvolennia Ukrainy, no. 1 (August 2, 1914), 8. 
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promised a solution to the land question and the freedoms of religion and speech in the wake of 
the anticipated Austrian advance into Ukraine. These promises struck Russian Ukrainian critics 
of the SVU’s collaboration with the Entente’s enemies as naive. Undaunted, Dontsov argued that 
if Ukrainian patriots capitalized on Vienna’s actions to increase Ukrainian national autonomy (on 
the path to full independence), then the official war aims of this new “ally” (or any other) were 
irrelevant. Moreover, as he had insisted in his 1913 speech, foreign intervention would be 
necessary to achieve Ukraine’s liberation from Russia. Moral concerns should not enter the 
calculus—a notion that Dontsov developed into one of the axioms of Ukrainian integral 
nationalism: “amorality” (amoral’nist’).28  
The SVU’s second statement, “To the Public Opinion of Europe” (published in German), 
also bore Dontsov’s imprint, calling for the defense of “the old civilization [of Ukraine] from the 
Asiatic barbarism of the Muscovites.”29 Speaking on behalf of the “Ukrainians of Russia,” the 
appeal proclaims their striving for independence and the establishment of a “bulwark against 
Russia on the wide steppes of Ukraine.”30 With the wavering support of Austria-Hungary and 
Germany, the SVU spent the war engaged in propaganda and enlightenment (prosvita) efforts 
among the Ukrainian POWs of the Russian Army, who numbered about 50,000 in Germany and 
30,000 in Austria, shaping them into nationally conscious soldiers for the war against 
Petrograd.31 In exchange for pledges of loyalty to the Ukrainian (as opposed to imperial Russian) 
________________________ 
 
28 Golczewski, Deutsche und Ukrainer, 91-93. 
 
29 “An die öffentliche Meinung Europas,” Vistnyk Soiza Vyzvolennia Ukrainy, no. 1 (October 10, 1917), 1. 
 
30 Ibid. 
 
31 It published dozens of books, brochures, and newspapers in multiple languages. On the SVU, see Mark von 
Hagen, War in a European Borderland: Occupations and Occupation Plans in Galicia and Ukraine, 1914-1918 
(Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2007), 54-71; Oleh S. Fedyshyn, “The Germans and the Union for the 
Liberation of the Ukraine, 1914-1917,” in Hunczak, ed., The Ukraine, 1917-1921, 305-22; and, I. Mikhutina, 
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cause, the SVU offered the prisoners schools, hospitals, theaters, libraries, and reading rooms, as 
well as courses in Ukrainian history and literature, German language, and cooperative 
economics. In exchange for funding and access to the POW camps, the SVU promised to support 
the Central Powers’ war effort and to moderate relations between the German and Austrian 
armies and the Ukrainian people in East Galicia, as well as the ethnically Ukrainian territories of 
the Russian Empire. The SVU dispatched representatives to all the Central Powers and numerous 
neutral European countries, and carried out “Ukrainization” work in Volhynia and Podlachia 
during their respective Austrian and German occupations. After the February Revolution of 
1917, the SVU successfully organized two armed Ukrainian divisions—the Bluecoats under the 
German Army, and the Graycoats under the Austro-Hungarians—which were later incorporated 
into the Army of the UNR. Declaring its mission accomplished after the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk 
(February 9, 1918), which constituted legal recognition of Ukrainian independence by the 
signing states, the SVU dissolved on May 1, 1918.  
Dontsov, however, took part in almost none of these activities. Ever restive, ambitious, 
and cantankerous, he left the predominantly leftwing SVU in September 1914, just weeks after 
its formation, citing financial, personal, and ideological disputes with his older comrades. The 
SVU had rejected Dontsov’s motion to disclose the Union’s finances, which were notoriously 
irregular,32 but financial scandals appear to have been of secondary importance to interpersonal 
conflict. One year later Zhuk publicly denounced Dontsov as tactless, uncooperative, and 
“unsuited to organized political activity.”33 Responding to an inquiry from Viacheslav 
________________________ 
“Separatisty iz l’vovskogo kafe: O deiatel’nosti Soiuza osvobozhdeniia Ukrainy, 1914-1915 gg.,” Rodin,a no. 11 
(1999): 75-77. 
32 Sosnovs’kyi, Dmytro Dontsov, 204-5. 
 
33 Andrii Zhuk, “Soiuz vyzvolennia Ukrainy,” Vistnyk Soiuza Vyzvolennia Ukrainy 37-38 (10 October 1915), 1. 
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Lypyns’kyi about his memories of Dontsov’s brush with the SVU, Zhuk further impugned 
Dontsov’s character and integrity, providing insight into how the latter’s erstwhile USDRP and 
SVU comrades perceived him: 
In emigration in L’viv, Dontsov led a rather cloistered life, but belonged to our foreign 
Social Democratic group there, although he in no way distinguished himself. He was a 
very ‘orthodox’ Marxist [who] terribly scolded the Ukrainian ‘petty-bourgeoisie’ in Nash 
holos.34 At this same time he considered himself the inventor of Ukrainian ‘separatism,’ 
imposed his invention on everyone in the century, and was awarded for this with a 
caricature [of him] drawn by [Volodymyr] Vynnychenko35 . . . Prior to this the Ukrainian 
Social Democratic Group, which published Nash holos and represented the party abroad, 
. . . removed Dontsov from their midst. When I founded the SVU in the first days of the 
outbreak of war . . . I also recruited Dontsov . . . though I did not personally support 
relations with him at this time. We even made him the head of the Union. And it went to 
his head that he truly was the founder of Ukrainian separatism too, and of Ukrainian 
independence. Moreover, he began to carry himself very ‘independently,’ going behind 
our backs with [Mykola] Vasyl’ko and company,36 so we were compelled to remove him 
from the leadership. And then he went into the service of Vasyl’ko and [Kost’] 
Levyts’kyi37 . . . and dishonored the Union and every one of us individually. In 1918, as 
is well known to you personally, Dontsov made himself a great Hetmanite, and you know 
his further evolution better than I. Although as I did get to know Dontsov well, never 
living with him closely, this is a person with unrestrained ambition—to be the first! Thus 
such stunning transitions occurred. He rushed to where he hoped to make a ‘career,’ to be 
the first, but since this was not successful he now gallops just as quickly away, 
condemning that which he served yesterday.38  
                                                
34 “Our Voice,” a monthly of the USDRP published in L’viv from 1910 to the end of 1911. 
 
35 Unfortunately, Zhuk was unable to remember the publication in which this caricatured portrait of Dontsov 
appeared, and I have not been able to locate it. Vynnychenko’s three-volume memoir of Ukraine’s independence 
struggle 1917-1920, is a valuable source for the history of this period. Voldymyr Vynnychenko, Vidrodzhennia 
natsii, U 3-kh ch. (Kyiv: Politvydav Ukrainy, 1990). 
 
36 Zhuk refers to the Ukrainian Parliamentary Club in the Austrian Reichsrat in Vienna, which included Mykola 
Vasyl’ko (1868-1924) and Kost’ Levyts’kyi (1859-1941). All the major national minorities of the Dual Monarchy 
maintained “clubs” in the Austrian parliament through their national representatives. 
 
37 A prominent Galician Ukrainian politician and deputy to the Austrian Reichsrat, Kost’ Levyts’kyi founded the 
Ukrainian National Democratic Party (UNDO) in 1885, and played a major role in the formation of both the 
Ukrainian People’s Republic (UNR) and the Western Ukrainian People’s Republic (ZUNR). During the First World 
War he also served as a prosecutor for the Austro-Hungarian Empire, overseeing the suppression of Russophile 
activists in East Galicia, and promoted the SVU as a tool for fomenting a Ukrainian national revolution in Russia. 
 
38 Zhuk to Lypyns’kyi on March 2, 19126, in Lypyns’kyi, Lystuvannia, vol. 1, 842-43. This correspondence took 
place in 1926, after Lypyns’kyi’s falling out with Dontsov; the two had been on good working terms during the First 
World War, but in the early 1920s Dontsov polemicized with the Hetmanites and Lypyns’kyi. The latter was 
preparing a rebuttal to Dontsov’s attacks of inclusion into his seminal ideological work—Letters to Brother-Farmers 
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Thus, according to Zhuk, sheer arrogance and careerism explain Dontsov’s changing loyalties 
during the war. For his part, Dontsov went public with the purported reasons for his break with 
SVU in June 1915 in an article, “To My Political Adherents,” which also finalized and 
advertised his rejection of the USDRP.39 Apart from denouncing the SVU as a body of comically 
impotent amateurs, “turncoats” who had opposed Ukrainian independence as a “dangerous 
utopia” before the war, and known Russophiles with no right to represent their country, Dontsov 
accused them of working with “Russian Social Democrats who deny the very existence of the 
Ukrainian nation”40 and lacking any contacts with genuine separatist groups operating illegally 
inside the Russian Empire. He concludes with an appeal to Ukrainian nationalists to focus on 
“real work” and avoid the SVU altogether. But Dontsov’s charge that the “whole of their activity 
for the ‘liberation’ of Ukraine is confined to press propaganda” and “work among prisoners [of 
war]” could just as well have been leveled at himself,41 since at no point in the First World War 
or the struggles for Ukrainian independence that emerged from it did he take up arms and fight. 
He remained an influential propagandist who served and observed the unfolding Ukrainian 
revolution from safer vantage points.  
The recriminations between Dontsov and the SVU turned on the interrogation of one 
another’s avowed or hidden allegiances to the Central Powers, to Russia, to socialist 
________________________ 
on the Idea of Ukrainian Monarchism. See Viacheslav Lypyns’kyi, Lysty do brativ-khliborobiv pro ideiu i 
organizatsiiu ukrains’koho monarkhizmu, pysani 1919-1926 (Vienna: Carl Herrmann, 1926), xx-xxiv. 
 
39 Dmytro Dontsov, Do moikh politychnykh odnodumtsiv (z pryvodu t. zv. Soiuz vyzvolennia Ukrainy, (L’viv: n.p. 
1915). 
 
40 This accusation was at least partially true; documents in the Austrian State Archives indicate that the SVU funded 
Lenin. Stefan T. Possony, Lenin: The Compulsive Revolutionary (Chicago: Henry Regency, 1964), 169-70. 
 
41 The charge was not true in any case, given the SVU’s successful efforts to organize a Ukrainian Legion made up 
of 12,000 volunteers, some of whom later participated in the wars for Ukrainian independence between 1918 and 
1921 in various military and paramilitary formations. 
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internationalism, or to the Ukrainian people alone. Few today would doubt their commitment to 
the Ukrainian national cause, but both sides of the conflict also relied heavily on support from 
the Central Powers during the war, and they all had backgrounds in the socialist parties of the 
Russian Empire, from which they fled or were exiled for political reasons. Rather hypocritically, 
given the SVU’s German-Austrian patronage throughout its existence, Skoropys’-Ioltukhovs’kyi 
accused Dontsov of being under Berlin’s control in 1917.42 Decades later, after the Second 
World War had put collaboration with expansionist Germans in an entirely unsavory light, 
Dontsov changed his purported reasons for breaking with the SVU, recalling that it was in fact 
Skoropys’-Ioltukhovs’kyi who wanted to turn the SVU into a “German-Austrian agency.”43 In 
the 1960s Dontsov denied having any contacts with the Austrian or German governments as of 
August 1914—a claim confirmed by his wife Mariia in a 1969 interview—and he insisted that 
only the SVU cultivated these ties.44 Elsewhere he asserted, somewhat perplexingly, that the 
SVU members had rejected him “because he was not a socialist anymore.”45 This sort of 
inconsistency, alas, is typical of Dontsov’s autobiographical clarifications. 
 
Epistles to the Germans 
In fact, Dontsov began working directly with the German government almost 
immediately after his break with the SVU, which was also obliged to pivot toward Berlin after 
                                                
42 Oleksandr Skoropys-Ioltukhovs’kyi, “Vid vydavtsiv,” in Samostijna ukrajina R.U.P. (Wetzlar: Soiuz vyzvolennia 
Ukrainy, 1917), 32, 39-42; Golczewski, Deutsche und Ukrainer, 95. 
 
43 Dmytro Dontsov, Rik 1918, Kyiv, 119. 
 
44 Dmytro Dontsov, “Emigrants’ki i soviets’ki marksysty proty natsionalizmu,” Visnyk, no. 3 (New York, 1966), 6. 
 
45 They went on to become “Sovietophiles” after the war, according to Dontsov. He fails to explain why they had 
become tired of him within weeks of the war’s beginning. Dmytro Dontsov, “Emigrants’ki shasheli i natsionalizm,” 
Visnyk, no. 8 (New York, 1965): 17-23, 21; Golczewski, Deutsche und Ukrainer, 94. 
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the Austrians began withdrawing their support from Ukrainian nation-building projects.46 
Residing in Berlin (on Bayreuther Strasse 8) from 1914 to 1916 and provided with an Austrian 
passport “for secret political reasons,” Dontsov headed the local office of the information service 
and press bureau of the Ukrainian Parliamentary Club in Vienna—led by Reichsrat members 
Kost’ Levyts’kyi and Mykola Vasyl’ko and heavily funded by the Central Powers—which sent 
him 300 marks a month (about 1500 USD today) to edit its weekly press bulletin, Ukrainische 
Korrespondenz.47 Dontsov’s task was to extoll the advantages of Ukrainian independence for 
Central Europe’s wellbeing to the German government and society, as well as to produce and 
distribute anti-Russian, pro-Central Powers, and pro-Ukrainian propaganda. While in Berlin he 
cultivated ties with German officials and academics, including Paul Rohrbach, Germany’s most 
prominent advocate of Ukrainian independence and an agent of the German Foreign Office, who 
reportedly helped him get an article past the German censors.48 During this time Dontsov 
published a series of German-language brochures on the Ukrainian and Polish questions in 
relation to the war and the interests of the Central Powers, making the case that the Germans and 
their allies should take full advantage of the multiethnic composition and discontent nationalities 
of the Russian Empire in order to destroy it.49  
                                                
46 Golczewski, Deutsche und Ukrainer, 106-8. 
 
47 Ibid. 
 
48 Dontsov, Rik 1918, Kyiv, 22, 120. Dontsov claims to have met with Rohrbach in Kyiv in 1918, and again during 
World War II. He notes Rohrbach’s distance from Nazism and criticism of the Second World War as “unnecessary.” 
 
49 This pro-German position was antithetical to that of the analogous Polish integral nationalist Roman Dmowski—
one of Dontsov’s chief role models, though he refused to admit it—who considered Germany, not Russia, to be 
Poland’s mortal enemy, and the true threat to European (and world) stability. See Dmowski’s 1908 work, Niemcy, 
Rosja i kwestia polska (Germany, Russia, and the Polish Question) in Roman Dmowski, Wybór Pism Romana 
Dmowskiego, vol. 1 (New York: Instytut Romana Dmowskiego, 1988). 
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Although Dontsov, the Ukrainian Parliamentary Club, and the SVU were in conflict, their 
propaganda materials differed little.50 German historian (and future SS-Hauptsturmführer) Hans 
Joachim Beyer (1908-1971) summarized the five central theses of the pro-Ukrainian texts that 
circulated among the German-speaking public during the First World War: 1) Ukrainians are not 
Russians, but a distinct nation with a distinct language; 2) the Ukrainian national movement and 
cultural revival began in the eighteenth century, followed European norms of development, and 
had grown into a formidable political force even in Ukraine’s Russian-governed regions; 3) 
Ukraine’s national movement sympathizes with the Central Powers and favors separation from 
Russia; 4) the Poles are, like the Russians, inherent enemies of Ukraine (according to both 
émigré commentators, such as Dontsov, and to Galician Ukrainians); 5) a Ukraine made 
independent from Russia is the economic and strategic keystone to German victory in the east.51 
Dontsov would have enthusiastically concurred with historian Dominic Lieven’s observation 
that, “as much as anything, World War I turned on the fate of Ukraine. . . . Without Ukraine’s 
population, industry, and agriculture, early twentieth-century Russia would have ceased to be a 
great power. If Russia ceased to be a great power, then there was every possibility that Germany 
would dominate Europe.”52 This, precisely, was the intended outcome.  
Dontsov’s German-language writings hammered on all five of Beyer’s points, reaching a 
large readership of powerful and influential people. Otto Hoetzsch (1876-1946), for example—
professor of Eastern European history in Berlin, member of the ultranationalist Pan-German 
League (Alldeutscher Verband), and one of the founding fathers of German studies of Eastern 
                                                
50 Golczewski, Deutsche und Ukrainer, 203. 
 
51 Hans Beyer, Die Mittelmächte und die Ukraine, 1918 (Munich: Isar, 1956), 24-25. Fedyshyn, Germany’s Drive to 
the East, 26. 
 
52 Dominic Lieven, The End of Tsarist Russia: The March to World War I and Revolution (New York: Viking, 
2015), 1. 
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Europe (Ostforschung)—considered Dontsov’s brochure, The Idea of a Ukrainian State and the 
War against Russia, to be “the most meticulous in Ukrainian agitation literature.”53 The German 
embassy in Vienna funded the work with a 1000-crown grant.54 According to a police report 
requested by the German Foreign Office, Dontsov spent several hours a day at the Royal Library 
in Berlin researching the brochure. While acknowledging that German interests in Ukraine were 
purely strategic and that Ukraine boasted fewer supporters in Germany than imperial Russia did, 
he traced German interest in his homeland; from the partially successful efforts of the 
antiserfdom activist, Ukrainian Cossack, and playwright Vasili Kapnist (1758-1823), to build an 
alliance with Prussia, to the German philosopher Eduard von Hartmann’s (1842-1906) idea of a 
“Kingdom of Kyiv” to free Europe from “the hard pressure of Tsarism.”55 “Now,” writes 
Dontsov, “[the Ukrainian question] is firmly bound up with the fate of Austria-Hungary and 
Germany, upon whose victory we, Russian Ukrainians and our brothers in Austria-Hungary, will 
build our future.”56 Dontsov describes “Muscovy,” driven to westward expansion in search of a 
warm-water port, as a perennial threat to European stability and an oppressor of the small nations 
east of Germany. Poland, Sweden, Germany, Austria, and Turkey thus find a natural ally in 
Ukrainian separatists, whose relevance has grown during the war. Claiming a strict adherence to 
“political realism” (Realpolitik), Dontsov underscores the historicity and feasibility of Ukrainian 
statehood, the economic viability of an independent Ukraine, Kyiv’s traditional ties to the West, 
the discontent of Ukrainians living under Russian hegemony and abusive tsarist regimes, and the 
                                                
53 Otto Hoetzsch, Russische Probleme (Berlin: G. Reimer, 1917), 37. 
 
54 This is according to Kost’ Levyts’kyi, who visited Dontsov in Berlin in April 1915. Kost’ Levyts’kyi, Istoriia 
vyzvol’nykh zmahan’ (L’viv: Nakladom vlasnym, 1930), 108-109, 131-32. 
 
55 Donzow, Die ukrainische Staatsidee, 31-47. 
 
56 Ibid. 67. 
 
  117 
accelerating development of Ukrainian national consciousness. On the latter point, Dontsov 
emphasizes the importance, not only of the 1905 Revolution, but also of the dismemberments 
and occupations of the Ukrainian territories between imperial Russia and Austria-Hungary. Still 
more decisive is the heightened activity of the Ukrainian press, the existence of independent 
religious, cultural, and educational organizations for Ukrainians, and their desire for participatory 
government (entirely foreign to Russians), all of which makes them a tragically stateless 
Kulturnation whose liberation would permanently check Russian power and demonstrate to 
world opinion the Central Powers’ good will in Eastern Europe.57  
Using the same financial support from Vienna and translating assistance from Paul 
Rohrbach,58 Dontsov published another German-language brochure in 1915, Greater Poland and 
the Central Powers, in which he weighs in on the crucial Polish question as a “neutral 
observer.”59 Rejecting “hackneyed” accounts of Poland as belonging wholly to the West or 
wholly to Russia, he gives an “objective” assessment of Poland’s agricultural capacity and the 
outlook of its minorities, who already resent Polish domination and who would likely face 
oppression and forced assimilation in a “Greater Poland.” Though not opposed to a “small 
Austro-Polish solution” that would unify Congress Poland with the Polish regions of the Austro-
Hungarian Empire, Dontsov argues that, “thanks to [Poland’s] social and national makeup, it 
cannot be a bulwark against Russia.”60 Such a bulwark can be achieved, of course, only by 
wresting Ukraine from Russia, raising it “up to a high level of development,” and transforming it 
into a German or Austrian protectorate. The Central Powers’ proclamation on November 5, 
                                                
57 Ibid., 65-67. 
 
58 Dontsov, Rik 1918, Kyiv, 22. 
 
59 Dmytro Donzow, Groß-Polen und die Zentralmächte (Berlin: C. Kroll, 1915). 
 
60 Ibid., 7, 62-63 
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1916, of support for an independent Poland, inclusive of East Galicia, annoyed Dontsov, but he 
preferred the Polish domination of Galicia to the Russian domination of the rest of Ukraine, 
conceding that “we absolutely must declare ourselves against Russia. . . . In Poland we would at 
least have the right of association and the possibility of a constitutional struggle. In Russia, never 
under any circumstances.”61 Dontsov continued to prioritize the fate of Central and Eastern 
Ukraine over the fate of East Galicia throughout the interwar period, accusing those who took the 
opposite view of “sacrificing the whole for a part” and “narrow provincialism.” Yet, given the 
choice between the Catholicism of the Uniates (concentrated in Polish-dominated East Galicia) 
and the Orthodoxy adhered to by most Ukrainians, Dontsov insisted that “we should declare 
ourselves in favor of the former, since we are behind aristocratic-clerical Austria in its struggle 
with tsarism.”62 He felt that questions of religion, morality, and the proper relationship between 
church and state must be subordinated to the national principle and international politics.       
He approved of any alliance or compromise, no matter how unpalatable, so long as it 
undermined Russia’s foothold in Ukraine. It is thus no surprise that Dontsov began forging ties 
with the German far right during the First World War. In 1916 he contributed to an anthology of 
anti-Russian essays, The Colossus on Clay Feet, compiled by Axel Ripke (1880-1937)—German 
journalist, publisher of the prowar annexationist paper Der Panther, early leader of the Nazi 
Party, and mentor to Joseph Goebbels.63 In his contribution to the volume, “The Changing 
Russia,” Dontsov describes Russia as the prime untapped market of German industry and the 
                                                
61 From a letter to the editor of Shliakhy, Fedir Fedortsiv. Quoted in Golczewski, Deutsche und Ukrainer, 216. 
 
62 Dmytro Dontsov, “Sprava Unii” Shliakhy 5 (1916) in Vybrani tvory, vol. 2, 132-39. 
 
63 Axel Ripke, ed., Der Koloß auf tönernen Füßen (Munich: Lehmanns Verlag, 1916). 
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average Russian as “a natural opponent of the German Reich.” If Russia modernized, he warns, 
then Germany could face military defeat and end up a playing the “role of a second-rate state.”64  
For the keys to victory in the present conflict, Dontsov again turned to history, writing a 
pamphlet on the Swedish-Ukrainian alliance against the Tsardom of Muscovy in the Great 
Northern War (1700-1721), which he considered to be analogous to the Eastern Front of the First 
World War.65 Extracting the strategic and geopolitical lessons of this ill-fated crusade, Dontsov 
calls for a reevaluation of the campaign of King Charles XII of Sweden (1682-1718) and 
Ukrainian Hetman Ivan Mazepa (1639-1709), not as a foolhardy adventure, but as a 
geopolitically necessary act of self-defense against Muscovite barbarism. The failure of their 
collective attempt to stop Russian expansion into the lands between the Baltic and Black Seas 
was not preordained, but an unfortunate accident of history attributable to the error of 
underestimating the importance of the Ukrainian factor. Charles XII had every reason to believe 
that he could defeat Muscovy, which was an obscure and uncivilized country so far as 
enlightened Europe was concerned. Sweden, by contrast, had enjoyed supremacy in the north for 
over a century and was simply protecting its “vital interests” in the Baltic.  
Two tendencies prevailed in early eighteenth-century Eastern Europe: the pro-Russian 
orientation, taken by the Kingdom of Poland (portending its doom later in the century), and the 
anti-Russian orientation, taken by the Ukrainian Cossack Hetmanate as a matter of self-
preservation. The latter, Dontsov maintains, had entered into a military alliance with the 
Tsardom of Muscovy as a sovereign state, but also had a tradition of fighting Moscow (even 
alongside the Muslim Turks). Moreover, Ukrainian-Russian relations had been deteriorating 
since the reign of Hetman Bohdan Khmel’nytskyi in the mid seventeenth century. According to 
                                                
64 Dmytro Donzow, “Das veränderte Rußland,” in Ripke, Der Koloß, 55-69. 
 
65 Dmytro Donzow, Karl XII: Feldzug nach der Ukraine (Vienna: Gerold, 1916). 
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Dontsov, Ukrainians were the original source of whatever was European in the “half-Asiatic” 
Muscovite culture. They already possessed constitutional, monarchic, and republican institutions 
and values, whereas Peter I sought only the merciless centralization of the Russian state. Dontsov 
also describes the decisive advantages Ukraine’s fertile land and pro-Swedish, anti-Russian 
population would have offered to Charles XII’s armies—had they campaigned south and joined 
Mazepa in 1708 instead of waiting in vain for the arrival of his Turkish and Polish allies. The 
Swedish-Ukrainian defeat at the Battle of Poltava in 1709 sealed the fate of the whole campaign; 
Russia triumphed, bringing two centuries of chaos and ruin to Eastern Europe in its wake. 
Nevertheless, Dontsov concludes, what was not accomplished in the eighteenth century—
namely, a satisfactory solution to the “Eastern question”—might be accomplished in the 
twentieth if modern Germans learn from Charles XII’s blunders. Only by taking full advantage 
of Ukrainian agriculture, national aspirations, and resentment for Russian domination can the 
Central Powers win on the Eastern Front. Dontsov’s pamphlet on the Great Northern War was 
republished for Ukrainian audiences during the 1918 occupation of Ukraine by the Central 
Powers, which followed the propagandist’s advice by exploiting the country’s vast supply food 
for the war effort, inciting its people against their erstwhile Russian masters, and cultivating 
Ukrainian national consciousness and pro-German sentiment among the peasantry.66    
Dontsov’s German-language brochures evidently hit their mark, circulating widely 
among diplomats, activists, and academics concerned with the Ukrainian question. Karl Heinz, 
the German Reich’s consul in L’viv/Lemberg, for example, wrote Chancellor Bethmann 
Hollweg about his admiration for Dontsov’s “superbly written” brochures. The latter, Heinz 
remarks, “demonstrate the historical and political knowledge of their author,” and deserve “the 
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broadest recognition and dissemination among the educated layers of our people.”67 Others were 
less enthusiastic, including Leon Wasilewski (1870-1936)—a prominent activist in the Polish 
Socialist Party, close collaborator of Piłsudski’s, and, after the war, one of the main architects of 
“Prometheism.”68 Wasilewski opposed the Polonization of Galician Ukrainians and supported 
Piłsudski’s wartime vision of an “Intermarium” alliance (a democratic federation that would 
include, at a minimum, the independent states of Poland and Ukraine), but in 1916 he wrote that 
the Ukrainians of Russia had “degenerated into a crude ethnographic mass” whose separatism 
“exists [only] in the fantasies of Russian informers,” naming Dontsov, “whose theses are 
beginning to be found in certain youth circles.”69 But the appearance of the UNR the next year 
refuted Wasilewski’s dismissive remarks on the Ukrainian national movement in Russia, while 
Dontsov’s “theses” reached audiences well beyond the Galician Ukrainian students who 
constituted his home base of support.                         
Nevertheless, the pro-Ukrainian independence propaganda efforts of Dontsov and others 
met with little success in the first year and a half of the war. Of the Central Powers, only the 
Turks were eager to take this course of action at first.70 Austrian officialdom generally thought of 
the Ukrainian question as an internal (Galician) problem, and did not wish to offend its Polish 
subjects, who regarded Lwów/L’viv/Lemberg and the surrounding region as rightfully Polish 
                                                
67 Quoted in Golczewski, Deutsche und Ukrainer, 204. 
 
68 Prometheism was the Second Polish Republic’s flagship policy in the east. It aimed at the succor and coordination 
of the non-Russian national independence movements of the (former) Russian Empire and Soviet Union. 
 
69 Anonymous [Leon Wasilewski], Die Ukrainer in Russland und die politischen Bestrebungen derselben (Krakow: 
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territory.71 The Dual Monarchy thus began withdrawing its support from the SVU as early as 
January 1915, demanding that it cease its work among Austria’s Ukrainians (“Ruthenians”) and 
relocate to Constantinople. Hereafter the Germans took a greater role in the SVU’s activities, 
allowing it set up an office in Berlin and encouraging it to cultivate contacts with Lenin, the 
Bolsheviks, and the Turks.  
However, certain Habsburg circles began toying with the notion, in the event of a 
catastrophic defeat for Russia, of setting up a Ukrainian crownland with the ardent Ukrainophile, 
Archduke Wilhelm von Habsburg (1895-1948), as monarch.72 While Berlin’s strategists were 
considerably more adventurous when it came to nation-engineering in the east, they did not 
develop specific plans for a future Ukrainian state until January 1916, when an up-and-coming 
generation of German politicians, academics, and diplomats finally met with success in their 
push for a more aggressive wartime Ostpolitik that would exploit Russia’s alien nationalities 
politically as well as militarily. They had hopes of appealing to liberal opinion in the (still 
neutral) United States under President Woodrow Wilson by representing Germany as a true 
champion of the right to national self-determination in Europe and a guardian of Russia’s 
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oppressed non-Russians.73 German agents famously smuggled a disguised Lenin from Central 
Europe into Petrograd in the wake of Tsar Nicholas II’s abdication, but imperial Germany also 
aided and encouraged nationalist movements on Russian territory, ultimately including the 
attempted co-optation of the Ukrainian Revolution—the Reich’s final and most ambitious Drang 
nach Osten (“drive to the East”) of the war. With the more reluctant collaboration of the Austro-
Hungarian Empire, whose tenuous dominion over the nations of the Slavic majority within its 
borders had been one of the primary causes of the war, imperial Germany represented itself as 
the liberator of smaller, weaker nations (called Randvölker, or “borderland peoples”) from 
Russian oppression.  
In practice, however, Germany’s ambitions in the East were colonial in nature, 
amounting to a quest for German Lebensraum at the expense of the “barbaric” Russian Empire.74 
Many German officers, diplomats, politicians, and soldiers generally regarded the indigenous 
peoples of Eastern Europe as inherently backward.75 Some, such as Heinrich Class (1868-1953), 
president of the ultranationalist Pan-German League, coveted the land, preferably with its mostly 
Slavic inhabitants Germanized or removed, for the development of Teutonic agrarian utopias.76 
Class had called for the creation of an independent Ukraine closely aligned with Germany as 
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early as September 1914 in a memorandum to Bethmann Hollweg that the chancellor rejected. 
This was a major point of contention between the wartime chancellors (Hollweg, Georg von 
Hertling, and Max Prince von Baden) and the Pan-German League, which unsuccessfully 
attempted to induce General Erich Ludendorff, who sympathized with the Pan-Germanists’ on 
many points, to engineer a coup and carry out their annexationist plans as dictator.77 Others, 
above all the Baltic German specialist on the “Eastern question” in Russia and the Middle East 
Paul Rohrbach, counseled against imperious attitudes toward the Randvölker, and advocated 
Ukraine’s removal from “Muscovy” and incorporation (alongside Poland) as an independent 
state into a German-dominated economic union—the “Mitteleuropa project.”78 An ally of 
Dontsov's, Rohrbach led the “Osteuropa school,” which helped to popularize the Ukrainian 
question as the key to a permanent victory against Russia in wartime Germany. Rohrbach's 
influence was limited, but he did win support for his idea of collaborating with the Ukrainians to 
make Ukraine independent from Russia. The German economists Max Sering, Friedrich Ernst 
von Schwerin, and Dr. Eric Keup—leaders of the Society for the Advancement of Inner 
Colonization (Gesselschaft zur Förderung der inneren Kolonisation), whose mission was to 
promote the settlement of Eastern Europe by Germans—also took a special interest in the 
Ukrainian question. Executive officials in the German Foreign Office and Imperial Chancellery, 
such as Foreign Minister Gottlieb von Jagow, his successor as Secretary of State, Arthur 
Zimmerman, and even Emperor Wilhelm II were at least open to the idea.79  
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The League of Russia’s Foreign Peoples 
Ultimately, arguments in favor of using Ukrainian nation building in the Reich’s war 
against Russia proved irresistible. In spring 1916 the German Foreign Office, acting with the 
reluctant consent of the military (especially of General Erich Ludendorff), approved the idea of 
the “League of Russia’s Foreign Peoples” (die Liga der Fremdvölker Russlands, LFR), which 
claimed to represent the Lithuanians, Belarusians, Poles, Finns, Ukrainians, Georgians, Muslims, 
and Jews of Russia.80 Coordinated from Berlin, the League worked through the German embassy 
in Bern, Switzerland, utilizing the private apartment of Dr. Hermann Gummerus (a prominent 
Finnish nationalist) as a headquarters—a location chosen because it was safe for political exiles 
and ideal for conspiratorial activity.81 Like the Bolsheviks, including Lenin and Dontsov’s older 
brother Ivan, both of whom made Switzerland their home base during the war, the various 
nationalists and German agents of the LFR set up shop in the neutral country. In addition to 
sharing a sponsor—the German Foreign Office—the Bolsheviks in exile and the LFR 
collaborated against their common enemy, the tsarist state.  
The LFR’s first move was to issue an appeal to President Woodrow Wilson, “the most 
ardent defender of humanity and justice” and, by extension, to “the nations that are today the 
allies of Russia.”82 Using the language of national self-determination championed by Wilson 
(prior to the US entry into the war), the appeal describes the plight of Russia’s ethnic minorities 
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and ends with a cry of desperation to the civilized world: “Help us! Save us from extermination!” 
Dontsov was among the appeal’s nineteen signatories, all of whom relocated to Lausanne, 
Switzerland, to participate in a formal “Congress of the League” on June 25, 1916, the day after 
which they took part in the so-called Third Conference of the Nationalities.83 Enjoying the 
financial support and interest of the German government, the resultant Congress of Nationalities 
brought together 400 representatives from 23 nationalities, serving as a tool of anti-Russian 
German politics throughout Dontsov’s tenure there, with the State Secretary for Foreign Affairs 
of the German Empire until his resignation in August 1917, Arthur Zimmerman, personally 
participating in the deliberations of the congress.84 Advertised by its sponsors as a spontaneous 
gathering of delegates of the oppressed nationalities of Russia rather than a meeting directed in 
secret from Berlin via the LFR, the Third Congress of Nationalities presented itself as pro-
Entente, disguising the anti-Russian orientation and German patronage of its membership, which 
included the German-Lithuanian Baron Friedrich von der Ropp, the Estonian socialist Aleksandr 
Kesküla, the Polish monarchist Michał Łempicki, and the Ukrainian nationalist Volodymyr 
Stepankivs’kyi (1885-1957), and Dontsov.85 The demands of the latter two at the “pro-Entente” 
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conference were accordingly modest, referring to Ukrainian national independence as a maximal 
ideal not an immediate demand.86 Gabrys considered the conference a success, with the world 
press reporting extensively and favorably on the documents declaring the “Rights of 
Nationalities” and the necessity of a “union of the weak.”87  
That September the German Foreign Office recruited Dontsov as a secret agent and 
dispatched him to Bern with instructions to assist Stepankivs’kyi, chief of the LFR’s office there. 
Once in Bern, Dontsov was charged with heading the League’s publishing activities and 
promised a salary of 500 franks.88 He also formed and directed the “Bureau of the Nationalities 
of Russia” (das Büro der Nationalitäten Russlands), coordinating propaganda with the Union des 
nationalités and the LFR.89 Disagreements over his role materialized shortly after his arrival. The 
LFR was willing to give him a free hand in his propaganda work, provided that he secure 
Stepankivs’kyi’s approval in advance of publication. But the Foreign Office insisted on having 
final say over everything and, in secret, without Dontsov knowing its editorial and financial role. 
Necessary funds from the Foreign Office were to be transferred to Dontsov through 
Stepankivs’kyi, who would receive them from the German diplomat in Bern, Carl von Schubert. 
Schubert insisted that Dontsov not become aware of the origins of this money—an untenable 
________________________ 
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condition that Golczewski regards as an insult to Dontsov’s intelligence, arguing that the notion 
that he would have been unaware of such assistance is “laughable.”90 The League’s presidium 
did not wish to comply with it, proposing instead that Dontsov be placed in charge of financial 
matters and made aware of the money’s source. Himself no stranger to the Germans, Dontsov 
questioned Stepankivs’kyi about the origins of these funds.  
Although Dontsov corresponded with German diplomat Gisbert von Romberg about 
conspiratorial matters sensitive enough to be hidden even from Germany’s Austrian allies, 
Romberg evidently distrusted him, fearing that he might blow the League’s cover and make its 
German sponsorship known to the world.91 Romberg wrote Bethmann Hollweg about the matter, 
expressing concern that Dontsov might become aware that the LFR was a project of the German 
government. According to the instructions of Arthur Zimmermann, only Stepankivs’kyi was to 
handle the money. He should lead Dontsov to think that the funds came from private and 
anonymous individuals and organizations.92 Romberg believed, probably erroneously, that 
Dontsov never learned the truth about the money.93 Ultimately, Dontsov was limited to the role 
of editor of the League’s official publication, Korrespondenz der Nationalitäten Russlands, 
which (funded via Stepankivs’kyi at 2,000 franks per month)94 also appeared in French as 
Bulletin des Nationalités de Russie and in English as Bulletin of the Nationalities of Russia. The 
first edition of the biweekly went out to readers on September 23, 1916. Each issue consisted of 
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four columns and short editorials dealing with Poland, Finland, Lithuania, and Ukraine, as well 
as an ethnographic map of Russia showing the claimed territories of these nationalities. A 
paraphrased Victor Hugo quote, “There is civilization among the peoples, and barbarism among 
the rulers” (“Die Kultur ist unter den Völkern, die Barbarei ist unter den Herrschenden”) served 
as the paper’s motto.95 The LFR dispatched Korrespondenz in runs of 1,000 copies per language 
to major newspapers, politicians, and private persons across Western and Central Europe.  
But problems stifled the LFR’s efforts to shape world opinion from the inception of 
Korrespondenz, which carried some of these internal controversies on its pages. Perhaps most 
damaging were the personal and professional quarrels between Dontsov and his collaborators in 
the League. Two Baltic German members of the LFR, Barons Friedrich von der Ropp and 
Bernard von Uexküll, criticized the League’s organ for being “uninteresting and incomplete,” 
and for exhibiting too obvious an anti-Russian bias. Ropp threatened to cut off the League’s 
funding of the publication altogether. Romberg echoed their concerns in a letter to Bethmann 
Hollweg, remarking that Korrespondenz failed to disguise its anti-Russian prerogative.96 Other 
critics decried the paper’s excessive focus on Ukrainian and Polish matters, at the expense of the 
other nationalities. The Estonian Bolshevik-turned-nationalist Aleksandr Kesküla refused to 
cooperate with Dontsov outright, claiming that he was guilty of “betraying his countrymen” (in 
all likelihood because of the total breakdown in his relations with the SVU and USDRP).97 
Kesküla resented the lack of coverage on the Estonian question in Korrespondenz, and seconded 
Ropp’s criticisms, complaining to Stepankivs’kyi that the publication’s propagandistic intent was 
too obvious. Dontsov responded to these charges by blaming the paper’s shortness and 
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emphasizing the corresponding need for brief synopses of only the most importance news. 
Longer, more in-depth articles occasionally appeared in Korrespondenz, but Dontsov usually 
wrote them himself.98 He explained that even anti-Russian contributions “of course” needed to 
take a “respectable tone”:  
It would already mean a lot if we brought an Entente audience (and we write for it, after  
 all, when we edit Korrespondenz here [in Bern] and not in Berlin) to the belief   
 that we are foreign peoples there [in Russia], that it is bad for us in Russia, and that our  
 fate—of course to the detriment of Russia—must be determined anew. If you wish to  
 inform the Entente public that this fate should of course be changed in the German spirit,  
 then it would appear to be only a hopeless task.  
 
Dontsov insisted that he had kept the pro-Central Powers’ orientation and patronage of 
the LFR under wraps, outwardly following the conventions of neutral journalism. The other 
complaint voiced by certain members and sponsors of the LFR concerning Korrespondenz was 
its perceived lack of provocativeness and verve. Ropp felt that Dontsov had “no sense for the 
sensational. To him the study of sources is more important than the stimulation of attention, 
though we have founded not an historical, but an active bureau.”99 Dontsov—rather ironically 
given his later penchant for anti-intellectualism, inflammatory propaganda, and demagoguery—
wanted the style of the league’s bulletin to at least appear “objective,” “neutral,” and “scholarly.” 
He spent much of his time in libraries and archives gathering materials for use in the anticipated 
peace talks, hoping to secure Ukraine’s independence through the mechanisms of international 
law and historical precedents. Dontsov did not heed Ropp’s instructions to change the paper’s 
style and content, causing the latter to write Stepankivs’kyi and insist that the editor of 
Korrespondenz is “not an historical researcher, but a sensation-journalist.”100 Ropp went so far as 
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to suggest outsourcing the paper’s editing to an American journalist, relegating Dontsov’s role to 
the physical setting and printing of the bulletin in Bern.  
In his defense, Dontsov pointed to the large number of letters he received expressing 
appreciation for Korrespondenz. Although he recognized the propagandistic aim of his task, 
Dontsov took the journalistic prerogatives of his work for the LFR seriously. He accused 
Stepankivs’kyi of doing nothing to help the Bern office, requested more staff, and expressed his 
readiness to resign as editor. Self-conscious about addressing sophisticated Western audiences 
and thus committed to an even-handed tone, investigative research, and fact-checking, Dontsov 
rejected sensationalism, at least in this case, as ineffective. He argued that making preparations 
for the peace by gathering historical documents in support of the autonomy (at minimum) of 
Russia’s national minorities was of the utmost importance, and thus placed his hopes in a 
rational, juridical assessment of the facts by responsible international actors. “One of the most 
essential tasks in this regard would be the compilation of all treaties of a legal importance to the 
nationalities, which were made in their time between Russia on the one hand and its various 
foreign peoples on the other, which should justify our claims for a special status in Russia.” He 
had in mind the 1654 Treaty and Constitution of Pereiaslav (renewed in 1728), the Georgian 
Constitution of 1783, the Finnish Constitution of 1809, and the Polish Constitution of 1815. 
Dontsov proposed the composition of a memorandum detailing the situation of Russia’s foreign 
peoples and the violations of their rights and treaties, to be dispatched to the diplomats of all 
nations. The memorandum, which he offered to prepare himself, would take the “proper” tone, 
avoiding unnecessary agitation and sticking to the facts. Despite everything, Uexküll and Ropp 
agreed to support Dontsov’s project in December 1916, and he began working on it at the outset 
of 1917, but Ropp withheld the funds for the project without explanation and, wishing to further 
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reduce Dontsov’s role in the LFR, considered delegating the task instead to Stepankivs’kyi. 
Ultimately the memorandum never materialized. Irritated, Dontsov again threatened to quit the 
League in January 1917. He finally left for Geneva in March without notifying the German 
Foreign Office, abandoned the Bern headquarters of the LFR to be closed in his absence, and 
made plans to return to Ukraine alone and take part in the revolutionary situation just beginning 
there.  
Dontsov’s confidence in the power and beneficence of international law and prospective 
peace treaties did not survive the Great War and the failed Ukrainian Revolution. As of the mid 
1920s he had become quite the opposite of a dull “historical researcher,” embracing a warlike, 
action-focused ethos, and an editorial style that was proudly anti-intellectual, nonacademic, 
hyperbolic, provocative, and sensationalist. His time with the LFR, which ended rather 
embarrassingly for him, likely contributed to his drift toward the much more visceral style of 
propaganda writing for which he is best known. The experience did nothing to mitigate 
Dontsov’s Germanophilia, however, but seems rather to have convinced him that Germany was 
the only great power in the world with an abiding interest in Ukrainian independence. 
Nevertheless, it would be simplistic to interpret German sponsorship of the LFR as evidence that 
Dontsov was merely an agent of Berlin masquerading as a patriot of Ukraine. He, not unlike 
Stepankivs’kyi (who was quick to appeal to the Entente once its victory seemed immanent), and 
other members of the LFR, harbored suspicions about the German government’s true and 
ultimate intentions in Eastern Europe, but believed that Ukraine had nowhere else to turn. 
Sympathy for the long-partitioned Polish nation was relatively common in the USA, France, and 
Britain, but most Westerners knew little to nothing about Ukraine, or thought of it in vague terms 
as an integral component of their ally Russia. 
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Germany was a problematic sponsor for different reasons. Although the League’s 
sponsors in Berlin favored the creation of a chain of at least nominally independent buffer states 
(Pufferstaaten) in Russia’s western borderlands—a strategy termed “Dekompositionspolitik”—
they were at odds with the considerably more powerful Ludendorff, who did not trust the League 
and intended to annex only parts of Poland and the Baltic lands to the German Empire, leaving 
the bulk of Ukraine at Russia’s mercy. (The German Foreign Office remained cautious about 
exploiting stateless nationalisms in general, refusing to back a worldwide league of nationalities 
that would have included the anti-British Irish, Egyptians, and others, yet posed the risk of 
inadvertently undermining Austria-Hungary.) Still, high-placed advocates of Ukrainian 
independence existed in Germany, and resources badly needed for revolution making were 
available there. Dontsov, for his part, considered Germany not only a means to an end—
Ukrainian statehood—but also the paragon of European civilization and culture.  
Sincere though their patriotism doubtless was, the extent to which Dontsov and the other 
members of the League and its affiliate organizations in Switzerland actually represented their 
respective nationalities proved to be low. In March 1917, when revolution broke out in the 
Russian Empire, the League’s leaders—acting as émigré double agents, individual eccentrics, 
and free-lance diplomats—proved out of touch with their countrymen in Russia, and thus unable 
to locate, let alone coordinate with, the nationalist cells and networks allegedly in existence 
there.101 (This is exactly what Dontsov had accused the SVU of in 1915.) As of mid 1917, the 
Central and Eastern Ukrainians to whom Dontsov or Stepankivs’kyi might have appealed 
remained overwhelmingly in favor of national autonomy and federation with Russia, as opposed 
to the outright secession advocated by the League. But the prevailing opinion in Kyiv changed 
rapidly in favor of Ukrainian independence in the course of the following year, which brought 
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the replacement of the Provisional Government by Bolshevik-Soviet power in Russia (both 
regimes were openly hostile to Ukrainian federalists and separatists), the birth of the first modern 
Ukrainian nation-state (albeit short-lived), and the Central Powers’ victory on the Eastern Front, 
soon to be overshadowed and nullified by their defeat on the Western Front.      
 
The Hetmanate  
     
The February Revolution of 1917 set off a chain of events that led to the appearance of 
the Ukrainian People’s Republic (UNR) and its governing body, the Central Rada—a 
parliamentary council of Ukrainian intellectuals and activists in Kyiv. They were the liberal 
socialist Ukrainophiles—Hrushevs’kyi, Vynnychenko, Petliura, and others—whom Dontsov had 
begun denouncing at the war’s outset for what he regarded as their self-defeating and servile 
fealty to Russia. Facing the hostility of the Russian Provisional Government, the Bolshevik-
dominated Soviet regime that ousted it in November 1917, and the Russian imperialist White 
movement that emerged in opposition to the Communist takeover, this fledgling Ukrainian 
nation-state evolved from its original calls for a free and equal socialist federation of the Russian 
empire’s nationalities on June 7, 1917, toward a declaration of full independence on January 25, 
1918 (the so-called Fourth Universal). The latter came in response to the escalating Ukrainian-
Soviet War (1917-1921), conventionally regarded as one of many theaters in the broader Russian 
Civil War. Scrambling to reassemble whatever it could of the old Russian Empire, yet 
simultaneously withdrawing from the war with the Central Powers, the new Soviet regime 
decried the Central Rada as bourgeois, counterrevolutionary, and illegitimate, proffering its own 
Leninist version of national self-determination and inciting the largely Russian working class of 
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Ukraine’s cities to revolt.102 The Bolsheviks first attempted to declare a Ukrainian Soviet 
Republic unsuccessfully in Kyiv, and then, successfully, in the eastern city of Kharkiv (the 
capital of Soviet Ukraine until 1934) on December 26, 1917. From Kharkiv paramilitary “Red 
Guard” formations launched a campaign against the UNR, which failed to raise an army capable 
of resisting the attack and soon began hemorrhaging territory to the Bolsheviks. Besieged in the 
Ukrainian capital by early February, the leaders of the UNR were compelled to turn to the 
Central Powers, which they had by and large dutifully opposed (as loyalists to Petrograd) since 
the beginning of the war.103 Meanwhile, the German Foreign Office intensified its pro-Ukrainian 
propaganda efforts, hoping to further destabilize what remained of the Russian Empire.104  
The peace negotiations between Germany, Austria-Hungary, the UNR, and Soviet Russia 
took place against this backdrop and culminated in the first (Ukrainian-German) Treaty of Brest-
Litovsk on February 9, 1918, and the second (Russian-German) Treaty of Brest-Litovsk on 
March 3, 1918. Taken together, the agreements formalized the German annexation of the Baltic 
countries, the end of (Soviet) Russia’s involvement in the First World War, and the recognition 
of Ukraine’s independence as a German-Austrian protectorate by the Central Powers and 
Petrograd.105 The delegates of the UNR (Mykola Liubyns’kyi, Mykola Levyts’kyi, Oleksandr 
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Sevriuk, and Vsevolod Holubovych) immediately established a good rapport with the 
Germans—represented at the peace talks by General Max Hoffmann (1869-1927), one of the few 
German commanders fluent in Russian and sympathetic to the Ukrainian cause, and the 
industrialist Richard Kühlmann (1873-1948), Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs since Arthur 
Zimmermann’s resignation in June 1917. Outmaneuvered by their Ukrainian counterparts, the 
Soviet delegates Lev Trotsky and Lev Kamenev were forced into recognizing the UNR despite 
the unfolding Ukrainian-Soviet War. Enjoying final say in such matters, Erich Ludendorff agreed 
to a “peace for bread” (Brotfrieden), which promised military assistance to the UNR, should the 
Central Rada publicly request it, in exchange for large tributes of food from Ukrainian 
agriculture and coal from the Donbas region (supplies desperately needed by the Germans). The 
even weaker Austrian government, represented by Foreign Minister Count Ottokar Czernin 
(1872-1932), reluctantly consented to the deal despite misgivings about Ukrainian claims to East 
Galicia and related fears of upsetting the Poles.106  
Thanks to the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, the Central Powers could now call themselves the 
“liberators” of Ukraine from Russian and Bolshevik tyranny, and Ukrainian separatists could 
now claim political independence from Petrograd and the support of powerful European friends. 
The German-Austrian occupation of Ukraine ended the Red Guards’ incursions into the country, 
but forced the UNR into a reluctant military alliance with Vienna and Berlin, whose conservative 
leadership generally regarded Ukrainian statehood only as a means to their ends and distrusted 
the Central Rada almost as much as they did the Russian Bolsheviks (whom they had also 
________________________ 
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bankrolled). Still, the Germans’ decision to help build an independent Ukraine as a bulwark 
against Russia confirmed Dontsov’s convictions that such a state could be born with the help of 
the Central Powers, and that the recognition of Ukraine’s independence by the international 
community might be secured through the peace process.  
 
Figure 2.2. Ukraine during World War I. Source: Paul Magosci, Ukraine: A Historical Atlas 
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1985), 21. 
 
But Dontsov did not make it to Russian Ukraine until March 1918, after the beginning of 
the German-Austrian occupation.107 Thus, he did not participate in the peace talks that led to the 
recognition of Ukraine’s independence by Soviet Russia, Germany, Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria, 
and the Ottoman Empire. It is not clear why he postponed his return for the negotiations, for 
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which he had spent the preceding three years preparing. (In any event, his historical arguments 
for Ukrainian statehood ended up being quite irrelevant to the proceedings.) Dontsov apparently 
had planned to travel to Kyiv via Stockholm to gather Ukrainian constituents and launch a 
propaganda campaign for an immediate peace treaty in the spring of 1917.108 He allegedly had 
high hopes of heading the new Ukrainian government’s press agency.109 But despite the Austrian 
authorities’ reported willingness to support this venture he remained in Bern, Switzerland, and 
Austrian-controlled L’viv. Dontsov later claimed to have unsuccessfully sought Archduke 
Wilhelm’s assistance to return to Kyiv sooner,110 but it seems likely that he avoided embroiling 
himself in Ukrainian politics earlier for reasons other than a lack of means. He had, after all, 
burned whatever bridges there were between himself and the USDRP and Socialist 
Revolutionaries in power in the Central Rada. His connection to life in the Ukrainian capital had 
weakened during his decade abroad, and the situation there had changed dramatically in his 
absence. Instead of joining the Ukrainian Revolution, Dontsov resumed his publicistic work in 
L’viv, completing his law degree there in August 1917. His absence during the birth pangs of the 
UNR prompted accusations of cowardice, betrayal, and irresponsibility from his former USDRP 
comrade, Volodymyr Vynnychenko (then prime minister of the Central Rada).111  
Whatever his motives for avoiding the UNR in its troubled infancy, Dontsov revised his 
ideology to match the swiftly changing times. Following the comparative-historical method—the 
idea that laws of human development can be discerned and extrapolated from the comparison of 
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phenomena in neighboring and otherwise analogous regions (a relic of nineteenth-century 
positivist thinking that Dontsov nevertheless returned to throughout his career)112—he developed 
an increasingly nationalistic set of values and predictions in the course of the First World War. 
The string of successes enjoyed by national liberation movements in the Balkans and East 
Central Europe convinced him that Ukraine, too, was destined to have a successful national 
revolution and gain independence.113  
Reflecting on the emerging European order and the intensifying Ukrainian-Russia 
conflict, Dontsov proclaimed the dawn of a new “national era” that would supplant the old 
politics of imperialism, liberalism, and socialism.114 With the exception of Ukraine’s easternmost 
regions, he argued, the Ukrainian people instinctively opposed Russia, a destroyer of national 
cultures and a menace to the entire civilized world. Russia was the number-one enemy of the 
Polish nation as well, and the greater threat beside which the localized Ukrainian-Polish conflict 
over East Galicia paled. Like Poland, Ukraine would be a better state for Europe to deal with 
than Russia on key issues, such as the fate of Danzig and the Dardanelles, because it sought 
international dialog rather than constant wars of expansion. “The disintegration of Russian 
power, its breakdown into many centers of political thought and will, therefore lies in the most 
                                                
112 Dmytro Dontsov, Dvi literatury nashoi doby (Lviv: Prosvita, 1991), 171. 
 
113 Volodymyr Holovchenko, Vid “Samostiinoi Ukrainy” do Soiuzu Vyzvolennya Ukrainy: narysy z istorii 
ukrains’koi sotsial-demokratii pochatku XX st. (Kharkiv: Maidan, 1996), 133. Iryna Shlikhta insists, however, that 
methodology was not the main thing for Dontsov, citing the memoirs of Nadiia Syrovtsova, a colleague of 
Dontsov’s in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Ukrainian State (Hetmanate), who writes that “reading various 
literature, [Dontsov] took excerpts, and there was a big card file. Then, when it was time to write some work, he 
simple ‘pulled out’ the appropriate citations from the card file, from here came the brilliant wave of citations in 
various languages.” Nadiia Surovtsova, Spohady (Kyiv: Vydavnytsvo imeni Oleny Telihy, 1996), 146. On the 
syncretic haphazardness of Dontsov’s “method” also see Motyl, Turn to the Right, 67-68. 
 
114 Von einem Ukrainer, “Die separatistische Bewegung der Ukraine,” Neue Zürcher Zeitung 1467 (August 10, 
1917). Republished in Ukrainian as Dmytro Dontsov, “Separystychnyi rukh na Ukraine,” Shliakhy, no. 3-4 (1917) in 
Dontsov, Vybrani tvory, vol. 1, 256. 
 
  140 
specific interests of the European world.”115 An independent Ukraine would thus ensure the end 
of the expansionist projects that had bathed Eastern and Central Europe in blood. He used 
rhetoric of this sort to drum up support for Ukrainian-Teutonic cooperation, first against tsarist 
and then against revolutionary Petrograd, which he lambasted in a series of articles depicting 
Miliukov as an impotent liberal anachronism, Alexander Kerensky as the “Don Quixote of the 
Revolution,” and Lenin as a dangerous “Russian Torquemada” (a reference to the infamous 
Grand Inquisitor of fifteenth-century Spain).116  
Dontsov’s views on what defined the stateless Ukrainian nation and what it might 
become with (or as) a state differed from the strictly ethnographic and racialist ones he later 
adopted. It was, rather, a territorial, geopolitical conception of Ukraine—a frontier between two 
mutually hostile civilizations, faced with the choice “either/or”—that guided his thinking at this 
time. “We must be statesmen more than nationalists,” he wrote in 1918, “remembering that the 
Jew, the Pole, or the Moskal who stands firmly on the foundation of Ukrainian statehood is a 
better support for it than Ukrainians who dream about federation.”117 Dontsov derided Russian 
politics, society, and culture as an aberration from the legal-democratic path of development 
exhibited by Western countries—the ideal that he expected Ukraine to follow as a matter of 
course at this time118—but Dontsov’s Russophobia did not disclose the ethnic and racialist 
overtones that it later would. Russianness was a state of mind, a mode of politics, and a negation 
of the national idea, not a nationality. He professed to favor a democratic form of government 
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that “wants to raise the masses to the ideals [of the individual],” and not the Russian one, which 
seeks “to lower these ideals to the desires and tastes of the uncivilized masses.”119  
The question of whether the state preceded the nation or vice versa remained muddled in 
Dontsov’s thinking (one could find excerpts that suggest he held both positions between 1914 
and 1918) but he praised Ukrainians for the “miracle” of having created the kind of civil society 
needed to follow the Western path, despite lacking a state, and thereby demonstrating their high 
level of civic awareness and activeness.120 By contrast, the weakness of civil society and the 
overbearing strength of the state in Russia combined, paradoxically, to generate a tendency 
toward “anarchism.” Dontsov attributed this to the Russian “psyche,” characterized by a lack of 
self-discipline, self-respect, and respect for others, as well as the essence of Russian 
civilization—a barbaric culture that allegedly enslaved all its estates.121 Dontsov blamed all these 
ills on Russia’s geography, the inexhaustibility of its human and natural resources, and the 
merger of the individual with the collective (manifest in the repartitional commune, the Russian 
Orthodox Church, and other collectivistic institutions).122 The centuries-long repression of 
political dissent bred an obsequious idiocy in the Russian populace, even in their moments of 
revolt. Russia’s mystical conception of “the people,” its near-perfect obliteration of 
individualism, its messianic faith in the justness and inevitability of world domination by itself 
alone (“the Third Rome”); all of it forced Ukrainians to turn west. “We do not have an enemy in 
the system, in tsarism, in Kadetism, or in Bolshevism [but] only in that from which tsarism, 
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Kadetism, and Bolshevism emanate.”123 After the Bolsheviks had taken power, Dontsov repeated 
the idea that the problem was the insidious culture of despotism underlying the Russian state, not 
the form that it happened to take at any given moment.124  
Dontsov’s understanding of nation and nationalism evolved on the basis of his analysis 
and comparison of the Russian and Ukrainian cases. In the former, he identified two strains: an 
“official” “bureaucratic” nationalism, designed to serve the imperial state but largely incapable 
of inspiring non-Russians to action, and a more dangerous popular or social one, based on an 
ambivalently ethnic conception of Russianness that claimed, at a minimum, all Orthodox East 
Slavs.125 The greatest peril, he thought, was a synthesis of the two: “Tragedy and comedy at 
once. The struggle of a caste for its privilege alongside a nation that wants to struggle with all the 
peoples of Russia against this caste, but also against all foreign peoples with the same caste.”126 
Dontsov’s prewar and wartime writings generally linked nationalism with democracy, but he 
regarded Russian nationalism as an instrument of imperialism and tyranny, irrespective of 
whatever its proponents called themselves. While a surfeit of statism perverted Russian 
nationalism, the lack of a state and a political elite prevented Ukrainian nationalism from getting 
off the ground. In a particularly controversial essay from 1917, “The Bastard Nation” (Narid-
Bastard), Dontsov formulated a Darwinian yet subjectivist definition of nationhood: “The nation 
is created not by ethnographic independence, not by ancientness of origin, not forms—only that 
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mystical force (mystical because the reasons for it are not clear), which is called ‘the will to life,’ 
the will to create a single collective individuality among the races.”127 By this definition, Ukraine 
had not yet become a nation at all—a task that would fall to a new elite of parental figures who 
could discipline, educate, and organize the orphaned Ukrainian ethnos.128    
In search of such leaders, Dontsov found the Ukrainian Democratic-Agrarian Party 
(Ukrains’ka demokratychno-khliborobs’ka partiia, or UDKhP), embracing its nationalist, 
conservative, monarchist, and ostensibly propeasant yet authoritarian statist ideology. The 
party’s ideological leaders were Mykola Mikhnovs’kyi and Viacheslav Lypyns’kyi, both of 
whom Dontsov had already known and admired for years. As a student he had read 
Mikhnovs’kyi’s famous 1905 pamphlet, Samostiina Ukraina (Independent Ukraine), and 
claimed that it exerted a decisive influence on him.129 Still, he retained a certain critical distance 
from Mikhnovs’kyi’s ideas, writing in 1918 that Samostiina Ukraina is “an idealistic mistake 
that rests only upon historical tradition” (namely, the rights promised to the Ukrainian Cossacks 
in the 1654 Treaty of Pereiaslav yet subsequently violated by the Tsardom of Muscovy).130 This 
was a charge that Dontsov could easily have leveled at himself for having devoted the preceding 
three years to researching the international agreements and alliances of the early-modern 
Ukrainian Hetmanate, as if these were pertinent to twentieth-century diplomacy. The more 
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influential figure, for Dontsov and for the UDKhP, was Lypyns’kyi, who drafted the party’s 
program to solve the land question through the state’s purchase of Ukraine’s latifundia to be 
leased to poor peasants and agrarian cooperatives, leaving middle-sized landholdings to remain 
in private hands.131 The UDKhP followed Lypyns’kyi in declaring itself an advocate of private 
property, Ukrainian national sovereignty, and the interests of Ukraine’s landowners as well as 
peasants—positions that put it decidedly at odds with the Ukrainian SRs and SDs. Though not 
always in synch politically and ideologically, Lypyns’kyi and Dontsov worked closely together 
in 1918, remaining on good terms until the early 1920s (after which their views, tactics, and 
circles diverged considerably, bringing their friendship and collaboration to an end). Like 
Dontsov, Lypyns’kyi entrenched himself in the Germanic world, becoming the Ukrainian state’s 
ambassador to Austria-Hungary in 1918 and living between Vienna and Berlin for the rest of his 
life.132   
During the First World War, Dontsov came to share many of Lypyns’kyi’s ideas, 
including: 1) a cyclical yet nondeterministic conception of history and civilizations; 2) an 
emphasis on agriculture, territorial patriotism, and the reassimilation of Ukraine’s native yet 
Polonized or Russified aristocracy as the basis for a Ukrainian national rebirth; 3) the desirability 
of social stratification and nondemocratic or “classocratic” forms of government, based on iron 
discipline and unity of purpose; 4) the primacy of the will over the intellect, and the political 
inefficacy of appeals to reason; and 5) the belief that the church should serve as an autonomous 
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source of the nation’s moral and cultural strength. Dontsov concurred with Lypyns’kyi’s critique 
of the leftwing Ukrainian intelligentsia and the Central Rada in particular, but tended to prefer 
the populist view that nations precede and invent states, not vice versa.133 Before Ukraine could 
become a state, Dontsov thought, it must become a nation (that is, Ukrainian people must be 
made to desire that they become a “collective individuality”). Lypyns’kyi took the opposing, 
“statist” perspective—the Ukrainian nation would have to be built from the top down, starting 
with the creation of a new ruling class, drawn from the ranks of the country’s gentry, and the 
immediate dismissal of the current Ukrainian government.  
By the time Dontsov finally returned to Kyiv in March 1918, he, Lypyns’kyi, the 
UDKhP, and the German military’s occupation regime had reason to be dissatisfied with the 
Central Rada’s performance. The UNR’s socialist agrarian reforms, which redistributed land to 
the peasants (or encouraged them to seize it independently), created disorder, lowered 
productivity, and interfered with deliveries of grain. Conversely, the military occupation and the 
requisitions embittered farmers, turning them against the Germans and the Central Rada, and 
weakening both. Despite assurances that the German intervention would not interfere in 
Ukraine’s internal governance and operations (apart from the railroads)—that they were 
“friendly guests” who would leave when asked to do so, just as they were invited—Erich 
Ludendorff and the Supreme Army Command quickly grew impatient with the Central Rada, 
which they had never trusted. Frequently in conflict with the civil, political, and diplomatic 
authorities of the Foreign Office and the Imperial Chancellery, yet indisputably in charge on the 
Eastern Front, Ludendorff appointed Field Marshall Hermann von Eichhorn (1848-1918) chief of 
German forces in Ukraine, but delegated most decision-making to General Wilhelm Groener 
(1867-1939), who was dispatched to relieve General Max Hoffman (one of the few high-ranking 
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German officers with expertise in Russian and Eastern European matters).134 The Foreign Office 
nevertheless insisted on the appointment of Alfons Mumm von Schwarzenstein (1859-1954) as 
the Reich’s ambassador to Kyiv to act as a moderating influence on Ludendorff and the Supreme 
Army Command. (Mumm had served as director of the Central Propaganda Agency in Berlin 
since the outbreak of the war.) Further complicating matters were the conflicts between the 
Germans and the Austrians, who administered their own occupation zone in Southern Ukraine 
and had their own candidate for the Ukrainian throne, Archduke Wilhelm von Habsburg (then an 
officer in the Ukrainian Sich Riflemen [Sichovi stril’tsi]135 fighting against Bolshevik forces).  
The Central Powers’ armies and the Central Rada soon began losing control over the 
countryside. Responding to the mounting anti-German sentiment of the Ukrainian peasantry, 
Groener censured the Rada and recommended the use of force to carry out grain requisitions. 
Ludendorff pushed for the restoration of land to the former noble owners, hoping to intensify 
agricultural production and simplify extraction to the German home front, but the Rada refused 
to yield. The militarization of the seizure of Ukrainian food began in April 1918, sparking armed 
resistance against the occupation and the police of the UNR. Retaliation was disproportionate 
and indiscriminate, with Eichhorn declaring German and Austrian courts martial legitimate in 
cases relating to “public order.” The number of death sentences handed down in such trials rose. 
Fearing the growth of Ukrainian military power, Mumm and Groener forced the Rada to dissolve 
the German- and Austrian-sponsored volunteer divisions that had participated in the liberation of 
the country. With Ukrainian-German relations rapidly deteriorating, Mumm considered replacing 
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the Rada but hesitated. Nevertheless, Mumm tentatively distanced himself from both the leftist 
Rada and the idea of Ukrainian independence. As of mid-April, Eichhorn, Groener, and the 
Supreme Army Command had embraced the idea of a bloodless coup d’état that would put a 
more cooperative and efficient dictatorship in charge, and begun the search for native co-
conspirators.                           
Lypyns’kyi’s state-building (as opposed to nation-building) prescriptions carried the day 
on April 29, 1918, when the German occupation regime and the UDKhP conspired to remove the 
Central Rada from power and declare Pavlo Skoropads’kyi (1873-1945) hetman of Ukraine. 
Skoropads’kyi was an aristocratic Ukrainian Cossack, aide-de-camp of Tsar Nicholas II, and 
decorated general in the Imperial Russian Army who had nevertheless been active in the 
Ukrainian national movement since the February Revolution. He returned to Kyiv at the 
beginning of the German occupation, later claiming in his memoirs to have organized the putsch 
himself, presenting the Germans with a “fait accompli.” Skoropads’kyi exaggerated: although he 
and the Central Powers did work toward the Rada’s ouster independently of one another, the 
Germans provided the military means of carrying out and sustaining the hetman’s rule, and, 
despite initial pledges of neutrality, heavily interfered in how he governed throughout the 
alliance, which lasted until the end of the war on the Western Front (November 11, 1918).136 The 
conspirers renamed the Ukrainian People’s Republic to the “Ukrainian State,” or the Hetmanate.  
The UDKhP supported the plot from its inception, jostling to position itself as the 
political and ideological foundation of the Hetman’s dictatorship. These were the first 
“Hetmanites”—a conservative monarchist strain of Ukrainian nationalism that would survive 
until Skoropads’kyi’s death near the end of the Second World War. Having returned to Kyiv, 
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Dontsov worked his way into the UDKhP’s leadership and embraced its ideology. Vynnychenko 
alleged that Dontsov personally took part in the anti-Rada conspiracy to put Skoropads’kyi in 
power, but his actual role in the coup, if any, is unclear.137 The Hetmanites’ publications after 
1921 do not support Vynnychenko’s claim.138 In any event, Dontsov enthusiastically supported 
Skoropads’kyi and his government from the outset. He recorded his impressions of the general in 
his diary, 1918, Kyiv—a key source for understanding Dontsov’s role in the Hetmanate despite 
the fact that he did not publish it until 1954, with any number of omissions and revisions made to 
fit the times and shield the author’s legacy. Given his opposition to the hetman and his followers 
after the war, however, we can take Dontsov at his word when he claims to have seen in 
Skoropads’kyi a politically courageous and ambitious individual amid a morass of “demo-
socialist leadership”; a man of war who might have become Ukraine’s Napoleon—the creator of 
a new “ruling caste” capable of bringing both the “Jacobins” and the “Monarchists” into line.139  
The realities of the Hetmanate, however, quickly disillusioned Ukrainian nationalists 
such as Dontsov. The Hetmanate’s attempts to juggle German, Ukrainian, and Russian interests 
on the left and the right posed intractable problems. Skoropads’kyi was not only beholden to and 
dependent upon Berlin, but was also a product of the conservative officer class of the defunct 
Imperial Russian Army. Unmoored Russian officers—most famously the talented future White 
Army General Pyotr Wrangel—rallied around the hetman and the Ukrainian State, not out of 
sympathy for Ukrainian independence or German ambitions in the east, but in hopes of living to 
defeat the Bolsheviks who had exiled them from Russia’s heartland and, ultimately, to 
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reconstitute the Russian Empire and the Romanov dynasty.140 Despite being agents of the 
Ukrainian State, the hetman’s cabinet of ministers and advisors thus had a markedly Russian, 
Russophile, and Russophone makeup.  
One important exception was Dmytro Doroshenko (1882-1951), who served as foreign 
minister and faced the (ultimately impossible) task of reconciling the regime’s contradictory pro-
Ukrainian, pro-German, and pro-Russian elements and tendencies.141 Of noble Ukrainian 
Cossack origins, Doroshenko had been a member of the liberal democratic Ukrainian Party of 
Socialist Federalists (UPSF), which supported federal ties between Ukraine and the Russian 
Republic, but resigned from the party to join the hetman’s foreign ministry, betraying his 
comrades in the Ukrainian intelligentsia and the Central Rada. Given Skoropads’kyi’s reliance 
on tsarist, conservative connections from the officer corps, including ultranationalist Black 
Hundreds, the Ukrainian State also adopted a rightwing orientation that alienated the 
predominantly socialist, liberal, and democratic political culture of the Ukrainian intelligentsia. 
The hetman tried and failed to bring representatives of the Ukrainian left (including Socialist 
Federalists, Socialist Revolutionaries, and Social Democrats) into his government. Patriotic, they 
naturally resented Skoropads’kyi as a military dictator in thrall to German invaders, but without 
their help badly needed agrarian reforms and outreach efforts among the discontented Ukrainian 
peasantry could not get off the ground.  
Pressure on the hetman to politically and linguistically “Ukrainize” his government, its 
largely Russian-speaking bureaucracy, and Ukrainian society at large came from the German 
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occupation authorities, who wanted their client state to a have a broad and firm base of support. 
In order to overcome barriers to communication that hindered the day-to-day operations of the 
Hetmanate (especially food deliveries) and damaged its relations with the country’s peasant 
majority and nationally conscious leftwing elite, Ukrainian was to become the national language 
of the state and education. But most of what remained of the old regime’s local government 
carried on using Russian out of habit or did not know Ukrainian at all, and there was a dearth of 
Ukrainian speakers qualified for administrative work to replace them.142 Demands for the 
Ukrainization of the hetman’s regime also came from the Ukrainian National-State Union 
(UNDS)—an umbrella organization of pro-Ukrainian political actors, many of whom supported 
the Central Rada—but their vision of nation-building, based on agrarian socialism, was anathema 
to that of the hetman, his conservative allies, and much of the German military leadership. 
Hoping to transcend these divisions and win over Ukrainian nationalists, the German Foreign 
Office organized a visit to Kyiv by Paul Rohrbach and Axel Schmidt, another well-known pro-
Ukrainian academic from Berlin. The weeklong affair convinced Rohrbach that the hetman was, 
“at the bottom of his heart, more Russian than Ukrainian,” having “always looked with an eye to 
Moscow,” and that the Hetmanate was “of Great Russian orientation and is endeavoring to lead 
Ukraine back to Moscow. It simply cannot be trusted, since it is composed mainly of Kadets. 
These people have clearly shown themselves as enemies of Ukraine not only during the Tsarist 
regime but since the Revolution as well.”143 Although Rohrbach accused Mumm of disqualifying 
ignorance on Ukrainian matters, the latter approved of the agrarian reform and Ukrainian 
                                                
142 Borislav Chernev, “Ukrainization and Its Contradictions in the Context of the Brest-Litovsk System,” in Lohr, 
Tolz, Semyonov, and von Hagen, The Empire and Nationalism at War, 163-88. 
 
143 Paul Rohrbach, Um des Teufels Handschrift: Zwei Menschenalter erlebter Weltgeschichte (Hamburg: Hand 
Dulk, 1953), 220-21. Quoted in Fedyshyn, Germany’s Drive to the East, 152-53. 
 
  151 
national education system proposed in Rohrbach’s report to the Imperial Chancellery. Mumm 
even stipulated that the hetman’s compliance in this nation-building program was a requirement 
for continued German support. Skoropad’skyi acquiesced.  
 
Figure 2.3. Hetman Skoropads’kyi flanked by Generals Ludendorff (right) and Hindenburg (left), 
September 9, 1918. Source: Geiser Theodore Collection, Imperial War Museum. 
 
Precedents for the targeted, German-sponsored “nationalization” or “indigenization” of 
nations in wartime Eastern Europe already existed in Ober Ost—the military state overseeing the 
German-occupied areas of Poland and the Baltic coast. The “Kultur program,” which historian 
Vejas Liulevicius describes as a colonial-utopian “civilizing” mission, sought the creation of 
subordinate states and peoples that would be “German in content, ethnic in form.”144 Benighted 
local cultures would be permitted to flourish outwardly while accepting the imposition of 
purportedly superior Teutonic management, military discipline, and cultural and technological 
gifts. The Germans implemented this program (a predecessor to subsequent Soviet indigenization 
policies) later and more haphazardly in Ukraine and with even more dubious results.   
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In the course of the summer and fall of 1918, the hetman and the Germans charged 
Dontsov with carrying these Ukrainization efforts forward. Although he later decried Soviet 
Ukrainization as a cynical ploy, Dontsov approved of the idea of synthesizing German Kultur 
with the promotion of Ukrainian national consciousness through schools, newspapers, and 
government under the Hetmanate. On May 24 he became director of the Ukrainian State’s 
Ukrainian Telegraph Agency (UTA) and press bureau, overseeing the production and 
dissemination of propaganda and news in support of the Hetmanate and the German-Austrian 
occupation. He took the position shortly after Doroshenko’s dismissal, which followed demands 
by the UNDS for a pro-Ukrainian change of cadres at the highest level.145 Skoropads’kyi 
regularly consulted Dontsov on matters of Ukrainization and Russification, as well as the 
regime’s relations with the Central Powers, Russians, Bolsheviks, and peasants. Hoping to reach 
the latter, the Hetman ordered Dontsov to develop a publication to rally the peasantry around the 
Ukrainian State. The result was Selians’ke slovo (The Village Word), which broadcasted the 
prohetman ideology and activities of the UDKhP into the countryside, seeking to build a broad-
based party of conservative nationalist peasants, landowners, and intellectuals. To this end 
Dontsov had the support and counsel of Lypyns’kyi—the hetman’s newly appointed ambassador 
to Vienna—and Mikhnovs’kyi. In his diary, Dontsov recorded his advocacy for state censorship 
of the (competing) democratic press during meetings around the hetman’s table.146 He argued, 
moreover, that German outreach to the Ukrainian population should be conducted in Ukrainian, 
not Russian, and that every effort must be made to defend the Ukrainian State from both the 
Whites and the Reds. Dontsov’s opposition to Ukraine’s federation with Russia and insistence 
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upon the use of Ukrainian provoked attacks from Russian-language papers in Kyiv of the right 
and the left, including Kievskaia mysl’ (Kievan Thought) and Rabochaia zhizn'’ (Workers’ Life).  
Dontsov exhibited hostility toward Ukraine’s Jews, regarding them as inherently pro-
Russian, pro-Bolshevik, and anti-Ukrainian fifth columnists, yet some critics mocked his press 
bureau as “the all-Jewish congress of the Russian press in Ukraine.”147 The Ukrainian Social 
Democratic press charged that Dontsov secretly harbored pro-Russian sentiments, pointing to his 
collaboration with the hetman.148 But his rapport with influential Germans and Austrians, such as 
Archduke Wilhelm and Paul Rohrbach, made Dontsov a valuable asset despite the controversy 
he courted. The hetman even regarded him as a candidate for the position of minister of foreign 
affairs. Still, the occupation authorities were not always pleased with Dontsov’s performance. 
General Groener complained to Skoropads’kyi that the UTA gave too much attention to 
disturbances in the provinces (which were embarrassing for the regime), and not enough to 
drumming up support for the Hetmanate. Dontsov answered that he was between “a hammer and 
an anvil” at the press bureau—on the one hand was the “Jewish-Russian press,” on the other 
were the Germans, who, he thought, were angry at the shortage of pro-German advertisements 
broadcasted by the UTA.149 He nevertheless took great pride in his ability to communicate 
effectively in German, which he thought distinguished him from “amateurs,” such as 
Doroshenko and Zhuk.150 With the “Great Ukrainian Jacquerie” raging in the provinces, Dontsov 
felt alone in his emphasis on the peasantry living outside the capital and the need for a new party 
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to represent and mobilize them, while his collaborators, such as Mikhnovs’kyi, regarded Kyiv as 
the site of the most important political work to be done.151  
Dontsov weighed in on other debates, such as the future of the Crimean peninsula, which 
the grand strategists of the German Empire coveted and which Russian nationalists considered 
their sacred patrimony. Much to the annoyance of interested Germans and Russians, Dontsov 
gave speeches and published articles calling Crimea an “integral part of Ukraine” that, given its 
enormous strategic importance, should be granted neither autonomy nor democracy.152 The ideal 
Ukrainian nation-state would take the form of a strong, centralized, authoritarian government 
expanding from the Kuban region (north of the Caucasus), to Kholm (Polish: Chełm) and East 
Galicia. (The former ultimately went to interwar Soviet Russia, while the Second Polish 
Republic acquired the latter two provinces.) Dontsov was steadfast in his opposition to 
democratic federalism, which many powerful figures within the Hetmanate continued to 
advocate, preferring a military dictatorship.  
Another pressing and related matter was the need for a large Ukrainian army loyal to the 
Hetman and ready to halt the threats posed by the Whites, who enjoyed the support of the 
Entente powers, and the Reds, who were already making gains in the unfolding Russian Civil 
War. Dontsov may have resented Skoropads’kyi’s other advisors, who called for “peaceful 
negotiations with the Bolsheviks,”153 but he participated in the temporarily successful peace talks 
with the Petrograd Soviet between May 23 and October 7.154 The German Army’s refusal to 
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permit, let alone support, the creation of an independent military for the Ukrainian State forced 
Dontsov and his allies, above all Colonel Ievhen Konovalets’—leader of the Sich Riflemen 
disarmed by their erstwhile German and Austrian sponsors for refusing to back the hetman’s 
coup—to plan for the imminent siege of Kyiv in secret.155 Meanwhile, the domestic and 
international position of the Hetmanate continued to deteriorate: the Germans were losing on the 
Western Front, the Entente was not interested in Ukrainian independence, and internal opposition 
to Skoropads’kyi was gaining steam. The followers of Symon Petliura (who had risen to the rank 
of Chief Otaman of the UNR’s Army and led the defense of Kyiv from the Red Guard only to be 
jailed under Skoropads’kyi) organized themselves into a variety of regular and irregular armed 
units to struggle against the hetman, the Germans, and the Bolsheviks, and restore the UNR to 
power. Further complicating the situation was the anarchist leader Nestor Makhno and his 
Revolutionary Insurrectionary Army, which fiercely battled the Whites, Reds, Germans, and 
Ukrainian nationalists alike, and soon carved out the so-called Free Territory, an experiment in 
stateless libertarian communism, in southeastern Ukraine (Dontsov’s home region). Dontsov 
especially feared the latter movement, Makhnovshchyna, regarding the black flag of anarchism 
as a harbinger of chaos and ruin, and the antithesis of his own worldview.  
Trepidations of disorder and collapse were well founded among supporters of the 
Hetmanate during the summer of 1918. On July 30 the Russian Socialist-Revolutionary Boris 
Donskoi assassinated Field Marshal Eichhorn, commander of the German occupation of Ukraine. 
Demands for repression, high-profile arrests, gunfights and explosions in the streets, and general 
confusion followed. Dontsov watched the bedlam from his balcony in downtown Kyiv, blaming 
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the Entente, the Reds, the Whites, and the Poles, working together or independently, for the 
outburst of sabotage and unrest.156 Simultaneously, Lypyns’kyi reported that Vienna, despite 
rumors of backing the young Archduke Wilhelm’s ascension to the “throne” in Kyiv, had 
entirely withdrawn its support for Ukrainian nation-building—especially with regard to Kholm 
and East Galicia—leaving the Hetmanate with only the German Empire on which to rely.157 But 
the position of Ukrainian independence faced new challenges in Berlin too, and from the most 
embarrassing sources. On August 22, Fedir Lyzohub, prime minister of the Ukrainian State, gave 
an interview to the liberal newspaper Berliner Tageblatt in which he discussed a future 
Ukrainian-Russian federation as a desirable possibility, invoking the 1654 Treaty of Pereiaslav. 
The interview outraged Dontsov. Declaring it a “causus belli,” he demanded Lyzohub’s 
dismissal or a public retraction, to no avail.158 According to Dontsov, the German military 
command and the hetman’s court adopted an increasingly Russophile, federalist outlook from 
September, while Ukraine’s hedonistic would-be statesmen, seemingly incapable of serious work 
even in the face of ruin, danced and drank.159  
By early October the defeat of the Central Powers appeared inevitable, as peace 
negotiations—and preparations for new wars—to determine Eastern Europe’s future got 
underway. The German Reich accepted Wilson’s Fourteen Points but, hoping to retain its gains 
on the Eastern Front, promised to withdraw its troops only on the condition that the status quo 
post-Brest-Litovsk be maintained there. This included preservation of Ukraine’s independence 
from Russia and, problematically, the reign of Skoropads’kyi, who lurched toward the Russian 
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right despite renewed pressure to Ukrainize his cabinet and implement agrarian reforms.160 As 
rumors of an impending withdrawal of the demoralized German and Austrian troops stationed in 
Ukraine spread, the White movement (represented in Kyiv by Pavel Miliukov) grew bolder, 
organizing large demonstrations in Kyiv, amassing volunteers, and attacking Ukrainian 
nationalist groups in the provinces. In response, Dontsov claims to have added his voice to 
German demands for immediate land reforms and a recomposition of the hetman’s cabinet. He 
urged representatives of five Ukrainian newspapers to launch a campaign against the Russian 
organization of landowners.161 An emergency quorum of the UDKhP’s leadership, including 
Mikhnovs’kyi and Dontsov, resolved to lobby the hetman and the occupation authorities for the 
deportation of pro-Russian agitators, the dispersal of pro-Russian forces, and the closure of pro-
Russian newspapers. Skoropads’kyi was convinced, however, that the Entente desired a “single 
and indivisible Russia,” and hence that he could not appoint Ukrainian conservatives or socialists 
and retain the good will of the war’s imminent victors.162  
The rifts in Ukrainian politics deepened as nine of the fifteen ministers in the hetman’s 
cabinet declared themselves in favor of union with a “new” anti-Bolshevik Russia on October 
19. Fearing a Russian uprising in Kyiv, Dontsov again urged the hetman to raise a pro-Ukrainian 
army;163 wishing to retain their hegemony in Ukraine, the German and Austrian authorities both 
opposed the creation of such an army until the last possible moment, just days before revolution 
toppled the Kaiserreich and the Entente claimed victory on November 11. Even then, the 
Hetmanate lacked the financial and political resources to raise more than an entirely insufficient 
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65,000 men.164 Despite objections by the militantly anti-Bolshevik Ludendorff, German 
occupation forces began evacuating Ukraine, leaving the Hetmanate to face Petliura, the Whites, 
and the Reds alone. The Germans left only a small garrison behind in Kyiv, pledging neutrality 
in the ensuing conflict. Meanwhile, Austria-Hungary’s collapse left the fate of East Galicia, 
Kholm, and Volhynia to be determined by the Ukrainian-Polish War (1918-1919). In a move of 
desperation, Skoropads’kyi appealed to the Entente powers for assistance, openly pivoting 
toward “Russophile” positions that he expected to appease them, and on November 14 
proclaimed the Hetmanate’s federal union with Russia.  
The hetman’s declaration, an ultimately ill-advised gamble on the future success of the 
White movement and the Entente’s beneficence, outraged Ukrainian nationalists across the 
political spectrum, and brought an end to Dontsov’s collaboration with the hetman. Dontsov 
resigned from the UTA and, soon thereafter, an order for his arrest appeared, forcing him into 
hiding as full-scale warfare engulfed the country once again.165 Simultaneously, the Ukrainian 
National State Union declared itself in open revolt against the Hetmanate, establishing the 
Directorate of the UNR under the leadership of Volodymyr Vynnychenko and Symon Petliura, 
pending new elections. Petliura’s forces took control of Left-Bank Ukraine and laid siege to 
Kyiv in the following weeks. Joining the antihetman putsch, Dontsov published an article in 
Nova Rada (New Council)—the daily newspaper of the pro-UNR Socialist-Federalists—warning 
that Skoropads’kyi and his followers “will soon raise [Russian] tricolors over Kyiv.”166 
(Ukraine’s “Russian-Jewish” revolutionaries and reactionaries continued to make a repulsive 
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impression on him, just as they had over a decade prior during his imprisonment in 
Lukianivs’ka.)167 The footnotes to Dontsov’s diary cite another regime-critical article (“Pered 
katastrofoiu” [Before the Catastrophe], published in Nova Rada on 22 October) as proof that he 
had begun to oppose the hetman before his fall from power.  
The final battle for the city occurred on December 14, at which point Skoropads’kyi 
resigned and fled the country with the last few remaining German troops.168 Dontsov recounted 
observing a firefight between Russians in the buildings along Khreshchatyk and Ukrainians in 
the streets below. Pro-Ukrainian celebrations followed Petliura’s triumphal entry to the capital. 
Although Dontsov received an order to take back the UTA and await the Directorate’s 
instructions, he loathed the new regime, calling it “Bolshevik.” Speaking to the first assembly of 
Ukrainian parties convened by the Directorate, he warned them: “You began this revolution 
under the blue-yellow Ukrainian flag, you carry it now under the red flag of socialism. You will 
end it under the black flag of anarchy.”169 Dontsov’s gloomy predictions turned out to have some 
warrant. The Directorate quickly lost control over the Ukrainian-speaking territories that it 
claimed to govern. The ensuing three years of warfare between the Reds, Whites, Anarchists, and 
Polish and Ukrainian nationalists caused more deaths through combat, terror, pogroms, disease, 
and famine than the preceding four years of the Great War. “It seems the whole world is falling 
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into the abyss, and us with it,” Dontsov lamented.170 He advised the Directorate to grant Petliura 
emergency dictatorial powers and use them for a crackdown on Ukraine’s emboldened 
Bolsheviks, who soon thereafter seized Kharkiv and began moving west, but the new socialist 
regime was not inclined to heed the advice of a “Hetmanite,” even if his friendship with Petliura 
meant that he retained his post at the UTA. News that White Volunteers had put a price on his 
head and were after him reached Dontsov, who was warned to lay low and encouraged to 
emigrate.171 In early January he resolved to do just that and, with the assistance of Konovalets’ 
and Petliura, departed for Paris as part of the UNR’s diplomatic mission to the peace talks at 
Versailles.  
 
Conclusion: “Good Europeans” and “Great Politics” 
“Our age is the age of the twilight of the idols (prysmerku bozhkiv) to which the 
nineteenth century prayed. The catastrophe of 1914 did not fly over our heads in vain: all the 
‘unshakeable’ foundations and ‘eternal’ laws of social evolution crumbled into ash, opening up 
limitless vistas before the human will.”172 These are the opening sentences and central thesis of 
Dontsov’s most famous work, Natsionalizm (1926), the enchiridion of Ukrainian integral 
nationalism. In the course of one decade, Dontsov’s thirties, the First World War and its 
revolutionary shockwaves had transformed Europe, breeding militant rightwing nationalist 
writer-activists like himself by the hundreds and thousands, as well as large and receptive 
audiences of resentful, battle-scarred listeners. The war exposed, as he saw it, the impotence and 
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obsolescence of the old values, habits, and convictions of the Ukrainophiles and their “idols”—
liberalism, pacifism, internationalism, socialism, and materialism. In their place he offered a 
doctrine that celebrated war and counseled all members of the nation to emulate the soldier’s 
unflinching execution of orders in the name of unquestioned ideals. He also reproached the older 
generation of Ukrainian activists in Kyiv for their ingrained deference to Russian liberals and 
leftists, and to the imperial Russian language, literature, and political culture in which all late 
nineteenth-century Eastern Ukrainian intellectuals (including himself) were raised. The fathers’ 
traditions and model ancestors, from Tolstoy to Drahomanov, were losing their relevance; it was 
time to smash their icons and find suitable replacements in foreign lands or the more distant past.    
Dontsov’s postwar credo aspired to be as German as it was Spartan. Fittingly, the 
epigraph above the first page of Natsionalizm is a quotation, in German, from one of the 
founders of German nationalism and idealist philosophy, Johann Gottlieb Fichte: “The only thing 
that can help us is a complete regeneration, the beginning of an entirely new spirit.”173 Dontsov 
took the words from Fichte’s 1808 work, Addresses to the German Nation, written on the 
occasion of Napoleon Bonaparte’s invasion and occupation of Central Europe. In the addresses, 
Fichte advocates a German nationalist reaction to the French threat that would carry on the 
betrayed ideals of the 1789 Revolution, delivering them to the world and heralding a new era of 
history in which humanity’s purpose, universal freedom, is achieved. Dontsov imitated Fichte’s 
cultural-exclusivist definition of the nation, which called for the denial of German citizenship to 
Jews; his desire to synthesize cosmopolitan and nationalist strivings, while insisting on the 
latter’s precedence; his authoritarianism; his penchant for mysticism; and his contempt for 
decadence, sensuous materialism, and the corrupting belief in determinism. Like Fichte, he 
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placed Germany at the vanguard of history as a messianic liberator of nations. Ukraine was 
destined to play the supporting yet essential role of guarding the eastern steppe, Europe’s natural 
and cultural frontier, from the encroachment of Muscovite despotism.  
The First World War had proven that German and Ukrainian nationalists were natural 
allies in the war between Mitteleuropa and its eastern enemies—a war that still raged in their 
hearts, despite the peace treaties that proclaimed it finished and the vaunted establishment of new 
borders on the principle of national self-determination. But the Ukrainians were to remain the 
junior partner, whose “new spirit” and “total regeneration” would require the emulation of 
Teutonic-Prussian traditions of militarism, voluntarism, efficiency, and idealism. The alternative, 
as Dontsov understood it, was to be conquered by Russian communism, cast into the abyss, cut 
off from the true fount of human progress. Ukraine faced annihilation at the hands of the nascent 
Soviet state, but so too did the rest of the continent. A crusade uniting Europe’s anti-Bolshevik 
forces was needed to save the community of free nations. Dontsov began thinking in terms 
similar to those of another German role model—Imperial Chancellor Otto von Bismarck’s 
“Great Politics”—the grand, realist strategy of rallying the nations of Europe around the 
purportedly German core of European power and civilization. Joining a cause and a tradition 
such as this, Ukrainians might finally (or once again) become “good Europeans,” to borrow a 
concept from another one of Dontsov’s German heroes from the same era—Friedrich 
Nietzsche.174 As “good Europeans,” Ukrainians would be fervent patriots of their own homeland, 
to be sure, but outward-looking ones with a sense of their still-greater responsibility and 
birthright to imbibe and defend the ancient culture of Europe from the timeless barbarism of 
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Muscovy; in a word, cosmopolitan ultranationalists. Dontsov claimed to loathe cosmopolitanism, 
but for political exiles like himself a cosmopolitan outlook was necessary in order to take 
advantage of the opportunities for rejuvenation and reinvention that the war had presented.          
One way of thinking about Dontsov’s wartime search for German exemplars and 
examples of German-Ukrainian cooperation in the historical record is “retrospective ancestral 
constitution,” which historian Hayden White describes as a potentially revolutionary process 
driven by a rebellious generation against the sociocultural system into which they were born.175 
White gives the example of Lenin and the Bolsheviks, whose chosen (ideal) ancestors were Marx 
and the European socialists rather than the Russian forebears whom their fathers expected them 
to honor. Similarly, Fichte, Bismarck, and Nietzsche were not Dontsov’s real ancestors but they 
were his ideal ancestors, and he chose them in the hope of giving the Ukrainian national 
movement an entirely new lineage and a revolutionary path forward—out of the Russian Empire, 
Bolshevik or Romanov, and back into Europe. Dontsov’s quest for worthy Ukrainian forebears 
led him to Hetman Ivan Mazepa, who was acceptable for this purpose because of his distance in 
time and his status as the traitor par excellence in the imperial Russian narrative. But the rest of 
Ukraine’s more recent inheritance was tainted with “saccharine Little Russian sentiment.” If he 
could convince a critical mass of Ukrainians to embrace this alternative ancestry of German 
geniuses and Zaporizhian warriors, then he would have effected a national revolution.  
Pushing the ideologue along a geographically and intellectually circuitous (some would 
say opportunistic) route, World War I inspired central components of Dontsov’s doctrine of 
Ukrainian integral nationalism, shaping a generation of veterans, activists, and students inclined 
to embrace his militaristic ideology in the tens of thousands. The war confirmed Dontsov’s 
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prewar skepticism about the morality and efficacy of international law, and the concept of a 
“right to national self-determination,” but not before driving him to place his highest hopes for 
Ukrainian independence, not in the force of arms, but in the force of arguments and peace 
treaties buttressed by well documented historical precedents and Wilsonian rhetoric. It convinced 
him that nations are doomed to battle one another in a zero-sum struggle for survival, but also 
that alliances were crucial to any future Ukrainian state- and nation-building. The Great War 
strengthened Dontsov’s affinity and admiration for the German world, but undermined his 
previous conviction that it would (or could) become the guardian of an independent Ukraine. 
Dontsov entered the 1920s with an all-consuming hatred for the Muscovites, but he could not 
conceal his awe and esteem for the Bolsheviks’ meteoric rise to power, their resolve, ferocity, 
discipline, and organization, which allegedly assured their victory over the squabbling, 
bumbling, out-of-touch aesthetes and leftists of the Ukrainophile camp. The maturing ideologue 
also honed his skills as a journalist and propagandist during the war, ultimately arriving at his 
signature style of emotive demagoguery—and the corollary belief that single-minded zealotry 
and passion drive human action and history more than facts and reason—but only after years of 
taking a much more subtle and academic approach to winning over an international readership to 
the Ukrainian cause. It would thus be simplistic to interpret Dontsov’s postwar integral 
nationalist worldview as a direct and inevitable result of the world conflict. His opinions, 
methods, and loyalties were open to revision throughout 1914-1918, and remained malleable 
thereafter, but the Great War and the failed Ukrainian Revolution to which it gave rise became 
Dontsov’s touchstone experience.  
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CHAPTER 3: “TO THE OLD GODS!” REACTIONARY MODERNISM AND THE 
FOUNDATIONS OF UKRAINIAN INTEGRAL NATIONALISM, 1919-1925 
 
 
In the years following the Versailles settlement, Russian (Soviet) and European politics, 
culture, and mentalities retained the imprint of total war and the passions that drove it. This was 
especially the case in Eastern Europe, where the Great War’s denouement brought neither an end 
to the hostilities, nor the resolution of disputed borders, nor the triumph of Wilsonian national 
self-determination and liberalism, but a calamitous “continuum of crisis” lasting well into the 
1920s, and arguably until World War II.1 The “Russian Civil War”—more accurately thought of 
as a multitude of distinct conflicts among many nationalities—saw the continuation of the 
methods, havoc, and enmities of World War I, condensed onto the territory of the former Russian 
Empire at an even greater immediate and long-term cost to the people who lived there. Reds, 
Whites, Blacks (Anarchists), Allied expeditionary forces, Ukrainians, Poles, and other non-
Russian nationalities fought against and alongside one another in a bewildering array of 
combinations. Although fighting continued, particularly in Central Asia, until at least 1926,2 the 
conventional narrative marks the end of the Russian Civil War at the Treaty of Riga (March 18, 
1921), which established the border between the nascent Soviet Union and the Second Polish 
                                                
1 Numerous recent works have stressed the continuities between World War I and the events and trends of the years 
that followed it, including the Russian Civil War, the rise of Fascism and Stalinism, breakneck modernization 
projects, and heady modernism in philosophy, literature, and the arts. See, for example, Modris Eksteins, The Great 
War and the Birth of the Modern Age (Toronto: Vintage Canada, 2012); Peter Holquist, Making War, Forging 
Revolution: Russia’s Continuum of Crisis, 1914-1921 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2002); and Jonathan 
D. Smele, The “Russian” Civil Wars, 1916-1926 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015). 
 
2 Smele, “Russian” Civil Wars, chap. 6.  
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Republic, dividing the Ukrainian lands into a Soviet east and a Warsaw-dominated west (East 
Galicia and Volhynia)—a state of affairs that lasted until the summer of 1939, when, as the 
“winners” of the Russian Civil War, the Poles and the Bolsheviks gained states of their own and 
turned to the task of consolidating their rule over the “losers,” especially the Ukrainians, who 
failed to maintain their grip on statehood and either reconciled themselves to working with the 
new order or chose the path of struggle, vengeance, and revision. Confronted with the failure of 
their national revolution, Ukrainian nationalists who chose the latter course faced the “accursed 
questions”—who is to blame and what is to be done?  
Dontsov’s answers to these questions proved as influential as anyone’s in interwar 
Ukrainian politics and culture. He pinned the blame for defeat on the Ukrainophile socialists and 
the Hetmanite conservatives, who were out of synch with the times and the imperatives of a 
Ukrainian national politics. Both had failed to learn the lessons of World War I, which swept 
away old values and ideas. Only those who accepted this radical break with the past and boldly 
pressed forward, heedless of the weak and outmoded, would inherit power and shape the future. 
Yet, in order to be reborn, Ukrainians would need to invoke the strength and traditions of their 
ancient “gods” and ancestors. Dontsov admired the Bolsheviks, despite loathing them, and the 
Italian Fascists, holding them up as examples to be emulated by a new breed of ruthless, 
iconoclastic, fanatical, and authoritarian Ukrainian nationalism. He advocated an anti-Bolshevik 
alliance with Poland, which was a “European” nation unlike [Soviet] Russia, but participated in 
the formation of a militarized Ukrainian nationalist underground, which initiated a violent 
struggle against Warsaw’s rule in East Galicia and Volhynia. The recruits for the Ukrainian 
underground were drawn from the veterans of the wars and revolutions whose outcome—the 
reversal of Ukrainian independence—they refused to accept. Dontsov spearheaded the creation 
of a press and a community of writers to represent this underground, setting an avant-garde 
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aesthetic agenda, inspired by expressionism and futurism. His central goal was to produce the 
palingenetic national mythology he thought would be needed to transform Ukrainian politics and 
culture into a force to be reckoned with in the brave new world of interwar Europe. 
The tension between tradition and innovation in Dontsov’s thought placed him in the 
same camp as a new breed of leaders, artists, and ideologues appearing throughout interwar 
Europe who combined a modernist (“progressive”) aesthetics with a palingenetic and 
particularistic (“reactionary”) politics. Effacing the traditional distinctions between right and left, 
progress and reaction,3 they embodied what historian Jeffrey Herf has dubbed “reactionary 
modernism”—the paradoxical combination of a mystical fetishization of high technology, formal 
experimentation in the arts, and cutting-edge philosophy with radically backward-looking 
politics and the repudiation of modernity as decadence.4 Rejecting the concept of a universal, 
teleological model of modernity, Herf argues: “There is no such thing as modernity in general. 
There are only national societies, each of which becomes modern in its own fashion.”5 The 
subjects of his study, the artists, ideologues, and engineers of the Right in Weimar and Nazi 
Germany, were products of their nation’s Sonderweg, which is to say its “paradoxical and 
truncated” incorporation of the Enlightenment. Thus, Herf challenges the Frankfurt School’s 
analysis of Nazism and the Holocaust as a consummation, rather than a negation, of the 
Enlightenment, with its “means-ends rationality of bureaucratic terror,” the nexus of myth, 
                                                
3 See Zeev Sternhell, Neither Right nor Left: Fascist Ideology in France, trans. David Maisei (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1996). 
 
4 Jeffrey Herf, Reactionary Modernism: Technology, Culture, and Politics in Weimar and the Third Reich 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), 1. 
 
5 There is a paradox here, in that Herf discards the teleological concept of modernity, yet keeps it by using the word 
“modern.” But if one follows Andrew Hewitt in reinterpreting Herf’s assertion to mean that a nation’s discovery of 
“its own fashion” and “becoming modern” are one and the same process, then it becomes a “question of identity 
being constructed in the process of modernization as something originary.” Andrew Hewitt, Fascist Modernism: 
Aesthetics, Politics and the Avant-Garde (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1993), 44. 
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reason, and domination over nature that it implies, and, consequently, its enormous potential for 
destruction through war and genocide.6 Rather than blaming fascism on a surfeit of inhumane 
rationalism, Herf concurs with the Marxist philosopher György Lukács, who pinned the blame 
on the irrationalist, subjectivist rebellion of art and literature against the Enlightenment, from 
Romanticism to Symbolism: “If the mendacious and demagogic slogans of fascism about ‘blood 
and soil’ were able to find so rapid a reception among the petty bourgeoisie, then the philosophy 
and literature of the decadent period, which awakened these instincts in its readers . . . is in large 
measure responsible, for it helped in fact to cultivate those feelings.”7 Relatedly, German 
Expressionism, despite the predominantly left-wing politics of its founders, produced some 
prominent converts to Nazism, such as the Hanns Johst (1890-1978) (poet laureate of the Third 
Reich and an SS officer during World War II) and Gottfried Benn (1886-1956), who hoped that 
Hitler’s regime would bring an end to the degeneracy of the Weimar Republic and exalt their 
aesthetics into the official art form of a rejuvenated Germany.8 Lukács attributed Benn’s and 
Johst’s scandalous enthusiasm for Nazism to the Expressionists’ Nietzschean, irrationalist, and 
vitalist declaration of independence from the tyranny of social and economic forces. Imagining 
themselves as autonomous subjects liberated from historical necessity, they favored a romantic 
                                                
6 Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno, Dialectic of Enlightenment (New York: Herder and Herder, 1972), 168-
208. 
 
7 György Lukács, “Marx and the Problem of Ideological Decay” (1938), The Destruction of Reason (London: 
Merlin, 1980), 131. In Symbolism, the height of decadence, “the experience of fragmentation spills over into an 
epiphanic, but nevertheless ideological, assertion of the unity of the subject,” while “the social connection between 
over-refinement of vacuous individuality and this unleashed bestiality might strike readers as paradoxical, caught as 
they are in the prejudices of our time. But they can be readily shown in the whole intellectual and literary production 
of the decadent period.”  
 
8 This enthusiasm for Nazism was short-lived in Benn’s case, however. He turned against the regime after the Night 
of the Long Knives (1934) but joined the Wehrmacht in 1935 (his way of protesting through the “aristocratic form 
of exile”). The Nazi press began denouncing Benn’s experimental poetry as “degenerate,” “homosexual,” “Jewish,” 
and so on. 
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(hence ineffectual) anticapitalism instead of classical Marxism.9 The Expressionists’ petit-
bourgeois refusal to accept the primacy of economic, social, or biological determinants (the 
whole edifice of nineteenth-century positivism) led to a mystification of the real source of their 
cultural despair—capitalism—which, Lukács maintained, could be overcome only through 
communism, not via some heroic “transvaluation of values” at the level of individual 
subjectivity. This basic error allegedly directed the Expressionists down the path to the specious 
salvation of culture offered by fascism, a “utopian barbarism.” We will recall that Dontsov spent 
some of his formative years in the decadent Symbolist milieu of fin-de-siècle St. Petersburg (the 
Silver Age of Russian Poetry), imbibing the scene’s “irrationalist” and antimodern yet 
subversively experimental literature and existentialist religious philosophies, bound up into a 
vision of apocalyptic redemption at the end of history.10  
But I would like to get beyond the (hyper)rationality/irrationality, pro-/anti-
Enlightenment debate. Both qualities are discernible in figures such as Dontsov, who counseled 
brutal irrationalism in the defense of “European” reason (Latin ratio as opposed to Russian 
logos), while offering rational arguments for the primacy of the irrational (will, instinct, and 
intuition) and warning of the dangers of reason for human vitality and creativity. As French 
philosopher Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe suggests, “it would be better to learn to stop considering 
fascism a ‘pathological’ phenomenon (from what extra-social position, asks Freud, might one 
make such a diagnosis?) and recognize in it not only (at least) one of the age’s political forms—
and one no more aberrant or inadequate than any other—but the political form that is perhaps 
                                                
9 György Lukács, “Expressionism: Its Significance and Decline,” Essays on Religion (Cambridge: MIT Press, 
1980). Originally published in Internationale Literatur 1 (1934): 157-73. 
 
10 Consider, for example, Dmitrii Merezhkovskii’s “Third Testament,” an obscure twelfth-century doctrine that he 
reimagined as a modern Church of the Holy Ghost (transcending the Father and the Son), replete with sex rituals 
that scandalized St. Petersburg society. 
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best able to bring us enlightenment regarding the essence of modern politics.”11 Myth and 
representation—the purview of art—are at the heart of this “essence.”  
Thus, instead of treating Dontsov’s cultural and political doctrine as yet another symptom 
of a hidden malady of modernity, let us analyze it with the tools of a different paradigm: 
aestheticization. According to Walter Benjamin’s seminal formulation, “fascism is the 
introduction of aesthetics into politics.” Through fascism, the avant-garde aestheticist principle 
of “art for art’s sake” (l’art pour l’art) became the principle of “war for war’s sake.” Fascists 
reimagined war, along with all experiential acts of violence and destruction, as something 
profoundly “creative” and “beautiful.”12 To illustrate this point, Benjamin cites the poet Filippo 
Tommasi Marinetti (1876-1944), one of the founders of Italian Futurism to enthusiastically 
embrace Fascism.13 Fascism offers the materially discontent working masses of modern society a 
“chance to express themselves” (in the forms of a unifying, mobilizing spectacle of mass rallies, 
propaganda films, monumental architecture, and the state- or party-sanctioned words and acts of 
violence directed at enemy others), instead of the more just arrangement of property relations 
toward which they strive. The accumulated energy and rage of the masses, along with the 
technological might of industrial production alienated from them, seeks a constructive outlet in 
                                                
11 Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe, Heidegger, Art, and Politics (Oxford: Blackwell, 1990), 107. Quoted in Hewitt, 
Fascist Modernism, 191. 
 
12 Walter Benjamin, “Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction,” Illuminations, ed. Hannah Arendt, trans. Harry 
Zohn (New York: Schocken Books, 1968), 241-42. 
 
13 “For twenty seven years we Futurists have rebelled against the branding of war as antiaesthetic. . . . Accordingly 
we state: . . . War is beautiful because it establishes man’s dominion over the subjugated machinery by means of gas 
masks, terrifying megaphones, flame throwers, and small tanks. . . . War is beautiful because it combines the 
gunfire, the cannonades, the cease-fire, the scents, and the stench of putrefaction into a symphony. War is beautiful 
because it creates new architecture, like that of the big tanks, the geometrical formation flights, the smoke spirals 
from burning villages, and many others. . . . Poets and artists of Futurism! . . . Remember these principles of the 
aesthetics of war so that your struggle for a new literature and a new graphic art . . . may be illumined by them!” 
Quoted in Benjamin, “Art in the Age,” 241-42. Analogous observations on the relation between avant-garde poetry 
and fascist ideas can be the case of the German Expressionist Hanns Johst: “I shoot with live ammunition! When I 
hear the word culture… I release the safety on my Browning!” Hanns Johst, Hanns Johst’s Nazi Drama Schlageter, 
trans. Ford B. Parkes-Perret (Stuttgart: Akademischer Verlag Hans-Dieter Heinz, 1984), Act 1, Scene 1. 
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vain and must be redirected (away from the necessary, genuinely socialist revolution) into 
“imperialistic war,” which Benjamin pithily defines as a “slave revolt of technology.”14 “All 
efforts to render politics aesthetic culminate in one thing: war. War and war only can set a goal 
for mass movements on the largest scale while respecting the traditional property system.”15  
Dontsov’s metaphysics of war as a vital and sacred expression of the nation—a force of 
nature as beautiful as any other instance of life on earth and an imperative of modern political 
organization—reflected this tendency. So too did his socioeconomic views, which projected the 
establishment of the petite bourgeoisie as the hegemonic class, despite its material 
impoverishment and decline under modern conditions. He dismissed the grievances of the 
“Russian-Jewish” proletariat in Ukraine’s cities and condemned its desire to rule the whole 
country as an “alien minority.” As of the early 1920s, Dontsov advocated the preservation or 
restoration of property of the country’s peasant and petit-bourgeois majority as the basis for a 
new order, established through myth-motorized willpower, which would nullify the false “laws 
of social development.” Given the fact that Ukraine’s anachronistic peasants, artisans, and 
aristocrats faced the real prospect (unlike their counterparts in Western Europe) of being 
“eliminated as a class” by the Soviet state, the theoretical problems of economic determinism 
and historical materialism took on a greater urgency and concreteness for anti-Bolshevik 
Ukrainian nationalists. Dontsov’s antieconomism—a rejection of Marxist and liberal theories 
explaining history, society, ethics, and culture in terms of economic forces and interests—which 
he shared in common with most fascists, can be analyzed despite itself in socioeconomic terms 
                                                
14 “Without approaching the surface of the significance of the economic causes of war, one may say that the 
harshest, most disastrous aspects of imperialist war are in part the result of the gaping discrepancy between the 
gigantic power of technology and the minuscule moral illumination it affords.” Walter Benjamin, “Theories of 
German Fascism: On the Collection of Essays War and Warrior, edited by Ernst Jünger,” New German Critique 17 
(Spring, 1979): 120-28. 
 
15 Benjamin, “Art in the Age,” 241. 
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as a product of his own class ressentiment as a déclassé petit bourgeois.16 Nevertheless, the 
hegemony that this class managed to achieve through fascism, despite its economic 
enfeeblement, constituted an objective refutation of the sociohistorical laws that had created it, a 
denial of the existence of class tout court, and thus a watershed in the nature of modern politics 
and society. This was not simply a “flight from reality” that elided sociopolitical strife through a 
false reconciliation in the realm of “representation.”17 Rather, it was a “flight of reality itself” 
through which the “real” became ideological.18 Or so Dontsov hoped vis-à-vis his ideology and 
Ukrainian reality. (As it turned out, Western Ukraine later endured revolutions “from above” that 
instead came from abroad, taking the forms of Stalinism and Nazism, which denied Ukrainian 
integral nationalists a chance to see their own ideology reified and hegemonic.)19                   
In addition to Italian Fascism and Bolshevism, Dontsov drew inspiration from one of the 
prime examples of reactionary modernism, to which writers have compared his ideology and 
literary circle:20 the Conservative Revolutionary movement. Emerging in the Weimar Republic 
                                                
16 Wilhelm Reich, The Mass Psychology of Fascism, trans. Victory R. Carfagno (New York: Farrar, Straus and 
Giroux, 1970), 44. 
 
17 “The fascist public sphere should be understood as a ‘beautiful illusion,’ which is, however, different from the 
‘beautiful illusion’ of art which served as a means for private psychic flight from reality. The fascist illusion is the 
factual result of a flight from reality by the petty bourgeois masses, who are socioeconomically and siocio-
psychologically most disposed to such flight. German fascism can therefore be understood as a false, perverted, 
merely formal fulfillment of the ideals and intentions of classical aesthetics for which bourgeois society had no use, 
i.e. as a pseudo-socialist changeling.” Rainer Stollmann, “Fascist Politics as a Total Work of Art: Tendencies of the 
Aestheticization of Political Life in National Socialism,” trans. Ronald L. Smith, New German Critique 14 (Spring 
1978): 41-60, 59.  
 
18 Hewitt, Fascist Modernism, 172. Perhaps the most famous statement of this idea is Guy Debord, The Society of 
the Spectacle (London: Rebel Press, 2000). 
 
19 See Jan T. Gross, Revolution from Abroad: The Soviet Conquest of Poland’s Western Ukraine and Belorussia 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002), chaps. 3-4; and Amir Weiner, Making Sense of War: The Second 
World War and the Fate of the Bolshevik Revolution (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001), chap. 5. 
 
20 Ihor Zahrebel’nyi, Natsionalizm versus modern: zhyttia i tvorchist’ Dmytra Dontsova v optytsi konservatyvnoi 
revoliutsii (Kyiv: Vydavnytstvo Serhiia Pantiuka, 2004). Zahrebel’nyi’s study of Dontsov’s life and works is not 
strictly academic, but also prescriptive with regard to present-day Ukrainian nationalists. Also see, Mykhailo 
Chuhuienko, “Idei konservatyvnoi revoliutsii v ukrains’kii suspil’no-politychnii dumtsi: D. Dontsov i M. 
Khvyl’ovyi,” in Dopovidi ta povidomlennia 3-ho mizhnar. Konhresu ukraintsiv “Politolohiia, etnolohiia, 
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shortly after World War I, its leading representatives, including Arthur Moeller van den Bruck 
(1876-1925), Ernst Jünger (1895-1998), Oswald Spengler (1880-1936), and Carl Schmitt (1888-
1985), combined militarism, nationalism, voluntarism, irrationalism, and a “third-way” rejection 
of both capitalism and Communism, with an unrestrained enthusiasm for technology, even (or 
especially) in its most terrifying, inhumane aspects, as well as avant-garde modes of literary 
expression and philosophical inquiry.21 The Conservative Revolutionaries inspired central 
elements of Martin Heidegger’s philosophy, and arguably laid the intellectual foundations for the 
subsequent rise of Nazism. Diagnosing Germany’s humiliating defeat in the First World War and 
the revolutionary crises it engendered as symptoms of an excessively rational civilization, 
unmoored and in decline, these writers turned to a vision of national renewal that sprang directly 
from their reportedly transcendental experiences of modern warfare, yet took their models for the 
future from a romantic mythology of the nation’s imagined racial, historical, and cultic origins. 
They latched on to a mystical apotheosis of war for its own sake, holy and eternal, abstract and 
metaphysical, purifying and ennobling—the deepest, most primeval expression of the nation’s 
essence and (hence) of nature itself. Nevertheless, as Peter Osborne clarifies, Conservative 
Revolution was unmistakably “modernist” in the sense that it was geared, above all, toward a 
total break with the past and an altogether unprecedented future.22 “In this respect, it is the term 
‘conservative’ which is the misnomer, rather than ‘revolution.’ Conservative revolution was a 
________________________ 
sotsiolohii,” (Kharkiv: Oko, 1996), 305-10. Chuhuienko rejects Sosnovs’kyi’s methodology, which sees too many 
commonalities between Dontsov and fascism (an attempt, he argues, that reflected the OUN’s move to distance 
itself from Dontsov’s “totalitarian” heritage in the 1970s). Chuhuienko challenges the idea that “active nationalism” 
was “totalitarian” at all, instead treating Dontsov as the leader of a Ukrainian variant of “Conservative Revolution.” 
Dontsov synthesized conservative and revolutionary ideas into an antidemocratic, yet antitotalitarian worldview that 
upheld traditionalism, clerical autonomy, rigid social hierarchies, territorial patriotism, and private property.  
 
21 On the Conservative Revolutionary movement, see George L. Mosse, The Crisis of German Ideology; Intellectual 
Origins of the Third Reich (New York: Grosset & Dunlap, 1964); Herf, Reactionary Modernism, chap. 2. 
 
22 Peter Osborne, The Politics of Time: Modernity and Avant-Garde (New York: Verso, 1995), 164. 
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form of revolutionary reaction. It understands that what it would ‘conserve’ is already lost (if 
indeed it ever existed, which is doubtful), and hence must be created anew.”23 Whether they 
affirmed or bemoaned technology in the narrow sense of the word, reactionary modernist 
projects of this sort were actually quite novel, made possible only by the paradoxical conditions 
of modernity. “What Herf calls reactionary modernism is not a hybrid form (modernism + 
reaction),” Osborne continues. “Rather, it draws our attention to the modernistic temporality of 
reaction per se, once the destruction of traditional forms of social authority has gone beyond a 
certain point.”24 Russia and Europe passed this threshold around the First World War, opening 
the floodgates for revolutionary ideologies across the spectrum.25   
Dontsov’s nationalism at this stage was the mirror image of yet another group of 
reactionary modernists: Russian Eurasianism, a school of thought founded by White émigrés 
under the same circumstances of defeat and exile from the former Russian Empire between 1917 
and the early 1920s.26 The two doctrines, Eurasianism and Ukrainian integral nationalism, agreed 
that Asiatic Russia and Occidental Europe formed an oppositional dyad with fundamentally 
                                                
23 Ibid. Also see Roger Griffin’s work on fascism as a form of political modernism, which, even in its reactionary 
aspect, had “a mission to change society, to inaugurate a new epoch, to start time anew.” Roger Griffin, Modernism 
and Fascism: The Sense of a Beginning under Mussolini and Hitler (Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 2. 
 
24 Ibid. 
 
25 “Both politically and aesthetically, ‘progress’ and ‘reaction’ can no longer be fully disengaged historical concepts. 
The stage is set for Fascist Modernism.” Hewitt, Fascist Modernism, 47. Artistic and literary movements combining 
modernist forms with reactionary agendas also appeared in France (around Georges Sorel and the Proudhon Cercle), 
the UK, and the US. See Mark Antliff, Avant-Garde Fascism: The Mobilization of Myth, Art, and Culture, 1909-
1939 (Durham: Duke University Press, 2007); and Charles Ferrall, Modernist Writing and Reactionary Politics 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001). 
 
26 The founding figures of Eurasianism were the renowned linguist Prince Nikolai Trubetskoi (1890-1938), the 
publisher Petr Suvchinskii (1892-1985), Petr Savitskii (1895-1968) (a young protege of Petr Struve), historians and 
theologian of the Russian Orthodox Church Georgii Florovskii (1893-1979), and the poet-turned-priest Prince 
Andrei Lieven (1872-1937). Savchinskii and Suvchinskii, it is worth noting, identified as “Little Russian” and 
cherished what we would today call Ukrainian culture but embraced a Russian imperialist politics. Mark Bassin, 
Sergey Glebov, and Marlene Laruelle, “Introduction: What Was Eurasianism and who Made it?” in Mark Bassin, 
Sergey Glebov, and Marlene Laruelle, eds., Between Europe and Asia: The Origins, Theories, and Legacies of 
Russian Eurasianism (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2015), 3. 
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different spiritual values and geopolitical interests, but they took antithetical views concerning 
which civilization was superior and thus entitled to a sphere of influence in Ukraine (“Little 
Russia,” to the Eurasianists). They also shared a deeply pessimistic, Spenglerian view of 
(Western) modernity as a manifestation of decadence and bourgeois philistinism, favoring some 
vision of antidemocratic “conservative revolution,” and seeking to revive equally archaic yet 
generally opposing traditions in order to bring about a spiritual rebirth. While Eurasianism could 
imagine a messianic transfiguration of the Soviet Union that would herald the liberation of the 
colonial world and even the rejuvenation of Europe, Dontsov and his followers saw only a 
“Mongolic” monstrosity, as imperialistic and brutal as its predecessors, that needed to be slain 
for the sake of all nations and individuals. Like the Eurasianists, Dontsov turned to Christianity 
(first Catholicism then Orthodoxy), as one of the moral, institutional, and cultural pillars of a 
new order in the country that he had abandoned to the Bolsheviks. In doing so, both drew from 
the antimodern religious and political philosophies of the fin-de-siècle Russian writers Nikolai 
Berdiaev (1874-1948), Sergei Bulgakov (1871-1944), and Petr Struve (1870-1944)—whom the 
Eurasinianists nevertheless blamed for ignoring the Russian folk in much the same way that 
Dontsov blamed the Ukrainophiles for failing to inspire the Ukrainian peasantry. Dontsov read 
these authors “against the grain” as symptomatic of Russia’s primitivism and innate hostility 
toward the West, but their core ideas—anti-Enlightenment, authoritarian, elitist yet fascinated by 
the untapped elemental power of the masses, mystical and traditionalist—were nearly identical. 
The Eurasianists proudly regarded the vast empire of Chingis Khan and his lineage, not Kyivan-
Rus’, as the true antecedent of imperial Russia; Dontsov happily agreed, claiming Kyivan-Rus’ 
for Ukraine (and Europe), yet represented Russia’s Mongol kernel as the source of a great plague 
loosed upon the world. Finally, both called upon their audiences to reorient themselves in two 
ways: one spatial—of Eurasia away from Europe and of Ukraine away from Eurasia, 
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respectively—and one temporal—against the notion of universal, deterministic, mechanistic 
“progress” and for a freely willed traditionalism/alternative modernity.27     
The same processes of antimodern modernization unfolded in the (Western) Ukrainian (or 
southeastern Polish) context through the efforts of Dontsov and his coterie as in the Italian, 
French, German, Polish, and Russian émigré contexts, but this was not a case of west-to-east 
diffusion. The appearance of Ukrainian integral nationalism in the early 1920s coincided with 
that of Italian Fascism, Eurasianism, and Conservative Revolution, and drew inspiration from 
them, but it followed (or, more accurately, discovered) “its own fashion.” Responding to the 
same experiences of total war and socialist revolution, Dontsov sought to aestheticize Ukrainian 
politics with a reactionary modernism designed according to his own tastes.  
 
The Versailles Settlement and the Realignment of Ukrainian Nationalism  
Between 1919 and 1921, Dontsov returned to a life of exile and international diplomacy, 
but achieved little. The representatives of the Entente proved to be far less interested in the 
Ukrainian question than the Central Powers had been. Britain, France, and the US favored the 
territorial claims of Poland and the White movement under General Anton Denikin, leaving no 
space for a Ukrainian nation-state between them. Dontsov placed little faith in Wilson’s rhetoric 
about national self-determination, calling the US president’s Fourteen Points a “wordy 
pronouncement with no content.”28 Officially, Dontsov served in the Ukrainians’ quixotic 
delegation to Paris for just ten days (January 18-28, 1919), before being cut to meet the maximal 
number of members.29 Instead, he spent mid-January to mid-February in Vienna, where he met 
                                                
27 Ibid., chaps. 3-5. 
 
28 Dontsov, “Peterburs’kyi perevorot,” 535. 
 
29 It is not clear why he was cut or how he reacted. Dontsov, Rik 1918, Kyiv, 132. 
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with Lypyns’kyi and an officer of the Sich Riflemen, Colonel Ievhen Konovalets’ (1891-
1938)—a leading Ukrainian nationalist and close collaborator of Dontsov’s during the 1920s—to 
draw up an anti-Bolshevik military and political strategy. They dreamed of remobilizing the 
thousands of Ukrainian POWs who had been deployed to Italy in the Austro-Hungarian Army 
for a two-pronged assault from Galicia and Odesa to drive out Ukraine’s socialists, Bolshevik or 
otherwise, and install a military dictatorship.30 The never realized such ambitions, of course, but 
the war-tempered mentality that inspired them endured.    
Dontsov and Lypyns’kyi also worked to coordinate their propaganda efforts from the 
latter’s base in the Ukrainian Bureau in Vienna, but increasingly disagreed on the best path 
forward ideologically and geopolitically. In November 1919, Lypyns’kyi tried to bring Dontsov 
on board with the reorganization of Ukrainian conservative monarchist forces around his new 
Ukrainian Union of Agrarian-Statists (USKhD), the successor to the Ukrainian Democratic 
Agrarian Party, which sought to consolidate émigré Hetmanite elements in a new group.31 
Dontsov, however, kept his distance from the new formation, citing what he considered to be its 
pro-Russian tendencies. Lypyns’kyi struggled unsuccessfully to convince Dontsov that dialogue 
with Russian and Russophile elements was a necessity, however unpleasant. “Our state can be 
built only by state-building elements, but these elements have for so long been connected with 
Russia that to overthrow their political thought all at once is impossible,” Lypyns’kyi reasoned: 
“Thus, our relations with Russia must be arranged such that our statesmen, yesterday’s 
Russophiles, will themselves evolve in accordance with Ukrainian statehood.”32 Denying rumors 
________________________ 
 
30 Ibid., 99-105. January 22-23. 
 
31 As of its founding in Vienna in February 1920, the USKhD’s membership included the deposed Hetman Pavlo 
Skoropads’kyi, Dmytro Doroshenko, Osyp Nazaruk (1883-1940), and Serhii Shemet (1875-1957). 
 
32 V. Lypyns’kyi to D. Dontsov, November 12, 1919. Viacheslav Lypyns’kyi, Lystuvannia, vol. 1, 572-74. 
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that he had converted to East Slavic federalism, Lypyns’kyi promised to explain his strategy to 
Dontsov in an “open letter addressed to political friends and the like-minded—thus, above all to 
you, Pan Doctor! . . . What would you think about the revitalization of the organization of our 
party or, better put, tendency—at any rate here in the emigration abroad? To me it seems that our 
time has already arrived and we must be ready for this moment, but we are wasting it just like 
the Hetmanate wasted it.”  
 
Figure 3.1: Interwar Ukraine. Source: Paul Robert Magocsi, Ukraine: An Historical Atlas 
(Toronto: Toronto University Press, 1986), map 22. 
 
Dontsov was unswayed. For Lypyns’kyi, the greatest enemy of Ukraine was a resurgent 
Poland, which was certain to pursue the Polonization of any ethnic Ukrainians subject to its rule. 
Dontsov, by contrast, regarded Russia as Ukraine’s only mortal foe and Poland as a natural 
partner in the resistance to Russian or Bolshevik expansion. Thus, although Lypyns’kyi 
________________________ 
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continued to think of Dontsov as an ally, the two ideologues had already begun to grow apart. 
Dontsov insisted on ending Ukrainian negotiations with White or Red Russia in favor of an 
implacable struggle for survival against both, alongside the anti-Bolshevik powers of the West, 
in the spirit of Ukraine’s glorious past, but for the sake of a culturally dynamic future—a 
modernist appeal for a living European “tradition” against deadening oriental “stagnation.”  
We must find this spirit of occidental civilization in ourselves, we must baptize ourselves  
 anew with the forgotten traditions of our ancient culture, if we do not want to dissolve in  
 the Muscovite pseudoculture, which is above all a culture of stagnation. This is the task  
 we must absolutely fulfill. . . . Culture cannot be separated from politics. Because only a  
 national organism powerfully infused with Western civilization has the strength   
 to resist any political experiments from Russia. But if the organism of the nation is  
 poisoned with a culture of the east foreign to it, then no political separation will help us  
 in the least.33     
         
Lypyns’kyi responded skeptically to Dontsov’s starkly anti-Russian thinking, as well as 
his elitist persona and politics, underscoring what he saw as the latter’s self-defeating rejection of 
the rational, civic values that allegedly made Europe different from Russia:  
In my naiveté (which you accuse me of as a ‘nonbeliever’) I think with sorrow that the  
 matter stands poorly with our Europeanness when it can be propagated among us only by  
 Asiatic methods. If your task is to create a sect of Russia-fighters, then perhaps you will  
 succeed in this. But if you wanted to Europeanize even a part of our society,   
 disseminating within it the European spirit of civic organicity and collective sense (and  
 not with the romanticism to search for a collective paradise in life), then I think that your  
 book [Pidstavy nashoi polityky —T.E.] does not offer the desired conclusions.34 
  
Lypyns’kyi’s letter cautioned Dontsov against aggrandizing himself as a sage among fools in 
need of an authoritarian leader and a simplistic black-and-white worldview to follow blindly. 
“Europeanizing” Ukrainians would entail, to the contrary, giving them the knowledge, poise, 
strength, and will to organize and defend themselves no matter the direction, east or west, from 
which a threat might originate.   
                                                
33 Dmytro Dontsov, Kultura primitivizmu. This publication is from Dontsov’s speech to the Ukrainian Club in Kyiv 
on June 19, 1918. 
 
34 V. Lypyns’kyi to D. Dontsov, [undated] 1921. Lypyns’kyi, Lystuvannia, Vol. 1, 574-78. 
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The question remained whether any European power would take an interest in Ukraine’s 
plight. As it turned out, the Versailles settlement included no provisions for the recognition of 
Ukrainian independence. Their former sponsors, the Central Powers, were defeated and in crises 
of their own, but émigré Ukrainian nationalists still regarded Germany, despite its failings, as the 
only major European power to which they could turn in their ongoing liberation struggle. A 
“strictly confidential” May 1919 memorandum addressing “Germany’s task in the coming era,” 
probably written by Dontsov given its style, charged Germany with having made the mistake of 
abandoning its Ukrainian “agents” “in their hour of need,” whereupon they “sheepishly fell at the 
feet of the Entente.”35 The end result was a diplomatic “fiasco.” Those who received money from 
Germany (the memo singles out Mykola Zalizniak of the SVU, but says nothing about Dontsov’s 
own activities and the League of Russia’s Foreign Peoples) did so only to enrich themselves. 
These opportunists had failed to appreciate the “historical necessity” of the “German-Ukrainian 
orientation.” Moving forward, Ukrainians must rely on Germany, “but ensure that it is not mixed 
up in either our political or economic internal conditions,” “grow[ing] strong with its help and 
liv[ing] in friendship with it,” while preserving autonomy from Berlin. To do this they should 
seek longterm German investment, but the development of an effective propaganda apparatus 
was the more important and pressing task, and one which Dontsov was uniquely well positioned 
and qualified to execute.  
Still, even Central Europe was losing its luster for Dontsov, who grew more pessimistic 
and cynical day by day, losing whatever faith he had had in peaceful diplomacy, international 
law, and the steady march of human progress. An ideological reorientation seemed to him as 
necessary as a geopolitical one. The bittersweet experience of returning to Vienna after the war 
                                                
35 Quoted by Golczewski, who agrees that Dontsov composed the memo. Golczewski, Deutsche und Ukrainer, 374. 
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convinced him that European civilization, too, was undergoing a potentially irreversible decline. 
The Austrian capital retained the charm and beauty of “an ancient and glorious dynasty” and “the 
brilliant traditions of a great state,” but merely on its facade. World War I may have been the 
direct cause for the death of these traditions, Dontsov opined, but “nihilism,” “demoralization,” 
and “anemia”—all manifest in the prewar Dual Monarchy’s art, literature, and music, which 
lacked “bright colors, great problems, the pulse of hot blood”—had begun decades earlier.36 On 
this score he echoed the Italian Futurists, early enthusiasts for Mussolini’s Fascism, and their call 
for a culture of speed, violence, machismo, and machines; “humanity” be damned. “My 
misanthropy grows with each day,” he confided to his diary on February 2, 1919, yearning for 
the appearance of a new man, tough and ruthless enough to revive and defend Europe’s once-
great nations in an era of total wars and totalitarianism.37 Two days later, Kyiv fell to the Red 
Army, pushing him deeper into grief and despair at the dawn of a new era of “rule by plebeians” 
and the proliferation of “charlatans” without the class, sophistication, or will to achieve great 
things.38 Dontsov was convinced that Bolshevism would bring physical ruin to Ukraine, but the 
problem, as he saw it, was global and existential, and as much internal as external. The 
nineteenth century’s cherished moral, political, and aesthetic ideals—optimistic, universal, 
materialist doctrines, such as liberalism, Marxism, and positivism—had brought the continent to 
the brink of annihilation. Modernity per se meant decadence. The cure that Dontsov and other 
interwar rightists offered was a “revolutionary,” paradoxical blend of nationalism, 
authoritarianism, militarism, modernism, and traditionalism. This entailed a continent-wide 
effort because the disease of modernity compromised the ability of the West as a whole to defend 
                                                
36 He singles out the “musical demagoguery” of Wagner and Strauss for reproach. Dontov, Rik 1918, Kyiv, 128-29. 
Dated January 20. 
 
37 Ibid., 106. 
 
38 Ibid., 107-8. February 7. 
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itself and emboldened its mortal enemies (Russians and Communists). Ukrainians could not 
fulfill such a daunting task alone, but to whom could they turn if the Entente favored “Russia” 
and the defeated Central Powers no longer counted (at least for the time being)?  
 
The Ukrainian-Polish-Soviet War and the Treaty of Riga 
Despite a year of bloody conflict between the Western Ukrainian People’s Republic 
(ZUNR) and the Second Polish Republic over possession of L’viv/Lwów and East Galicia, 
which the Western Ukrainians lost, the idea of a Polish-led bloc of reconstructed independent 
Eastern European nation-states bridging the Black and Baltic Seas struck many Ukrainian 
nationalists as the last remaining hope for their cause in 1919. As Dontsov had counseled for 
years, they proved willing to make painful concessions if it meant a chance to prevent the return 
of Russian imperialism, under any guise, to Ukraine. Acting in this pragmatic spirit, Petliura 
forged a last-ditch alliance with Piłsudski, the Treaty of Warsaw, on April 21, 1920, renouncing 
Ukrainian claims to Galicia and Volhynia in exchange for Polish military support in the 
Directorate’s bid to drive out the Bolsheviks and reclaim power. The Polish-Ukrainian force 
launched the Kyiv Offensive, briefly controlling the Ukrainian capital before a successful Soviet 
counterattack from June to August pushed Piłsudski’s army back to Warsaw. Polish fighters 
delivered a crushing defeat to the Bolsheviks in the Battle of Warsaw (August 12-15), and, 
through a series of follow-up victories, moved the frontline and eventual border between Poland 
and the Soviet state as far east as Minsk to the north and Kamianets’-Podils’kyi to the south. 
With nothing of the UNR left to defend, Petliura and his closest supporters fled to Western 
Europe, leaving embittered Ukrainian nationalist veterans of the conflict to debate whether he 
had been a fool or a traitor for placing his trust in Piłsudski and the Poles, who entered separate 
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peace talks (expressly forbidden in the terms of the Warsaw Treaty) with representatives of 
Soviet Russia and Soviet Ukraine.   
    
Figures 3.2-4: Józef Piłsudski, Symon Petliura, and Colonel Ievhen Konovalets’. Source: Internet 
Encyclopedia of Ukraine and www.wikipedia.org 
 
The inclusion of non-Communist Ukrainians in the negotiations that culminated in the 
March 1921 Treaty of Riga, hosted by the Latvian government in its capital, remained an open 
question. The Soviet republics resolutely opposed the admission of Petliura’s people to the talks, 
but the hope remained that the Entente and the new states of Poland, Lithuania, Estonia, Finland, 
and Latvia might be persuaded to rebuke the demand. The UNR’s ambassadors throughout 
Europe shifted their lobbying efforts toward achieving this goal. Among them was Dontsov, who 
departed Vienna for Bern to once again head the Ukrainian press bureau from 1919 to 1920 on 
behalf of Petliura’s beleaguered government-in-exile. The state of the Ukrainian diplomatic 
mission in Switzerland, half of whom had allegedly been replaced by obscure “Jews and 
Russians,” appalled Dontsov,39 but he remained more committed to the idea of Ukrainian 
independence than ever, despite the grim situation back home.  
                                                
39 Ibid. February 8. 
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His wife, Mariia Bachnys’ka-Dontsova, whose mastery of German and tireless 
administrative support had made Dontsov’s activities in Central Europe possible during the First 
World War, also represented the UNR at this time, but as an ambassador to Denmark in 
Copenhagen.40 Dontsova was highly active in Ukrainian civic and political life in the 1920s, 
taking leadership roles in the education society Prosvita (Enlightenment), the sporting 
organization Sokil (Falcon), the youth scouting group Plast, and the women’s patriotic charity 
and teaching society Ukrains’ka Zakhoronka (Ukrainian Shelter).41 She published numerous 
articles on politics, art, the women’s movement, and philanthropy in the women’s press.42 As we 
will see in chapter 5, Dontsova espoused views on humanity diametrically opposed to those of 
her husband, serving as the leader of the feminist group Soiuz Ukrainok (Union of Ukrainian 
Women), which rejected Dontsov’s nationalism, from 1926 to 1927.  
The couple shared hopes that the Ukrainian peasantry, which resented Soviet power, War 
Communism, and the associated return of coercive food requisitions, intensified to famine-
causing levels in order to supply the Red Army and Bolshevik-dominated urban centers, would 
subvert Muscovite domination themselves. On January 10, 1920, Dontsov expressed to Dontsova 
that “the situation in Ukraine seems better since the insurrections against the Moskals are 
burning with a new force and the chances of the Vynnychenkos, Hrushevs’kyis, and other idiots 
                                                
40 TsDAVO, f. 3849, op. 1, spr. 9, ark. 9. 
 
41 Iryna Shlikhta, “Shtrykhy do portreta Marii Dontsovoi” in Ukrains’kyi arkheohrafichnyi shchorichnyk, vol. 11/12 
(Kyiv: Vydavnytstvo M.P. Kots’, 2004), 683. 
 
42 See, for example, Mariia Dontsova, “Zhinka i mystetstvo,” Zhinochyi vistnyk, no. 8 (1922); “Vybory i zhotstvo,” 
Zhinocha dolia, no. 16 (1927); “Rozvytok nashykh zhinochykh tovarystv,” Iliustrovanyi kalendar-al’manakh 
“Zhinochoi doli” na zvychainyi rik 1927: Na novuyi shliakh (Kolomiya, 1926); “Zhinochyi rukh: zhinka na 
Radians’kii Ukraini,” Zhinocha dolia, no. 3 (1926); and “Ukrains’ka zhinka v Radians’komu Soiuzi,” Nova khata, 
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are falling.”43 (Hrushevs’kyi had emigrated to Vienna, and Vynnychenko resigned from the 
Directorate on January 30, 1919, leaving it entirely in Petliura’s hands.)44 The “Moskals,” 
however, were there to stay: although the White Army (under the leadership first of Denikin and 
Wrangel) found itself cornered in Crimea by March 1920, the Red Army supplanted it as the 
dominant force in Ukraine east of Volhynia. Unsurprisingly, Soviet possession of Kyiv (unlike 
Minsk) was nonnegotiable at the international congress in Riga.       
In search of reliable partners other than his wife to somehow turn the tide in favor of 
Ukrainian independence via diplomacy, Dontsov found only the pro-Petliura geographer and 
member of the Directorate Oleksandr Lahutenko (1885-1959),45 then serving as secretary of the 
diplomatic mission of the UNR to Riga. Lahutenko wrote to Mariia about his respect for her 
husband’s “crystal clear honor” and became a follower and collaborator of the Dontsov’s 
throughout the interwar period.46 He reported to Dontsov on the difficulties encountered in his 
attempts to secure an invitation for the UNR to join the peace talks from the ministries and 
officials of the Baltic States. The government of Lithuania, in particular, had allegedly fallen 
under Soviet Russian influence. Regarding Petliura as an ally of its enemy, Poland, with which it 
was then in conflict over the fate of Vilnius, the Lithuanian state refused to recognize the UNR 
                                                
43 D. Dontsov to M. Dontsova. TsDAVO, f. 3849, op. 1, spr. 17, ark. 196. 
 
44 As an émigré in Vienna, Vynnychenko converted to the “Sovietophile” position, founding the Foreign Group of 
the Ukrainian Communist Party, which mostly consisted of former USDRP members. He traveled to Moscow during 
the summer of 1920 where he made an unsuccessful attempt to reach an agreement with the Soviet leadership 
ensuring Ukraine’s independence. Disillusioned with the Bolsheviks, whom he accused of Great Russian 
chauvinism and disingenuous socialism, he spent the rest of his life as a writer in Germany and France. Similarly, 
Hrushevs’kyi continued his political and historical work as an émigré in Central Europe at this time, reconciling 
himself to Communist rule in Ukraine after the implementation of NEP and the Ukrainization program, then 
returning to Kyiv in 1924 as a full member of the All-Ukrainian Academy of Sciences, only to be arrested in 1931 
and dogged by the authorities until his death in 1934. 
 
45 Lahutenko continued to work with Dontsov throughout the interwar period, contributing ideologically charged art 
criticism to Vistnyk. 
 
46 Oleksandr Lahutenko to Mariia Dontsova, February 20, 1920. TsDAVO, f. 3849, op. 1, spr. 19, ark. 64 
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as a legitimate representative of “the entire Ukrainian people,” blocking its participation in the 
congress.47 In August 1920, Dontsov reported on the situation to the UNR’s Minister of Foreign 
Affairs, Andrii Nikovs’kyi (1885-1942). Despite Lahutenko’s efforts, which Dontsov highly 
praised, the Latvian, Polish, and Lithuanian delegations refused to allow the UNR’s participation 
(only the Estonians and the Finns responded favorably to their entreaties).  
As usual, Dontsov pinned the blame for the failure on his fellow Ukrainians, whether 
socialist or conservative: “One cannot but notice that our ‘patriots,’ in particular Mr. 
Vynnychenko, hinder us the most. Generally under his influence, the Lithuanian Government 
responds to us insultingly and easily yields to the requirement of the Bolsheviks concerning the 
non-entry of Ukraine to the conference.”48 Lahutenko and Dontsov also expressed concerns 
about the damage done to the UNR’s reputation by the activities and publications of the 
Hetmanites around Europe. Dontsov’s former collaborator in the LFR and editor of L’Ukraine in 
Geneva, Volodymyr Stepankivs’kyi, publicly disavowed the UNR, deliberately undermining 
Petliura in the Swiss press and using his ties to Berlin and London to plot a joint invasion of 
Ukraine by Hetman Skoropads’kyi and General Wrangel, backed by British capital. Sounding 
the alarm about these and other imagined Hetmanite conspiracies, Dontsov continued to distance 
himself from Skoropads’kyi’s circle.  
This included Lypyns’kyi, who invited Dontsov to join his reorganized Hetmanite party, 
the Ukrainian Union of Agrarian-Democrats (USKhD), to no avail throughout 1920. Dontsov 
was apparently unconvinced that Lypyns’kyi and his party actually favored Ukrainian 
independence. Such doubts bemused Lypyns’kyi: “I remember myself in 1908, when we met 
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with you in Zakopane, you called the idea of state independence, which I presented before you 
then, very naive. Today I am glad that you accuse me of ‘vacillation’ with regard to 
independence.”49 His patience wearing thin, Lypyns’kyi offered to publish Dontsov’s work in the 
USKhD’s journal, Khliborobs’ka Ukraina (Agrarian Ukraine), emphasizing their relative 
ideological affinity: “I think that the differences in our views are not so great that they could not 
find a place within the framework of one publication.”50 Saddened by Dontsov’s rejection of his 
project to reorganize Ukrainian conservatives, Lypyns’kyi made a final attempt to convince him 
that “it is not hatred for Russia but the construction of our own Ukrainian monarchy that will 
save us from Muscovite bondage. Without this, all current ‘independentists’ will be forced to 
accept some kind go autonomy.” Petliura was especially to blame for the internal (hence 
external) “ruination” of Ukrainian politics, argued Lypyns’kyi, whereas Skoropads’kyi deserved 
a second chance at governing at the helm of a revived aristocracy. Unpersuaded, Dontsov instead 
sought new doctrines, preferably of his own creation, and new leaders to represent them. The 
following year Lypyns’kyi began taking shots at the “republican” “democratic” ideology of 
Dontsov, “for whom we [Hetmanites] are only the authors of naive books” with 
“incomprehensible political manners.”51 These partisan squabbles, as both sides were painfully 
aware, did nothing to help a situation that demanded unity in the face of overwhelming odds: 
neither Petliura nor Skoropads’kyi had a shot at regaining power under the circumstances.  
The Riga peace talks formally concluded on March 18, 1921, nullifying the Warsaw 
Treaty and dividing the Ukrainian lands between the Soviet and Polish, as well as Czech, 
Hungarian, and Romanian governments—a state of affairs that lasted until the summer of 1939. 
                                                
49 V. Lypyns’kyi to D. Dontsov, June 25, 1920. Lypyns’kyi, Lystuvannia, vol. 1, 575. 
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The UNR’s consequent death meant the closing of its embassies in Bern and Copenhagen, which 
Mariia and Dmytro departed for L’viv/Lwów. Count Mykhailo Tyshkevych (1857-1930)—a 
Ukrainian diplomat and publicist in Lausanne during World War I, and the UNR’s ambassador 
to the Paris peace talks and the Holy See—supported their applications for Polish visas to resettle 
in Galicia. Piłsudski personally approved their permanent return to the region (now called Little 
East Poland), remarking “the Ukrainian writer D. Dontsov was already our political colleague 
(combattant politique) before the world war.”52 There is no evidence the two were personally 
acquainted, but Sosnovs’kyi indicates that Piłsudski intervened on behalf of Mariia’s wealthy 
and well-connected family—the Bachyns’kyis.53  
Unlike many other Ukrainian nationalists, who considered Piłsudski’s deal with the 
Soviets a betrayal and took an understandably dim view of Warsaw’s intentions with regard to 
the sizable Ukrainian minority it thereby inherited, Dontsov continued to espouse pro-Polish 
views. The “Intermarium”—Piłsudski’s vision of an anti-Bolshevik, anti-Russian imperialist 
alliance of Poland, Ukraine, Hungary, Romania, and the other young nation-states between the 
Black and Baltic Seas—struck Dontsov as infinitely preferable to Ukraine’s absorption into a 
Soviet pseudo-federation. A cordon sanitaire such as this might prevent future Russian 
incursions into Europe, Dontsov reasoned, but only if Poland regained a sense of messianism 
toward Eastern Europe, rekindling its traditional antipathy toward Russia.54 Since the eve of the 
First World War, Dontsov had considered the Poles a natural ally to Ukraine despite their 
“atavistic” tendency to regard the borders of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth as the 
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rightful boundaries of a twentieth-century Polish nation-state. In 1917 he urged Ukrainians to put 
the conflict over Galicia and Volhynia into a wider perspective, for “only then will we not be led 
astray by political loudmouths and super-patriots who do not see the forest for the trees.”55 
During the 1920s and early 1930s, Dontsov reached a modus vivendi with the Polish Interior 
Ministry, which permitted him to work in L’viv and Warsaw in peace, provided that he publish 
nothing overtly critical of Poland’s treatment of minorities. The police moved to deport Dontsov 
as a danger to civil society in 1924 following an investigation into his ties to the Ukrainian 
nationalist underground, but dropped it at Dontsov’s request—an indication that circles in the 
Polish government considered him useful as a fierce critic of Moscow and a proponent of Polish-
Ukrainian cooperation. Despite his ties to nationalist organizations and individuals that were 
militantly anti-Polish and illegal, he studiously avoided doing or publishing anything that might 
raise suspicion,56 instead working to channel Ukrainians’ resentment in defeat eastward and 
leftward, away from the Polish republic and its conservative supporters.      
 
The Foundations of Ukrainian Integral Nationalism  
Dontsov changed allegiance numerous times over the course of the First World War and 
the Ukrainian Revolution, striving to retain his ideological purity within the confines of a 
political philosophy that he himself was still in the process of cobbling together from disparate 
sources, but by the early 1920s he had found his way to an original and independent position, 
which he dubbed “active nationalism” (chynnyi natsionalizm). He presented it in Pidstavy nashoi 
polityky (The Foundations of Our Politics), the first book to propound a comprehensive 
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Ukrainian integral nationalist program, and one of the most important in his oeuvre.57 Stressing 
continuity, as was his lifelong wont (despite the ruptures of which his biographers are well 
aware), the preface to the first edition claimed that its author had been espousing the same ideas 
since before the war, as far back as 1907, and had hurried the volume into publication because 
the “byways of provincialism, Moscophilia, and cosmopolitanism” continued to mislead and 
debase Ukrainian political thought. Still, the book exudes the bitterness of a disillusioned 
apostate, not only from the community of Ukrainian socialists, but also from Lypyns’kyi’s 
conservative monarchism, and above all from the Russian world of his youth. The central thesis 
of the work—that Russia and Europe are two antithetical civilizations—was nothing new for 
Dontsov as of 1921, but he presented it in much starker and broader terms in Pidstavy, offering 
up hatred of Muscovy and the imperatives of struggle against it as a basis for the politics, 
literature, and spirituality, not just of Ukraine, but of the entire Western world.  
Characteristically, Dontsov’s starting point is World War I, which reminded all European 
nations that traditions matter and that all conflicts are ultimately settled with “blood and iron.” 
But such revelations eluded Ukraine, where the “outbreak of war found our political thought at 
an impasse.”58 Lulled into a slumber by their faith in the inevitable evolution of humanity, the 
peaceful resolution of all conflicts, and “international brotherhood,” Ukrainians took their 
prophets from other nations. He rejects the “vulgar idea” that the war was caused by the “secret 
diplomacy” of the imperialist powers, that only a worldwide social revolution will prevent such 
conflicts from happening again. The true essence of World War I was a clash of two 
civilizations, Muscovy and the West, just as Friedrich Engels, Konstantin Leontiev, Mikhail 
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Bakunin, Maxim Gorky (1868-1936), and others had allegedly predicted. Everything in 
Dontsov’s thought was structured around this oppositional dyad hereafter.  
Bolshevism is simply the latest manifestation of the Asiatic threat. Dontsov dismisses the 
“ignorant” people who say that Bolshevism is an international movement to overthrow the “gods 
of the bourgeois pantheon” (capitalism, imperialism, nationalism), and the anti-Semites who 
suppose that it is a Jewish conspiracy to weaken Christianity. Rather, Bolshevism is first and 
foremost a “Russian phenomenon.”59  Dontsov cites Dostoevsky, Bakunin, Lenin, and the 
archconservative Konstantin Pobedonostsev (1827-1907) to the same effect: they all sought to 
destroy European democracy as “the great lie of our era.” Tsarism and Bolshevism share the 
same essence: “Russian messianism.” This argument is almost identical to the one found in the 
essays of the Russian philosopher Nikolai Berdiaev as roughly the same time.60 According to 
Dontsov, a mystical belief in Russia’s destiny to displace the declining West and thereby bring 
about humanity’s salvation, informs the purportedly anti-Western convictions of figures as 
diverse as Alexander Pushkin (1799-1832), Alexander Herzen (1812-1870), and Vasilii Rozanov 
(1856-1919). Thus, Bolshevism is concerned not with fomenting a revolution of the international 
proletariat, but only with undermining Western states and societies. Hence Leninism’s 
condemnation of the colonial practices of Britain, France, and America, but not those of Russia. 
Nikolai Bukharin directs his wrath, not against traitors of the working class, but against 
“German, Austrian, French, and English Mensheviks.” Like the pan-Slavists, the Bolsheviks 
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incite the revolutionary proletariat to the “destruction of ‘rotten’ European democracy,” to the 
greater glory of Russia.61 Imperial Russia’s expansion into Europe was the sole cause of World 
War I. Following in its footsteps, the Soviet state opposes Europe per se, leftists and rightists 
alike, freely deploying the methods of tsarism (unlike European socialists, who adhere to the 
principles of liberalism). Russia has always behaved this way, recognizing (correctly) that every 
advance of Europe is a threat to its fundamental nature. This, Dontsov avers, is the key to setting 
Ukraine’s politics on firmer foundations.62             
Pidstavy’s second chapter, “Muscovite Barbarism,” contrasts the features of Europe (to 
which the non-Russian Slavic nations belong) with those of Russia. In Europe there is pluralism 
and drama, the dynamic interplay of forces, states and societies, classes, great historical figures, 
powerful religions and churches. In Russia there is only bleak homogeneity and oppression, a 
state that dominates a passive, faceless mass, a history of slavery, drudgery, and inertia. Russian 
“primitivism,” Dontsov argues, does not distinguish the “I” from “we.” “Thus, in the West there 
is, in the widest sense, self-government [Dontsov uses the English term —T.E.]; in Russia there 
is chaos or absolutism.”63 The Russian peasantry’s repartitional commune or obshchina 
epitomizes this immobilizing collectivism, which breeds slavishness and irresponsibility. The 
Russian serf—whether under tsar or commissar—is an empty vessel to be filled with whatever 
wickedness and idiocy one pleases.64 The other Russian estates, the clergy and the gentry, are no 
better. Their rights were merely “granted from the mountain”—they never fought for them like 
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their counterparts in the West. Dontsov claims that, thanks to this overbearing statism, honor and 
human dignity, even as concepts, are totally lacking in Russia.   
To the progressive rationalism and autonomy of the Catholic Church in Europe, Dontsov 
contrasts the Russian Orthodox Church’s dogmatism, authoritarianism, dependence on the state, 
and incapability of reform.65 Orthodoxy is passive; Catholicism is active. The former does not 
require the active participation of its congregates in the cult, only their passive submission; the 
latter addresses itself directly to the individual’s conscience and demands his or her active 
participation.66 The consequent moral weakness of individual Russians and their governmental, 
familial, and church structures accounts for the “shameful collapse” of their ruling class before 
Bolshevism and the submissiveness of the peasantry. Stark theological differences between the 
Catholic West and Orthodox Russia affected the intellectual histories and mentalities of the two 
civilizations: “the foundation of European philosophy is reason [ratio], the foundation of 
Russian thought is logos [the word]. Reason is a human attribute; logos, by contrast, is 
something metaphysical and godly, . . . the hidden force that lives in every thing, and which does 
not recognize logic, only ‘internal intuition.’” A mystical obsession with “oneness” and the 
“totality” leads to the Russian preoccupation with the collective subconsciousness—the unknown 
god. This “cult of the masses,” which Dontsov compares this “somnambulistic” mindset to 
Buddhism, predominates in Russian literature, particularly Lev Tolstoy, who connected “two 
epochs of Russian history: tsarism—when the masses carried out the intelligentsia’s pogroms at 
the instigation of the gendarmes—and Bolshevism, when these same masses carried out the same 
intelligentsia’s pogroms [but this time] at the instigation of the people’s commissars.” Of 
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Tolstoy’s allegedly anti-intellectual, altruistic, and collectivist ethics, as presented in War and 
Peace, Dontsov asks: “Is this not the philosophy of Bolshevism?” European-style heroes, which 
have their own ideas and act on the basis of their own reason cannot appear in the literature of 
Russia, where such men are regarded as “the Devil in disguise.” Russian heroes, by contrast, are 
mere conduits through which the colorless, stupefied masses, which “do not know whether to 
‘Beat the Jews’ or say ‘Long Live the Revolution,’” and impersonal historical forces act. Like 
Tolstoy, Dostoevsky propounded the “apotheosis of the masses” as a “higher truth, to which the 
nameless individual must be subordinated.” Better “serfdom” than a freedom that permits the 
existence of “kulaks.”67 
Dontsov discerns only continuities between Russia’s prerevolutionary theological and 
philosophical traditions and the attitudes of the Soviet state: “The new socialist ideologies of 
Russian society have come bearing the vestiges of yore. And this is not surprising! Because the 
whole science of Marxism captivated Russians not through its socialism, [but] only through its 
materialist fatalism and, as is clear to the Moskal’s intellect, the negation of the role of 
individuality in history.”68 The most reactionary Slavophiles also hated the West for its 
individualism. Leontiev condemned its “human rights,” “democratic revolutions,” and “respect 
for women.” Orest Miller (1833-1889) opposed the European “cult of human individuality” and 
“chivalry with its cult of personal honor.” Muscovy, a “nation of slaves” whether rightists or 
leftists rule it, constitutes an existential threat to the Occident, which it wishes to overrun through 
sheer force of numbers and plunge into chaos. Russian conceptions of freedom and democracy 
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are incompatible with those found in Europe and America. The Russian scientist and ideologue 
of pan-Slavism Nikolai Danilevsky (1822-1885) observed that “Russians know democracy but 
not in the sense of government by the people, but in the sense of equality, or better said, 
egalitarianism,” which Dontsov calls a “superlatively vulgar ideal,” foreign to Europe and 
tantamount to “political slavery,” mirrored in economic life as a preoccupation with “distribution 
and leveling, not the interests of production and trade.” In the absence of personal initiative there 
is only abject submission to authorities. For Russians, “wealth is an object of hatred [and] 
poverty is an object of adoration.” The result is an impoverished, stagnant, and inept society and 
economy. Russians push egalitarianism to disastrous extremes: a fear and loathing of “talent and 
genius,” “science and art,” “the elegance and beauty of women,” and of all who might raise 
themselves above the crowd and lead it (masters, manufacturers, engineers, singers, the heads of 
workers’ syndicates). The Russian contempt for work and material prosperity as things beneath 
their lofty spirituality breeds “laziness” and “negative parasitism among nations.” To show this 
Dontsov quotes Dostoevsky: “By God, I do not want these virtues. Everything to work, like the 
free, and everything to hoard money, like the Kikes (zhidy). I’d much rather plow a row, like a 
Russian”; “Russians should be exterminated for the good of humanity, as a harmful parasite!”69 
A Russian hates the European bourgeoisie and the Jew, not because of some socialistic, 
altruistic, or ascetic principle, but because he is too listless and undignified to become anything 
like them.  
 Driven by what Nietzsche called ressentiment, Russians are slaves and slave moralists 
bent on taking revenge against their natural superiors. Their goal is “the apotheosis of deformity 
[kalitstvo], physical and moral,” which takes the form of a revolution that will make rulers of 
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humanity out of “cripples” and “failures” like themselves. Herd-like, Russian society requires 
despotism to hold it together. A lack of internal discipline necessitates external discipline. Even 
after the “Great Revolution,” the fatalistic, dissolute, and uncomprehending Russian folk need a 
tsar. Dontsov concludes that Russia must struggle against Europe because:  
The amorphous Russian masses can be led only through absolutism; the self-active 
European society, only through self-action. For this Russia must, on the one hand, defend 
itself against the European principle and not allow European bacilli into it, because if 
they were inoculated into Russia they could lead only to the debauch and collapse of the 
state mechanism. On the other hand, they must strive to destroy this Europe, to destroy its 
ideas, everywhere they exert their influence, because these ideas are the sole protection 
against everything, and this includes Muscovite absolutism, that strives toward 
domination over the continent. To destroy this spiritual compound that unites individuals 
into groups, states, classes, and unions, and to make of them an amorphous mass, 
incapable of any resistance.70  
 
The crisis engendered by the Russian-European clash, and the role that Ukraine was to play in it, 
are the central concerns of the new “foundations” that Dontsov claims to provide for “our 
national politics and the essence of our collective ideal.”71 The latter is not, he clarifies, 
something “metaphysical,” but the concrete tasks that nations and classes must complete—in the 
service of humanity (liuds’kist’)—so as not to be condemned to death by history. Holding every 
modern imperialism but Russia’s to have had a positive impact on the world, Dontsov invokes 
the Monroe Doctrine, which “concentrates everything into the racial-geographic interests of the 
nation,” as an exemplary “national idea.” Ukraine, too, needs a national mission of global 
significance in order to survive.  
 What should the Ukrainian collective ideal be? Dontsov begins his answer by placing 
Ukraine within Central Europe, geographically and culturally, as the easternmost outpost of 
Western civilization (along with Poland and the Baltic countries). The absence of the 
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repartitional commune among the Ukrainian peasantry, the presence of constitutional and liberal 
thought in Ukrainian political traditions, and a “legal psychology” distinguish the country and its 
people from Russia, binding them to Europe. Thanks to its position, Ukraine is the kingmaker in 
Eastern Europe: if it sides with Russia, then the Poles, Czechs, and other Slavic nations will 
crumble before the Muscovite horde, critically endangering Western civilization in the process, 
but if it sides with Europe (emphatically including Poland), then the Slavic world will be won for 
the West, empowering European civilization. The keys to mastery over the Slavic peoples are 
L’viv and Constantinople, which must not be allowed to fall into Russian hands. Ukraine’s 
separation from Russia is the only way to prevent this. The West must offer cultural and material 
support to Ukraine in order to ward off the “Muscovite plague.”  Ukraine will fulfill its collective 
ideal, return to Europe, and join the chorus of self-conscious, sovereign nations only by 
embracing “national egoism.” “The will to become a political nation must become the highest 
law,” marshaling all the nation’s resources and abilities.72     
 Paradoxically, in order to earn its rightful and heroic role in the universal progress of 
humanity, Ukrainians must renounce the ideas and slogans of universal human progress, above 
all “federalism, pacifism, and international socialism,” as foggy-headed romanticism and 
cosmopolitanism. Federalism (between rather than within nations) is, for Dontsov, an incoherent, 
wishy-washy term, devoid of content, but it is dangerous for Ukraine (and Europe) because it 
entails the acceptance of fatally corruptive Russian elements into the national organism. Dontsov 
dismisses “absurd” talk of a purely economic federation or trade union between Ukraine and 
Russia, warning that is the first step to political union. Disunion and strife propels human 
advancement. Whereas pacifism is utopian and naive, war is the natural, inevitable, and desirable 
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result of conflict among peoples (not conspiratorial elites). International laws and parliaments are 
as powerless to stop them as earthquakes. Moreover, pacifism is “reactionary” (in a vaguely 
Marxist sense of the term) because it preserves every status quo, including “political monsters 
like Turkey or states like Mexico, which have not the slightest understanding of the idea of 
progress and civilization.”73 Dontsov attacks the League of Nations, the idea of international 
government, and Wilson’s Fourteen Points, attributing them to an “illness of the president.” 
Citing John Maynard Keynes’s The Economic Consequences of the Peace, Dontsov calls the 
Versailles Treaty a “fiasco” doomed to failure. As for international socialism, it lost the 
revolutionary prerogative it had during the era of Marx, Engels, and Lasalle, when it advocated 
for the oppressed nations. Since the Russian Revolution, international socialism has taken its 
orders from the “poisonous-imperialist spirit of the Kremlin’s cellars.” Still, Dontsov praises the 
callous principle of “scientific socialism” that “divides nations into those whose liberation lies in 
the interest of human progress (not the ‘liberation of the proletariat!’), and those whose 
disappearance will benefit human civilization.”74 It is for this reason that Marx would have 
supported Russia enemies in 1914, just as he did in his own time. The Second International’s 
national nihilism was a betrayal of the master, who recognized the importance of struggles that 
took an outwardly national rather than class form. The Third International, emanating from 
Bolshevik Moscow, has replaced the “corpse” of the second and resumed the First International’s 
interventionism in conflicts between nations, but it has done so to support nations that oppose 
world democracy and to attack those fighting for it (such as Poland and Ukraine). “Both [the 
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Second and the Third Internationals] placed the interests of a vanishing bunch of the urban 
proletariat over the needs of the great masses [and] of peasant democracy.”75  
 Contra the Third International, founded in 1919 by the Communist parties of Europe 
under Bolshevik leadership, Dontsov considered European imperialism a necessary component 
of Ukraine’s liberation, but gave up on the idea of Germany freeing Ukraine from the Muscovite 
yoke and feared the prospect of a Russian-German union. He argues, in hindsight, that the 
German “invasion of Ukraine was an apparition, which served only as proof to the Moskal’ that 
the entire ‘Ukrainian intrigue’ bore the stamp Made in Germany.” In actuality, Dontsov adds, 
contravening his erstwhile Germanophilia, the Central Powers’ motivation for supporting the 
UNR and the Hetmanate was their need for bread and peace on the Eastern Front, not a desire to 
dismember Russia. In the war’s aftermath, German and Russian interests are more aligned than 
ever, necessitating a Ukrainian reliance on the “imperialism” of “those states in the Entente that 
will fall into antagonism toward Russia with a change of the political map of Europe,” especially 
Great Britain: 
For this, the construction of a bloc of states from the Baltic to the Black sea would lie in 
our interests. For this, a strong Rumania, Hungary, and Poland would lie in our interests. 
For this, it would be good if the Union Jack flew triumphantly above the Bosporus and 
the Dardanelles. This would mean that the bridge between Europe and Asia, as Karl Marx 
called Constantinople, would become the tête de pont of Europe on its path to the East, 
and not of Russia in its expansion to the West.76             
                                                                                                     
Turning his attention away from England, Dontsov advocates a rapprochement with Poland. 
“The feelings that inspired our grandfathers against Poland” are not the basis for a collective 
ideal, which is founded upon love for one’s own country, not hatred for another’s. The anti-
Polish politics of Galician Ukrainians is “nothing other than a political atavism, though it may 
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also proceed from great love for the native country.” “The conception of that great and old 
conflict between Europe and Russia forces us, whether we like it or not, together with Poland on 
this side of the democratic line, on this side of the barricade.” Dontsov presents the threat of 
Russification as much greater than that of Polonization for the Ukrainian people. Alongside the 
Austrians and Prussians, the Poles have at least transmitted the spirit of civic duty, military 
discipline, and other “European values” to Ukrainians. Russian domination means the 
destruction of Warsaw and Kyiv as alternate bases of power; Western hegemony means the 
opposite. Thus, “unity with Europe, under all circumstances, at any price, is the categorical 
imperative of our external politics.”77    
 Similarly, internal politics must be geared toward the discovery and realization of 
Ukraine’s national ideal, and, ipso facto, its independence, in accordance with the West’s norms, 
values, and “racial” qualities. Invoking Nietzsche’s concept of the “will to power” and 
Merezhkovsky’s “will to the fatherland” [voliu k otechestvu], Dontsov argues that “the 
categorical imperative of [our] internal politics should be to instill in all the composite parts of 
the nation a ‘Wille zur Nation’ [will to the nation].” The foundation for this higher sense of unity 
and purpose is early modern Ukraine’s historical traditions, from the Constitution of Orlyk to the 
Battle of Poltava. The “German-Latin culture” has given Ukraine its “individualistic psychology, 
its activeness, which, acting upon individuals as well as groups, empowered [it] to stand against 
Russian influences.” Such occidental traditions are as significant as any in Europe and should be 
cultivated and celebrated. But since political independence is the basis of literature (according to 
Fichte), stateless Ukraine remains a “cripple among nations.” The greatest danger: Ukraine 
ceases “to be a complete organism, [and] makes itself a sect, like the Jews or the ‘Old 
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Believers.’” The individual members of such a nation suffer from schizophrenia, delusions, and 
insanity. Thus, the “territorial unity” of the nation must be maintained above all else. Sacrificing 
this for the sake of social justice will bring disaster because “the dominating factor in 
international life is not social struggle, but racial struggle.” Internal politics (including all 
questions of constitutional rights and equality) must be subordinated to external politics and the 
biological survival of the nation in the international arena.78  
 Dontsov’s vision of the form that this state would take is a rather confusing blend of 
libertarian individualism and authoritarian collectivism, democracy and elitism, capitalism and 
socialism. “For the lack of a better term,” Dontsov champions “democracy” in the specific sense 
that it is allegedly understood in the West—i.e. “political and economic self-action,” and the 
“freedom of the individual.” He derides the idea that the revolution in Ukraine should have been 
socialist because the majority of the population simply did not have a socialist mentality. Rather, 
the revolution should have had a peasant and petit-bourgeois character in order to reflect the 
emerging dominant classes of the town and country—a development that he interprets as 
“revolutionary” in its own right, given Ukraine’s stage of modernization (primitive capitalism). 
The petite bourgeoisie and peasantry, whether they are poor or wealthy, have interests opposite 
to the proletariat because they desire the expansion, not the liquidation, of private property and 
the free market (regulated in accordance with the “national will”). Unfettered capital, however, 
confronts them as an alien force: capitalist modernization impoverishes and displaces them as 
antiquated classes—an aporia that leads to searches, like Dontsov’s, for a “third way” between 
capitalism and socialism. The “reactionary” system that was put into place by the Soviet 
constitution is no more representative than the one that existed under Stolypin.  
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 According to Dontsov, the “dictatorship of the proletariat” is an absurd, antidemocratic 
idea that spells ruin for the vast majority of Ukraine’s population. The Bolsheviks pursue an 
antipeasant, antibourgeois policy in defense of the unchanged principle of Muscovite 
bureaucracy. “For Ukrainians, as a peasant nation, no kind of compromise with this ideology is 
possible.” Dontsov’s ideal, then, is a democratic “peasant, petit-bourgeois republic,” which may 
choose to embrace the traditions of European socialism, but never Bolshevism’s dictatorial, 
centralizing rule by the minority, which attacks electoral rights, the free press, individual rights, 
trade unions, and rival parties. “The principles [of self-government, the rule of law, and self-
action —T.E.] that lie at the base of European socialism, abstracting from it the requirements and 
possibilities of socialism in general, are the general principles of the dynamic of European social 
life, and as such must be recognized by us. In politics: parliamentarianism, not soviets. In 
industry: national consensus, not chaos and the dictatorship of a minority.”79 Under the influence 
of Fascism and Nazism, Dontsov abandoned even this qualified approval of socialism and 
democratic institutions in the years leading up to World War II, but as of the early 1920s he 
remained open to almost any politico-economic doctrine, from laissez-faire capitalism, to 
anarcho-syndicalism, to parliamentary socialism, provided only that it originated in the West and 
therefore pointed a way forward.    
 What, then, was wrong with Ukrainian socialism and democracy? To answer this 
question, Dontsov returns to his critique of Drahomanov and the Ukrainophiles, laying the blame 
for the failure of the Ukrainian Revolution at their feet. Cowardly, impractical dilettantes, the 
Ukrainian intelligentsia’s seizure of state power in 1917 quickly devolved into a tragicomedy 
because they failed to appreciate that the essence of the Russian-Ukrainian war was a “conflict of 
                                                
79 Dontsov, Pidstavy, in Dontsov, Vybrani tvory, vol. 5, 87–90. 
 
  203 
two nations, two races,” not an internal class struggle. To speak of such national conflict as a real 
feature of history, they thought, was to fall into the trap of the “satanic game of the ‘exploiters.’” 
Following Drahomanov, they saw all of Ukraine’s foreign policy interests as aligning with 
Russia’s. They were willing to struggle with the “errors of Bolshevik centralism” and the Black 
Hundreds, but never with Russia as such. This lack of an independent political ideal and naive 
faith in the compatibility of the Ukrainian and Russian national projects led to the zigzagging, 
confusion, and inevitable downfall of the nascent Ukrainian state. Dontsov cites Vynnychenko’s 
three-volume participant’s account of the revolution, Vidrodzhennia natsii (Rebirth of the 
Nation), as proof of the Ukrainophiles’ rejection of separatism before and during World War I. 
The Central Rada sought compromise with the Provisional Government instead of revolution, 
socialism instead of nationalism. It refused to raise a national army until it was far too late. They 
feared putting words into action—illegal, violent, terroristic action, if need be—even as the 
Ukrainian people demanded it and began acting independently. The Fourth Universal, which 
finally declared the UNR’s independence from Soviet Petrograd, and the invitation of the 
German occupation were similarly forced upon the Rada, which lost all legitimacy in the eyes of 
Ukrainians. The Hetmanate started out promising enough, reinvigorating the peasantry and 
granting the revolution a “national character,” but soon made the same mistake of giving power 
back to the “ideologues.” When Skoropads’kyi declared a “criminal” federation with the 
supporters of the tsarist old regime, he lost the respect of his supporters at once and forever. 
They followed him into exile, hoping against all experience that they would eventually be able to 
restore him. The Directory seized power in Kyiv, but it too failed to understand and utilize the 
peasantry’s open struggle against the Bolsheviks. Petliura foolishly hoped to work with the 
capitalist Entente and the socialist Soviets simultaneously. He was too soft and noble to match 
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the chaotic energy that Bolshevik Russia had unleashed upon the world with something of equal 
force and ruthlessness. What Ukraine really needed was “chauvinism.”80  
 Dontsov recounts the abysmal performance of the UNR’s diplomatic missions to Europe, 
but omits himself from the story despite his prominent role in it. These ambassadors, he claims, 
labored under illusions about their own importance as diplomats, posing as doctors and 
professors of all sorts to gain the respect of their European audiences, while petty jealousies and 
quarrels arose among them. There were scandals in the foreign press, a lack of unity, and 
inordinate focus on nonnational politics (i.e. socialism). The multitude of factions operating 
abroad (federalist, Hetmanite, pro-Bolshevik, and so on) hopelessly confused Ukrainian politics 
for European audiences. Meanwhile, the soldiers of the UNR were left hanging in the lurch, 
starved for cash, supplies, and weapons. Dontsov condemns the “paid foreign agents of the 
Union of the Liberation of Ukraine (SVU)”81 and the other Ukrainian socialist émigré groups for 
their indecisiveness, lack of national and personal dignity, inexperience, and sycophantic flip-
flopping between the Third International and the League of Nations. He attacks the Ukrainian 
Communists and Socialist Revolutionaries among these ambassadors as Russophile traitors to 
the national idea who regarded the Soviet despoliation of the peasantry and the loss of Ukraine’s 
cultural-linguistic identity as acceptable sacrifices for the sake of progress arm-in-arm with 
Moscow. Hypocritical or selectively amnesic, Dontsov avoids acknowledgement, let alone 
justification and differentiation, of his own part in this diplomatic fiasco.82 
 This disingenuous outsider’s perspective allows Dontsov to condemn the Ukrainian 
intelligentsia without personal embarrassment, unfairly rebuking them for having failed to adopt 
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a Ukrainian integral nationalist worldview before such a thing existed (he himself articulated it 
for the first time in Pidstavy, well after the fact). He rues their moral bankruptcy and political 
impotence in the face of the Bolsheviks’ “racial, national struggle” to enslave the Ukrainian 
peasantry in the name of the Russian-Jewish proletarian minority. Here Dontsov conflates the 
Jewish working-class in Ukraine with the Russian Communists bent on conquering it, arguing 
that the former sided with the latter thanks to their racial psychology and class interests, and 
blaming their behavior as a resentful and recalcitrant alien minority in various host nations for 
the rise of anti-Semitism across Europe. Despite the activism and heroism of the Ukrainian 
people at large, the intelligentsia failed to give their elemental “will to the power” ideational 
content, direction, and form.83  
 Dontsov maintains that Ukrainians needed a simple formula of uncompromising 
national struggle against Russia and a new type of leader to follow. This entailed resisting the 
modern decline of the West as a whole: “Ukraine together with the whole European-American 
world will pass this crisis, which will not end with the downfall of Bolshevism because it did not 
begin with it.”84 The rise of “European nihilism” that Nietzsche predicted in The Will to Power 
takes the form of Bolshevism, heralded by Russia and its agents, and threatens the existence of 
the nation as such. Only the peasantry and an ideology geared toward its interests and habits of 
thought can resist this grave danger in Ukraine. The urban proletarian minority, with its narrowly 
materialistic “stomach interests,” has nothing to offer. The haute bourgeoisie, too, is weak and 
unreliable. Dontsov points to the declining aristocracy as a potential source of leadership because 
they allegedly retain elements of “discipline, authority and the spirit of antimaterialism,” but 
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while he does not reject monarchy in principle, he doubts it could work in Ukrainian conditions, 
jabbing at the Hetmanites as faux monarchists.85 The basis for any nation-state-building in 
Ukraine, he insists, must be the wholesome, uncorrupted peasantry, the country’s absolute 
majority and rightful ruler.86 
 As late as 1921, Dontsov still spoke favorably of “democracy,” but what sort? Still 
reluctant to take the plunge into antidemocratic palingenesis, he skeptically referred to the 
“political spiritists, who want to charm the peril of nihilism with the shadows of the distant past, 
[and] do not believe in the possibility of regulating democracy, calling this task a squaring of the 
circle.” The desired democracy, he clarified, is not the plebeian nihilistic democracy of Rousseau 
and the Russians, of “pacifism, egalitarianism, antimilitarism, ochlocracy, stomach socialism and 
class struggle,” of “general leveling” and “sentimental-anemic people’s justice.” Rather, Dontsov 
envisioned a Ukrainian democracy modeled on the Canadian farmer and the French peasant: a 
rule by the people founded upon “work, hierarchy, social solidarity, duty, and the strong fist.” 
The equality propounded here is not the sort that drags the strong down to the level of the weak, 
making slaves of all, but a Social Darwinian “equality with regard to the point where the race 
begins and not where it ends,” that “recognizes the primacy of freedom” and “the competitive 
struggle for life.” Dontsov described an authoritarian agrarian democracy grounded in self-
discipline and self-action. He hailed the USA as the most perfect realization of this sociopolitical 
system and claims that the peasants of Ukraine are strongly inclined toward it.87  
 Still, the Ukrainian peasantry remained a class without a philosopher to guide and represent 
them—a role that Dontsov imagined himself fulfilling—and it needed a philosophy to match its 
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temperament and traditions. As the Scottish journalist Donald MacKenzie Wallace (1841-1919) 
observed in his travels in the Russian Empire, the Ukrainian peasant is a deep individualist like 
his English or American counterpart. He respects the family, private property, the state’s 
authority, the church, and other institutions that provide “social discipline.” Bolshevism and its 
chaos-inducing social engineering schemes are incompatible with the very existence of the 
Ukrainian peasantry. Noble and patriotic, imbued with a “healthy xenophobia,” the peasants may 
not understand “isms” but they are quite capable of building a society strong enough to save 
Europe from Muscovite barbarism. They share a common psychology with the West, the 
vestiges of medieval chivalry, enshrined in the concepts of individual freedom and personal 
responsibility. A politics built upon the bedrock of an independent peasantry and a corresponding 
ideology of rugged individualism could unify all the classes and nationalities of Ukraine, 
including the descendants of ethnically Russian or Polish colonists (Ukraine’s “Ulster”), with a 
collective ideal, common historical traditions, and devotion to their native land. As 
antianarchism (anti-makhnovshchyna), antitsarism, and anti-Bolshevism (anti-Russian 
messianism), this ideal is the nation living in accordance with the “perennial laws of racial 
struggle,” not class struggle and the “international solidarity of the proletariat.” The problems 
encountered in the pursuit of Ukrainian statehood (not autonomy) under a “blue-yellow flag” 
must be addressed within the “framework of great world-historical conceptions,” with reverence 
for the West (foremost peoples of the species) and scorn for Soviet Russia and its deceitful 
vulgarization of Marxism.88    
Dontsov’s closing remarks in Pidstavy concern the poetry of national revolution, and 
evidence his desire to “turn Marx on his head,” to invert the relation between superstructure and 
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base, to make consciousness prior to matter, to assert the reality of the text rather than the 
textuality of the real, to reconcile life and art, and to bring about a sociopolitical revolution in 
Ukraine through a spiritual-aesthetic revolution in its literature and mentality, smashing received 
idols yet drawing freely and anachronistically on exemplars from bygone eras:   
The poetry of this struggle may seem bizarre, . . . but even hyper-cultured Europe will 
soon find in this struggle the profound [and] original rhythm by which it too gyrates. To 
decipher this rhythm of movement, its sense—such is the task of our generation, which 
must finally understand that our national ideal can be realized only in uncompromising 
struggle with Russia. The movement of the peasantry also allows us to mend the caesura 
in the thread of our tradition, which is not the tradition of the [Brotherhood of Saints 
Cyril and Methodius], of Drahomanov, and of international-Moscophile socialism, not 
the tradition of the times of the nation’s decline, only the tradition of enlightenment from 
the West, the tradition of 1709 [the Battle of Poltava —T.E.], taken up in our times by all 
who want to realize it with weapons in hand.89 
 
Such is the hybrid tradition that will allow modern Ukrainians to return to the golden age of their 
nation: Cossack swashbuckling plus Western idealism, eulogized by a new generation of writers 
working in a time-honored “European” idiom.             
 
 
The Formation of Ukrainian Nationalist Groups in Postwar East Central Europe 
 
Dontsov struggled to balance the pro-Polish and pro-Entente image that he projected in 
Pidstavy with his reputation as a revolutionary and a purist among radicalized interwar Ukrainian 
nationalists. Although the Polish authorities tolerated him, he was closely connected to the 
largest and deadliest underground Ukrainian nationalist group of the time—the Ukrainian 
Military Organization (UVO), founded by former Sich Riflemen. “We have not been defeated!” 
Colonel Ievhen Konovalets’, leader of the UVO, thundered at its founding congress in Prague in 
August 1920. “The war is not over! We, the Ukrainian Military Organization, are continuing it. . 
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. . Victory lies before us!”90 The main parent organization of the OUN (founded in 1929), the 
UVO drew its ranks from the veterans of World War I, the Ukrainian-Polish War (1918-1919), 
and the Ukrainian-Soviet War (1917-1921), which caused a westward exodus of tens of 
thousands of pro-independence soldiers and civilians seeking refuge from Bolshevik rule in 
Eastern Ukraine.91 Those allowed into Poland were barred from settling in Eastern Galicia, 
moving instead into concentration camps to live in conditions widely condemned as appalling; 
the rest relocated to countries farther west, especially Czechoslovakia, setting up new hubs of 
Ukrainian émigré life in Prague and Podĕbrady.92 There were roughly 100,000 Ukrainian 
émigrés in Central and Western Europe at this time.93  
Declaring its intent to liberate Ukraine from both Polish and Soviet domination by any 
means necessary, the UVO infamously carried out political assassinations, acts of sabotage, 
high-stakes heists, and terrorist attacks against the Polish state and its Ukrainian “collaborators.” 
Warsaw responded with mass arrests, escalating repressions of Poland’s Ukrainian minority, and 
the intensified colonization and forced Polonization of the kresy (interwar Poland’s Ukrainian-
populated southeastern borderlands), further hastening the radicalization of Western Ukrainian 
society. This vicious cycle strengthened support for Roman Dmowski’s integral nationalist party, 
the Endecja, which rejected Chief of State Piłsudski’s more tolerant federalist ideals, advocating 
the coercive ethnic assimilation of non-Polish Slavs and the exclusion of Jews from the “national 
organism.” The climate of violence and hostility benefited the most radical Ukrainian 
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nationalists too. Still, Dontsov avoided Polonophobic rhetoric. Even the UVO membership’s 
considerable anti-Polish animus did not prevent him from advocating a military alliance with 
Poland against Soviet Russia at its founding congress. Konovalets’ and former president of the 
ZUNR Ievhen Petrushevych (1863-1940) blocked this motion.94 Like most Western Ukrainian 
nationalists, they regarded Poland as an inveterate enemy on par with Muscovy. Many 
underground activists, thousands of whom potentially faced arrest, torture, and execution for 
their activism,95 came to resent Dontsov’s coziness with the Polish regime, but the clean persona 
and record enabled him to create front organizations and publications intended to complement 
the illegal ones associated with the UVO.  
The most important of Dontsov’s surreptitiously subversive nationalist periodicals was 
Literaturno-naukovyi vistnyk (Literary-Scientific Herald, or LNV, 1922-1932). Previously the 
foremost Ukrainian literary and scientific journal, LNV was founded in L’viv in 1898. Mykhailo 
Hrushevs’kyi and Ivan Franko edited it as the official organ of the Shevchenko Scientific Society 
in a spirit of nonpartisanship, intellectual rigor, and artistic freedom. LNV moved to Kyiv in 1906 
after the expanded rights of expression gained in the Revolution of 1905 had made it possible do 
so, but the tsarist regime soon banned it, like all Ukrainian publications, in 1914. Revived after 
the end of the autocracy in 1917, the Soviet authorities banned it once more in 1920. Funds 
provided by the UVO made the revival of the journal in L’viv possible in 1922. At the insistence 
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of Konovalets’, Dontsov became LNV’s chief editor, giving the publication a decidedly 
nationalist agenda despite assurances that it would remain a neutral, nonpartisan forum, open to 
writers of all ideological persuasions. This was Konovalets’s attempt to win Dontsov over to the 
UVO’s cause before it was too late: “If you do not take Dontsov for what he is,” he once 
remarked, “then rest assured that he will become a fanatic opponent at once.”96 Hrushevs’kyi and 
the members of the directory of the Ukrainian Publishers’ Union, which also financed the 
publication, opposed Dontsov’s appointment, fearing that it might ruin the paper’s democratic 
traditions. Indeed, Dontsov quickly adopted an authoritarian and tendentious approach to 
managing the publication, causing one of the other original members of the editorial board, 
Volodymyr Doroshenko (1879-1963), to complain that he “led the journal according to his own 
will and taste, drawing some [likeminded people] into collaboration and rejecting others” and 
“had an abrasive, apodictic, tenacious character.”97 Unwilling to tolerate dissenting voices, 
Dontsov soon had Doroshenko and Volodymyr Hnatiuk (1871-1926) purged, assuming total 
control over LNV, retaining his independence from the UVO (and later the OUN), and using the 
journal as a platform for the promotion of his own ideas and goals.98   
Dontsov outlined his agenda for LNV in the first issue of the revived paper, published 
May 1922, in a manifesto, “Our goals” (Nashi tsili). He sought “to tear our national idea from the 
chaos in which it threatens to perish, to cleanse it of rubbish and mud, to give it bright, 
expressive content, to make of it a banner around which the entire nation might gather.”99 
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Dontsov hoped to create a new “worldview” and credo, expressed in simple, ecstatic slogans by 
supremely self-assured sloganeers, capable of mobilizing the masses. Dontsov derided Ukrainian 
literature for its quietism, fogginess, ineptitude, unhealthy faith in abstract historical 
determinisms, and drab, overworked realism, which will never inspire the people to action. 
Instead, he advocated a new romanticism of the peasantry, which has proven its willingness to 
fight and die for its and the nation’s interests. This new ideology “knows no iron laws of social 
and economic development. . . . We know, on the contrary, that many an unexpected renaissance 
has come about as a consequence of war inevitably leading, in many countries, to domination of 
the peasantry and in no way to democracy.” Nevertheless, there is a tendency toward a 
disintegration and decentralization of European powers, the fallout of 1914, which Dontsov 
considered favorable to the movement for Ukrainian independence. The peasants, he thought, 
“possess the virtues necessary to prosecute Ukraine’s national struggle,” above all personal 
initiative; they require only inculcation with a militaristic worldview, such as all Western 
European nations allegedly have. “We want to be not an object, but a subject of history,” 
Dontsov writes, insisting that the most essential thing for achieving such recognition is a 
purified, heroic, action- and future-oriented ideology of force, invoking George Sorel’s 
reflections on the power of myths to foment sociopolitical change, irrespective of their objective 
truth or realness.100  
LNV, its new chief promised, would serve as the main vehicle for a Ukrainian nationalist 
cultural renaissance, and the revolutionary war and liberation to which he hoped it would give 
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rise. On its pages, Dontsov began developing a nationalist mythology, which Zaitsev parses into 
the following101: 1) the myth of an apocalyptic “final battle” in Ukraine’s struggle for freedom 
(analogous to Sorel’s “social myth” of the “general strike” and its galvanizing role the workers’ 
movement); 2) the palingenetic myth of national rebirth and the triumphal return of Ukraine’s 
golden age102; 3) the myth of Ukraine’s ancient and modern role on the frontline of the civilizing 
(i.e. Europeanizing) mission against Russia and Asia as a whole103; and 4) the elitist myth of 
“knights and plebeians”—a binary opposition of lower and higher castes or “spiritual” human 
types derived from a vulgarization of Nietzsche’s Zarathustra (replete with Dontsov’s 
reimagining of Taras Shevchenko as an Übermensch [nadliudyna]—a creator of new values who 
takes action heedless of moralities and celebrates heroic deeds).104 Although Dontsov was 
steeped in the material secularism and anti-Christian currents of his era, he wanted to charge his 
nationalist worldview with a sense of the sacred and the sublime, hallowed in ecstatic paeans and 
capable of inspiring fanatical devotion. But the “death of God” and the “twilight of the gods” 
proclaimed by Nietzsche’s “untimely” prophet (Zarathustra), did not prevent Dontsov from using 
theological metaphors. Armed with modernist techniques and ideas, he produced (or at least set 
the agenda for) a Ukrainian nationalist “mythopoeia.”105  
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As we shall see, Dontsov called, rather cynically, for the mobilization of the church and 
the Christian convictions of the people for the purposes of warlike national egoism and the 
apotheosis of the nation, but he had no use, at this point, for the doctrines and stories of the 
Bible, preferring the Roman Empire’s transformation of early Christianity (a slave morality) into 
a religion of worldly power and glory (Catholicism). He thus viewed the Greek-Catholics or 
Uniates favorably in the early 1920s, though he took anticlerical, anti-Catholic positions in the 
1930s, after Greek-Catholic leaders came out in opposition to his ideology and its realization in 
the practices of the OUN. Dontsov was hostile toward Orthodoxy, the faith of his own 
upbringing and that of the majority of Ukrainians, but he later joined the Ukrainian Orthodox 
Church and became outwardly devout as he aged. The ideologue was as inconsistent about his 
theological as his political worldview, but there is no evidence that he had moved beyond the 
atheism of his youth with regard to his personal faith at this point, even if he now considered 
religiosity and religious institutions critical to the health of national states, societies, and cultures. 
He populated his 1920s writings with many “gods,” but the apparently sincere monotheism of his 
later years is missing. Dontsov sought the salvation of Ukrainian politics and culture in and 
through an aesthetically edifying, spiritually fortifying mythopoeia of the nation—not through 
God, Christ, or the morality of the Old and New Testaments.      
Despite the radical traditionalism at the heart of his mythopoeia, Dontsov favored the use 
of the iconoclastic, transgressive, and experimental methods of futurism and expressionism to 
achieve it. In this regard, he followed the trend throughout the Ukrainian world, especially in 
newly Soviet Kyiv.106 Dontsov presented his ideal modernist aesthetics in a study of one of his 
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few Ukrainian literary heroes, the renowned author Lesia Ukrainka (1871-1913). In “Poetka 
ukrains’koho risordzhimenta: Lesia Ukrainka” (Poetess of the Ukrainian Risorgimento), which 
appeared in LNV’s first two issues, Dontsov extols the power of Ukrainka’s poetry to possess 
readers, its energy and dynamism, militancy and burning faith, self-sufficiency, and refusal to 
compromise.107 He admired her storytelling for its recognition of the interdependence of good 
and evil, and for the “logic of dreams” that animates her plots. Dontsov later wrote that she 
rejected the “genial human morality of peace and love for one’s neighbor” as the “religion of 
slaves.”108 Ukrainka’s final poems, such as Boiarynia (The Boyar Woman, 1910) and Orhiia 
(The Orgy, 1912-13), depict armed struggle in the name of lofty ideals as Ukrainians’ only path 
to liberation from the “prison” of Russian imperialism.109  
Of all the Ukrainian intellectuals of her generation, Ukrainka alone rejected the 
“complacent provincialism,” “pornography,” and “peasant ethnography” that degraded the 
Ukrainian language into an argot, or a caricature based on the speech of the most oppressed 
social caste (the peasantry), something Dontsov accused Ukrainka’s uncle, Mykhailo 
Drahomanov, and Volodymyr Vynnychenko of doing.110 She was uniquely worthy of her 
predecessor, Taras Shevchenko, Ukraine’s greatest national poet, because she refused to collapse 
the Ukrainian nation into its peasant class, and counseled a voluntarist nationalism that was as 
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capable of hatred and action as of love and contemplation.111 Dontsov also admired Ukrainka for 
her ideals of personal sacrifice, arguing that martyrs must be conscious of and steadfast in their 
martyrdom, fanatically dedicated to the nation, and unafraid to spill the blood without which no 
idea can be sanctified—an ideal that his young followers enthusiastically embraced in the 
coming years.112 Such an approach to literature was precisely what was needed, Dontsov 
believed, for the creation of mass-mobilizing myths, which was his central goal as an editor, 
publicist, and critic from the early 1920s.113  
An editor unashamed to fill the pages of LNV with his own articles, Dontsov was 
successful in turning the journal into the beacon for a new formation of nationalist authors and 
subscribers drawn from the young Ukrainians of East Galicia, the native-born as well as emigres 
from the former Russian Empire. These were children of the Great War who refused to accept its 
outcome, and Dontsov’s ideology of force and willpower resonated with them.114 Not without a 
tinge of jealousy, Konovalets’ called Dontsov the “spiritual dictator of Galician youth.”115 In the 
early 1920s, they organized themselves into myriad formations: the Group of Ukrainian 
Nationalist Youth (HUNM)116 and the League of Ukrainian Nationalists (LUN), which combined 
into the Union of Organizations of Ukrainian Nationalists (SOUN); the Organization of the 
Higher Classes of Ukrainian Gymnasium Youth (OVKUH); and the Union of Ukrainian 
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Nationalist Youth (SUNM). These groups combined with the UVO to create the OUN in 1929, 
and like the UVO they held Dontsov in high esteem. OVKUH members, including future OUN 
leader Stepan Bandera (1909-1959) and future UPA commander Roman Shukhevych (1907-
1950), today the two most celebrated and condemned heroes in the history of Ukrainian 
nationalism, organized public readings of LNV in L’viv.117  
Another OVKUH member and future OUN(B) ideologue, Stepan Lenkavs’kyi (1904-
1977), claimed to have drawn all his political knowledge as of the early 1920s from Dontsov’s 
articles in LNV, “the leading organ of nationalist creativity.118“ He recalled that the SUNM, 
which offered financial support to Dontsov and boasted members published in LNV, deferred to 
him before all others on the most pressing political and moral questions.119 Many of the 
ideologue’s young followers even came to regard him as the prophet and founder of a new 
religion. As the author of the OUN(B)’s “Ten Commandments of the Ukrainian Nationalist,” 
Lenkavs’kyi appreciated the religious quality of Dontsov’s credo, writing approvingly in 1928 
that it exhibits “important distinctive marks of religion: strong emotional coloring, fanatical 
belief in the truth and inviolability of its dogmas, reckless intolerance to and negation of 
everything that does not agree with it.”120  
Dontsov was forthright about his aim to sacralize the politics and literature of Ukrainian 
nationalism, to turn it into an “ersatz religion” with himself as head priest and a pyramidal 
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hierarchy of acolytes and foot soldiers beneath him.121 “Modern” nationalism, he thought, was 
destined not to replace, but to modify and redirect the traditional sources of religious fulfillment 
in Ukrainian folklife, rendering God and nation, church and state, evermore synonymous. 
Dontsov’s attitude toward Christianity and its institutions in Ukraine continued to evolve away 
from atheism; the church and modern Ukrainian nationalism must, of necessity, draw near to one 
another and fight toward the same end—”the transformation of a scattered tribe into a conscious 
nation.”122 Whatever theological and political differences may have separated the two forces 
previously, Ukrainian nationalism and the church were drawn together by opposition to a 
common enemy: Russian Communism. In Pidstavy Dontsov called for a reformation of the 
Ukrainian church to cast off the chains of Muscovite Orthodoxy in the name of Westernization, 
to returning to its preschismatic roots and reuniting with the allegedly more empowering 
theologies and institutions of the West. “The organism of this monster [Russia] is mortally 
wounded in its three main foundations: autocracy, nationality, and orthodoxy. Our collective 
ideal places, instead of the first, the principle of self-action; instead of the second, self-
determination of the nation; instead of the third, an independent Church, faithful to its ancient 
ties with the Occident.”123 Accordingly, in 1921, Dontsov favored the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic 
Church, which was strongest in East Galicia and loyal to Rome, but by 1924 had switched to 
Ukrainian Orthodoxy—a conversion that held for the rest of his days, as his religiosity grew 
more vehement and apocalyptic with age.   
But Dontsov’s version of Christianity, as Zaitsev argues, was not that of the Jews’ 
“passive worldview,” which he followed Nietzsche in calling a “religion of submission” and 
                                                
121 Zaitsev, Ukrains’kyi integral’nyi natsionalizm, 222. 
 
122 Dmytro Dontsov, “Tserkva i natsionalizm,” LNV 2 (1924), 81. 
 
123 Ibid., 92. 
 
  219 
“slave morality,” but that of the allegedly more worldly, ennobling, and activist faith of the 
Roman church.124 “The idea that dying Rome [gave] to Christianity: the idea of virtus, the highly 
developed feeling of personal dignity and right, the cult of force and courage.”125 He learned 
from the French integral nationalist Charles Maurras that Christianity’s true essence was not the 
“Jewish letter” (the Bible) but its “Roman clarification.”126 Most valuable was its doctrine of 
holding faith above question and reason, conducive to an authoritarianism buttressed by 
supernatural forces and revelations, hieratic hierarchies, and the secrets of initiation. Nationalism 
moves inexorably toward the “theological worldview of the church,” sharing its antipathy for 
materialism and socialism.127 In place of rationalism they both offer a “dogmatism” that Dontsov 
casts in a positive, life-affirming light. “According to perhaps its greatest apostle, M[aurice] 
Barrès, modern nationalism dethroned l’intelligence, and in its place put passion [afekt] as the 
greatest explosive force in the history of humanity. Modern nationalism has begun to search for 
its God not in the combined reason of the ideal, but only in its own desire, its own faith.”128 
Forged in the crucible of World War I, the modern nationalist, “like a medieval fidei defensor, 
paid no mind to the number of existences that were sacrificed for the triumph of his idea . . . just 
as he paid no mind to it in 1914.” Dontsov went so far as to pronounce war the essence of both 
nationalism and Christianity, wedding “redemptive violence” on modern battlefields to a 
                                                
124 Zaitsev, Ukrains’kyi integral’nyi natsionalizm, 215. 
 
125 Dontsov, Poetka ukrains’koho rysordzhymenta, 34-35. 
 
126 Dontsov, “Tserkva i natsionalizm,” 82. 
 
127 Ibid., 75. 
 
128 Ibid., 76-77. 
 
  220 
traditionalist cult of ancestors.129 The church exists solely to serve the nation, doing God’s will 
by supporting Christendom’s nationalists.      
Certain circles of young Ukrainian writers responded with enthusiasm to Dontsov’s 
project—the production of a new nationalist religion and the spiritual revolution in ethics, 
politics, and aesthetics that this entailed. As poets, essayists, novelists, literary critics, and 
scholars of Ukrainian history, linguistics, mythology, and folklore, they sought to generate the 
texts that would reify this creed and win converts to it, inspiring fervent devotion and great deeds 
in the process. Dontsov’s LNV served as the beacon around which this cadre of aspiring myth-
makers rallied. Broadly speaking, the group included Ievhen Malaniuk (1897-1968), Iuryi Lypa 
(1900-1944), Leonid Mosendz (1897-1948), Oleh Ol’zhych (1907-1944), Iuryi Klen (1891-
1947), Olena Teliha (1906-1942), Mykhailo Mukhin (1894-1974), Andryi Kryzhanivs’kyi 
(Sviatoslav Dolengo) (1907-1950), and Ulas Samchuk (1905-1987), among others.130 Some 
scholars group these writers together as the “Prague School,” after the city where they gathered 
as émigrés in the early 1920s, or as the “Warsaw School,” after the city to which some of them 
relocated shortly thereafter, while others insist that these were two stylistically and 
programmatically distinct groups. I use the name “Vistnykivtsi,” which is derived from the 
journals in which they all published at one point or another (LNV and its revival under the 
Dontsov’s sole discretion, Vistnyk [1933-1939]), to denote a broader conception of Ukrainian 
émigré nationalist literature in the interwar period than the geographically confined Prague and 
Warsaw Schools allow. 
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Figures 3.5-7: Ievhen Malaniuk, Iuryi Lypa, and Oleh Ol’zhych. Source: Internet Encyclopedia 
of Ukraine. 
 
The unity of the Vistnykivsti was manifest in their ideology, personal connections, venues 
of publication, and the stylistics and themes of their writing. With the exception of Malaniuk, all 
became involved with the OUN, espousing a variety of radical nationalist ideas. Contributing to 
Dontsov’s periodicals and belonging to his club, the self-declared cultural elite of the interwar 
Ukrainian emigration, was more important than mere location. One of the implications of this 
category, which has made some Ukrainian literary critics uncomfortable, is that Dontsov, as the 
editor of LNV and Vistnyk, was also the founder and ideologue of the school—a controversial 
association that could taint or diminish the artistic accomplishments of individual Vistnykivsti. 
Many of the latter eventually outgrew Dontsov and turned against him, starting journals of their 
own and renouncing his influence—a select few remained loyal to the end—but all publicly and 
privately acknowledged his centrality to the Ukrainian nationalist literary milieu that took shape 
after World War I. Lypa found his “fine, audacious articles” and their “implacable militancy” 
strongly appealing.131 Malaniuk hailed him as “a phenomenon,” later heaping praise on Pidstavy 
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on the occasion of its author’s seventy-fifth birthday.132 Ol’zhych wrote the editor about the 
transformation he had effected in all of them: “We feel in ourselves, and this is original, the birth 
of such a force (you call this an awakening of the Western elements of the national psyche) that 
it is not surprising that pride goes to the head. Do not take this for evil—this is only faith in 
oneself, certainty of one’s strength and a sense of one’s calling.”133 Like the UVO, the origins of 
this generation’s nationalist poetry can be traced to the POW and refugee camps for the veterans 
of UNR’s army and other exiles from Soviet Ukraine, especially at Kalisz and Shchpiorno in 
central Poland, where Ol’zhych, Lypa, Malaniuk, Mosendz, Iuryi Darahan (1894-1926), and 
others met, began their careers as poets, and created their own journal, Veselka (Rainbow). 
Schools and theaters operated in the camps, serving teachers, students, farmers, soldiers, officers, 
and artisans. According to Ol’zhych, the emotions of the exile experience and the hardships of 
camp life shaped these budding poets’ expressive artistic individualities, deepening their 
appreciation for Ukrainian reality and widening their perspective on the national movement and 
its possibilities.134 They eagerly consumed Dontsov’s writings, which circulated in the camps, 
urging inmates down the path to nationalist radicalization.135  
According to the prominent Ukrainian cultural critic Iuryi (Sherekh) Shevel’ov (1908-
2002)—one of the most trenchant detractors of Dontsov and his influence on Ukrainian literature 
(despite admitting to a fascination with his ideas during World War II)—it was a worldview, not 
a particular style, that united the Vistnykivsti: a conviction that Ukraine possessed a unique 
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spirituality (dukhovnist’), theretofore repressed, and that their task was to realize it in the form of 
an independent nation-state.136 They sought this spirituality in Ukraine’s bygone eras and 
folklore—what Shevel’ov calls a “Herderian-romantic and in part also Hegelian cultural-literary 
ideology” of “the strong man, the aristocrat, the statesman, the warrior, and the knight,” which 
was “typical of interwar Europe.”137 Shevel’ov attributes the group’s voluntarism to Dontsov’s 
(pernicious) influence, dismissing their patriotism for its “delusion [and] artificiality” born of 
their estrangement from the fatherland.138 Under Dontsov’s “hypnotic” spell, the school, an 
autistic aberration, turned inward, spoke only to themselves, and succumbed to “internal 
exhaustion” by the late 1930s.139 Other commentators (Halyna Svarnyk, Ivan Fizer, and 
Volodymyr Derzhavyn) evaluate the school less harshly, focusing on its “tragic optimism,” 
“Ukrainian messianism,” and “Promethean worldview,” its creative achievements and continuity 
with eras of Ukrainian literature before and after, and the real self-sacrifices made by several 
Vistnykivtsi as OUN members during World War II, whose acts of martyrdom demonstrate the 
authenticity of their poetry and the sincerity of their beliefs.140  
With regard to style, the Vistnykivsti’s heavy use of irregular rhymes and accumulation 
of neologisms, rare words, and archaisms anticipated the work of the Soviet Ukrainian dissident 
poets of the 1960s (the Shestydesiatnyky). The Vistnykivtsi carried on traditions of form and 
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content stretching back to the Ukrainian Baroque and the Cossack period, but also pursued the 
aesthetic agendas inaugurated by modernist movements, such as symbolism and neoclassicism, 
transitioning from “art for art’s sake” to a radical commitment to political ideologies and the 
reconciliation of text and life after World War I (a typical progression for contemporaneous 
avant-gardistes throughout Europe).141 Pleased with his own impact, Dontsov described the 
aesthetic and ideological orientation of the generation under his influence in his 1923 essay, “Pro 
‘Molodykh’” (On “the Youth”):  
The revolution that has dethroned the saints of positivism has replaced them with 
intuitivism in philosophy (Bergson) and expressionism in art and literature (in poetry it 
was first called ‘symbolism’). The new worldview has broken irrevocably with 
everything old. This was a revolt in the name of everything elemental, subconscious in 
the human soul. Feeling took the place of reason, the personal ‘I want’ took the place of 
laws, mysticism took the place of phenomena. At the source of everything there appeared 
a will that knew no compromises, or more correctly its protoform—an obscure drive. 
Once more the world appeared as the play of turbulent, blindly raging forces, as a chaos 
in which nothing is but everything is just becoming. The individual ‘Ego,’ its 
autonomous creativity, and it untiring activism became values in themselves, independent 
of aims and content. Ethical pathos and ‘amorality,’ fas and nefas, the delight of the 
creator and the malice of the destroyer all became mixed up in the cult of the naked force 
and power that hates everything sickly or condemned to die, and that is the sole guarantor 
of victory in our epoch of lost illusions, unparalleled boredom, and war of all against 
all.142   
 
In addition to LNV, Dontsov disseminated these ideas more directly, with fewer 
pretensions to neutrality, through the journal Zahrava (Crimson Sky), which he edited in the 
years 1923-24, again with the support of Konovalets’ and the UVO. Highly regarded among 
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interwar Ukrainian integral nationalists, Zahrava was the official publication of the Ukrainian 
Party of National Work (UPNR, known internally as the “Ukrainian Party of National 
Revolution”). Founded April 24, 1924, the UPNR was the short-lived legal front organization of 
the UVO.143 The party’s rightwing program called for a “Ukraine for Ukrainians” purged of the 
foreigners who had deformed the country into a rural dependency. It recognized the importance 
of the peasantry in the life of the nation, called for reeducation of the youth in the values of 
discipline and self-reliance, and opposed cosmopolitan and internationalist ideas. According to 
Motyl, this was the first programmatic statement of the desires of Ukrainian nationalists, and it 
clearly bears Dontsov’s mark.144 The UPNR’s pursuit of a united front of Ukrainian forces led to 
its dissolution on July 11, 1925, when most of its members abandoned it to join the newly 
formed centrist Ukrainian National Democratic Alliance (UNDO), the largest legal Ukrainian 
political party in interwar Poland. Some attribute the party’s failure to Dontsov’s conflicts with 
Konovalets’, whom he accused of doing too little to support it.145 The outcome of the venture 
permanently damaged relations between the two. Others blame Dontsov’s disagreements with 
Paliiv (coeditor of Zahrava), who, unlike Dontsov, opposed the emulation of Western ideas and 
models.146 Whatever the case, order eluded him during his tenure at the helm of the UPNR and 
Zahrava; practical politics appeared not to be his strong suit and he never returned to them.147 
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Embarrassed by the affair, Dontsov later denied ever being a part of the UPNR’s leadership, 
though most researchers who have addressed the matter disagree.148 Nevertheless, Zahrava’s 
two-year run represented a milestone in the radicalizing development of Ukrainian nationalism. 
The success of Zahrava, LNV, and Pidstavy ensured Dontsov’s popularity, which only grew in 
the years that followed, propelling him to celebrity status in the Ukrainian émigré community in 
Central Europe.  
While all the nationalist youth groups acknowledged Dontsov’s intellectual authority, 
they had their own ideologues, some of whom eventually rejected aspects of his thought and 
positioned themselves as his competitors. By the mid 1920s a split had already begun to emerge 
between Dontsov’s “active nationalism” and the “organized nationalism” of the future OUN. 
Volodymyr Martynets’ (1899-1960), the chief ideologue of the SUNM at this time, complained 
of the “unnatural existence of two ‘nationalisms’—’Dontsovist’ and organized,” writing that “if 
someone wanted to call Dontsov the ‘father of Ukrainian nationalism,’ and us his children, then 
he would be a father who did not recognize his children and we would be children who already 
stood on our own legs on the day of [our] birth.”149 Martynets’s somewhat self-serving 
assessment underestimates Dontsov’s impact, eliding his sincere though unsuccessful attempts to 
spearhead the organization of Ukrainian nationalists through Zahrava and the UPNR. After 
________________________ 
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1925, it is true, Dontsov kept a safe distance between himself and the nationalist underground, 
but he did not abandon all of his followers, and the ones he supported played an active role in the 
OUN.  
Dontsov and Dontsova never had biological children, but instead devoted themselves to 
the cause of Ukraine’s liberation, becoming spiritual guardians to the young Vistnykivtsi, 
nurturing their authorial abilities, and offering them a platform through which to express and 
amplify themselves. Their protégés—Lypa, Teliha, Mosendz, Malaniuk, Ol’zhych, Klen, and 
Samchuk—published in the Dontsovs’ journals, gathered at their home in L’viv, joined them for 
dinner parties in Warsaw and Prague, accompanied them on vacations to the Carpathians and 
Western Europe, and even became romantically involved with them.150 Dontsov failed to build a 
parliamentary party on the basis of his ideas, but he played an essential role in Ukrainian 
nationalist politics from its inception, aestheticizing and sacralizing it, quite self-consciously, 
with a new poetics and an epic, palingenetic mythos.                   
 
Dontsov, Fascism, and the Avant-Garde 
After Benito Mussolini’s rise to power in 1922, Dontsov’s ideas and the organizations 
permeated by them elicited negative comparisons to Italian Fascism by critics. His predilection 
for authoritarian statism had already been called out in a review of Pidstavy by the Ukrainian 
Social Democrat Isaak Mazepa (1884-1959), who accused him of betraying the authentic 
traditions of the Cossacks, which were rebellious and anarchic. “If in contemporary conditions 
one could create a state based on Dontsov’s ideas,” Mazepa writes, “it could only be a police 
state in which the popular masses serve mutely as material for the experiments of various 
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‘brilliant cynics.’”151 But Dontsov insisted that the heavy-handed centralization of power 
promoted in his writing was only a transitional measure, necessary in the time of great stress and 
upheaval that stateless revolutionary Ukraine will face on its path to his ideal government and 
society: American-style democracy. “No one is so naive as to consider dictatorship a permanent 
form of government; this is a temporary phenomenon. . . . When I speak about a state system on 
the American model—I am speaking about the more or less stable form of an already constituted 
state.”152 Nevertheless, accusations of fascism did not offend Dontsov, who considered what 
Mussolini and his Blackshirts had achieved in Italy to be highly instructive for Ukrainian 
nationalists. His first published use of the term occurs in his 1922 work on Lesia Ukrainka, in 
which he writes that “the whole of her creative work is one frenzied cry to that bella vendetta, 
which, in its most recent form of ‘fascism,’ favored orgies in Italy, but [took] the form of 
uprisings in her native country.”153 The ascendant Italian ideology represented the aggressive, 
uncompromising values and monumental, overpowering aesthetic that he sought to inject into 
Ukrainian politics and literature.  
His 1923 article, “Bellua sine capite” (The Beast without a Head), written on the occasion 
of the fifth anniversary of the UNR’s declaration of Ukrainian independence, compares Fascism 
to Bolshevism to uncover the secrets behind their success. Both, he argues, were “above all 
antidemocratic movements,” which were nevertheless “popular” and “revolutionary.” Exhibiting 
“uncompromisingness and irreconcilability,” Fascism and Bolshevism were both “movements of 
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an initiative minority, which imposed its will on compatriots.”154 So long as Ukrainian 
nationalist movements lacked these elitist, authoritarian features and the corresponding ability to 
inspire fanatical commitment to an idea, they would continue to fail. However, Dontsov hedged 
such endorsements: “I am not making an advertisement here for either Fascism or Bolshevism: 
with what the first will end—I do not know; that the second will end in total bankruptcy—is 
obvious. But I am not concerned here with their internal politics, but only with the methods of 
seizing and consolidating the state apparatus . . . , and in this regard both Fascism and 
Bolshevism are still classic examples of how this is done.”155 Dontsov elaborated on the need for 
“creative violence” and “initiative minorities” elsewhere in the early 1920s, holding forth the 
possibility of a new elite emerging meritocratically in the crucible of revolution (a position that 
the Hetmanites rejected completely).156 In an anonymous 1923 article in Zahrava, “Chy my 
fashysty?” (Are We Fascists?), Dontsov addressed the Ukrainian left’s accusations directly: “We 
do not regard fascism as something evil. On the contrary!”157 Nevertheless, he expressed 
skepticism about the term’s meaningfulness outside the Italian context and specifically in 
Ukraine, quoting an unnamed “leader of Italian Fascism”: “‘Fascism is an essentially Italian 
matter. Because of this, any replication in a foreign country is impossible and would only be 
aping (malpovannia). A fascist world union is nonsense.’ We wholly subscribe to this 
declaration. And thus it is appropriate that we stand, like fascism, not on an international but on a 
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national platform, — we cannot be fascists.”158 Then again, as Zaitsev notes, Italian Fascism’s 
prioritization of national over social liberation, hostility toward internationalism, and conception 
of nationalism as a way of life prompted Dontsov to declare that “if this is the program of 
fascism, then have it your way — we are fascists!”159  
The following year he again identified his ideology as a form of fascism, albeit in 
quotation marks, in part because it opposed both communism and liberalism, following a third 
way between or beyond them, in part because a more precise term was lacking.160 Interestingly, 
he acknowledged the possibility of Ukrainian Communism combining with Ukrainian “fascism,” 
provided that it become “national” (i.e. purge itself of Russian messianism and instead pursue 
independence), because it had the right “antiliberal temperament” to prosecute a violent 
revolution.161 (In the meantime, of course, only a struggle to the death was possible between the 
two doctrines’ adherents.) Thus, at this point, despite his admiration for the modern states and 
societies of the West, above all the US, Dontsov’s antiliberalism was almost as uncompromising 
as his anti-Communism. Communists were at least capable of putting up a fight and exercising 
authority; the same could not be said of meek liberals. “If I had to characterize the doctrine of 
liberalism in one word,” he writes, “I would call it the atrophy of the instinct of domination, the 
weakening of the thirst for power. But the consequence of this is a negative relation to all 
attributes of power, to violence.” Liberalism’s principled rejection of violence directed at the 
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people, at rival parties, and at foreign nations rendered it impotent and anachronistic in the 
postwar present:  
In the first case it chooses, instead of dictatorship—consultation . . . instead of civil 
war—elections . . . instead of  aggressive nationalism—’national onanism,’ to use 
Mussolini’s name for such internationalism without reciprocation. At this time, in 
aggressive nationalism (fascism) as well as in aggressive socialism (communism), the 
element of domination [and] violence sets the tone in relation to the masses, to ‘parties,’ 
and to other nations, it is a goal and a method—[but] the method of liberalism is 
understanding, [and] its aim is an apolitical ‘happiness of all.’162      
                                   
The liberal conception of power and sovereignty as something that derives from the 
people as whole struck Dontsov as patently false. It was clear to him that only a small minority 
of any given population is actually capable of ruling—the rest are simply too stupid or 
uninformed for politics, no matter how many millions they comprise.163 (Adolf Hitler was 
making similar arguments against democracy at roughly the same time in his dictation of Mein 
Kamp.)164 World War I, thought Dontsov, heralded the “agony of liberalism” and its irrelevance 
as anything more than a moderating opposition to excessive dictatorships for the foreseeable 
future.165 Above all, he blamed liberalism and it abhorrence of “creative violence” for the failure 
of the Ukrainian Revolution and the disastrous triumph of Russian communism, concluding that 
“the only thing that could pick us back up from this downfall is a full rejection of the liberal-
democratic doctrine.”166  
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Historian Stanley G. Payne’s typology lists “anticonservatism,” alongside antiliberalism 
and anticommunism, as one of the basic features of fascism167; can it be ascribed to Dontsov as 
of the mid 1920s? Increasingly future-oriented and iconoclastic (with the exception of the half-
dead Cossack traditions that he reimagined to match his ideology), Dontsov’s opinion of the 
leading forms of contemporaneous Ukrainian conservatism—Lypyns’kyi’s agrarian-statism and 
Hetmanite monarchism—lowered in the course of the decade. He summed up his critiques of it 
in a 1925 article, “Pans’ko-muzhyts’kyi tsentavr i neomonarkhizm” (The Lordly-Peasant 
Centaur and Neomonarchism), in which he dismisses Lypyns’kyi’s doctrine as fantastical, 
utopian, and out-of-step with the times. It overestimated the Ukrainian nobility, to the meager 
extent that such a caste had survived, and its conception of the peasantry as a single class 
comprising all the country’s farmers, both wealthy and impoverished, was unrealistic. The 
neomonarchists and the would-be gentry of Ukraine demonstrated their unreliability when they 
backed Skoropads’kyi’s decision to side with the Russian Whites. Representatives of a 
“nonliving idea” and incapable of innovation, “these people lack that creative element that builds 
states and organizes still unorganized nations.”168 The Hetmanites put the narrow class interests 
of the Ukrainian pseudogentry before the goal of independence. While acknowledging the need 
for a personification of power and the strivings of the nation in the form of a charismatic leader 
whose word is synonymous with the law (the Führerprinzip), Dontsov believed that, for an 
independent Ukraine, such a man could not be a “legal monarch” because no such monarch 
existed. The Romanov dynasty had a stronger claim to rule in Ukraine, according to the same 
principle of legitimacy through unbroken hereditary succession, than an upstart like “Hetman” 
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Skoropads’kyi. Rather, such as Mussolini, the new leader of Ukraine would have to be ushered 
into power through the opposite principle of revolution.169                      
What, then, should we call Dontsov’s ideology at this point? It bears, at minimum, a 
“family resemblance”170 to Italian Fascism, sharing features commonly included in academic 
definitions of generic fascism: radical nationalism; exaltation of youth and war, order, discipline, 
and hierarchy; ideas of the initiative minority, of redemptive violence and creative destruction, of 
the new man, and of mythic palingenesis; willingness to accept the dictatorship of an absolute 
leader in order to hasten modernization and destroy internal or external enemies (especially 
communists); contempt for parliaments, egalitarianism, and weakness; association with 
paramilitary groups (the UVO); appeals to and strength of support among the middling “losers” 
of capitalist or socialist industrialization (the petite bourgeoisie and the independent peasantry); 
and alliances with conservative organizations such as the church, despite a post-Nietzschean 
dismay for modern Christianity and bourgeois moralism (not to mention an undercurrent of 
fascination with native polytheistic and pagan beliefs). Although interwar Ukrainian nationalism 
was, unlike Italian Fascism, stateless, and thus geared toward the attainment of a state rather than 
the transfiguration of an existing one, it drew upon overlapping sources of inspiration (Mazzini, 
Sorel, Bergson, Nietzsche), developed undeniably related worldviews and practices, and was 
born in the same crisis following World War I and the Russian Revolution.  
Dontsov appreciated that he was living through the dawn of what Eric Hobsbawm has 
called the “age of extremes” and which the French philosopher and historian Élie Halévy 
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170 Following Ludwig Wittgenstein, we can define “fascism,” not by a single thread or essence common to all 
putative instances thereof, but as “a complicated network of similarities overlapping and crisscrossing.” See his 
Philosophical Investigations (Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009), §66-68. 
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lamented as an “era of tyrannies.”171 The fortunes of liberalism were declining, while those of 
authoritarian socialism and integral nationalism, latent in modern warfare, rose. As a creature of 
the Great War, the Soviet experiment was the original model of this boldly futurist and hard-
edged vision of politics, inspiring its “progressive” friends and “reactionary” foes alike. Its 
“postwar socialism”—which Halévy broadly defined as “state control of production, exchange, 
and distribution” plus “state control of thought” via censorship and the “organization of 
enthusiasm” via mass agitation and propaganda—”derives much more from this wartime 
organization than from Marxist doctrine.”172 Still, the war radicalized ideas, which, as we saw in 
chapter 1, were already present in the heterodox, nationalized Marxism of Dontsov and many of 
his contemporaries. Reeling from the shock of the Russian Revolution and (in many cases) the 
humiliation of defeat, the fascists and integral nationalists of Central, Southern, and Eastern 
Europe imitated Bolshevik techniques, but did so in opposition to Soviet power and the Marxist 
credo, with the aim of promoting or reviving “traditional” values, hierarchies, and property 
relations rather than abolishing them.173 The Bolsheviks had seemingly proven that one could 
start with ideology (the superstructure, culture, philosophy, etc.), then, using state violence and 
propaganda, force social and economic “reality” to conform to it—an ironic contravention of the 
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172 Élie Halévy, The Era of Tyrannies: Essays on Socialism and War (New York: New York University Press, 
1966), 266. Halévy, a specialist in nineteenth-century British history, first presented his theses about World War I 
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generic “fascism” (using a definition of the term that most modern scholars, apart from A.J. Gregor, would reject). 
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same materialist conception of history that had inspired them in the first place. For Dontsov, 
there was no law binding humanity to a particular course of development; any ideology can 
become a reality, provided only that its adherents are victorious in war. Ideals and moralities, 
gods, myths, and heroes, castes, institutions, and titles; the modern ideologue and his people 
were free to take and combine whatever elements they liked from any era and any culture real or 
imagined, and reify them in the present through sheer will, commitment, and violence.    
Dontsov’s fascist style of political theorizing and cultural critique was not just modernist, 
but avant-garde. The historical avant-garde (1909-39) was a product of a crisis in the self-
consciousness of modernity that roughly coincided with the interwar period and the rise and fall 
of fascism. According to Peter Bürger: “Through the avant-garde movements, the historical 
succession of techniques and styles has been transformed into a simultaneity of the radically 
disparate.”174 A rupture within modernism, contemporaneous with and homologous to fascism 
(in politics), the avant-garde abolished historical diachrony and sequentiality in the arts; the 
Classical, the Gothic, the Romantic, etc., ceased to be distinct periods and styles, and instead 
became aesthetic possibilities at the disposal of the present in whatever combination the artist 
liked. In a way analogous to the avant-garde, fascism, according to Ernst Bloch, is characterized 
by “objective nonsynchronicities” and “the nonsimultaneity of the simultaneous”—concepts 
which he expounded in 1932 to explain the rise of Nazism.175 The underlying argument was that 
the various classes of (German) society had modernized at different rates and times, and thus 
inhabited different temporalities (a different “Now”), existing at “lower” or “earlier” levels of 
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socioeconomic development. Declining classes (to wit, the peasantry and the petite bourgeoisie) 
retained “anachronistic” worldviews because they were still involved in precapitalist modes of 
production. Modernity confronted them as a menace to their entire way of life, so they retreated 
into an idyllic past and embrace political ideologies that promise to revive “the ghost of history.” 
In situations where the unevenness of development is particularly acute, these nonsynchronicities 
can give rise to a conservative revolution (fascism) spearheaded by the antimodern (because 
premodern) classes. Bloch wrote in and about interwar Germany, but his thesis could be applied 
to Ukraine during the same period, which was also experiencing the displacements associated 
with industrialization, globalization, democratization, etc., and contained a vast peasantry and a 
smaller petite bourgeoisie, both threatened with annihilation and driven to desperation by the 
double bind of capitalism and Bolshevism. Political thinkers who addressed themselves to their 
plight, such as Dontsov, hailed traditions derived from whatever historical epochs happened to 
suit the moment—ancient, medieval, modern, prehistoric, and futural—all at once, in their bid to 
transcend an intolerable present.   
 
Conclusion: New Traditions 
The American philosopher Marshall Berman argued that early twentieth-century 
European intellectuals, in coming to terms with the illusion-shattering maelstrom of mechanized 
death and forgetting that had befallen them, resorted to “rigid polarities and flat totalizations” 
and “either embraced [modernity] with a blind and uncritical enthusiasm, or else condemned [it] 
with neo-Olympian remoteness and contempt.”176 Dontsov chose the latter course. However, in 
setting out his vision of an alternative modernity rooted in tradition, he adopted the avant-garde 
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modernist forms of expressionism and futurism in literature, and of vitalism and voluntarism in 
philosophy, which rejected the very idea of tradition as stifling and were incapable, in principle, 
of handing down new traditions to replace the old, apart from that of killing one’s idols. Dontsov 
arrived at traditionalism by assailing the traditions—imperial Russian, classical and revisionist 
Marxist, Ukrainophile populist, etc.—in which he was reared. This path was typical for radical-
minded intellectuals of his era. As an open-ended, accelerating process of self-negation and 
innovation, interwar Europe experienced a “tremendous shattering of tradition which is the 
obverse of the contemporary crisis and renewal of mankind.”177 This caesura in the 
communication of experience and in the nature of memory cut generations off from one another, 
leaving youth disoriented before a foreboding infinity of possibilities.178 Tradition implies a 
privileging of the past over the present (its steward) and the future (its anticipated mimesis), but 
in order to exist it must be willfully chosen and preserved by each succeeding generation. 
Modernity, tradition’s seeming antithesis, obliterates a multitude of specific traditions, but it also 
produces an entirely novel, transcendental idea of “Tradition” as its dialectical opposite, 
something timeless and eternal that does not permit modification or critique. Dontsov came to 
regard tradition in the latter sense as the solution to the post-World War I crisis. He yearned for a 
great simplification of communication and politics that would restore to the people, and 
especially the youth, the firm bedrock of authority and dogma upon which to stand in their 
struggle for survival and dignity.  
Dontsov’s early 1920s doctrine—closely related to the Eurasianism of the Russian 
émigrés, the Conservative Revolutionary movement in Germany, and Italian Fascism—was a 
                                                
177 Benjamin, “Art in the Age,” 221.   
 
178 The loss of the practices of apprenticeship and the relatively stable social ranks of earlier times exacerbated these 
anxieties. Also see Walter Benjamin, “The Storyteller: Reflections on the Works of Nikolai Leskov,” Illuminations, 
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form of reactionary modernism, aestheticized politics, and generic fascism, which developed in 
reaction to defeat and sought the spiritual and political transfiguration of the nation through a 
resurrection of its supposed mythic-heroic roots. The practical, theoretical, and aesthetic 
imperatives laid out in Pidstavy went a long way toward making Dontsov into the paradigmatic 
ideologue of interwar Ukrainian nationalism, providing the foundations upon which a new 
generation of like-minded students, militants, and writers organized themselves. Years later he 
repudiated modernism in art and literature as a cosmopolitan threat to the native culture of 
Ukraine, switching his allegiance to a more restrained, disciplined, and “traditional” classicism, 
but the program he set forth in the early 1920s dominated the nationalist literary scene in East 
Galicia until World War II. His hopes of exerting the same degree of influence in the realm of 
practical politics, however, were dashed by the quick death of the UPNR and his deteriorating 
relations with Konovalets’ and the UVO. In the next chapter we will explore Dontsov’s role, or 
lack thereof, in the formation and activities of the OUN, and his reactions to developments in 
Soviet Ukraine and events affecting the Ukrainian community throughout Europe in the late 
1920s and early 1930s.
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CHAPTER 4: NATIONALISTS, COMMUNISTS, AND NATIONAL COMMUNISTS: 
DMYTRO DONTSOV, THE OUN, AND SOVIET UKRAINE, 1926-1933 
 
 
 
“Whoever fights monsters should see to it that in the process he does not become a monster. 
And when you look long into an abyss, the abyss also looks into you.”1 
—Friedrich Nietzsche 
 
 
 
 At the height of his creative power and influence in the years 1926-1933, Dontsov 
published his most famous work, Natsionalizm (Nationalism), pursuing what I have called his 
authoritarian iconoclasm and cosmopolitan ultranationalism to their logical (or illogical) 
conclusion. In this and myriad other books and articles, he expounded the moral, cultural, and 
political implications of his “worldview” in light of the rise of Italian Fascism and Soviet 
Communism—Dontsov’s exemplars for the cultivation of a new Ukrainian: youthful, brutal, 
“with stone heart and burning faith,” inspired by legendary ancestors and bloody myths, 
disciplined, intrepid, fanatically devoted to the national idea, and prepared to sacrifice anything 
and anyone for it. Embracing these teachings, the Ukrainian Military Organization (UVO) and 
the various Western Ukrainian nationalist youth groups merged to found the Organization of 
Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) between 1927 and 1929. Despite repeated acknowledgements of 
the primacy of his ideology for their movement and invitations to join it, Dontsov refused to take 
partake in the leadership of the OUN or assume any responsibility for it.   
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The reason for his caution and distance was the OUN’s status as an underground terrorist 
group, committed to the destruction of the Polish state in Galicia and Volhynia, and, eventually, 
the creation of a nation-state incorporating all ethnically Ukrainian territories. Affiliation with 
the OUN would have ended Dontsov’s career as a publicist in L’viv/Lwów, and likely forced 
him to relocate to another European country to avoid arrest, joining one of the sizable Eastern 
Ukrainian émigré communities in Czechoslovakia or Germany, where most of the top OUN 
commanders resided. Relations between the Ukrainian minority in Poland and the Polish state 
and society rapidly deteriorated during these years, empowering and radicalizing nationalists on 
both sides. In May 1926, Piłsudski carried out an armed coup, establishing the so-called Sanacja 
regime (from the Latin, sanatio, meaning “healing”), which concentrated power in the executive 
(Piłsudski himself), restricted civil rights, and promised a stabilized economy and the speedy 
resolution of social, political, and ethnic conflicts. Piłsudski served as Poland’s dictator until his 
death in 1935. Facing the OUN’s escalating assassination and sabotage campaign, Warsaw in the 
fall of 1930 launched the widely criticized Pacification against suspected Galician Ukrainian 
nationalists. Gradually, the Sanacja regime moved away from the protection of national minority 
rights toward the forced assimilation (Polonization) of Ukrainians and other non-Poles in the 
country’s eastern regions, as advocated by the increasingly powerful Polish integral nationalists 
(the National Democrats or Endecja) under Roman Dmowski’s leadership.  
 The Soviet state and the Communist Party sought to capitalize on this strife by 
condemning the “fascist” Polish state for its oppression of Ukrainians, and by presenting Soviet 
Ukrainians as better treated, more autonomous, and more advanced, culturally, politically, and 
socioeconomically. After the conclusion of the Treaty of Riga, the Soviet leadership had 
abandoned War Communism in favor of the New Economic Policy (NEP), which permitted 
farmers to retain more of their produce and sell surplus grain on a semi-open market. A separate 
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Treaty on the Creation of the Soviet Union (December 29, 1922) created a “federation” of four 
original republics—the Russian, Belarusian, Ukrainian, and Transcaucasian—national in form 
yet socialist in content, and assured the signatory nations of their right to self-determination, up 
to and including secession from the union. Recognizing the power of nationalism, the Bolsheviks 
sought to both disarm and harness it, differentiating the tolerant Soviet system from the “Russian 
chauvinist,” imperialist one that it superseded.2 Beginning in 1924, they adopted a series of 
“indigenization” (korenizatsiia) policies designed to promote the titular nationalities of the 
republics into positions of cultural, economic, and political authority, to improve education in the 
indigenous language, and to bring about a flowering of previously oppressed national cultures, 
thereby infusing nationalist sentiments with pro-Soviet, socialist content. Terry Martin has 
likened these policies to “affirmative action”—a scheme of nation-building for the sake of 
modernization that was arbitrarily abandoned by Stalin in the early 1930s in favor of a return to 
primordialism and Russian chauvinism—but the long-term goal was the creation of a new Soviet 
socialist supranation.3 Initially, Ukrainization led to real successes in the cultural development of 
Soviet Ukraine, spurring a national renaissance in literature and art.  
 Dontsov believed that this process would sublate the smaller, colonized nationalities of 
the periphery (such as the Ukrainian) around a hegemonic, ethnic Russian core, depriving them 
of their native identities, traditions, and political freedoms. Early Soviet Ukrainian leaders 
intended NEP and Ukrainization to assuage the local peasantry, which violently resisted the new 
                                                
2 The Bolsheviks decided the internal boundaries and jurisdictions of the Soviet Union on the basis of an ambitious 
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(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2005), 7-9. 
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regime, to bridge the gap between Ukraine’s Russophone, proletarian cities and its 
Ukrainophone, peasant countryside, and to win the support of the “progressive” elements of the 
Ukrainian intelligentsia who had supported the UNR and fled west during the Bolshevik 
conquest of the country, ideally resulting in the secession of Western Ukraine from Poland and its 
annexation into the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic (UkrSSR). Many Ukrainian émigrés 
chose this “Sovietophile” path, returning to Kyiv and Kharkiv (the UkrSSR’s capital city until 
1934) to participate in the development of Soviet Ukraine and what grew into a renaissance of 
Ukrainian culture lasting until the late 1920s. Even Dontsov found cause for enthusiasm about 
the boldest exponents of Soviet Ukrainization, applauding the Cultural Renaissance of writers 
and artists who, sometimes under the influence of his ideas, defiantly called for a reorientation of 
Ukrainian culture toward Western Europe, away from the Moscow’s stifling oversight and 
mediation. In the late 1920s and early 1930s, however, the Communist Party denounced the most 
avid proponents and talented exponents of Ukrainization as “bourgeois nationalists” who had 
fallen under the spell of the “fascist” Dontsov and his journal, LNV. Stalin’s first Five-Year Plan 
(1928-1932), the disastrous collectivization of agriculture in Ukraine, and the suppression of the 
Soviet Ukrainian intelligentsia brought an end to Western Ukrainian Sovietophilism, and seemed 
to confirm Dontsov’s predictions that Bolshevism, as an alien, hostile doctrine, could bring only 
ruin to Ukraine, strangling the life out of its culture and people. Just as his writings, based upon a 
damning critique of Russian imperialism and Ukrainian provincialism, crossed the border and 
affected developments in the UkrSSR, so, too, did Soviet reality, or what he could discern of it, 
shape his worldview. 
 In these years, Dontsov interpreted the world more and more in terms of race, ethnicity, 
and violence. He alleged that Bolshevism was merely the latest manifestation of a nomadic, 
Asiatic, Jewish-Muscovite essence, which had emerged from the “racial chaos” of the Mongol 
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khanates to build the Russian Empire. As such, Bolshevism was innately hostile to the Ukrainian 
nation, which belonged to the racially and spiritually antithetical civilization of the Occident, 
despite centuries of degrading foreign domination. Nevertheless, Dontsov urged Ukrainians to 
emulate the Bolsheviks, who had proven the superiority of their mentality and practices by 
winning. In order to become more European and destroy Russian Communists, Ukrainians would 
have to mimic their cruelty, barbarism, courage, and dogmatism. This stance left him vulnerable 
to accusations, from the Left and Right, that he himself was a Russian who reasoned like a 
morally nihilistic, anti-Christian Bolshevik and corrupted the Ukrainian youth with revolutionary 
ideas no less foreign and dangerous. Dontsov collided with Lypyns’kyi over this and other 
issues, engaging in bitter polemics that gripped the Western Ukrainian nationalist community and 
brought his camaraderie with the conservative Agrarian-Statists and Hetmanites to a permanent 
end. Meanwhile, he continued voicing his approval of Fascism, but with fewer and fewer 
reservations. One of the primary advocates of an anti-Semitic account of Ukraine’s historic and 
present oppression, Dontsov helped set the OUN on a path toward collaboration with Nazi 
Germany years before Hitler’s rise to power in 1933.   
 
The Assassination of Petliura and Dontsov on Jewish-Ukrainian Relations  
 On May 25, 1926, Sholom Schwarzbard (1886-1938), an anarchist of Russian-Jewish 
background from southern Ukraine, confronted Symon Petliura on the rue Racine in the Latin 
Quarter of Paris. “Here's my chance, I thought,” Schwartzbard recounted in his testimony to the 
court:  
 ‘Are you Petliura?’ I asked him. He did not answer, simply lifting his heavy cane. I 
 knew it was he. I shot him five times. I shot him like a soldier who knows how to shoot, 
 and I shot straight so as not to hit any innocent passersby. At the fifth shot he fell. He 
 didn't say a word. There were only cries and convulsions. When I saw him fall I knew he 
 had received five bullets. Then I emptied my revolver. The crowd had scattered. A 
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 policeman came up quietly and said: ‘Is that enough?’ I answered: ‘Yes.’ He said: ‘Then 
 give me your revolver.’ I gave him the revolver, saying: ‘I have killed a great assassin.’ 
 When the policeman told me Petliura was dead I could not hide my Joy. I leaped forward 
 and threw my arms about [the policeman’s] neck.4  
 
Schwartzbard freely admitted to the crime and its premeditation, claiming that he had kept a 
photograph of Petliura in his pocket and walked the streets in search of him. He had shared his 
plan with Nestor Makhno, who had also been living Paris since the Bolsheviks forced him out of 
southeastern Ukraine. Shwartzbard claimed that he was terminally ill and hoped to take the 
exiled Ukrainian leader to the grave with him. Makhno forbade him from going through with the 
murder, having already intervened once before to prevent Schwartzbard from making an attempt 
at a gathering of Ukrainian émigrés for Petliura’s birthday, probably in view of Petliura’s 
gestures of good will to Makhno and his supporters. In 1919, Petliura had offered care and 
sanctuary in the UNR to 3,000 of Makhno’s typhoid-stricken men. When the two erstwhile 
enemies encountered each another in a POW interment camp in Poland in 1921, Petliura 
prevented the veterans under his command from murdering Makhno in retaliation for his 
opposition to the UNR. Despite the latter’s cultural Russification and closeness to the “Russian” 
anarchist movement, his opinion of Ukrainian national sentiments had improved while in exile; 
though he continued to oppose any effort to build a national or any other state in principle, he 
advocated a Ukrainization of the anarchist movement in Ukraine.5  
                                                
4 “Petlura Trial” Time 10, no. 9 (November 7, 1927). 
 
5 Makhno distinguished the authoritarian-statist Bolshevik-dominated “Russian revolution in Ukraine” from the 
libertarian-antistatist “Ukraine Revolution” that for a time superseded it, and held a high opinion of the Ukrainians’ 
innate revolutionary spirit.  In his memoirs (which he regretted not being able to write in Ukrainian, “the language of 
my people”), he wrote: “I began to lose my equanimity and almost cried for joy at the breadth of development of the 
Ukrainian workers’ and peasants’ souls. Before me arose the peasants’ will to freedom and independence, which 
only in the breadth and depth of the Ukrainian soul could so quickly and strongly manifest itself.” Elsewhere he 
wrote of the necessity of an anarchist acknowledgment of Ukrainian national aspirations: “The working masses 
sympathize with the idea of self-determination. At times they even affirm it in their life style. Thus, for example, 
they uphold their language and their culture, which in pre-revolutionary times were in the position of step-children. 
They keep up their life style, their customs, accommodating them to the achievements of their new life. The 
gentlemen state-builders have nothing against using . . . all these natural manifestations of Ukrainian reality, against 
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 In any case, Makhno’s rebuke of Schwartzbard’s plan did not prevent the murder, which 
sent shockwaves through the Ukrainian émigré and international Jewish communities. 
Schwartzbard’s defense presented the assassination as an act of revenge on behalf of the 50,000 
Jews killed in the pogroms that had beset Ukraine during Petliura’s time in power as leader of 
the Directorate of the UNR, 1919-20. The plaintiff accused him of being a Soviet agent and 
denied Petliura’s complicity in the pogroms.6 The trial in the French capital was a sensation, 
focusing international attention, for the first time and in an extremely negative light, on the 
recent struggle for Ukrainian independence. It turned on the guilt of the UNR rather than that of 
Schwartzbard (which was not in doubt) and lasted just eight days (October 18-26, 1927). Moved 
by the gruesome eyewitness accounts of the violence perpetrated against Ukraine’s Jewish 
population of Odessa, where Schwartzbard’s parents had been killed along with the other 
fourteen members of his family, the jury acquitted the defendant (who went into hiding in South 
Africa soon thereafter).7  
________________________ 
which the Bolsheviks would be powerless to struggle, even if they wished . . . for their goal of the creation of an 
independent Ukrainian state.” Making a point similar to Dontsov’s critique of the Ukrainophiles’ distance from the 
peasantry, Makhno argued that, “the Ukraine speaks Ukrainian, and because of this nationalism at times it does not 
listen to strangers who do not speak Ukrainian. One ought to consider this practically. If until this time anarchists 
have exerted a weak ideological influence on the Ukrainian village, it is because they cluster in the cities and do not 
take into consideration the national language of the Ukrainian village. Quotes from Frank E. Sysyn, “Nestor Makhno 
and the Ukrainian Revolution,” in Hunczak, The Ukraine, 1917-1921, chap. 11. See also Nestor Makhno, Russkaia 
revoliutsiia na Ukraine (Paris: Federatsiia anarkho-kommunisticheskikh grup Severnoi Ameriki i Kanady, 1929); 
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 The trial’s outcome, a twentieth-century Dreyfus affair, sent shockwaves through Europe, 
scandalizing conservative opinion in France, vindicating Jewish accounts of terrible abuse in the 
former Russian Empire, and outraging Ukrainian nationalists. With regard to this last group, 
Golczewski argues that the whole affair had three consequences: 1) the belief that Schwartzbard 
had acted as an agent of the NKVD discredited the Soviet regime, turned Sovietophile 
Ukrainians (such as Vynnychenko, Hrushevs’kyi, and Petrushevych) into pariahs of the 
Ukrainian emigration, and generally damaged the appeal of leftwing ideas among this 
community; 2) the trial strengthened the identification of the Jews with Bolshevism in the 
Ukrainian imagination, thereby justifying anti-Semitic currents in Ukrainian politics; and 3) 
because a French court handed down the verdict, the trial undermined Ukrainians’ faith in the 
democracies of the Entente, which seemed to be united with the Soviet Union and international 
Jewry against Ukrainian national aspirations, and by extension their faith in democracy per se.8 
Schwartzbard’s time in the French Legion during World War I, as compared to Petliura’s 
dealings with the Germans, was thought to have biased the court. The originally Russian idea 
that Ukrainian nationalism was a German invention gained currency in the West, as did the 
notion that self-identified Ukrainian patriots were inherently anti-Semitic. Ultimately, these 
mutual recriminations spurred the Ukrainian turn to the right.9 In the eyes of Ukrainian 
nationalists, Petliura’s death elevated him from being a hated failure of a leader who had sold out 
to the Poles and was rewarded with betrayal, to being a hero, martyr, and symbol of Ukrainian 
suffering, who was even forgiven by many Galicians.10 As one Petliura biographer notes, 
Ukrainians became more sympathetic to his ill-fated alliance with Piłsudski to fight the greater 
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enemy of Russian imperialism and Bolshevism, while their appreciation for the anti-Russian 
orientation in Ukrainian geopolitics that had justified the Polish-Ukrainian alliance, and which 
Dontsov had been urging for over a decade, grew.11  
 Dontsov seized the opportunity to press his longstanding agenda, but the assassination of 
Petliura, his personal friend and mentor, also shifted his own views, considerably darkening his 
outlook and exacerbating whatever Judeophobic sentiments he already harbored into full-blown 
political (though not yet racial) anti-Semitism. The event convinced him that the enemies of 
Ukrainian independence were more ruthless, implacable, and omnipresent than even he had 
imagined. As recently as 1918, Dontsov had regarded the Jews of Ukraine as anti-Russian 
chauvinism and thus favorably, or at worst neutrally, disposed toward Ukrainian national culture 
and statehood.12 He certainly had in mind Zionist figures such as Ze’ev Jabotinsky, who blamed 
Russian, not Ukrainian, nationalism and the inherent problems of imperialism for the pogroms 
and “blood libel”-crazed anti-Semitism that had plagued Ukraine since the assassination of 
Alexander II, as well as the chaos injected into the country by the Bolshevik invasions between 
1918 and 1921. Jabotinsky considered Ukrainian national aspirations natural and just, and hoped 
for the destruction of the Russian Empire, which, like all empires, was an enemy of national 
cultures—the flowers of human civilization and the highest manifestations of the species’ 
biological and spiritual essence.13 In 1921, he even reached an agreement with Petliura through 
the latter’s agent in Prague, Maxim Slavins’kyi, promising the creation of a Jewish police force 
                                                
11 Volodymyr Kosyk, “Zovnishnia polityka Symona Petliury,” in Volodymyr Kosyk, ed., Symon Petliura: Zbirnyk 
studiino-naukovoi konferentsii v Paryzhi (traven’ 1976): statti, zmitky, materiialy (Munich, Paris: Ukrains’kyi 
vil’nyi universytet, 1980): 27-46, 41. 
 
12 Dontsov, Mizhnarodne polozhennia Ukrainy, 20. 
 
13 Marina Mogilner, “Defining the Racial Self: Russian Contexts of the Anti-Imperial Nationalism of Vladimir 
Jabotinsky,” (paper presented at a Carolina Seminar of the center for Slavic, East Eurropean and Eurasian Studies, 
Chapel Hill, NC, February 25, 2016). 
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that would prevent further pogroms in Ukraine upon the UNR’s restoration to power following a 
projected invasion of the country that would also incorporate Jewish fighting units. Other 
Zionists condemned Jabotinsky’s deal with Petliura, but he defiantly upheld it, causing a schism 
at the Twelfth Zionist Congress in Carlsbad that led to his founding of a separate “Revisionist” 
Zionist movement (the anti-Communist Jewish-Ukrainian alliance never came to fruition).14 
Despite all that, now, by association with Sholom Schwartzbard, Ukrainian Jews came to 
represent insidious agents of Russian imperialism and Bolshevism for Dontsov.  
 Shortly thereafter, Dontsov published openly anti-Semitic articles in LNV commenting on 
Petliura’s legacy and assassination, the Schwartzbard trial, and its implications for Jewish-
Ukrainian relations.15 Petliura, he wrote, had made many errors, but always acted pragmatically 
with his heart set on the best interests of Ukraine. The faults of Petliura, thought Dontsov, were 
his meekness; his appointments of untrustworthy, often pro-Bolshevik Jews, Ukrainian socialists, 
and Russians to important, autonomous posts; his Judeophilia, not his alleged anti-Semitism.16 
Dontsov denied that anti-Jewish pogroms had taken place at all (much as Roman Dmowski had 
done seven years prior with regard to the first L’viv Pogrom [November 21-23, 1918], which 
Polish troops perpetrated upon their triumphal entry into the city at the end of the [Western] 
Ukrainian-Polish War).17 “What pogroms? There were no pogroms in Ukraine. There was a civil 
                                                
14 Joseph B. Schechtman, “The Jabotinsky-Slavinsky Agreement,” Jewish Social Studies XVII (1955): 289–306. 
 
15 Dmytro Dontsov, “Symon Petliura,” LNV 90, no. 7 (1926): 321-28, and “Memento (do paryz’koho protsesu),” 
LNV 94, no. 11, (1927): 261-66. He published the first immediately after Petliura’s assassination, and the second 
during the Schwartzbard trial. 
 
16 Dontsov, “Petliura,” 323, and “Memento,” 264-65. 
 
17 Dontsov, “Memento,” 261. On Dmowski’s denials of the L’viv Pogrom in the international press and before the 
diplomatic community, see, Alexander Victor Prusin, Nationalizing a Borderland: War, Ethnicity, and Anti-Jewish 
Violence in East Galicia, 1914-1920 (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 2005), chap. 5. 
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war in which masses of Jews, Russians, and Ukrainians perished.”18 According to Dontsov, it 
was the Jews, motivated by a desire to rule and exploit Ukraine, who were hostile toward 
Ukrainians, not the reverse. The Jews and the Russians had allegedly taken the Directorate’s 
1919 declaration of Jewish rights and cultural autonomy and Petliura’s creation of a ministerial 
position for Jewish affairs (exceptionally liberal policies on the issue at the time), as a sign of 
Ukrainian nationalism’s weakness.19 Petliura’s “womanly” qualities, such as his idealistic love 
for the motherland, had clouded his judgment, though the times called for a much more 
“masculine” approach—clearheaded, frank, capable of mobilizing the masses, and, when 
necessary, intolerant, aggressive, and ruthless.20 Petliura’s “interpretation of the Ukrainian idea” 
lacked a “clear delimitation from others” (i.e. non-Ukrainians, particularly Jews and [Russian] 
Communists). Dontsov applied his by now well-formed ideology of “might-is-right” voluntarism 
to the matter, arguing that the tragedy of Petliura and his generation was their unwillingness to 
rule, despite being granted the opportunity and the mandate to do so, which sprang from their 
spiritual, moral, and intellectual defects. Perhaps the next generation, Dontsov hoped, would 
learn the lesson that “history avenges weakness, not inhumanity.”21  
Dontsov saw Jews as “guilty, terribly guilty, because it was they who helped Russian 
domination in Ukraine to solidify, but ‘the Jews are not guilty of everything.’ Russian 
imperialism is guilty of everything. Only when Russia is defeated in Ukraine will we be able to 
address the Jewish question in accordance with the interests of the Ukrainian people.”22 This may 
                                                
18 Ibid., 261. 
 
19 Dontsov, “Petliura,” 324. 
 
20 Ibid., 328. 
 
21 Ibid. 
 
22 Ibid., 327-28. 
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be the most oft-quoted passage in Dontsov’s entire oeuvre. Commentators have generally 
interpreted it in one of two ways: either it is taken to mean that the Jewish menace to Ukrainians 
is entirely secondary to the problem of Russian imperialism, and the destruction of the latter 
would solve the former without need for additional measures against Ukraine’s Jews—thus, at 
this point, Dontsov did not hate the Jews per se, but only their unfortunate, historically 
contingent role as agents of Russian imperialism and Bolshevism; or it is presented as damning 
proof of its author’s inveterate anti-Semitism as early as 1926, and a thinly veiled threat to the 
Jewish population of Ukraine in the event that Ukrainians once again become masters in their 
own land.  
Both readings contain some truth. Russia and Russians remained the prime enemy of the 
Ukrainian people in Dontsov’s worldview and it was chiefly through the divide-and-conquer 
practices and nationally oppressive structures of tsarism and Bolshevism that the Jews had come 
to be opponents of Ukrainian national aspirations. When read in light of his other texts from the 
same period and the vitriolic tone of his prose when the subject turns on the Jewish problem, 
however, it seems clear that Dontsov had ceased to think of the Jews as a group that should be 
welcome in Ukraine for the foreseeable future; they constituted an alien, parasitic presence with 
distinct national interests, and they had already proven their disloyalty to and contempt for their 
Ukrainian hosts. “We must and . . . will struggle with the Jews’ attempts to play the inappropriate 
role of masters in Ukraine, but we will not break their strength until we have broken Russia’s 
power among us.”23 Ending Russian hegemony in Ukraine would disarm them, but there is no 
reason to suppose that “address[ing] the Jewish problem in accordance with the interests of the 
Ukrainian people,” as Dontsov understood it, would not involve an application of the bellicose, 
________________________ 
 
23 Dontsov, “Petliura,” 237. 
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authoritarian, xenophobic, and pitiless values and methods that he was vigorously promoting at 
the time. In the same article on Petliura’s assassination, he calls for a new, “nonbourgeois” 
ideology that views “the corpses of thousands and hundreds of thousands of Ukrainian 
farmers”24 as an entirely acceptable sacrifice to escape slavery and gain independence; why 
should the same principle not apply to the Jews, especially given their “fundamental hostility to 
Ukrainian statehood?” “The praise with which the Bolshevik and Jewish press showered the 
murderer [Schwartzbard] was unanimous,” Dontsov complained, attributing the contempt for 
Ukraine of the Jewish-Russian community to the incompatibility of Jewish messianism (as 
fulfilled in Ukraine [“our country”] rather than in Palestine, with the Ukrainian independence 
movement.25 Russians and Jews are carriers of their own Messianisms, which cannot coexist 
with that of the Ukrainians on Ukrainian soil.26 Still, Dontsov insisted that none of this had 
anything to do with anti-Semitism, “the socialism of fools”: “we are not socialists and do not 
wish to be fools.”27 “We will struggle by all means against pogroms, but we will bring the real 
culprits [the Jews —T.E.] to justice,” he writes, leaving the reader to wonder what percentage of 
Ukraine’s Jews qualify as “real culprits” and what form “justice” would take. For Dontsov, the 
possibility of peace between Ukrainians and Jews depended on the outcome of the Schwartzbard 
trial: “If the process ends with the acquittal of the murderer, then only traitors or idiots will speak 
of an understanding with the Jews.”28 Looking ahead, the subsequent anti-Semitic, yet putatively 
antipogrom, tendency in Ukrainian nationalism, as expressed in Point 17 of the OUN(B)’s 
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26 Ibid., 269. 
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pronouncement concerning the Jews in April 1941,29 originated, not under the influence of 
Nazism, but from Dontsov’s assertion that Ukraine’s Jews were merely agents of Russian 
imperialism and Bolshevism, a secondary evil subordinate to a primary one.30 Despite the 
rhetorical sidestep—implicitly justifying violent anti-Semitism while explicitly denouncing it—
from this point forward a rising (and increasingly racial) antipathy toward the Jews as such, 
irrespective of their alleged role in the oppression of Ukrainians, is detectable in Dontsov’s 
writing.                                                            
 
 
 
 
                                                
29 “The Jews in the USSR are the most devoted support of the ruling Bolshevik regime and the advance guard of 
Muscovite imperialism in Ukraine. The Muscovite-Bolshevik government exploits the anti-Jewish moods of the 
Ukrainian masses in order to divert their attention from the real source of evil and in order to direct them during the 
time of uprising into pogroms against Jews. The Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists struggles against the Jews as 
the support of the Muscovite-Bolshevik regime, at the same time making the popular masses aware that Moscow is 
the main enemy.” However, the OUN(B), acting with German encouragement and assistance, organized two 
pogroms in L’viv following the Nazi invasion of the Soviet Union and a short-lived declaration of Ukrainian 
independence (June 30, 1941). The first pogrom lasted from June 30 to July 2; the second, called the “Petliura 
Days,” lasted from July 25 to July 29, 1941. Altogether roughly 6,000 Jews were killed in the violence, which was 
justified as revenge for the “Jewish-Bolshevik” NKVD’s massacre of about 4,000 prisoners being held in L’viv 
during the hasty Soviet retreat from the Nazi advance just days prior. Taras Hunczak and Roman Solchanyk, eds., 
Ukrains’ka suspil’no-politychna dumka na 20 stolitti. Dokumenty i materialy, vol. 3. (N. p.: Suchasnist’, 1983), 15, 
quoted in John-Paul Himka, “The Lviv Pogrom of 1941: The Germans, Ukrainian Nationalists, and the Carnival 
Crowd,” Canadian Slavonic Papers 53 (2-4): 209-43. Dontsov’s understanding of the Jewish problem as of the mid-
1920s was also reflected in a statement made by the OUN(B) leader and head of the Ukrainian state declared on 
June 30, under the aegis of Hitler’s new order, Iaroslav Stets’ko (1912-1986). Presenting his autobiography to the 
Germans after they had arrested him (along with much of the OUN[B]’s membership) for his role in the unapproved 
declaration of Ukrainian statehood, he wrote: “I consider Marxism to be a product of the Jewish mind, which, 
however, has been applied in practice in the Muscovite prison of peoples by the Muscovite-Asiatic people with the 
assistance of the Jews. Moscow and Jewry are Ukraine’s greatest enemies and bearers of corruptive Bolshevik 
international ideas. Although I consider Moscow, which in fact held Ukraine in captivity, and not Jewry, to be the 
main and decisive enemy, I nonetheless fully appreciate the undeniably harmful and hostile role of the Jews, who 
are helping Moscow to enslave Ukraine. I therefore support the destruction of the Jews and the expedience of 
bringing German methods of exterminating Jewry to Ukraine, barring their assimilation and the like.” Quoted in 
Karel C. Berkhoff and Marco Carynnyk, "The Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists and Its Attitude Toward 
Germans and Jews: Iaroslav Stets’ko’s 1941 Zhyttiepys," Harvard Ukrainian Studies 23, no.3-4 (December 1999): 
147-84, 170-71. 
 
30 Golczewski, Deutsche und Ukrainer, 500. 
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Making Ukraine “Faustian” Again 
 When Dontsov published Natsionalizm (Nationalism) in 1926,31 he advertised it as a 
systematic exposition of his ideology, fulfilling a task that his experience with the UPNR and 
Zahrava had taught him was needed before the practical work of making a national revolution 
could begin to succeed. The book was not republished until 1958, but its circulation quickly 
expanded from L’viv to the neighboring territories of Volhynia, Zakarpattia, and Bukovina, 
reaching Ukrainian audiences abroad from Kharkiv to North America, achieving a wide 
resonance and polarizing audiences. His most radical up to that point, the text is a consummation 
of ideas that he had embraced by the early 1920s, pushing them to their limits and fleshing out 
their consequences and corollaries for a Ukrainian nationalist worldview. Stylistically more 
expressionistic and emotive than Dontsov’s previous prose, Natsionalizm includes a more 
developed argument for the use of avant-garde forms of futurism and expressionism in the 
production of nationalist myths. The rage and bitterness of Natsionalizm’s author radiates from 
every page, which he wrote with the express intention of inflaming the same sentiments in those 
who read it. Dontsov expected the book to define more than a political program or an orientation; 
Natsionalizm purportedly conveyed a total worldview that would transform, empower, purify, 
and unify a new generation of Ukrainian nationalists, preparing them for the terrible struggle for 
independence that lay before them. Dontsov, their “spiritual father,” had delivered his “gospel” to 
them.  
 Natsionalizm is divided into three parts. The first sets forth a critique of “Ukrainian 
provençalism” (provansal’stvo)—Dontsov’s umbrella term for a whole range of doctrines that he 
regards as having exerted a degenerative influence on the Ukrainian national movement. He 
                                                
31 Dontsov, Natsionalizm (1926). Republished on the basis of this first edition in Dontsov, Vybrani tvory, vol. 7, 19-
178. 
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devotes chapters to the evils of “primitive intellectualism,” “‘scientific’ quietism,” “small-farm 
[khutorians’ka] ‘universalism,’” “materialism” (including liberalism, democrats, pacifism, 
particularism, and anarchism), “antitraditionalism,” and “support for the symbiosis of Ukraine 
and Russia.” The second part describes the antithetical value system of “active” (chynnyi) 
nationalism, with a metaphysical foundation of voluntarism (“will as the law of life”), the 
imperatives (vymohy) of romanticism, dogmatism, “illusionism” (iliuzionizm), fanaticism, 
amorality, “creative violence,” and “the initiative minority.” Part two concludes with a theory of 
the division of peoples into two types, the “Faustian” (European) and the “Buddhist” (Asiatic), 
which Dontsov adopted from Oswald Spengler’s The Decline of the West, published in 1918. 
Finally, the third section sketches out the content of the “Ukrainian idea” (namely, “brightness,” 
“exclusiveness,” and “all-encompassing-ness” [vseobiimaiuchist’]), the prospect of a “new 
national eros,” and the connection between mysticism (mistyka) and “real life.”  
 Presenting the whole of modern Ukrainian history as an era of decadence and ruin, with 
the exception of a few voices in the wilderness (Shevchenko, Ukrainka, and Mikhnovs’kyi), 
Natsionalizm’s point of departure is Dontsov’s diagnosis of a chronic, cultural-political illness. It 
picks up where Dontsov left off with his critique of Ukrainophilia as represented by Mykhailo 
Drahomanov, Ivan Frank, and the members of the Brotherhood of Saints Cyril and Methodius. 
Their first sin is “primitive intellectualism”: an excessive emphasis on reason, contemplation, 
logic, and harmony that renders one passive, afraid to fight, deprived of healthy instincts, and 
thus vulnerable to domination by the aggression and willfulness of others. Following Spengler, 
Dontsov blames Europe’s relative decline and weakness in the face of an existential threat to its 
civilization (emanating from Russian Communism) on this hyperrationalism.32 The nineteenth 
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century was the “golden age of reason,” the residual symptoms of which have been especially 
severe in Ukraine, emasculating its intelligentsia and national liberation movement through the 
tyranny of intellect, as if the national idea were a theory to be proved by recourse to facts and 
arguments, rather than an axiom to be accepted without question and foisted upon the world. The 
overdevelopment of intellect blinded the older generation to the underlying realities of social, 
national, and international life, the perennial calamities and conflicts of which are chocked up to 
“misunderstanding” and “ignorance” rather than the beastly fundamentals of nature (survival of 
the fittest, and the iron laws of struggle and domination between races). They naively proffer 
education, persuasion, and dialogue as the solution to war. Dontsov’s (Social) Darwinism, one of 
the centerpieces of nineteenth-century positivism, contradicts his stated desire to replace the 
scientistic, teleological “laws of human development” with the “will to power” (Nietzsche’s 
voluntarism incorporated a critique of Darwinism that Dontsov was apparently unaware of or 
disinterest in). But to fault Dontsov for logical fallacies and factual inaccuracies is to have 
already missed his point: the problem is precisely the intellect-heavy approach that demands 
reason and evidence instead of motivation and action. There is no system in Natsionalizm, 
though it gives that outward appearance, but a collection of impressions and expressions 
designed to have an emotional effect and undermine the reader’s trust in reason per se. Patent 
falsehoods, such as Dontsov’s (mis)representation of the Ukrainian anarchist Drahomanov as a 
“convinced Russian statist,” either evade detection and are accepted prima facie, or anger the 
reader and turn her immediately against the book.33 (It is likely, ironically, that Dontsov 
inadvertently popularized Drahomanov with his tirades against him.)34 To resume tracing his 
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34 Volodymyr Martynets’, Ideolohiia orhanizovanoho i t. zv. vol’evoho natsionalizmu. Analitychno-porivnial’na 
studiia (Winnipeg: Novyi shliakh, 1954), 33. 
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“argument,” however, we should note that one of the most detrimental consequences of 
Ukrainophile intellectualism, according to Dontsov, is its interpretation of nation and nationalism 
as “superstition” and the artifice and trickery of the ruling classes. It is thus no surprise that they 
were resoundingly defeated in the Ukrainian Revolution by forces that did not stop to be 
persuaded, persuade others, or engage in enlightened self-critique but, already convinced of their 
own correctness, immediately deployed violence.35  
 The second defect of Ukrainophilia, or Ukrainian provençalism, “‘scientific’ quietism,” 
consists of a pseudoscientific faith in “unbreakable social laws” that assure the perpetual 
betterment of humanity through “evolution” and “progress.”36 Dontsov presents his nationalism 
as a dose of healthy skepticism for this teleology, in the true spirit of science, but he immediately 
resorts to what Schopenhauer calls the qualitas occulta (mystical quality)—“will, the 
independent driving force in history, which creates from [within] itself” (tvoryt’ z sebe samoi).37 
Dontsov opposes the mechanical reduction of all social and historical change to a material base, 
arguing that ideas and “conscious strivings” in seeming contradiction with physical reality can 
alter that same reality through defiant acts of will. Marxism, he notes, had lost its explicatory 
power in light of the Russian Revolution, in which an ideologically motivated initiative minority 
introduced socialism into a country that had not even reached the capitalist “stage of 
development,” as well as the “counterrevolutionary” rise of the “unhistorical nations” of Eastern 
Europe to independent statehood. The idea that capitalist modernization would inevitably wipe 
out national individualities and conglomerate smaller states into larger ones was untenable after 
World War I. The purportedly “iron laws of social development” proved to be far more malleable 
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than anyone had expected. Determinism and the notion that “history is on our side” breed 
fatalism, flagging willpower, and acquiescence in the face of oppression because the passage of 
empty, homogeneous time is taken to be the sole and inevitable resolution of the problem.38      
 By “small-farm ‘universalism’” Dontsov means the Ukrainophiles’ refusal to recognize 
“the truth that what may be truth for one people is a lie for another.”39 The belief in a “universal 
truth,” knowable to all peoples and sects as participants in humanity, also follows from 
“primitive intellectualism.” The Ukrainian socialists’ universalism puts the Ukrainian people, 
their culture and desire to determine their own destiny, in an entirely subordinate position vis-à-
vis the wider world: “These same socialists and radicals only permit national slogans, only 
justify an independent national ideal, when it is in agreement with ‘the thoughts of global 
humanity,’ with the general truth. Nationalism is permissible only when it can be ‘proven’ that it 
‘doesn’t contradict’ socialism, ‘but on the contrary aids its development.’”40 But such “universal 
truths” all consider the “self-sufficient national ideal a dangerous utopia.”41  
 Inveighing against “materialism,” one passage in Natsionalizm could serve as a 
(loquacious) definition for “integral nationalism”: This eternal arational [sic] right of the nation 
to life will take its place above everything temporal, phenomenal, ‘graspable,’ rational, above 
the life of a particular individual, above the blood and death of thousands, about the prosperity of 
a particular generation, above abstractly reasoned calculations, above a ‘general-human’ ethics.42 
Materialism is blind to the eternal and changeless plane of existence that the nation, properly 
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understood, inhabits. Citing Hegel and Spengler, Dontsov criticizes this modern fixation on 
observable, material phenomena and objects a “prosaic” worldview that fails to appreciate the 
overriding importance of the metaphysical “form” of the nation (a term he uses interchangeably 
with “species”), which alone gives individuals and generations meaning. He opposes it to the 
utilitarian idea (here attributed to Jean-Jacques Rousseau) that the foundation of ethics is the 
happiness of concrete individuals; the good of the nation is the good of its transient 
manifestations (you and me), not the reverse. On these grounds Dontsov rejects a series of 
materialist doctrines: “liberalism, which placed the interests of the masses as a collection of 
individuals above the interest of the nation as the higher end; democratism, which placed the 
interests of ‘the people’ as an unorganized formless crowd above the interests of the nation; 
socialism, which placed the interests of a class above the interests of the nation.”43 Anarchism (a 
“form of liberalism” for Dontsov), humanitarianism, pacifism, provincialism, the “destructive 
principle” of laisser faire, all followed the same logic—they all oppose “the idea of statehood as 
a value in itself.” Here, Dontsov shifts from “nation” to “state” without explanation, as if the two 
concepts were synonymous and might serve interchangeably as the summum bonum of his 
worldview.  
In Dontsov’s thinking, nation and state, in essence, uphold the same principle —a 
vaguely defined authoritarian sublime—without which human existence would lack all form and 
order. As two facets of the same principle, nation and state seek and consummate one another. If 
a nation is stateless, or a state is not coextensive with a certain nation (containing more than one 
as empire or less than one as province), then there is an imbalance, a sin against nature, which 
must be redressed. Dontsov does not deny the anarchist critique of the state as a tool of the ruling 
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class that operates solely through violence and the threat thereof—on the contrary, this is what he 
likes about it.44 All human achievements (creative, spiritual, intellectual) can be traced back to 
the state, sphinxlike, bloodthirsty, and terrible, for which no sacrifice is too great or satisfying. It 
is the “willingness to sacrifice the individual life,” Dontsov avers, which “sets the great races 
apart.”45 War is more than mass murder and death; it is a profound and beautiful expression of 
the nation’s will to life, sanctified by the destruction of its ephemeral parts (individual human 
beings). Dontsov takes great offense at the idea that one is free to choose a different nationality 
than the one into which they were born, as if it were a matter of personal choice. To submit, live, 
kill, and die at the disposal of an uncompromising, unmerciful (nation)state—that is the duty, 
destiny, and freedom of the individual.   
Dontsov’s ideology calls for a temporal reorientation away from the “present,” the 
fleeting “now,” the pleasantness of which is the sole concern of “materialists,” and for sacrificing 
it in the name of a “future ideal.”46 Nationalism totalizes the succession of generations, from the 
primordial to the distant future, giving each an identity and a purpose that is eternal and all-
encompassing. Incapable of this, the Ukrainophiles were “antitraditionalists” who did not respect 
the nation’s dead and yet to be born, ignoring the “mystical voice” of blood, opportunistically 
seeking only the advantage of the moment and the welfare of the living.47 Instead, they chose the 
                                                
44 Dontsov did not engage with Nietzsche’s critique of the modern state as “the new idol,” even though he was 
certainly aware of it and quotes other passages from Thus Spoke Zarathustra throughout Natsionalizm. According to 
Nietzsche, the (modern) state brings the “death of peoples,” it reeks of decay, it lies, it is a “cold monster,” it creates 
nothing, but merely steals from those who do. “Where there is still a people, it does not understand the state and 
hates it as the evil eye and sin against customs and rights,” according to Nietzsche’s Zarathustra. Were the 
“anarchistic” Ukrainians assailed by Dontsov not such a people? But he had no use for the parts of Nietzsche that 
inveigh against nationalism and statism. Friedrich Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra: A Book for All and None, 
trans. Walter Kaufmann (New York: Modern Library, 1995), 48-51. 
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path of “political symbiosis” with other nations in the forms of Pan-Slavism, the Soviet Union, 
the League of Nations, and so on.48 This leads only to foreign domination and never a mutual 
understanding of equals. (Already in the habit of purging inconvenient facts from his 
autobiography, Dontsov does not mention the World War I-era Central Powers, the idea of a 
German-dominated Mitteleuropa, and the attempts, in which he enthusiastically participated, to 
incorporate Ukraine into it.) Pushing the biological metaphor, Dontsov argues that Ukraine’s 
relationship with Russia has never been symbiosis, but parasitism, and that it can regain its 
health only as an independent organism with its aggressiveness and immunity fully restored.49   
 “Violence” (nasyl’stvo) is an even more fundamental concept in Natsionalizm than nation. 
Dontsov asserts that an unwillingness to use violence against others springs, not from a love of 
humanity, but from a sick and cowardly lack of faith in one’s own rightness and strength.50  The 
Ukrainophiles lost because they recoiled from the thought of violently foisting their own vision 
onto the amorphous masses (the “spirit of hierarchy”). They sought an understanding with the 
enemy rather than its uncompromising destruction. Their “atomistic conception of the nation” as 
the sum of its individual members, springing from a general refusal to recognize a higher order, 
the primacy of the collective and the universal (epitomized, for Dontsov, by the Roman and 
British Empires), left the followers of Drahomanov incapable of the violence needed to liberate 
Ukraine. “The ideal of provençalism, an essentially plebeian ideal, was the happiness of the 
individual, the happiness of all, freedom from all the ‘occult’ powers [okul’tni syly] standing 
________________________ 
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above them.”51 They abhorred the basic “principle of state violence,” toying with utopias that 
inspired no one instead of fanatically embracing myths and legends that inflamed the passions 
and justified the butchering of great numbers, dispatching them into “the abyss” (bezodna). 
Dontsov cannot stand their Christ-like cheek turning, their humaneness and tolerance, which 
lacks hatred, chauvinism, and cruelty entirely, invoking the meek and conformist swamp folk in 
Nietzsche’s Zarathustra: “And then there are such as sit in their swamp and speak thus out of the 
reeds. ‘Virtue—that is sitting still in a swamp. We bite no one and avoid those who want to bite; 
and in all things we hold the opinion that is given to us.’”52 But it is only through “creative 
violence,” through bloody acts of aggression, wars, and revolutions, that “new ideas” enter 
history.53                  
 Dontsov’s debt to the conception of the interrelation of violence, myth, and history found 
in Sorel’s Reflections on Violence was substantial. “Myths,” he quotes Sorel, “are not a 
description of things, but an expression of will. Utopia, by contrast, is an invention of intellectual 
labor.” Myths are the motors of history; they inspire revolutionary epochs. Perhaps the most 
powerful myth is the apocalyptic “Last judgment,” the “final battle.” Even Marx foretold a 
“catastrophe” (within capitalism) that would usher in a new era. The more terrible the vision of 
the vengeance and destruction to come, the more effective its power to make that violence a 
reality and thus alter the course of history. “The myth that inspires the adherents of a new faith—
this is the expectation of the active strata. The expectation of the passive strata is utopia.”54 
Utopianism left the Ukrainophiles with no stomach for violence, struggle, and action, lulled into 
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a sweet slumber by idylls, lacking any appreciation for tragedy and the abyss, like “a noontime 
siesta in the tropical south, when sky, water, earth, [and] air seem frozen, as if in a dream.”55 
Their literature, with its “photographic realism” and “vulgarizer’s clarity,” was devoid of all 
movement and drama, exhibiting a “passive relation to the external world and material,” afraid to 
plumb the depths of the irrational. With the exceptions only of Lesia Ukrainka and the Soviet 
writer Mykola Khvyl’ovyi (discussed below), Dontsov dismisses the Ukrainian literature of the 
late nineteenth and early twentieth century as stagnant and uninspiring.56 The aging 
Ukrainophiles did not recognize the “law of struggle and competition,” and thus favored an 
ethics by and for “the weak in body and in spirit.”57 He calls this “lowly sentimentalism” of 
“small-farm (khutorians’ka) ‘kalos kagathos’” (kalokahatiia—from the ancient Greek concept of 
“the good and the beautiful”), which he characterizes as the eagerness to compromise among 
men too moderate, prudent, and peace-loving to inspire or execute great deeds. In the face of 
oppression it offers only tears and lamentations, or provincial, agrarian escapism. In place of kala 
kagathos, Dontsov calls for a return to a starkly black/white, either/or worldview (hardly 
distinguishable the dualistic Russian Platonism that he was condemning as “primitivism” just six 
years prior) that permits no middle or common ground, and no possibility of rapprochement, 
between (national) heroes and villains, between the realm of perfect forms and ideals and the 
realm of transient phenomena. A dynamic new Ukrainian literature of “expressionism” and 
“romanticism” would be needed to produce the kinds of “myths” and “legends” that can inflame 
the nation’s revolutionary will to power.  
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 A smattering of precedents for Dontsov’s ideal—the ethos, mythos, and poetics of a fully 
“self-sufficient nationalism”—existed in modern Ukrainian culture. There was Shevchenko, 
Mikhnovs’kyi, Ukrainka, and Iuliian Bachyns’kyi (author of Ukraina irredenta [see chapter 1]). 
Even Nikolai Gogol (Mykola Hohol’) was on the right track when he “sought happiness in the 
cruel and bloody virtues of the Middle Ages.”58 But Dontsov disparaged the rest of modern 
ukrainstvo as the worldview of a “Buddhist,” as opposed to “Faustian,” culture, embracing the 
then popular theory of an “Aryan master race.” “Was Buddhism not a reaction, an uprising of the 
non-Aryan races against the Aryan?” he asks.59 “Our [Ukrainian] Buddhism was a reaction 
against the philosophy of the strong, a reaction of ‘weak creatures’!”60 The teaching of 
“Buddhism”—to be understood here, not so much as a specific religion, but as a civilizational 
type, which Dontsov adapts from the Oswald Spengler’s The Decline of the West—counsels men 
to purge themselves of all desire, to detach themselves from the worldly “veil of tears,” and 
thereby transcend suffering and attain enlightenment. But Dontsov warns that renouncing desire 
and striving—the will to life and power—saps the strength of individuals and peoples. The 
“Buddhists” “love their enemies.” In forbidding themselves to engage in wars of aggression, they 
ultimately come to reject wars of defense as well. Buddhist peoples, “degenerate races,” as 
Dontsov calls them, can expect to be conquered and enslaved by “strong races,” above all the 
“Faustian” nations of the Occident.61 The “Faustian” worldview recognizes the primacy of the 
irrational, of passions and instincts. It is driven to “blind activity” and relentless expansion, in 
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time and in space, toward ever-greater conquests and discoveries, toward the domination of all 
being. According to Spengler, it is the “European spirit,” which struggles against whatever is 
“near,” against the “stupefactions of the moment,” but seeks “the universal and enduring.”62 
Dontsov quotes the heresy of Goethe’s Faust, “Im Anfang war die Tat” (“In the beginning was 
the act”), not “the word,” let alone “the thought.” There is, according to Dontsov, a wholesome 
measure of anti-intellectualism in the heedless adventurism and domineering brutality of the 
“Faustian.” Embracing the “right of might” as an unbreakable “law of nature,” the “Faustian” 
relishes the “joy to kill” (a reference to Jack London’s The Call of the Wild). His “will to power” 
is a desire for victory, a constant striving to remake the universe in his own image.  
 Dontsov makes a strained effort bring this into line with Christianity and the church. Dr. 
Faustus’s deal is with the Devil (Mephistopheles), after all, so how could a Christian nation such 
as Ukraine embrace this “Faustian” vision of unbridled Satanic arrogance, hatred for the enemy, 
contempt for the weak, boundless greed, and bloodlust? But the Jesus found in Natsionalizm is 
an avenger, the conduit of God’s wrath, the harbinger of the apocalypse. He comes to mankind 
bearing “a sword.” He heralds strife between fathers and sons, and the ruination of kingdoms. 
Reimagining the “Prince of Peace” as a god of war, Dontsov asserts that every instance of 
pacifism implies war, which permeates everything in nature (as Heraclitus thought). War (and 
militarism) leads dialectically to the higher peace and oneness of the struggle between opposing 
forces, like the tonal dissonance without which there can be no music or the tension without 
which the strings of a violin cannot produce notes. First Armageddon, then the Kingdom of 
Heaven on Earth—first the bloody revolution, then harmony.63 As far as Dontsov is concerned, 
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there is more to admire and emulate in the history of the Catholic Church than there is in the life 
and teachings of the Jesus of the Gospels. He extols the “pathos of fanaticism” and intolerance 
that animated the Crusades and the Inquisition. Doubts lead only to death and defeat, so the 
national idea must be closed to discussion, requiring no proof or sanction, drawing strength from 
its very illogicality. Dontsov hails the dogmatism and “religious intensity” born of “mass 
fantasies” (what he calls “illusionism”), citing the crowd psychology of the French polymath and 
political reactionary Gustave Le Bon (1841-1931). It is “the promise of the unreal” and “the 
chimerical” that sparks mass movements. “Couldn’t all these ‘Eternal Jews’ [vichni zhydy] 
among us lead humanity to new impulses and new promised lands?”64 Dontsov asks, implicitly 
invoking anti-Semitism as precisely the kind of “noble lie” or “mass fantasy” needed to rouse the 
folk to action.65 Dontsov counsels a principled “amorality” in the choice of means, physical and 
rhetorical, by which to appease the nation’s will to life and power. Only fanatics found great 
movements, states, and religions, and only through extreme violence, anti-intellectual conviction, 
and deceit. The triumph of the strong over the weak is the real agent of progress (postup), 
Dontsov asserts, before launching into an apologia for British and American imperialism and the 
genocide of indigenous peoples around the world.66 The great empires of the West are, 
paradoxically, the highest exemplars of nationalism because they cause the death of (other, 
lower) national cultures and the globalization of their own (the “civilizing mission,” the “white 
man’s burden”).67  
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67 Dontsov was a big fan of Rudyard Kipling, whom George Orwell called a “prophet of British imperialism.” 
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 This logic moves Dontsov to make a variety of provocative statements, such as “Caesar 
and Cecil Rhodes were better internationalists than Lenin and Marx,” and “only imperialist 
nations, whose imperialism is in a kinetic state, at least potentially, have the right to self-
determination.”68 The reason for this state of affairs is simple: “Nature does not know humanity 
and justice, she knows merits and rewards.” Ukrainians, too, must learn to embrace “all manly 
(not eunuch-like) doctrines.”69              
 “Creative violence” is the “how,” but who would carry out the national revolution and 
build an independent Ukrainian nation-state? Dontsov’s answer: people of an “entirely new 
spirit” (Fichte); not the people, which is quite incapable of the task, but an “initiative minority” 
from within yet above it. Every revolution comes about through the action of a fanatical 
minority. The Bolsheviks and the “class-conscious proletariat” (a small minority of the Russian 
Empire) and the Italian Fascists are Dontsov’s models. Such groups “give form to ideas that are 
incomprehensible to the masses, make them approachable for these masses, and, finally, mobilize 
‘the people’ for the struggle for this idea.”70 The Ukrainian nationalist “initiative minority” 
would need recruits of a new type—“the strong man” (syl’na liudyna)—to be drawn, Dontsov 
envisions, from the ranks of the peasantry (which he idealizes, much like the Ukrainophile 
populists he savagely critiques)71. In addition to “imperialism in politics, a church free from the 
________________________ 
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state in religion, [and] occidentalism in culture,” Dontsov’s national ideal included the promise 
of “free initiative and growth in economic life,” reflecting a fascination with unfettered markets 
and private property that is characteristic for his thought during this period.72 But the actual form 
an independent Ukrainian state might take is secondary to its creation by any means necessary.   
 At the outset, Natsionalizm, a self-contradictory and paradoxical work, proclaims the 
nonexistence of all laws of human development and social phenomenon, then declares the 
ineluctable reality of a whole series of such laws (the “iron laws” of “struggle,” of “survival of 
the fittest,” of “oligarchy,” and so on). It asserts that idealism is the philosophical basis of “active 
nationalism,” then proceeds to explain nations and states in terms of reductive biological 
metaphors. One finds the notion that the nation precedes the state, but also the claim that a non-
self-governing nation is not a nation at all (and hence that the Ukrainian nation does not yet 
exist). If will is “elemental”—a blind and unconscious force or instinct without cause or reason, 
as the book argues—then how can “the cultivation of a new will” come about as the result of a 
conscious human effort? In accordance with its own logic, aporias such as these only increase the 
book’s mystique, just as irrational passions strengthen the “national ideal” that it celebrates. The 
book appeals to the emotions first and foremost, holding the method of rational persuasion to be 
beneath the gravity of the matter at hand.  
Written at the peak of his creative powers, Natsionalizm best encapsulates what I call 
Dontsov’s “authoritarian iconoclasm” and “cosmopolitan ultranationalism.” The iconoclastic side 
of “active nationalism” praises avant-garde experimentation; mercilessly critiques past 
________________________ 
Biblioteka Ukrains’koi nardonoi obnovy, 1934), 25. Some have argued that Dontsov’s “rightwing populist” focus on 
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72 Dontsov, Natsionalizm, in Vybrani tvory, vol. 7, 176. Motyl considers the yankophile Dontsov of the 1920s a 
proponent of laisser-faire capitalism, suggesting that his “active nationalism” contained elements of (classical) 
liberalism, despite appearances. Motyl, Turn to the Right, 82. 
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generations; calls for revolution, heretical innovation, noncomformity, feats of individual genius 
and will power, amorality, Anglo-American libertarianism, and creative violence. But its 
authoritarian side demands submission to previous generations, to the state, and to cultural and 
religious tradition, extolling mindless dogmatism, unflinching obeisance to the powerful, and 
fanatical self-sacrifice for the greater good of the whole. Natsionalizm’s cosmopolitanism is 
manifest in its adulation of the West, the “Faustian civilization” whose thirst for adventure and 
conquest has driven it to the farthest reaches the globe. But if imperial nations alone have the 
“right” to self-determination, why speak of Ukrainian independence at all? Why oppose Russian 
or Soviet imperialism, and on what grounds, if it is, after all, the consequence of a racial-
biological “law of nature” and there are no universal moral standards by which to condemn it? 
How could the Ukrainian nation assert its uniqueness and wholeness, “the self-sufficiency of its 
idea,” by mimicking international empires? As Mykola Riabchuk argues, Dontsov’s cult of the 
West was ambivalent and artificial thanks to a contradiction between the (decadent, 
cosmopolitan, imperialist) modernity that European civilization represented, and the native 
traditions, ancestor worship, xenophobia, and attachment to the homeland that he purportedly 
wished to revive.73  
 
The Dontsov-Lypyns’kyi Polemic and the Formation of the OUN  
 After Natsionalizm’s success Dontsov became convinced of his prophetic abilities and 
spent the rest of the interwar period repeating the work’s main premises, elaborating upon them 
in light of new events, and making minor revisions.74 The book turned him into an idol for the 
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nationalistic youth in Poland, Czechoslovakia, and throughout Europe, who came to believe that 
he alone had set before them the task of heralding a glorious new epoch of Ukrainian history.75 
They were eager to become the stronger “people of a new spirit” described in Natsionalizm, 
ready to sacrifice everything—and commit any atrocity—for the national ideal.  
 But not everyone was so impressed. Lypyns’kyi, for instance, loathed the book, 
denouncing is a bastardization and plagiarism of his own ideas. Dontsov’s Natsionalizm does not 
cite Lypyns’kyi’s work, but was it indebted to his ideas? As early as 1919,76 Lypyns’kyi had 
expressed a number of the points found in “active nationalism”: 1) a critique of democracy that 
proposed the cultivation of a new ruling class, raised in the traditional, knightly values of the 
Cossack period, to give form to the unarticulated strivings of the peasantry; 2) a critique of the 
fatalism and anarchism born of determinist conceptions of history, advocating fervent belief in 
one’s own will (voluntarism) and the harnessing of irrational drives and elemental desires for the 
purposes of action (vitalism); 3) a critique of the leadership of the UNR, focusing on the 
Ukrainian intelligentsia’s estrangement from the peasantry, their subservience to Moscow, their 
inexperience and indecisiveness (here Lypyns’kyi and Dontsov agreed that the peasantry’s 
mentality is inherently anti-Bolshevik, conservative, private property-minded, xenophobic and 
patriotic—they just need a native, war-capable aristocracy that they can respect); 4) a critique of 
provincialism and regionalism (particularly in Galicia), in favor of nationalism; and 5) a critique 
of socialist cosmopolitanism (the myth of the proletarian revolution) as a source of 
demoralization and spiritual decadence, in favor of new (yet ancient) myths and legends to 
inspire a national revolution. However, many of these ideas can be traced to prior and external 
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influences that Lypyns’kyi and Dontsov shared in common, such as Georges Sorel, Gustave Le 
Bon, Charles Maurras, Roberto Michels, and the rightwing Italian economist Wilfred Pareto 
(1848-1923), not to mention Edmund Burke, G.W.F. Hegel, and other classic conservative 
thinkers. Lypyns’kyi and Dontsov were nearly the same age and, although the former had 
embraced a Ukrainian identity despite a “Polonized” background while the latter arrived at the 
same national subjectivity from a “Russified” background, the two developed in parallel, 
responding to the same events, living in the same cities, working for the same government, and 
moving in the same circles. This makes the disentanglement of their intellectual paths and the 
discernment of who influenced whom, when, and how, next to impossible.  
 From the inception of Lypyns’kyi’s party and the Hetmanite movement in 1918, Dontsov 
was active in the politics of Ukrainian conservatism, which, there is no doubt, provided the 
foundations for his “active,” “volitional” (vol’ovyi) nationalism. But he departed from 
Lypyns’kyi on several key points. For Dontsov (as of the mid 1920s) the nation precedes the 
state, in time and in importance, and a Ukrainian nation still needed to be cultivated before a 
Ukrainian state would be possible; Lypyns’kyi, a statist, thought the opposite. They took 
opposing approaches to the legitimacy of power and legality (irrelevant for Dontsov but essential 
for Lypyns’kyi). They defined “the will” differently (“conscious striving” for Lypyns’kyi versus 
“irrational feeling” for Dontsov). Finally, their strategy for building a Ukrainian state diverged: 
Lypyns’kyi’s decidedly top/down vision gave the leading part to the landed (re-Ukrainized) 
gentry, conspiring with a narrow circle of followers to place a monarch (hetman) in power in 
Kyiv; for Dontsov the national revolution would have to be of, by, and for the Ukrainian 
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peasantry, with the gentry playing an auxiliary role (the goal being to incite massive popular 
upheavals, not to engineer coups d’état.77                                          
 Practical and theoretical differences aside, relations between the two ideologues had 
already deteriorated beyond to point of repair by 1926. Dontsov had failed to provoke 
Lypyns’kyi on the pages of LNV the previous year first by attacking the legalism central to the 
latter’s thinking.78 Then he called Lypyns’kyi’s commitment to the idea of Ukrainian 
independence from Russia into question. Lypyns’kyi responded with a letter to the New Jersey 
newspaper Svoboda (Freedom) and mailed a copy to Dontsov:   
In issue 94 of your newspaper dated 23 April of this year you wrote that I ‘agitate for 
dropping the goal of independence and for voluntarily recognizing Ukraine’s place in the 
Russian Empire.’ I know you Ukrainian intelligentsia snakes too well to be surprised by 
these lies, to have any desire to answer them, or to engage in polemics with you. Keep 
lying. The more your lies besmirch the Ukrainian name, which you yourselves represent, 
the more your baseness will drive away all honest Ukrainians, and the sooner the branch 
on which you sit will fall, and you boors will die, blinded by your own spite.79  
 
But the polemic continued. Dontsov responded the next month with a private letter addressed to 
“Wacław Lipinski” (a Polonized version of Lypyns’kyi’s name) expressing “extreme concern” 
about the latter’s sanity and urging him to seek professional psychiatric care.80 Previously 
theoretical squabbles became even more personal and public in Lypyns’kyi’s introduction to 
Lysty do brativ-khliborobiv. Dontsov’s ugly divisive tone introduced chaos into Ukrainian 
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politics. Dontsov had slandered him as “a Moscophile who struggles against the idea of 
Ukrainian independence.”81 But Lypyns’kyi insists that Dontsov became a Ukrainian nationalist 
only thanks to his influence, trying to claim all the credit for his ideas years later after it had 
become fashionable and profitable to do so.  
 Much of Lypyns’kyi’s obloquy does not engage in a sustained critique of the actual 
content of Natsionalizm (he lumped Dontsov’s doctrine with the varieties of Ukrainian socialism, 
which “can bring only what is already brought: the ruin of Ukraine”).82 Instead, he dwells on 
Dontsov’s Russianness, his hollow imitation of Bolshevism, and pettiness, referring to him as 
“Mit’ka” (a Russophone diminutive):  The problem is not that he [Dontsov] is a Moskal’ [i.e. a 
Russian —TE]. Honest Ukrainians are and have been Moskals. Ultimately, just as there are no 
pure-blooded Americans, there are no pure-blooded Ukrainians. . . . A Ukrainian is anyone who 
wants Ukraine to cease being a colony; for her varied tribes, races, and faiths to become one 
Ukrainian State.” As a Moskal’, Dontsov might have contributed the virtues of “authority, 
organization, discipline—precisely what the Ukrainian national movement lacks. So the problem 
is not that he is a Moskal’.” Rather, Lypyns’kyi asserts, “the problem is that his egocentric and 
cowardly nature could not gather the courage, discipline, and organization of the Muscovite 
revolutionaries—the one thing that is good about them.” “[Dontsov] sought only to make an easy 
career among ‘stupid khokhols’ [a slur for Ukrainians —TE] out of the effrontery of 
revolutionary Muscovite courage.”  
From the beginning [Dontsov] imitated the ‘enlightened’ Petersburg S[ocial] D[emocrat]s 
and chided the ‘khokhols’ for being petit-bourgeois, independentists, nationalists, not 
Marxists. Then [he] decided to speculate in nationalism and scolds them now for being 
Marxists, Moscophiles, provincialists, and not nationalists. Being a socialist Moscophile 
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he struggled against the rotten West, noble Poland and the bourgeois prejudices of 
Catholicism. But, having seen that he will not make a great career in this, suddenly 
recloaked himself in a ‘Western’ costume, began to denounce Asiatic Moscow and 
Orthodoxy, insinuated himself under the family of Cardinal Mercier, and began to 
promote an orientation toward Austria from the beginning, and now toward Poland.83            
                                                                                                                                  
According to Lypyns’kyi, Dontsov’s texts are rife with internal contradictions: “In one month he 
writes that Ukrainians ‘have a womanly psychology’ [because they are guided in the first place 
by feeling instead of logic] (Pidstavy nashoi polityky); in another, that they are rationalists, that 
is, dominated by logic and not feeling (Natsionalizm).” Dontsov draws upon “a mass of citations 
of ’Western European works,’ which he has never read. ‘Stupid provincials’ and the like all take 
this for genius. What’s actually ‘genius’ is only his skunk-like means of building a literary career 
for himself.” Dontsov is a plagiarist who steals ideas and presents them as his own. He relies on 
ad hominem attacks, misrepresentation of opponents, and falsification of texts. He claims to be 
Ukraine’s only representative to the West, but Mit’ka is really a product of Muscovite, socialist, 
revolutionary ideas, not of conservatism. Ever since Khmel’nyts’kyi, people such as Dontsov 
have been “the first cause and clearest manifestation of the provincialism of Ukraine.” When the 
time came, during the Ukrainian Revolution, for the “direct action” and “creative violence” that 
he harps on about, Dontsov “hid under his wife’s skirt.” Hence his biography of betrayals, shape-
shifting, and careerism. He was never loyal to the Hetmanate and ultimately betrayed Petliura 
and the UNR as well, charting a ridiculous pro-Polish course in Pidstavy nashoi polityky. 
Lacking discipline and courage, he is incapable of organized political action, which is to say, 
loyalty to a party: “Suppose that today a respected nationalist organization were to appear and 
say: come, Mit’ka, work with us as a disciplined member. Mit’ka’s answer would certainly be: 
nationalism is the most provincial stupidity; not a nationalist, but a true [pravdyva] Ukraine was 
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born in my head today!”84 Lypyns’kyi hoped that this opprobrium would be withering for 
Dontsov, but it seems to have had the opposite effect of building the latter’s fame and resolve.   
 The polemic between Dontsov and Lypynsk’yi became one of the main themes of 
discussion among Ukrainian nationalists from this moment forward. The prominent theorist of 
Ukrainian conservatism was highly regarded by the leadership of the future OUN still taking 
shape in the late 1920s, but Dontsov’s popularity with the youth (and hence with the nationalist 
rank and file—the next generation of Ukrainian leaders represented by Bandera, who differed 
from the older, more conservative leaders, such as Konovalets’ and Andrii Mel’nyk) surpassed 
Lypyns’kyi’s following the publication of Natsionalizm. Ukrainian nationalists generally 
considered Dontsov’s writing easier to understand and more inspiring than Lypyns’kyi’s more 
measured and academic political works. Dontsov was poised to emerge as, perhaps, the foremost 
ideologue of Ukrainian integral nationalism at the moment of its self-organization into a united 
force.  
 According to Volodymyr Martynets’, he and Konovalets’ approached Dontsov with an 
offer of collaboration and material security, including the recognition of the author of 
Natsionalizm as the spokesman and ideological authority of the UVO abroad, which would be 
autonomous.85 The three met in December 15, 1927, in L’viv, but Dontsov refused to sign on. 
Martynets’ attributed this to Dontsov’s personal distaste for Konovalets’, who offended him with 
insufficiently active support for the Zahrava group,86 but Petro Mirchuk (1913-1999), another 
leading OUN member, blamed the failure of the recruitment mission on Martynets’s rude 
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behavior: “Martynets’ not only did not bring Dm[ytro] Dontsov to collaboration, but, on the 
contrary—shocked the latter with his annoying disposition, cockiness, and tactlessness.”87 Other 
future members of the OUN leadership—which called itself the Provid Ukrains’kykh 
Natsionalistiv (Leadership of the Ukrainian Nationalists), or PUN—attempted to bring the 
ideologue on board with the practical organization underway, but all were decisively rebuffed.88  
 Years later, members of the PUN disagreed as to why they failed to pull Dontsov into 
their ranks; some claimed that he was not amenable to collaboration under any conditions.89 
Zenon Pelens’kyi, a regional leader of the OUN in Galicia, later compared these oftentimes rude 
exchanges to “nationalist barbs in the ass,” while Dontsov spoke of a “psychological chasm” 
separating him from the organized nationalists, arguing that their worldview was not the one he 
propounded.90 Dmytro Andriievs’kyi (1892-1976)—a former colleague of Dontsov’s from the 
Ukrainian Diplomatic Mission to Switzerland and one of the founding leaders of the OUN—
contacted Dontsov repeatedly, growing frustrated with his rejection of the “organized 
nationalists” (as they called themselves and their doctrine). Andriievs’kyi wrote from Brussels on 
June 18, 1927, on the occasion of the founding of a new nationalist journal, Rozbudova natsii 
(Nation Building)91—the official organ of the PUN—and of rumors that Dontsov’s 
nonengagement with it was evidence of a rift within the nationalist camp:  
                                                
87 Petro Mirchuk, Narys itsorii Orhanizatsii Ukrains’kykh Natsionalistiv, ed. S. Lenvav’skyi, vol. 1 (Munich: 
Ukrains’ke vydavnytstvo, 1968), 84. 
 
88 Sosnovs’kyi, Dmytro Dontsov, 375-83. Zaitsev, Ukrains’kyi inetgral’nyi natsionalizm, 170-71. 
 
89 Knysh, Stanovlennia OUN, 61. 
 
90 Quoted in Zaitsev, Ukrains’kyi inetgral’nyi natsionalizm, 170. 
 
91 Published by Mykola Stsibors’kyi and edited by Volodymyr Martynet’s, Rozbudova natsii, banned in Poland, was 
based in Prague and in publication from January 1928 to 1934. Despite Dontsov’s immediately hostile reaction to it, 
he regularly received and read copies of it at his home and office. M.V. Mandryk, Stanovlennia ideolohii 
intehral’noho natsionalizmu v intelektual’nii spadshchyni ukrains’koi emihratsii (1920-1930 rr.) (Diss. [Kandidat 
istorychnykh nauk], Natsional’nyi pedahohichnyi universytet imeni Mykhaila Drahomanov, 2004), 154. 
  276 
The situation is all the more paradoxical that for every layman our genetic connection 
with you, with your declared thoughts, is obvious. I again emphasize, that we are your 
spiritual sons. You deny us, at least in letters to me, but we nonetheless properly make 
you responsible for our appearance in the world. Even if one takes only the formal aspect, 
the very name of our movement, as a “nationalist movement,” we are created by you . . . I 
cannot suggest that you step out against us, because then the situation would become 
entirely false. Because in sincerity we would not be able to explain that this is a 
fundamental divergence, because we don’t have that. Thus it stands with every guess 
about your unwillingness [to work with us —TE], which has nothing to do with ideology. 
. . . You properly prepared [the youth] for the acceptance of our organization and our 
discipline, and you prepared it such that if you wanted to change something about this, 
you would scarcely succeed. . . . Excuse us that we use your work and even your 
terminology—nationalism—but believe that we were certain to be formed by your work, 
together with you, and that it is not our fault that you still have your reservations.92      
 
Elsewhere he beseeches Dontsov to assume a role in the leadership of the nascent OUN: “Surely 
it is clear to all that we are your spiritual sons, raised on your writings, baptized by your spirit. 
You can of course drive us away with a cross and object to some of our ‘deviations,’ but in vain. 
We feel ourselves your kinsmen and that’s how it is. It would be a pity, if we confined ourselves 
to repetitions of your thoughts and did not build something of our own.”93 Nevertheless, “it 
would be wonderful if you found the opportunity for yourself to take part in our organization, 
and did not avoid us. I promise to you from my side total sincerity and openness.”94  
 Dontsov did not budge. Offended by the rejection, Andriievs’kyi came to agree with 
Lypyns’kyi’s evaluation of Dontsov as a man incapable of organized political work and loyalty. 
“I read the introduction to the Lysty do brativ khliborobiv . . . Unfortunately, I cannot give much 
consideration to the matter of your competition with Lypyns’kyi, but he does not seem tragic to 
me. Of course you feel otherwise . . . I must acknowledge that I consider the work of Lypyns’kyi 
________________________ 
 
92 BN, DD, mf. 82673, 76. Letter of Dmytro Andriievs’ky to D. Dontsov. June 18, 1927, Brussels. 
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to be of great use in our confused community. Moreover many of his thoughts are mine.”95 
Andriievs’kyi later asserted that Dontsov was too egocentric to join the OUN, and was never 
able to accept the fact that a group had realized his ideas in practice without his leadership. 
“Thus,” he writes “it is as if we usurped Dontsov’s ‘invention,’ and took the wind out of it. In 
fact, he missed the right moment to fall into line with us, and now he is disoriented.”96 Dontsov, 
Andriievs’kyi asserted in a letter to Konovalets’ in 1928, offered “absurd, maximalist precepts,” 
including the disastrous idea of conducting a “war against all.”97 Dontsov also fell into conflict 
with Ukrainian nationalist leaders over the content and direction of LNV, ultimately refusing to 
engage in further communication with them in his capacity as editor.98    
Dontsov’s rebuffs and criticisms of the émigrés were noted at the OUN’s founding congress, 
which took place from January 28 to February 3, 1929, in Vienna.99 The OUN incorporated the 
various Ukrainian nationalist youth and veterans groups into a single political formation under 
the leadership of Konovalets’. Like the UVO before it, the OUN upheld violence as a necessary 
and desirable method in the struggle for Ukrainian independence, but it was considerably larger 
and more radicalized than its predecessor. The OUN’s membership, mostly young Galician 
Ukrainians, engaged in targeted attacks against the Polish regime, including the assassinations of 
high-profile figures, such as the diplomat and politician Tadeusz Hołówko (1889-1931) (a 
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leading theorist of “Prometheism” and an advocate of Polish-Ukrainian cooperation), and the 
Polish interior minister, Bronisław Pieracki (1895-1934). The OUN also attacked Ukrainian 
“collaborators” with the Polish regime, including government officials, members of the liberal 
UNDO party, and educators, notoriously murdering Ivan Babii (1893-1934), the esteemed L’viv 
academician and veteran officer of the Ukrainian Galician Army of the ZUNR. In retaliation for 
the Great Famine of 1932-1933 (the Holodomor), OUN members also killed a Soviet consular 
officer, Alexei Mailov. The membership of the OUN’s Homeland Executive, based in Galicia and 
mostly comprised of young people, embraced Dontsov’s promotion of “creative violence” and 
put it into action, frequently acting independently and without the approval of the older 
leadership abroad (the PUN or Provid). A fringe minority in Western Ukrainian politics, they 
took the initiative, exerted their will, and displayed a fanatical dedication to the national idea, 
just as Dontsov had counseled them. Stepan Lenkavs’kyi, a proponent of expanding the OUN’s 
use of terrorism, praised the “recklessness and fanaticism,” voluntarism, and “amoral” rejection 
of “a sentimental sense of justice toward others,” with which Dontsov had imbued young 
Ukrainian nationalists.100 Lenkavs’kyi used philosophical and psychological categories to expose 
the internal contradictions in Dontsov’s thought, but praised his ideas, regarding them as the 
spiritual basis for a new nationalist movement.101    
Still, Dontsov refused to assume command over them as his own “spiritual children.”102 
Shortly after the founding of the OUN, Konovalets’ sent a student delegation to Dontsov to 
                                                
100 Lenkavs’kyi, “Filosofs’ki pidstavy,” 272-76. 
 
101 Ibid. 
 
102 Reflecting on Dontsov’s prophet-like relation to the OUN, Oleh Bahan, an avid promoter of “active nationalism” 
in Ukraine today, has compared Dontsov to Jesus Christ, who never joined his own church. Bahan argues that 
Dontsov’s ideology was an organic outgrowth of native Ukrainian traditions (above all those associated with the 
national poet, Taras Shevchenko), not an imitation of Western, let alone Russian, precedents. Bahan, Pomizh 
mistykoiu i politykoiu.  
  279 
inform him of the OUN’s existence and encourage him to collaborate closely with it. They were 
not to insist on Dontsov’s joining the OUN as a leading member because the Poles, as 
Konovalets’ understood, would in that case drive the ideologue out of Galicia, where he was 
needed to carry on his “educational” work.103 His answer, again, was negative: no collaboration, 
secret or otherwise, would occur. That summer, Martynets’ made another attempt to reach a 
mutual understanding with Dontsov and include him in the propaganda side of the OUN’s 
activities. Dontsov recalled this in a letter to his wife, on August 29, 1929: “I again received a 
terrible invitation from Martynets’ and Co. to write to them and so on and so on (this time they 
use flattery). They say that they are issuing some kind of crude journal. . . . I again thanked 
[them] and, regarding the journal, answered that there is a place for everyone in Lit[eraturno] 
Nauk[ovyi] Visnyk, let them write, and whoever has a good heart can help to make this journal 
better.”104 Dontsov was not interested in relinquishing any control over the ideological vision that 
he claimed to have been alone in propounding. He stuck to his own platform, LNV, and, although 
he invited the members of the OUN Provid to contribute to it, only a few articles by 
Andriievs’kyi and Ievhen Onats’kyi (1894-1979) (a representative of the OUN in Rome) 
appeared on its pages. Dontsov was afraid to assert his authority and take control over the 
practical results of that vision, despite numerous invitations to do so, and despite claiming full 
credit for the “trendiness” (modnist’) of integral nationalist ideas and passions in Ukrainian 
politics.      
 Because Dontsov refused to cooperate, relations between him and the PUN went from 
mutually suspicious to openly hostile in the following years. By 1930, Andriievs’kyi and other 
________________________ 
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members of the “organized” Ukrainian nationalist leadership had begun to consider Dontsov a 
dangerous competitor to the OUN for influence over the youth, a “provocateur” with impractical, 
divisive, “fanatical,” and “diabolical” ideas.105 The émigré PUN sought to attenuate and regain 
control over the outbreak of unsanctioned political violence in Galicia, arguing that, although 
“our circumstances demand the greatest firmness, determination, and élan,” “violence is a 
double-edged sword and hides as many dangers as it does advantages. The use of violence can as 
soon reduce a society to anarchy as restore it to health. To achieve the second and not the first, 
violence should be ethical.”106 On this point, Onats’kyi attacked Dontsov, without naming him, 
for promoting selfish, antisocial deeds.107 In a 1933 speech to fellow nationalists, Andriievs’kyi 
bemoaned the fact that a failure to demonstrate perfect adherence to Dontsov’s teachings was 
liable to discredit one as a sellout in the eyes of Galician youth.108 He called him an “epochal 
phenomenon,” but a “dangerous” one.109  
 Developing this line of critique in a 1926 review of Natsionalizm, Martynets’ rejected 
Dontsov’s amorality, his iconoclasm vis-à-vis Ukrainian traditions, and the lack of positive, 
inspiring images and exemplars drawn from Ukrainian history (a critique of the OUN 
leadership’s fundamental disagreements with Dontsov that he further developed after World war 
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II).110 Martynets’ fell into a heated polemic with Dontsov over these issues during the summer of 
1930, despite Konovalets’s desire to avoid such a confrontation.111 The PUN did not share 
Dontsov’s unrestrained enthusiasm for Italian Fascism, rejecting the label as harmful slander by 
enemy propagandists. Thus, in 1929, the editors of the PUN’s main organ, Rozbudova natsii, 
declared:  
We underline the inappropriateness of the term ‘fascist’ that opponents have used to 
describe Ukrainian Nationalism. Fascism is the movement of a people with a state; it is a 
current born out by a social underpinning that has struggled for power in its own state. 
Ukrainian Nationalism is a national-liberation movement, whose purpose is the struggle 
to win a state, to which is has to lead the broadest masses of the Ukrainian people. . . . 
With even greater reason Ukrainian Nationalism cannot be compared to other social and 
politically reactionary currents among other state peoples that are similarly called 
fascist.112  
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Figure 4.1. The First Congress of the OUN in Vienna (February 1929). Source: Internet 
Encyclopedia of Ukraine   
 
Disputes between the LNV editor and OUN leaders persisted and worsened through the mid to 
late 1930s, diverging again on the issue of German National Socialism after Hitler’s rise to 
power (see chapter 5). Meanwhile, Dontsov studiously avoided doing anything that might 
connect him to the OUN, despite his obvious ideological affinities with the organization. As 
Andriievs’kyi suggested, Dontsov feared the repercussions of association with an illegal political 
organization for his life and work in Poland.  
 There were barriers to collaboration at the level of personalities as well. Andriievs’kyi 
criticized Dontsov as “organically incapable of living with people, either in private or public 
life.”113 Thus, in May 1932, when the unofficial weekly organ of the OUN, Ukrains’kyi holos 
(Ukrainian Voice), announced its intentions of celebrating the ten-year anniversary of the 
reestablishment of LNV under Dontsov’s editorship, the latter wrote the paper’s editor that this 
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action might “give the impression, among the uninitiated public, of some kind of special 
ideational (and perhaps also organizational) intimacy, closeness of the two publications [LNV and 
Ukrains’kyi holos —TE] that does not correspond to reality.”114 In an oral interview with his 
friend and biographer, Mykhailo Sosnovs’kyi, near the end of his life, Dontsov explained that he 
trusted Konovalets’ and recognized his authority, but did not like his entourage, especially 
Martynets’ and Andriievs’kyi.115 Dontsov also did not care for Andrii Mel’nyk (the future leader 
of one of the two main splinter groups of the OUN after the schism that occurred following 
Konovalets’s assassination in 1938). Yet another reason for Dontsov’s refusal to join the OUN 
was his unwillingness to share (or subordinate himself to) authority, as evidenced by his 
dictatorial approach to editing LNV and, previously, Zahrava. It is likely that, had he entered the 
OUN’s leadership, personal and ideological conflicts would have followed him, just as they did 
previously when he joined other parties and organizations only to resign in disgust and deny ever 
having had anything to do with them.  
 Dontsov recognized the necessity of an organized movement as the only path to victory, 
but regarded it as a secondary concern of “active nationalism,” asserting the primacy of spiritual 
rebirth and the formulation of a national ideal to serve as the beacon for a new generation of 
nationalists, with or without an organizational basis.116 His doctrine commanded the loyalty of 
the younger members of the OUN—including Stepan Lenkavs’kyi (1904-1977), Volodymyr 
Ianiv (1908-1991), Stepan Bandera, and Iaroslav Stes’ko (1912-1986)—who went on to be the 
chief of the OUN(B) and the Anti-Bolshevik Bloc of Nations (ABN), based in Munich, during 
the Cold War. The older, more conservative leadership, by contrast, tended to favor Lypyns’kyi, 
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often distancing themselves from Dontsov’s ideology in public.117 Nevertheless, the OUN 
included almost all of Dontsov’s works in its list (published in 1930) of mandatory books for the 
organization’s libraries and reading rooms and his ideas were the basis for the OUN’s 
authoritarianism and fixation on absolute leaders.118 “In the work of the ideological reeducation 
of the masses, it is not the cabinet of theories,” the first program of the OUN states, “but the 
direct approach to the soul of the mass man, that has the decisive significance; the ability to 
inspire his feeling and imagination with the simple (despite all their greatness) truths of 
nationalism; to carry him away with examples of heroic, willful action.”119 Dontsov’s “myth of 
the final battle” and the notion of “permanent revolution” were manifest in the OUN’s 
insurrection against Poland throughout the 1930s, as were his voluntarism, romanticization of 
“creative violence,” and the “initiative minority.” Ultimately, the OUN was both more and less 
extreme than Dontsov. On the one hand, it engaged in the real (as oppose to imagined or 
aesthetic) violence of a national insurgency. Unlike Dontsov, the OUN was willing to break 
Polish laws, kill the enemy, and face the consequences. On the other hand, because OUN’s 
members’ lives were on the line and certain acts of violence threatened to damage the 
organization’s reputation, the nationalist leadership attempted to mitigate Dontsov’s incendiary 
rhetoric and promotion of spontaneous, irrational action with calls to order and discipline. 
Moreover, since the OUN claimed to lead and represent the oppressed Ukrainian masses, 
Dontsov’s elitist, antidemocratic, pro-Fascist, and Bolshevik-admiring statements had to be 
criticized or rejected outright, at least in public. After all, what were Ukrainian nationalists 
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fighting against, if not despotic states? Would a Ukrainian authoritarian dictatorship be any better 
than the Polish or (more to the point) Soviet-Russian ones that the OUN had vowed to destroy? 
Was Dontsov, as Lypyns’kyi and other critics charged, a “revolutionary Moskal’” who had 
opportunistically adopted a Ukrainian aesthetic?                              
 
 
Dontsov’s Critics and the Image of the Russian Enemy 
 My aim here is to examine Dontsov’s constantly evolving image of and relation to 
Russia, Bolshevism, and the Soviet Union. His contemporary opponents often accused him of 
secret Moscophilia (or Polonophilia), affinities for Bolshevism, and repressed Russianness. In 
large part, these allegations were intended simply to enrage and embarrass Dontsov by 
attributing his fanatical Ukrainian nationalism to the pathos of a self-hating Russian. Hitting their 
mark, these attacks dogged him for the rest of his life.120 The commonness of the charge across 
the spectrum of non-Soviet Ukrainian politics reflects the extent to which anti-Russian 
sentiments had become the norm in the interwar period, thanks in no small part to Dontsov’s own 
efforts (though it is important also to recall the extreme destructiveness of the imperial Russian 
occupations of Galicia during World War I, just a decade prior). There is, nevertheless, some 
substance to the charge that Dontsov’s worldview bore the imprint of his origins in New Russia, 
his Russified (or simply “Russian”) family, his education in St. Petersburg, and his grounding in 
the classics of imperial Russian literature and philosophy. The ideologue’s loathing for Muscovy 
and Russian Communism could hardly be denied, but he also seemed to despise the vast majority 
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of his contemporary Ukrainians, claiming, to the shock of many, that they could all learn a great 
deal from the Bolsheviks. Had Dontsov imbibed the very evil (Eurasian despotism) that he had 
purportedly devoted his life’s work to destroying? 
 Certainly his Western Ukrainian non-Communist socialist and liberal-democratic critics 
thought so. Karl Kobers’kyi (1980-1940), for example, a political activist, academic, and leader 
in the cooperative farming movement, proclaimed (under the pseudonym “Pushkar”): ”D. 
Dontsov is a typical representative of Russian nihilism on our soil, despite his vocal critique of 
everything that comes from the East.”121 Kobers’kyi dismissed Dontsov as an “antidemocratic 
fascist nationalist” whose ideology offered no positive, constructive program.122 Dontsov’s 
“Russian nihilism” included a reactionary social teaching that serves only the ruling classes, 
which, given the circumstances of Ukraine’s colonization by Poles and Russians, meant non-
Ukrainians.123 Instead of offering a path forward, Dontsov’s “active nationalism” impeded 
progress with backward-looking, antidemocratic slogans that promised no solution to the 
Ukrainian question. Despite their “cult of tradition,” Donstov’s followers attacked the best 
Ukrainian traditions of freedom of thought and democracy, replacing them with thinly disguised 
Russian traditions of dogmatism and absolutism.124 The ethical relativism of Dontsov’s 
worldview is as damaging as the class-based ethics of Marxism, leading to the rejection of ethics 
tout court (amoral’nist’).125 Kobers’kyi noted the “purely opportunistic character” of Dontsov’s 
antidemocratic, authoritarian, “might is right” stance: it provided no moral basis for demanding a 
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Ukrainian state, but justified its nonexistence, “because this people [the Ukrainians —TE] had 
lost their first battle for this state.”126 Kobers’kyi also argued that Dontsov’s tirades against 
determinism rang hollow, noting the sociological deterministic outlook of his own ideology: in 
ways analogous to Marxism’s prophecy of the inevitable demise of capitalism (in accordance 
with certain unbreakable laws of social development), “active nationalism” regarded the crisis of 
democracy and the appearance of dictatorships across Europe since World War I as a the onset of 
a new historical stage in which democracy is no longer tenable, no matter how much individuals 
and societies may desire it.127 Ultimately, the “elite” that a Dontsovian ideology would usher into 
power would degenerate into a corrupt, nepotistic clique.128 Kobers’kyi believed (rather too 
optimistically, as it turned out) that “active nationalism” would die a quick death in (Western) 
Ukraine owing to the lack of a social or cultural basis for fascist and “Russian nihilist” ideas to 
grow there.129   
 The Western Ukrainian Social Democrat Volodymyr Levyns’kyi (1880-1953) also 
accused Dontsov of being Russian at heart. As we saw in chapter 1, Levyns’kyi recalled meeting 
Dontsov’s older brother, Vladimir, in Switzerland during World War I, and being struck by the 
latter’s self-identification as a Russian and a Bolshevik, and his hostility toward everything 
Ukrainian. His recollections of the younger Dontsov, published in 1936 as Ideoloh ukrains’koho 
fashizmu: zamitky pro Dmytra Dontsova (The Ideologue of Ukrainian Fascism: Notes on the 
Dmytro Dontsov) offered more evidence of Dontsov’s foreignness on (Western) Ukrainian soil. 
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Levyns’kyi claims to have met Dontsov as a USDRP comrade shortly after he had emigrated 
from the Russian Empire to Austro-Hungarian L’viv. Dontsov was “an ‘orthodox’ Marxist” who 
possessed “only the weakest command of the Ukrainian language. His language was, properly 
speaking, a Muscovite-Ukrainian jargon.”130 “The influences of Russification,” Levyns’kyi 
continues, “had clearly left their mark on him. He made efforts to purge himself of them, but slid 
from one gutter pipe into another, for he fell under the strong influence of Poland,” which 
“subjected his language to a great desolation, from which he has not yet recovered to this day. 
Just read his Pidstavy nashoi polityky from 1922 and you will be perfectly convinced of this.”131 
Dontsov was unable to distinguish between Ukrainian and Polish because both were alien to him, 
and his grasp of the former was superficial and forced. Levnys’kyi states: “It appears that 
Dontsov is a Moskal’ by origin.” But, he hastens to add: “These moments [from Dontsov’s 
assimilation into Galician Ukrainian culture from a Russian background —TE], which I raise 
now, are not for me the basis from which I would make even the smallest reproach against 
Dmytro Dontsov. If, however, I bring them up, then it is only because Dontsov himself is an 
adherent of so-called racism and has more than once reproached his opponents or enemies for 
racial impurity of blood.”132 (This, Levyns’kyi reminds us, is precisely what happened between 
Dontsov and Lypyns’kyi.)  
 Levyns’kyi then surveys Dontsov’s prewar writings, highlighting his statements of 
principled, socialist-internationalist opposition to Ukrainian independence at the time. 
Levyns’kyi assesses the ideologue’s stretch as press minister in Pavlo Skoropads’kyi’s 
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government, in which he sat at the negotiating table with Bolsheviks, Whites, “Little Russians,” 
and other false patriots—“all working to make Ukraine a province in ‘a united and indivisible 
Russia’”—while Ukrainian socialists (such as Levyns’kyi) were fighting for it, against the 
Hetmanate and its various foreign masters.133 Dontsov’s innate hostility toward Ukrainian 
culture, also symptomatic of his Russian background, is reflected in his contempt for the vast 
majority of his Ukrainian contemporaries and immediate predecessors (Ukrainophiles), with the 
exception of his ridiculous reimagining of Shevchenko, Ukrainka, Mikhnovs’kyi, Olena Pchilka, 
and Panteleimon Kulish as protofascists. Levyns’kyi’s chief purpose in writing Ideoloh 
ukrains’koho fashizmu was to defend Mykhailo Drahomanov and his legacy from Dontsov’s 
constant diatribes. According to Levyns’kyi, Drahomanov was, for his era, a truly radical 
Ukrainian nationalist, which is more than can be said of Dontsov and his followers decades later, 
who owe everything to Drahomanov.134 Unlike Drahomanov, Dontsov hides “a reactionary, 
misanthropic face” behind a mask of false (because non-liberationist and antidemocratic) 
nationalism, “speculating on the national feelings of the popular masses.”135 Levyns’kyi takes 
Dontsov at his word when he calls himself a fascist, but challenges the compatibility of that 
stance with nationalism properly understood. According to Levnys’kyi, nationalism has been 
bound with democracy from its inception, citing the examples of Mazzini and Garibaldi during 
the unification of Italy. Stripping nationalism of democracy, as fascism does, leaves nothing but a 
hollow shell, the cynical exploitation of national culture in the name of a small elite (not the 
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nation).136 Dontsov popularizes a “cult of Mussolini, Hitler, and other fascist strongmen” in 
Galician society, corrupting naive students for his own personal gain. Given the “nonsense” of 
fascism for a stateless nation, his views can bring about only civil war to Ukrainian society. 
“Fortunately, Dontsov’s ‘voluntarism’ is only on paper.”137 Like Kobers’kyi, Levyns’kyi 
predicted a short life for the alien ideology: “The twilight of Dontsovism (Dontsovshchyna) will 
be complete when even the most naive of Dontsov’s pilgrims recover from all ‘voluntarisms’ and 
the other ‘imponderables’ of his idiocy.”138      
 Dontsov’s fiercest Hetmanite critic was Osyp Nazaruk (1883-1940), a conservative 
Catholic writer and political activist who took part in the Ukrainian Revolution as chief of the 
UNR’s press and propaganda division, then emigrated to the US, where he edited the Ukrainian-
language newspaper Ameryka in Philadelphia from 1926 to 1927. He read Dontsov’s 
Natsionalizm at that time initially liked it, even republishing excerpts from the work in 
Ameryka,139 but soon thereafter expressed a concern that this cult of the nation would “transform 
men into beasts.”140 Under Lypyns’kyi’s influence, Nazaruk turned decisively against “active 
nationalism.”141 Nazaruk returned to L’viv, where he edited the official organ of the Ukrainian 
Catholic Organization, Nova zoria (New Star), and became a leading ideologue of the 
                                                
136 Ibid., 24-28. 
 
137 Ibid., 29. 
 
138 Ibid., 37. 
 
139 Zaitsev, Ukrains’kyi Integral’nyi Natsionalizm, 379. 
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conservative Catholic political party, Ukrainian Popular Renewal (Ukrains’ka narodna obnova) 
(UNO), called the Ukrainian Catholic Popular Renewal (UKNO) after 1931.142  
 From this position, Nazaruk wrote a lengthy anti-Dontsov article for Nova zoria, which 
he republished as a brochure, Natsionalizm Donstova i inshi Myshugizmy (The Nationalism of 
Dontsov and Other Myshugizms), detailing the reasons why all Christian Ukrainians should 
abhor “active nationalism.”143 To begin, Nazaruk repeats Lypyns’kyi’s claim that Dontsov had 
plagiarized his work.144 Christian ethics, Nazaruk argues, were entirely incompatible with—
indeed, antithetical to—the sinister “science” of “creative violence” found in Natsionalizm.145 
The anti-Christian Dontsov is a provocateur who incites Ukrainian youth to commit terroristic 
acts of violence that send them to prison and the gallows, and are generally harmful to Ukraine 
and its prospects of achieving independence.146 Nazaruk describes Dontsov an easterner with a 
“nomadic mentality,” a “Moskal’ by birth” with all the worst but none of the better features of a 
Russian147: “Dontsov descended from the steppe vagabonds who invaded Ukraine, bringing 
everyone to ruin, to the praise of covert murderers, and so on.”148 As Zaitsev observes, Nazaruk 
is here guilty of the same xenophobia for which he reproaches Dontsov, attributing his pernicious 
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views and behavior to the evil traits of Russian ethnicity.149 In the course of the 1930s, both 
Nazaruk and Dontsov began to regard the Eurasian steppe, including Eastern Ukraine, as a 
chaotic mixture of Asiatic races formed under the Mongol Yoke.150 Nevertheless, Nazaruk’s 
subsequent correspondence with Skoropads’kyi suggests that the Hetmanite strategy of the years 
1937-38 accepted that members of “all local ‘nations’ that desire a Ukrainian state on the 
territory of the Ukrainian people” could join the “Ruling Stratum” of “classocratic 
monarchists.”151  
 Like Dontsov, Nazaruk drew upon the political wisdom and methods of the Bolsheviks, 
including the example of effective leadership and fanaticism found in Lenin and his close circle 
of conspirators.152 He did not have the same admiration for the OUN, which “spoils the 
atmosphere in Galicia,” and blamed Dontsov for its appearance. “His activity among the 
Ukrainian youth is extremely harmful,” Nazaruk writes, suggesting that Skoropads’kyi, “may be 
able to better understand a type such as Dontsov, simply because he was raised in a Russian 
(Rossiis’kii) atmosphere.”153 “Dontsov’s theory of the ‘luxury of knife and blood’ is a 
hodgepodge of old Ukrainian haidamatstvo154 with Russian pugachevshchyna”155 combined with  
                                                
149 Ibid. 
 
150 Ibid., 381. This is nearly the same view taken by the Russian Eurasianists, but as a point of Muscovite pride 
rather than shame. Dontsov embraced a racial conception of Ukraine in his 1941 work, Dukh nashoi davnyny, which 
was a decisive break with the subjective-voluntarist definition of the nation to which he adhered during the period 
under consideration here. See chapter 5. 
 
151 TsDIAL, f.  359. op. 1, spr. 8, ark 140. O. Nazaruk to P. Skoropads’kyi, December 4, 1937. 
 
152 TsDIAL, f.  359. op. 1, spr. 8, ark 75-88. O. Nazaruk to P. Skoropads’kyi, October 27, 1937. 
 
153 TsDIAL, f. 359, op. 1, spr. 8, ark. 165-68. O. Nazaruk to P. Skoropads’kyi, March 25, 1938. 
 
154 From the word “haidamak” (from Turkish, “hajdemak”—“to pursue”), meaning a participant in one of the 
spontaneous Cossack-peasant uprisings against the Polish state in the eighteenth century. The Haidamaks are the 
subject of some of Shevchenko’s most famous works and heroic figures in the Ukrainian national mythos, but they 
are also associated with anti-Semitic pogroms and senseless, chaotic violence in the Jewish and Polish historical 
memories. 
 
  293 
“the modern theories of anarchism in various shades,” and “Dostoevskyism (but with the faith in 
God that Dostoevsky had thrown out),” “Bakuninism,” “the ancient steppe wildness of every 
Black Hat,156 from Pugachev to the modern ruination, which grew on the propaganda of 
Marxism.”157 Nazaruk compares “active nationalism” to Bolshevism, describing it as another 
manifestation, albeit a farcical one, of modern Russian atheism, moral nihilism, and bloodthirsty 
eastern barbarism. Linking Dontsov’s “Muscovite” background to an alleged hostility toward 
Christian mores and institutions, Nazaruk accuses Dontsov and the OUN of attempting to create 
a pseudoreligion and to co-opt and subordinate the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church158 for their 
own ends.                                                                        
 Some of the most active opponents of Dontsov and the OUN were members of the 
Greek-Catholic Church, who publicly condemned the nationalists’ terrorist acts and insisted on 
the fundamental incompatibility of the universalist morality of nonviolence and international 
institutions of Catholicism. There were anticlerical currents in the OUN (as well as instances of 
overlap and cooperation between nationalist elements within the Church and the OUN).159 In the 
spring of 1933 young members of the organization targeted the Easter parade of a Catholic 
________________________ 
155 From Emel’ian Pugachev (1742-1775), pretender to the throne who led a failed Cossack insurrection against 
Catherine II. 
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group, “Ukrainian Youth for Christ” (Ukrains’ka Molod’ Khrystova), throwing stones at them.160 
The Galician Ukrainian press roundly condemned the violence, accusing the OUN of heretically 
deifying of the nation and engaging in immoral, unjustifiable methods of struggle.161 The OUN 
harassed other nonnationalist youth groups (such as the youth sports clubs Luh and Sokil), which 
it accused of being either pro-Polish or insufficiently anti-Polish. Metropolitan Andrei 
Sheptyts’kyi (1865-1944), the head of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church from 1927 to 1944, 
denounced the OUN’s killing of Ivan Babii, warning that nationalist hatred and violence would 
inevitably turn against Ukrainian society, most of which did not live or think in accord with the 
organization’s ultranationalism. “Because we have for years affirmed, and will affirm, and not 
cease to repeat that a crime [zlochyn] is always a crime, that a sacred cause can never be served 
with bloody hands. We will not cease to assert that [he] who demoralizes the youth is a criminal 
and an enemy of the people.”162  
 The Ukrainian Catholic movement and press amplified Sheptyts’kyi’s condemnation of 
the OUN and its Dontsovian ideology, dealing a major blow to the nationalist underground’s 
image in Galician society. The Ukrainian Catholic journal Dzvony (Bells), for example, claimed 
that Dontsov “disseminates an evil Nietzschean worldview under the guise of nationalism. No, 
his nationalism is not nationalism . . . True nationalism is the good of the nation, not its ruin, the 
raising of human dignity, not its degradation to bestiality. True nationalism is the compound of 
religious feelings with national ones, not setting them at odds, the raising of personal and social 
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morality to the highest level, and not amorality in all areas.”163 Nevertheless, Dontsov praised 
Andrei Sheptyts’kyi, alongside Cardinal Mercier (1851-1926) (known for his role in leading the 
Belgian resistance to Germany during World War I), as an ideal church activist.164 As of the late 
1920s, Dontsov believed that Sheptyts’kyi recognized the constructive role of “active 
nationalism,” albeit with considerable moral reservations: “The metropolitan was very outraged 
at me for the ‘predatory’ nationalism,” Dontsov wrote to Mariia Dontsova in 1927, “but 
confessed—to himself, as it were—the reasons why my propaganda, as an antidote to the 
leftwing current, is good and must take extreme forms.”165 Whatever the Dontsov’s impressions 
of Sheptyts’kyi’s inner dialogue were, the clergy and laity of the Church in Western Ukraine 
largely rejected Natsionalizm as a work of dangerous blasphemy and the OUN as a criminal, 
anti-Christian group engaged in the moral destruction of the young. As one recent study of the 
relationship between Ukrainian integral nationalists and the Greek-Catholic Church concluded: 
“We can affirm that the Catholic camp found Ukrainian integral nationalism deeply 
unacceptable, especially in its Dontsovian version, which proclaimed the superiority of action 
over thought and a particular morality that was incompatible with Christian ethics. The greatest 
alarm among representatives of the Church was caused by the tendency to transform nationalism 
into a secular religion that threatened to marginalize or engulf rational Christianity.”166  
 Then again, as far as Dontsov was concerned, the creation of a totalizing “secular 
religion” was Bolshevism’s greatest achievement, and something to which Ukrainian nationalists 
should also aspire: “Bolshevism is not only a religion, it is an organized religion, a communist 
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church, with martyrs, canons, its own books, cathedrals, synods, and an inquisition. . . . 
Dogmatism in faith and autocracy in discipline, these are the foundations of the religion of 
Bolshevism.”167 Throughout the interwar period, Dontsov interpreted Bolshevism as a savior of 
“eternal Russian principles,” the only possible form of Russian statehood, and the latest 
incarnation of Russian imperialism, messianism, and nationalism. Bolshevism, he was quite 
convinced, was doomed as an economic system, especially on Ukrainian soil. Nevertheless, 
Bolshevism served as one the chief models, alongside Italian Fascism, for the politics of a 
mythologically galvanized new Ukrainian man envisioned in Natsionalizm. The way that the 
Soviet system was cultivating the next generation especially impressed Dontsov. Youth and the 
cult thereof were at the heart of “active nationalism,” the theory and practice of the OUN, Italian 
Fascism, and Soviet Communism—all of which imagined themselves as the midwives of a 
revolutionary break with the old and decrepit, and the birth of a brighter, healthier, more 
juvenescent future. These radical Central and Eastern European ideologies were, Dontsov 
thought, inspired by the idea of lifting their respective nations up to the level of Great Britain or 
the US, which naturally got to where they were by embodying the racial and civilizational traits 
lauded in Natsionalizm. Thus, in his 1928 brochure, Iunatstvo i Plast’ (The Youth and Plast)—
written for the patriotic Ukrainian equivalent of the Boy Scouts, Plast, of which Dontsov was a 
member—he encouraged young Ukrainians to follow the example of the “Anglo-Saxon race”: 
“The potent ideas of this most healthy, most courageous, most brutal, yet also most noble, fully 
idealistic race of the Occident; the ideas upon which the civilizations of Europe and America 
were built can lead us from ruin.”168 “Look at the great European or, better yet, American city,” 
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Dontsov writes, and one will find the glorious result of a “cult of success and victory in mutual 
competition” that is totally foreign to the Orient. Americans, the descendants of brave colonists, 
hardened in the “war with the ‘red-skins’ [chervonoskirymy] and other white races,” epitomize 
the love of conquest, danger, struggle, industry, expansion, youthfulness, and victory at any cost. 
Young Ukrainians needed to emulate Americans:  
Because only the cult of personal initiative, instead of the cult of the mass; only the thirst to 
surpass others, instead of jealous equality; the cult of competition for competition's sake, 
instead of peace; the cult of irrefutable national dogmas, instead of debates and doubts; the 
cult of courage, instead of humanity; the cult of the will to perform the common of one’s 
conscience, instead of will-less dreaming; finally, only the cult of great ideas, instead of 
bondage to the temporal, and of a conquering idealism that stands above your 
compassion—will lead the nation from moral decline!169 
 
 However, it was not from the American, but from the Soviet example that Dontsov drew 
the most concrete lessons for the Ukrainian situation. He discussed the matter at length in the 
1933 article, “Sovits’ka molod i my” (Soviet Youth and Us), arguing that the generation rising 
under the tutelage of the Bolsheviks already possessed all the traits that he had called for in 
Natsionalizm: fanaticism, dogmatism, unwavering faith in collective myths and ideals, hardness, 
combativeness, and voluntarism.170 Dontsov considered Bolshevism to be a form of Russian 
chauvinism despite its claims to being the vanguard of the proletarian international, but it also 
exemplified a nationalism that was internationalist in the sense that it affected all of humanity, as 
the British Empire had done, driving the progress of world history through the strength of its 
ideas and expansionary will to power. Soviet youth were growing into “wolves,” so it was 
imperative that Ukrainian youth not grow into “sheep.”171 The antiliberalism, antidemocracy, and 
anti-intellectualism of Soviet education, society, culture, and politics were giving Communist 
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youth a decisive edge over their freer, more thoughtful, but soft and irresolute counterparts in 
Europe. Again, Dontsov found the theological character of the Bolshevik approach to molding 
young minds and bodies for “class” (actually imperialist) warfare most appealing. The Soviet 
mythos was simple, compelling, manichaean, and all-encompassing:  
First, there was the chaos of capitalism and exploitation before daybreak. Then Marx 
arrived—the forerunner of ‘Ilich’ [i.e. Lenin —TE], and behind him the ‘liberator’ himself. 
Thanks to the sacred god-carrying, all-Russian proletariat, the capitalist ‘gates of hell’ were 
forced open and chaos reigned. The new ‘sermon from the mount’ gave the world a new 
law—the law of the “five-year,”172 the law of the all-liberating machine. To teach all 
peoples this law is the duty of the red ‘apostles’: ‘Go ye therefore and study all languages.’ 
Until the arrival of the second Messiah, the world revolution, when Moscow will appear 
before the entire world.173         
 
Ukrainians, and Europeans in general, needed an equal but opposite political religion to triumph 
over Russian Communism, which, if victorious, would assuredly bring about the ruin of Western 
civilization and its myriad achievements.        
 Dontsov’s appreciation for the enemy, Russia—or Bolshevism, the two being essentially 
identical to his mind after 1917—led him to count it as one of the great “world-historical” 
nations in the Hegelian sense. That is, Russia was an agent in the rising self-consciousness of the 
freedom of absolute spirit (or God) via the tragedy and suffering of humanity through time 
(historical theodicy). Dontsov highlighted Russia’s prodigious creation of internationalist 
doctrines, such as Orthodox Christianity, Slavophilia (Pan-Slavism), Leninism, and so on, all of 
which promised universal salvation in one form or another.174 In the late 1920s, Dontsov 
expressed his admiration for the Messianism in Russian literature, even though he rejected its 
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content as a plebeian “philosophy of the envious unlucky” and a cult of “quantity against 
quality.”175 Critics then and since have argued that Dontsov imported more of “Russian” culture 
and thought into Ukrainian culture, through LNV and the Vistnykivtsi, than anyone else during the 
interwar period.176  
 This accusation baffled and infuriated Malaniuk, who defended Dontsov, “the most 
determined publicist of Ukraine’s present,” from a “united front” of detractors form “all parties, 
all groups, and all organs of the press. Most surprising about this ‘united front’ is its unnatural 
method of linking—in confusion, it would seem—Dr. Dontsov to the whole of Russia, the 
former (the empire) and well the modern (the USSR).”177 Malaniuk maintained that the 
Ukrainian socialists’ and conservatives’ accusation that Dontsov was either “Russian” or “pro-
Russian” were baseless. There was no proof that Dontsov’s “Occidentalism, Western European 
voluntarism, sermons of hierarchy, of quality of character, of moral value, of talent and 
personality, sermons of anti-Russian cultural hygiene,” all of which appalled his more moderate 
countrymen, were, “entirely to the contrary, the spirit of Asiatic mass devastation and revolt.”178 
Malaniuk denied that Dontsov, whom he regarded as having had a singularly positive, 
conservative, pro-Western influence on Galician youth, was somehow “Oriental” and moved by 
the “spirit of the haidamaks.” One could hardly disagree with Malaniuk that Russophobia and 
anti-Communism were two of the central pillars of “active nationalism,” but the fact remains that 
he found a great deal in Russian culture and Soviet reality to be edifying.  
                                                
175 Dmytro Dontsov, Rosiia chy Ievropa? (London: Soiuz ukrainstiv u V. Britanii, 1955), 22-23. This was first 
published as an article in LNV in 1929. 
 
176 Ihor Kachurovs’kyi maintains that the Vistnykivtsi stood at the point where Ukrainian poetry was most strongly 
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 Shlikhta attributes Dontsov’s praise for and desire to mimic aspects of Russia to his 
“inconsistency, even in the most important elements of his conception,”179 but his residual 
affinity for the Russian world, despite his avowed hatred for it, was also critical. His struggle 
against Soviet Russia kept bringing him back to the Russian “idea” and the reasons for its 
tenacious stranglehold on Ukrainian cultural and political life. Dontsov studied Moscow’s 
strengths as closely as its weaknesses, incorporating them into his strategy for a national spiritual 
revolution. As cultural critic Anatol’ Kamins’kyi argues, Dontsov’s ideology thus suffered from a 
“paradoxical weakness”—it was fiercely anti-Russian, yet carried “Russian” habits of thought—
nihilism, intolerance, authoritarianism, exclusivity, etc.—onto (Galician) Ukrainian ground.180 
Thus, when Dontsov advocated the use of “Bolshevik methods against Bolshevism,” he had in 
mind much more than conspiratorial undergrounds, armed insurrections, and secret police. The 
aggressiveness, ruthlessness, esprit de corps, and general psychology of Bolshevism, its power to 
create its own traditions and future, to remake countries and generations in its own image, were 
even more commendable traits. Russian despotism and Messianism suddenly became something 
that Ukrainians would have to replicate in order to defeat; that this would represent a triumph for 
Russian despotism over European freedom, even if the Soviet Union were smashed to pieces in 
the process, seems not to have troubled Dontsov.    
 
National Communism, “Active Nationalism,” and the “Executed Renaissance”                 
 Setting aside the acrimonious rhetoric, a muted kinship, potentially embarrassing to both 
sides, existed between Dontsov and parts of the Russian-Soviet world. He was as indebted to the 
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Russian Right as to its Left, though he did not make an essential distinction between the two. 
When it came to understanding the October Revolution and the state to which it gave rise, for 
example, he relied on Fyodor Dostoevsky’s fictional account of Russian nihilism in Demons, 
calling the Russian novelist “Lenin’s predecessor.” Dostoevsky knew and hated the Bolshevik 
leader before he was even born when he wrote “of the vile slave, of the stinking, depraved 
lackey, who’ll be the first to clamber up the staircase, a pair of scissors in hand, to slash the 
divine countenance of the great ideal in the name of equality, envy, and digestion.”181 This 
description, thought Dontsov, summed up Leninism perfectly, whereas European social 
categories were quite useless for understanding Soviet reality. Bolshevism had little to do with 
Marxism as it was understood in the West, relying upon a benighted peasantry (not the Russian 
proletariat) to build a state that was “socialist” in name only—an empty plagiarism. The essence 
of Bolshevism, rather, is “a will to simplification [uproshchennia], a metaphysical will to 
savagery,” thought Dontsov, quoting Dmitrii Merezhkovsky.182 However much Dontsov 
disapproved of Russian Communism’s ressentiment-driven “leveling” of humanity, he relied 
upon the authority of Russian thinkers whom he obviously respected to explain it, and applauded 
Lenin’s singular role in making it work in practice despite the lack of a constructive program or 
an ideal higher than “buckwheat porridge.” For Dontsov, Lenin was a political genius who 
recognized the necessity of giving the masses a clear and simple goal.183   
                                                
181 Quoted in Dmytro Dontsov, “V. Lenin,” LNV, no. 3-4 (1924): 322-33, 322. Translation taken from Fyodor 
Dostoevsky, Devils, trans. Michael R. Katz (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 361. 
 
182 Dmytro Dontsov, “V. Lenin,” LNV 82, no. 3 (1924): 322-33, 323. 
 
183 Speaking of leveling and simplification, one of the chief consequences of Dontsov’s critique of Russia, according 
to Lysiak-Rudnyts’kyi, was the neglect of the Russian problematic as such among Western Ukrainian nationalists, 
their misunderstanding of Russian Soviet reality, and the lowering intellectual level of their discourse. Lysiak-
Rudnyts’kyi, Istorichni esei, vol. 2, 325. Others have accused Dontsov of actually popularizing Bolshevism among 
non-Soviet Ukrainians through his sometimes appreciative critiques of it, whatever his real intentions were. 
According to one account, this earned Dontsov the distinction of being one of the first Ukrainian theorists of 
totalitarianism. Chuhuienko, Formuvannia ta rozvytok ideolohii Dmytra Dontsova, 146. 
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 The Soviet press saw the good in Dontsov too, like the begrudging acknowledgment of 
an estranged relative’s redeeming qualities, despite bygone quarrels. In the early 1920s, Soviet 
journalists and scholars had denounced the LNV and its editor as “fascist,” but they began 
reevaluating Dontsov’s ideas in the mid to late 1920s. Unlike Italian Fascism, the ideology of a 
reactionary, imperialist state, “active nationalism” had progressive potential because it sought to 
direct the “spontaneous brutality” of the oppressed and stateless Ukrainian minority against 
“fascist” Poland, whose own anti-Ukrainian assimilationist policies had created the nationalist 
underground.184  
 To understand this variance of opinion it is necessary to step back and examine the 
trajectory of Soviet policy concerning the Ukrainian question in the 1920s. In addition to 
disarming Ukrainian nationalism by appeasing its core demands of cultural autonomy, 
nationalized education, and government by Ukrainian co-ethnics, one of the original intentions of 
Soviet Ukrainization was to project an image of life in Soviet Ukraine that would appeal to 
Ukrainians living abroad, especially within the borders of Poland, the early Soviet state’s prime 
foreign enemy. The Soviet leadership and press projected the UkrSSR as a Ukrainian 
“Piedmont”—the ideal basis for a unified nation-state. In the expanded UkrSSR, all “toiling” 
Ukrainians would be empowered to work toward the cultural and economic progress of their 
nation as a free and equal member of the Soviet “friendship of peoples,” a socialist 
internationalist federation of autonomous, yet cooperative, national republics, which would in the 
course of time draw closer together to form a new “Soviet people.” As far as Dontsov and 
similar-minded critics were concerned, if a unified “Soviet people” is created then its unifying 
________________________ 
 
184 The irony, of course, is that Dontsov was not anti-Polish. Gregorz Motyka, Ukraińska partyzantka, 1942-1960: 
Dyiałność Organizacji Ukraińskich Nacjonalistów i Ukraińskiej Powstańcyej Armii (Warsaw: Instytut Studiów 
Politycznzch Pan. Oficyna Wydawnicza Rytm, 2006), 73. 
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characteristic will be Russian hegemony, resulting in the cultural death of non-Russian peoples, 
not a “friendship” between them and the Russia.  
 There were, however, alternative visions for the future of the nationalities of the Soviet 
Union within the Communist Party. An oppositional current of Ukrainian “national communism” 
appeared during the Ukrainian Revolution and took part in the formation of the Soviet Union and 
the development of Soviet Ukraine.185 One such national-communist group broke ranks with the 
Bolsheviks in 1919, calling for a fully independent Soviet Ukraine, and founded the Ukrainian 
Communist Party (UKP) in January 1920. The UKP alleged that the economic exploitation of 
Ukraine by Russia, a holdover from the colonial policies of the tsarist era, had continued into the 
Soviet system, which was centralized around the Russian heartland, focused on industrialization 
and urbanization, and thus reliant upon the heavy extraction of resources from agricultural 
regions such as Ukraine. Annoyed with the UKP’s criticism, which struck at the heart of the 
Leninist claim that national conflicts and the other legacies of imperialism would be quickly 
resolved without further measures by the workers’-peasants’ revolution, the Soviet regime 
nevertheless tolerated the party as a legal, but powerless, opposition. The Communist 
International (or Comintern) forced the UKP to dissolve in 1925, but allowed its members to join 
the Communist Party (Bolshevik) of Ukraine (KP[B]U) and assume leading roles in 
Ukrainization. (Most former UKP members were later executed in the purges of the 1930s.)  
 Another Ukrainian national-communist formation, the “Borotbists,”186 a left faction of 
the Ukrainian Party of Socialist Revolutionaries (UPSR) that allied itself with the Bolsheviks 
after the Red Guards’ invasion of Ukraine in 1919, also insisted upon Ukrainian independence, 
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as well as separate representation (by themselves) in the Comintern. Lenin compromised with the 
Borotbists, who enjoyed more support among the Ukrainian peasantry, promising that Ukraine 
would have a separate, national republic in the Soviet Union on the condition that the Borotbists 
voluntarily merge with the KP(B)U, which they did in March 1920. One former Borotbist leader, 
Oleksandr Shums’kyi (1890-1946), was elected to the Central Committee of the KP(B)U and 
rose to become Commissar of Education of the UkrSSR from September 1924 to February 1927. 
From this post, Shums’kyi spearheaded Ukrainization, urging Stalin to accelerate the program 
and replace First Secretary of the KP(B)U Lazar Kaganovich (1893-1991) with an ethnic 
Ukrainian. Under Shums’kyi’s leadership, Ukrainization gave rise to a tremendous outpouring of 
literary, artistic, and scholarly productivity in Soviet Ukraine known as the Cultural Renaissance, 
which sought to reorient Ukrainian cultural toward Europe and remove all Russian 
intermediaries.187 In the recollections of political leader Mykola Kovalevs’kyi (1892-1957), the 
same idea had electrified the Ukrainian intelligentsia before World War I, when Dontsov had 
expressed it.188 Now, it seemed, they had been given an opportunity to Occidentalize Ukrainian 
art and literature under Soviet conditions. The UkrSSR’s self-promotion in southeastern Poland 
enjoyed considerable success in the mid 1920s, prompting numerous prominent émigré leaders 
of the Ukrainian Revolution to return to Kyiv, Kharkiv, and other Soviet Ukrainian cities to 
                                                
187 The other key activists of the Cultural Renaissance included: the Marxist historian Matvii Iavors’kyi (1885-
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participate in Ukrainization.189 Even Dontsov admitted that the Cultural Renaissance had 
produced some literature of great merit, although he consistently denied that high Ukrainian 
culture could grow and thrive under the circumstances of the Bolshevik occupation, and that the 
Bolshevik occupation would survive in Ukraine.  
 Of all the writers of the Cultural Renaissance, Dontsov was most impressed with Mykola 
Khvyl’ovyi (1893-1933), whose aesthetic and political convictions, despite being couched in the 
language of Soviet Communism, overlapped with his own in important ways. Hailing from the 
eastern Ukrainian city of Kharkiv, Khvyl’ovyi participated in the resistance to the Hetmanate in 
1918 and joined the KP(B)U the following year. In 1921 he published his first works of poetry, V 
elektrychnyi vik (In the Electrical Age) and Molodist’ (Youth), and signed the manifesto of the 
Ukrainian Proletarian Artists, “Our Universal.” Fiery, militant, iconoclastic, and futurist, the 
manifesto nevertheless promised to cherish and enrich the Ukrainian language, preserving the 
ancient heritage and traditions of the Ukrainian peasantry. Khvyl’ovyi’s first collections of short 
stories, Syni etiudy (Blue Etudes) and Osin’  (Autumn) appeared in 1923 and 1924, winning the 
acclaim of critics, including the émigrés Malaniuk and Dontsov, who wrote about the literary 
scene in Soviet Ukraine:  
There are such poets there, or writers with talent, such as Khvyl’ovyi or the already 
deceased Mykhailychenko,190 but the whole! The whole searches for noisy forms. . . . With 
regard to content, the burden of the sentimental worldview of the apostles of ‘beauty’ 
weighs on the ‘new,’ as they would call themselves, poets of the future (or Communists). 
They will not succeed in cultivating a dynamism of creative power for the sake of 
borrowed Russian Communist motives, and they cannot strengthen it with the nation’s 
                                                
189 The three most prominent Ukrainian emigre Sovietophiles, each disillusioned in his own way, were 
Hrushevs’kyi, Vynnychenko, and Petrushevych. See Christopher Gilley, The “Change of Signposts” in the 
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natural forces. Lacking originality in their creative work, they slavishly ape the Muscovite 
and cannot distinguish the idea of revolution from the Muscovite revolution.191  
 
Dontsov praised the “dynamism” and “originality” of Khvyl’ovyi’s prose, which used the 
techniques of impressionism and expressionism, and represented an ethics of fanatical, 
unscrupulous devotion to abstract ideals.192 The latter wrote experimental satires and 
psychodramas depicting infatuation, then disillusionment, with a revolution snuffed out by 
insipid bureaucrats and boorish, colonial-minded philistines. Dontsov already detected a tragic 
desire to escape westward in these stories, implying that it would destroy the author: “And 
Khvyl’ovyi too, strangled by the Muscovite scorpion, will cry out, like a groan before death: 
‘Memories glimmer . . . of what? —Of the steppe! The steppe! Away from you, steppe, I go!’”193 
“Such notes,” Dontsov observes, “are not to be heard in Russian revolutionary poetry; there was 
no breech between thought and feeling in the Moskals, who extolled their own and not, as our 
freshly baked communists did, a foreign revolution.”194  
 Aware of the “split personality,” as Dontsov called it, that Soviet Ukrainians suffered 
from thanks to this contradiction, Khvyl’ovyi published a series of highly controversial 
pamphlets in the years 1925-28,195 sparking the so-called Literary Discussion—a republic-wide 
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192 For instance, the protagonist of his semiautobiographical 1924 novellas, Ia (I), is a Cheka officer who orders the 
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195 Myroslav Shkandrij has translated these pamphlets into English. They were published in three series: Kamo 
hriadeshy? (Whither goest thou?) (1925), Dumky proty techii (Thoughts against the Current) (1925), and Apolohety 
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Ukrainization and the Cultural Renaissance, was cut short by Stalin’s condemnation of “Khvyl’ovyism” and 
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Studies, University of Alberta, 1986). 
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debate about the ideal orientation of Soviet Ukrainian writers. Should Soviet Ukrainian literature 
look to Russia or to Western Europe for inspiration, tutelage, and a way out of its perceived 
crisis? Khvyl’ovyi’s answer was unequivocal:“Het’ vid Moskvy!” (Away from Moscow!). 
Dubbing Moscow “the center of all-Union Philistinism,” Khvyl’ovyi argued that Ukrainians 
should instead find their own path, taking their lessons in civilization directly “from the 
source”—Western Europe—without Russian interference.196 Even more sensationally, 
Khvyl’ovyi attributed the painfully slow progress of Ukrainization to the resistance of the 
CP(B)U, whose predominantly Russian or Russified membership, still under the spell of 
prerevolutionary chauvinism, despised Ukrainian language and culture.  
 A close analysis of Khvyl’ovyi’s brilliant, challenging pamphlets is beyond the scope of 
this study, but following Myroslav Shkandrij (Khvyl’ovyi’s translator), I will summarize them in 
terms of four central symbols.197 The first is “Europe,” which Khvyl’ovyi defines as “the 
experience of many ages. Not the Europe that Spengler announced was ‘in decline,’ not the one 
that is rotting and that we despise. It is the Europe of a grandiose civilization, the Europe of 
Goethe, Darwin, Byron, Newton, Marx and so on and so forth.”198 “We conceive of Europe,” he 
continues, “also as a psychological category that thrusts humanity forward, out of prosvita and 
________________________ 
 
196 “This is absolute and unconditional. Our political union must not be confused with literature. Ukrainian poetry 
must flee as quickly as possible from Russian literature and its styles. . . . The point is that Russian literature has 
weighed us down for centuries as master of the situation, as one who has conditioned our psyche to play the slavish 
imitator. And so, to nourish our young art on it would be to impede its development. The proletariat’s ideas did not 
reach us through Muscovite art; on the contrary, we, as representatives of a young nation, can better apprehend these 
ideas, better cast them in the appropriate images. Our orientation it to Western European art, its style, its 
techniques.” Khvylovyi, Cultural Renaissance, 222-23. Shkandrij’s translation. First published as Mykola 
Khvyl’ovyi, “Apolohety pysaryzmu,” Kul’tura i pobut 13 (March 28, 1926). 
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onto the great highway of progress.”199 “Prosvita”—the Ukrainian word for enlightenment and 
the name of the popular education societies that operated in the villages of late nineteenth-
century Ukraine—is Khvy’lovyi’s second symbol. It represents the provincialism and 
backwardness weighing down the nation’s culture. It is the ethnography-obsessed populism of 
the Ukrainophile intelligentsia, and the literature of simple-hearted odes to the idiocy of rural life 
so common in pre- and postrevolutionary Ukrainian poetry. Prosvita may entertain and uplift the 
benighted masses, but what Ukraine truly needs is an elite literature capable of satisfying the 
rising intelligentsia of nationally conscious Ukrainians then pouring into the still-Russified cities 
of the UkrSSR. Khvyl’ovyi’s third trope is the “Asiatic Renaissance”—a utopia in which the 
October Revolution would bring about a cultural revival of all the peoples of the East, including 
Ukraine, by drawing upon the great traditions of European antiquity and embracing a “Romantic 
vitalism.” As a country on the frontier with the West, then in the midst of throwing off centuries 
of oppression, (Soviet) Ukraine would serve a Messianic, double-vanguard function: projecting 
the Asiatic Renaissance into Europe and the European Renaissance into Asia. Khvyl’ovyi’s 
fourth symbol, “art,” was his creative ideal. It would display “Romantic vitalism,” plumb the 
depths of human irrationality and conflict, provoke strong revolutionary emotions and instincts 
in the masses, but also engage the most sophisticated intellects and aesthetes.200  
 Khvyl’ovyi’s utopian vision of an anti-imperial yet antiprovincial national cultural 
revolution; his Europhilia and Moscophobia; the tension between traditionalism and iconoclasm 
in his thinking; his idealism, elitism, romanticism, and moral nihilism; his voluntaristic critique 
of economic determinism (heretical for a member of the Communist Party); his focus on the 
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creative power of youthful rebellion and violence; the content, tone, and lexicon of his 
pamphlets: all of this betrayed the influence of Dontsov’s writings, which were available in 
Kharkiv and Kyiv at the time, and which Khvyl’ovyi read “diligently and gladly.”201  
 Dontsov saw a kindred spirit in Khvyl’ovyi, commending him for his courage in the face 
of Bolshevik oppression, as well as his literary and ideological virtues on the pages of LNV. 
Diagnosing the young Soviet writer’s restless discontent as a symptom of colonial schizophrenia 
or “pseudomorphism,”202 Dontsov compared him to Nikolai Gogol (Mykola Hohol’): “The 
specter of insanity will visit [Khvyl’ovyi] just as it did [Gogol]. Both were tormented by 
corrosive doubts, seeking in vain for a synthesis of their feelings with the science of the East, 
pouring out their grief in satire. Both yearned for the virtues of the Middle Ages. Both wrote 
about their divided ‘I.’”203 Dontsov believed that something momentous was happening in Soviet 
Ukraine beneath the surface: “Our eyes are turned toward the East. Unfortunately, however, our 
press pays attention only to official expressions of life there. . . . This is a great pity! For what is 
hidden on that shore [i.e., on the Soviet one] is a hundred times more interesting than any 
Ukrainization. We are witnessing a major change in Ukrainian consciousness, a profound 
change, pregnant with incalculable consequences.”204 In December 1925, Dontsov expressed the 
hope that Khvyl’ovyi might finally be the one “to kill the enlightenment [prosvitianshchynu] in 
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our heads from one side, and the ideology of eastern Messianism from the other,” replacing both 
with “a yellow-blue ideology of force, fanaticism, and cruelty (zhorstokosty).”205  
 Observing the Literary Discussion from abroad, Dontsov returned to the subject of 
Khvyl’ovyi in April 1926, this time comparing him to the Russian philosopher Petr Chaadaev 
(1794-1856), and wondering if he will soon pen his own Apologie d’un Fou (Apology of a 
Madman), after the Muscovites inevitably decide to destroy him.206 Dontsov was less impressed 
with Khvyl’ovyi’s “Asiatic Renaissance,” rejecting it as a “chimera” and bristling at the 
inclusion of Ukraine within “Asia.” Dontsov denied that such a renaissance could occur under 
the Bolshevik regimes: “For a renaissance the free competition of talents is needed, but where is 
this allowed by the official ideology?!”207 Still, Dontsov was delighted by the effect that his 
“active nationalist” ideology had had on Soviet Ukrainian literature and politics via Khvyl’ovyi. 
“They begin to speak, not only among eastern Ukrainian emigres, but also (I emphasize with 
pleasure) in the home country, about ‘psychological Europe,’” and about “the need to construct 
within oneself this spirit of Occidental civilization natural to us.”208 As of early 1926, Dontsov’s 
and Khvyl’ovyi’s vision of a de-Russified, (re)Europeanized, and genuinely independent 
Ukrainian culture seemed to be gaining ground, even in the Soviet Union.  
 But then Stalin personally intervened in the Literary Discussion, rebuking Khvyl’ovyi 
and his chief patron, Shums’kyi, for what he perceived as their dangerously nationalistic, non-
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Leninist deviations in a letter to Kaganovich on April 26, 1926.209 Shortly thereafter, Khvyl’ovyi 
and Shums’kyi found themselves under a general attack by forces within the Soviet press and 
Communist Party that sought to decelerate or even reverse Ukrainization. Initially, Shums’kyi 
defended the young writer, blaming the implementation of the languid progress of Ukrainization: 
“I am deeply convinced that Khvyl’ovyi wants to build Socialism,” Shums’kyi assured the 
Central Committee of the KP(B)U: “But I also know that Khvyl’ovyi has not been given any 
clear, defined perspective by the party as to the development of Ukrainian culture and literature. 
He is choking in the provincial backwardness of Ukraine. He cannot see those broad vistas for 
the young, boisterous culture process and is attempting to chart them.”210  
 In an attempt to salvage his name, Shums’kyi publicly turned against Khvyl’ovyi in 
February 1927, forswearing the latter’s ideas in the KP(B)U journal, Bil’shovyk Ukrainy 
(Bolshevik of Ukraine). He alleged that Khvyl’ovyi had committed the “heresy” of “zoological 
nationalism” and joined the bourgeois Ukrainian chauvinist camp, citing as proof the “fascist” 
Dontsov’s acclaim for Khvyl’ovyi in LNV.211 Shums’kyi argued that NEP and the return of 
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Ukraine the extreme views of Khvyl’ovyi within the Communist ranks must be combated; Comrade Shums’kyi does 
not understand that only by combating such extremist views is it possible to transform the rising Ukrainian culture 
and Ukrainian social life into a Soviet culture and Soviet social life.” Quoted in Shkandrij, “Introduction,” 
Khvylovyi, Cultural Renaissance, 11-12. 
 
210 Quoted in Shkandrij, “Introduction,” Khvylovyi, Cultural Renaissance, 15. 
 
211 Shums’kyi also denounced the Zerov and the Neoclassicists as non-Marxist “internal émigrés,” and 
Hrushevs’kyi, whose work suggested parallels and continuities between imperial Russia and the Soviet Union. O. 
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Ukrainian emigres were to blame for the resurgence of local nationalism in Soviet Ukraine. 
Ultimately, however, this repudiation of Khvyl’ovyi did little to redeem Shums’kyi in the eyes of 
the Party. Their opponents invoked Stalin’s fear that Ukrainization was being forced upon 
Russian workers and alienating them from the Party, while emboldening Ukrainian “bourgeois 
nationalists” and weakening the Soviet state’s grip on the country. Although the slogan “Away 
from Moscow!” referred only to literature, its political implications were clearly subversive in a 
Marxist regime that regarded structure and superstructure as inexorably bound together, and 
subordinated art to the objectives of the state as determined by the Party; if Ukrainian culture 
moved away from Moscow, then its politics would have to follow suit, despite Khvyl’ovyi’s 
insistent that the two not be confused.  
 Khvyl’ovyi faced repeated accusations of being under Dontsov’s influence, which were 
not entirely unfounded given the similarities between their positions and the former’s previous 
expressions of agreement with the editor of LNV in his published works.212 Under attack, 
Khvyl’ovyi defended himself from Communist opponents, such as Serhii Pylypenko (1891-
1943), leader of the union of Ukrainian peasant writers Pluh (Plough), and advocate of 
“massism”—the idea that a new literature should come from the people themselves, even if this 
meant lowering aesthetic standards. He also distanced himself from and polemicized with 
Dontsov, especially in his series of pamphlets Apolohety pysarymzu. Do problem kul’turnoi 
revoliutsii (The Apologists of Scribbling: On the Problem of Cultural Revolution), which 
________________________ 
Oleksandr Shums’kyi, “Ideolohichna borot’ba v ukrains’komu kul’turnomy protsesi,” Bil’shovyk Ukrainy, no. 2 
(February 1927), 13. Quoted in Mace, Communism and the Dilemmas, 110. 
 
212 He repeatedly invoked the LNV editor with approval: “‘Literature is the looking glass in which trembles the 
rhythm of the national soul,’ says Dontsov and with complete justification.” “Here we agree with Mr. Dontsov: we 
will not hand the country over to petty-bourgeois fools and egoists.” “We are witnessing a serious moment—the 
meant at which, to use Mr. Dontsov’s words, ‘the October psyche is beginning to break down,’ when, also in his 
words, ‘a demobilization of the revolutionary spirit is commencing along the entire front.’” Khvylovyi, Cultural 
Renaissance, 173, 197, 205. Khvyl’ovyi quotes from Dontsov, “Ukrains’ko-soviets’ki psevdomorfozy.” 
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appeared between February and March 1926. He went so far as to threaten Dontsov with a 
violent death, but could not restrain himself from adding that “the most intelligent and consistent 
of the Ukrainian fascists,”213 was still a worthy foe: “When it becomes necessary and the 
possibilities are there, rest assured we will dispatch not only Mr. Dontsov to ‘Dukhonin’s 
General Staff’; but we will also know how to respect intelligent foes.”214  
 Khvyl’ovyi then went further and began to hail Moscow and Russian culture, joining in 
the attacks on his erstwhile supporters in the Literary Discussion, such as the O. Vlyz’ko 
(arrested and shot along with twenty-seven other Ukrainian poets in 1934), rebuking the latter for 
his praise of Hetman Mazepa and degradation of Peter I. During these years, Shevel’ov notes, 
Khvyl’ovyi found a bevy of sins against the state and Marxism-Leninism in the writings of the 
new generation that once admired him: “anti-Russianism, Trotskyism, nationalism, pro-
americanism, . . . provincialism, i.e. kulakism [kurkul’stvo],215 idealism, ‘kulak propaganda,’ the 
bourgeois idealism of Spengler, Dontsov, ‘and other ideologues of fascism,’ following in the 
footsteps of Dontsov, Petliura, and Iefremov216 and the ideology of ‘winded Ukrainization’.”217  
 But the public volte-face and mea culpas did not save Khvyl’ovyi, who was forced to 
publicly renounce his “errors” in December 1926, and leave the ranks of VAPLITE (an acronym 
of Vil’na akademiia proletars’koi literatury [Free Academy of Proletarian Literature])—the 
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214 The reference is to General Dukhonin, the last commander of the Imperial Russian Army. Bolshevik soldiers 
bayoneted Dukhonin to death and used his corpse for target practice. Khvyl’ovyi insinuates that Dontsov and his ilk 
will meet a similar fate. Khvylovyi, Cultural Renaissance, 174. 
 
215 From kurkul’, the Ukrainian word for “kulak” (Russian for fist), originally meaning a wealthy peasant, but 
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216 Serhii Iefremov (1876-1939), Ukrainian populist literary critic, historian, and political activist, former UPSF 
member, and member of the Central Rada. 
 
217 Khvyl’ovyi, Tvory, vol. 4, 40. Quoted in Roman Rakhmannyi, Dmytro Dontsov i Mykola Khvyl’ovyi (London: 
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Kharkiv-based writers’ group to which he belonged—the following month. Ultimately, this did 
not save VAPLITE either as the tide turned against Ukrainization. Shums’kyi, too, was accused 
of nationalism and dismissed from his post in February 1927, replaced as commissar of 
education of the UkrSSR by the more moderate, yet committed, Ukrainizer, Mykola Skrypnyk 
(1872-1933). After a stint in Berlin and Vienna, Khvyl’ovyi chose not to remain an emigre and 
returned to Kharkiv in 1928 to write works that he hoped would appease the Party, restore his 
reputation, and allow him once again to contribute to the cultural development of Soviet Ukraine. 
Success eluded him, however, and his new publications flopped. Reflecting on this turn of events 
“on the other side of the border,” Dontsov wrote that “the whole of Soviet literature in Ukraine is 
the best proof that creative literature can grow only from one’s own sensual and spiritual 
grounds; that cleft souls will not create a new literature.”218 Ostracized from the existing writers’ 
unions, Khvyl’ovyi founded two short-lived groups of his own, but found himself isolated and 
powerless to resist the harsh turn in Soviet governance of Ukraine of the late 1920s and early 
1930s.  
                                                
218 Dmytro Dontsov, “Nevil’nyky doktryny (Kharakterystyka chil’nykh pys’mennykiv Radians’koi Ukrainy),” LNV 
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Figures 4.2-3: Mykola Khvyl’ovyi and Oleksandr Shums’kyi. Source: Internet Encyclopedia of 
Ukraine 
 
 With “Shums’kyism” and “Khvyl’ovism” now officially censured as Dontsov- or 
Petliura-inspired “national deviations,” the Soviet state began a piecemeal abandonment of 
Ukrainization in the UkrSSR, in accordance with the logic of centralizing power in Moscow, 
dismantling the political and cultural autonomy of the UkrSSR, and preventing a revival of anti-
Bolshevik Ukrainian nationalism. In 1930, the show trial of the “Union for the Liberation for 
Ukraine” (SVU) (Spilka vyzvolennia Ukrainy)—a fictitious organization not to be confused with 
the SVU that Dontsov briefly led in 1914 and had ceased to exist by the end of the First World 
War—inaugurated a campaign of repression against the Ukrainian intelligentsia. Soviet 
prosecutors alleged that the SVU had “united the anti-Soviet intelligentsia, the former 
participants in the Petliurist movement, activists in the autocephalous church,219 and 
representatives of the kulaks,” all under the leadership of Serhii Iefremov, and had conspired to 
                                                
219 The Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church was founded through a declaration of independence from the 
Russian Orthodox Church and the Moscow Patriarchate in 1921. 
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incite a major anti-Soviet nationalist uprising in Ukraine.220 The Party leadership (Stalin, 
Molotov, and Kaganovich) and the Soviet Ukrainian secret police—the GPU (Gosudarstvennoe 
politicheskoe upravlenia)221—proceeded to arrest, exile, or execute as many as 30,000 
individuals in connection with the show trial, targeting educators, writers, members of the 
Autocephalous Church, and former employees of the UNR. While the Party continued to issue 
statements in favor of Ukrainization for several more years, the SVU affair terrorized the people 
most needed to implement it and continued the policy’s practical dismantlement, which had 
begun with the pillory of Khvyl’ovyi, Shums’kyi, and their supporters. Stalin followed the show 
trial closely, personally intervening with a directive at one point, and began to speak often of the 
dangers of “local nationalism” in Ukraine, while praising the “great” Russian nationality.222 
These were the beginnings of a Stalinist fusion of Russian nationalism with Marxism-Leninism 
that deepened in the 1930s. Dontsov had long argued that Bolshevism is an inherently Russian 
nationalist, imperialist ideology, which hid behind internationalist words but would never permit 
the flowering of Ukrainian culture, let alone political independence; these events seemed to 
substantiate his stance.        
 In the following decade, Dontsov’s warnings that the Soviet regime would initiate the 
physical, and not just cultural, destruction of the Ukrainian intelligentsia and peasantry were 
tragically validated. Stalin’s first Five Year-Plan (1928-1932) ended the NEP and commenced the 
collectivization of agriculture throughout the USSR. The stakes of collectivization were highest 
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in the Soviet Union’s black-earth breadbasket, Ukraine, where it provoked staunch resistance 
from the Ukrainian peasantry, which, as Dontsov had insisted for years, was an inherently 
conservative, individualistic, and private property-minded class at odds with (Russian) 
Bolshevism. The state’s response, “dekulakization”—a campaign of terror to “liquidate the 
kulaks as a class”—was touted as a new revolution of the pro-Soviet “poor” peasants against the 
nationalistic, anti-Soviet “rich” ones, but it targeted anyone perceived as a political enemy in the 
countryside, with at least as much attention paid to (ascribed) ethnicity as to economic status.223 
Collectivization involved the state-control, proletarianization, and, ideally, mechanization of 
farming, and was designed to boost the production of food for export, thus generating more 
capital for the heavy industrialization and urbanization of the USSR. In practice, however, 
collectivization caused a downward spiral of increasingly ruinous and untenable grain 
requisitions and police terror on one side, and livestock destruction, slowdowns, uprisings, and 
other forms of local resistance on the other, culminating in the Holodomor (“death by hunger”)—
a state-engineered and -aggravated famine that ended the lives of approximately four million 
inhabitants of Soviet Ukraine’s cities and villages, a staggering 15 percent of the population, 
between 1932 and 1933.224 Famine gripped regions throughout the Soviet Union in 1932, but it 
was considerably more severe and lasted longer in the UkrSSR and the ethnically Ukrainian, 
agriculturally rich Kuban region, north of the Caucasus Mountains in the Russian Soviet Federal 
Socialist Republic (RSFSR). Between December 1932 and January 1933, the authorities in these 
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regions enforced specific draconian policies, handed down from the Politburo, which 
deliberately worsened the famine, such as a ban on movement to other parts of the USSR in 
search of food, and a resolution threatening “the strictest punitive measures” for collective 
farmers guilty of “misappropriating and concealing grain.”225  
 Stalin and his chief lieutenants, Kaganovich and Molotov, interpreted the famine in 
national terms, regarding it as a consequence of “the mechanical implementation of 
Ukrainization.”226 “The national interpretation of the grain requisitions crisis,” was propounded 
in a Politburo decree on December 14, 1932, and blamed the famine on counterrevolutionary 
cells of “Petliurites” and other Ukrainian “bourgeois-nationalist elements,” which had allegedly 
infiltrated the KP(B)U and were acting under the legal cover provided by Ukrainization.227 Stalin 
had already acknowledged the possibility of classes and nations coinciding or fusing together in 
his theoretical writings on nationalities policy; now he linked the antipeasant and antibourgeois 
logic of Marxian modernization with the anti-Ukrainian (and anti-Polish) logic of Russian 
chauvinism, utilizing famine and terror to crush the double threat to his power in Ukraine and the 
Cuban.  
 According to the new official position, Ukrainization, unlike indigenization 
(korenizatsiia) policies in other parts of the Soviet Union, had empowered rather than disarmed 
Ukrainian nationalism, and thus had to be reversed, quickly and brutally if need be. The 
Ukrainian GPU arrested thousands of civilians and hundreds of KP(B)U members in 1932. At 
                                                
225 “Resolution of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolshevik) on the 
grain procurement in Ukraine,” and “Order from the Council of People’s Commissars of the USSR and the Central 
Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolshevik) on preventing the mass flight of starving villagers in 
search of food,” in Bohdan Klid and Alexander J. Motyl, eds., The Holodomor Reader: A Sourcebook on the Famine 
of 1932-1933 in Ukraine (Toronto: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies Press, 2012), 251, 254. 
 
226 Martin, Affirmative-Action Empire, 302-3. 
 
227 Ibid. 
 
  319 
the height of the famine in January 1933, Stalin dispatched Pavel Postychev (1887-1939)—the 
“hangman of Ukraine,” as he came to be known—to head the KP(B)U. Postyshev replaced 
Skrypnyk, who was accused of a “national deviation” that had abetted the Ukrainian and Polish 
nationalist plot to “separate the Ukraine from the Soviet Union and convert it into a colony of 
Polish fascism or German imperialism.”228  
 Simultaneously, Stalin appointed the ruthless Vsevolod Balyts’kyi (1892-1937) to 
command the secret police of the UkrSSR, who proceeded to launch a reign of terror against 
Ukrainian intelligentsia, targeting former Borotbists, UKP members, and old Bolsheviks accused 
of being to enthusiastic about Ukrainiazation (such as Skrypnyk). In May 1933, the GPU 
absurdly accused Shums’kyi of being a member of the UVO, which had all but ceased to exist 
after the founding of the OUN, condemning him to imprisonment on the Solovets Islands. 
Thousands of Ukrainians were purged from the Party at this time, many later to be arrested on 
trumped up charges and, in many cases, shot (prefiguring the Great Terror of 1937-38). 
Meanwhile, Stalin praised the Russians as “the most talented nation in the world,” which “first 
raised the Soviet flag against the entire world” in a post-May Day speech on May 2, 1933. 
Finally, the KP(B)U ended Ukrainization with a November 1933 plenum declaring that the 
“greatest danger” with regard to Soviet nationalities policy was no longer “Russian chauvinism,” 
as it had been since 1923, but was now non-Russian “local nationalism.”229 
 Thus, the “Cultural Renaissance” became the “Executed Renaissance.” Driven to despair 
by the famine and Postyshev’s terror, Mykola Khvyl’ovyi committed suicide on May 13, 
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1933.230 He shot himself in his study, leaving behind a letter that protested the Party’s “betrayal 
of the Revolution.” Thereafter, Khvyl’ovyi’s works and memory were banned, and went 
unpublished in Ukraine until after its independence. At first, Dontsov denied the official story 
that Khvyl’ovyi’s death had in fact been a suicide, accusing the Soviet secret police of 
assassinating him (an untenable conspiracy theory given the fact several of the writer’s friends 
were with him in his apartment at the time). Dontsov took the event as proof that defiantly, 
authentically Ukrainian intellectuals and artists could not survive under Bolshevism:  
The most terrible thing is the moral death that awaits everyone there [in the Soviet Union 
—TE] whom the conviction or feeling of self-respect will not allow to swear on every 
letter of the Leninist Koran. I did not think then [during the polemic with Khvyl’ovyi —
TE] that soon I would have such a tragic illustration of this assertion; that between 
physical and moral death, Khvyl’ovyi would choose the former as less terrible.231  
 
Despite his failed efforts to reconcile the contradiction between Ukrainian nationalism and 
cultural striving on the one hand, and collaboration with the thuggish, Russian Communist 
occupation of Ukraine on the other, Khvyl’ovyi’s convictions and writing could lead only to his 
downfall:  
It would be strange if such a smart and nimble journalistic and literary career as his did not 
mobilize those who gathered around the ‘center of federal Philistinism’—the Party, 
Moscow—against Khvyl’ovyi. . . . He preaches rebellion? But how dare he ‘sing of an 
abstract uprising, and idealize historical romance?’ This means ‘to incite the petty-
bourgeois element to active struggle against the dictatorship of the proletariat,’ the time for 
‘chaos and natural force’ [stykhiia] is already  finished!’ The proletarian was the rebel, now 
he is “a conscious member of the organized collective,’ now he is a ‘builder.’ . . . How dare 
he propagate ‘the struggle of two cultures,’ when ‘national enmity is a relic of the old 
relations?’232  
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When Khvyl’ovyi finally realized that “those who struggle, not for their own cause, but for the 
cause of a new empire, a new Moscow,” are merely “hired gladiators”—that “Moscow, with its 
‘majority,’” represents “the all-leveling herd as a principle, not only of political, but also spiritual 
life”—he killed himself. Nevertheless, Dontsov admired Khvyl’ovyi’s “final jest” as “a terrible 
moral blow for the deceitful politics of Russia in Ukraine.”233 Now there could be no question of 
returning to the old Sovietophilia; self-respecting Ukrainians, no matter their political ideology, 
would have to regard Bolshevism as the enemy.       
 Even the Communist Party of Western Ukraine (KPZU), which Moscow previously 
regarded as the vanguard of the Ukrainian national liberation movement in Poland, turned 
against the Soviet leadership, protesting the rollback of Ukrainization that began with the 
Shums’kyi affair and ended with the Holodomor and the repression of the Cultural Renaissance. 
The pro-Shums’kyi protests led the Comintern to depose the leadership of the KPZU, whom 
Kaganovich accused of treachery, in February 1928. The “national deviation” had spilled over 
the border. Now, in order to remain relevant in Western Ukrainian politics, which became 
stridently anti-Communist, Russophobic, and nationalistic in reaction to events in the Soviet 
Union, the KPZU rebranded itself as a nationalistic party, taking up causes such as opposing the 
forced conversion of Ukrainians to Roman Catholicism, but was unable to halt its decline over 
the course of the next decade.234 Absurdities and paranoia spread through the Communist camp 
as the anti-Ukrainian nationalist inquisition forged ahead. According to one anecdote, at a 
meeting of the Central Committee of the KP(B)U during the summer of 1933, in which 
accusations that the KPZU was under Dontsov’s influence were presented alongside 
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incriminating citations from LNV, one of those present, evidently under the impression that the 
journal’s editor himself was a member of the KPZU, slammed his fist on the table, and cried out: 
“Purge the rascal from the party!”235 Even Communists, it seems, had trouble taking Dontsov’s 
avowed anti-Communism at face value. They had lost their credibility among the Ukrainian 
emigration, and radical nationalists rushed to fill the void. Suddenly, Western Ukraine became 
the “Piedmont” and the UkrSSR replaced Poland as the symbol of national oppression, while 
figures like Dontsov basked in the vindication and redoubled their efforts. 
 
Conclusion: Dontsov the Moskal’? 
 
Lypyns’kyi’s two charges were, in the main, accurate: on the one hand, Dontsov really 
did think like a Bolshevik—a “revolutionary Moskal’”—who was not ashamed to express 
veneration for Bolshevik practices and Bolshevik writers, when he thought it appropriate; on the 
other hand, he was of little use when it came to organized political action, abandoning the 
integral nationalist OUN, his “spiritual children,” and the conservative Agrarian-Statists, 
Lypyns’kyi’s group, despite repeated overtures from both camps. Dontsov devoted little ink to 
condemning the bloody suppression of the Ukrainian intelligentsia and the Holodomor. On what 
grounds could he have done so? He had utterly rejected appeals to morality and humanity as 
ineffectual, irrelevant, chimerical, and counterproductive in Natsionalizm and other works. If 
Russian Communists killed Ukrainians, then Ukrainians had only themselves to blame for it 
because they had failed to kill Russian Communists. The tears and lamentations of Ukrainophile 
provincialism; the submissive, pacifistic worldview of “Buddhists”; the lack of abstract ideals 
worth committing awful crimes and suffering terrible deaths for—these defects were to blame for 
the oppression of Ukrainians at the hands of a race that is willing to conquer and destroy. 
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Dontsov’s radicalism distinguished him from the more conservative, gradualist traditions of 
Galician Ukrainian politics, socialist, liberal, and conservative. It resonated with Western 
Ukrainian students, activists, and writers of a revolutionary mentality, including KPZU members, 
and earned admirers in Soviet Ukraine, who took up Dontsov’s call to Occidentalize Ukrainian 
culture and elide Muscovite interference. And yet, for all his pro-European statements, one of the 
most common charges leveled against him was that he was a Russian, “by birth and origin,” and 
thus exhibited the contempt of a typical Moskal’ chauvinist for Ukrainian cultural and political 
traditions, urging them to be more like the Muscovites in order, paradoxically, to become more 
Ukrainian and European.                              
Previously rejecting anti-Semitism as a manifestation of Russian barbarity, Dontsov 
began to regard Jew-hatred as a quintessentially European tradition and a sign of a national 
vitality, conflating Jewishness, Russianness, and Bolshevism into an imagined anti-Ukrainian, 
anti-Western conspiracy. His anti-Semitism spiked after the assassination of Petliura, leaving a 
mark on Ukrainian integral nationalist ideas and practices thereafter. The rise to power of Adolf 
Hitler and the Nazis in March 1933—which, as we shall see in the next chapter, Dontsov 
welcomed enthusiastically—strengthened the anti-Semitic current already manifest in his 
thinking, but also added new scientific racialist elements to it. The birth of the Third Reich drew 
Dontsov’s gaze back to Germany, away from Poland, and came to represent for him the best 
hope of annihilating the Soviet empire and achieving Ukraine’s influence. Even before 1933, 
however, Dontsov had left little room for doubt about what he was proposing: the Muscovites 
and their Jewish allies in Ukraine should be given the same brutal treatment that they had forced 
Ukrainians to endure for centuries. Much to Dontsov’s delight, events seemed to be pointing in 
the direction of a second Great War and a chance to revise the outcome of the first one. The 
prospects of a Ukrainian-Polish peace, let alone alliance, were buried in the escalation of 
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violence between the OUN and the Polish state, which opened the Bereza Katuska detention 
camp to imprison thousands Ukrainian and Belarusian nationalists and other suspected political 
enemies without trial in June 1934. Sovietophilia and Communism lost their appeal in Western 
Ukraine following the assassination of Petliura by a presumed NKVD agent, the Shums’kyi 
affair, the SVU show trial, the repression of the Soviet Ukrainian intelligentsia, and the 
Holodomor; hereafter, Western Ukrainian and émigré attitudes toward the USSR tended to be 
extremely negative. “Active nationalism,” which to many seemed the ideology best equipped to 
guide Ukrainians through such perilous, inhumane times, reaped new adherents and notoriety.              
But Dontsov’s growing visibility did not save Literaturno-Naukovyi Vistnyk, which 
finally succumbed to an attrition of subscribers and contributing authors, who clashed with the 
editor’s authoritarian style, conflicts between Dontsov and the Ukrainian Publishers’ Union, 
which was responsible for the journal, over its increasingly nationalistic slant, and a financial 
crisis that closed both the union and LNV in 1932. Dontsov restarted the publication under the 
name Vistnyk (Herald) with the support of the writers who remained loyal to him, the 
Vistnykivtsi, the financial backing of the UVO, and his own publishing house, Vydavnytstvo 
Dontsovykh, which operated with funds provided by the Banchyns’kyi family wealth of 
Dontsov’s wife, Mariia Banchyns’ka-Dontsova. The first edition of Vistnyk appeared in 
December 1932 (dated January 1933), and existed until the German invasion of Poland in 
September 1939, operating entirely through Dontsov’s ideological prism as editor. The next 
chapter will return to 1926 to cover the last years of LNV, then resume our survey of the 
collaborations, rivalries, romances, literary productions, and intellectual trajectories of the 
Dontsovs and the Vistnykivsti through the 1930s to the end of World War II, in which many of 
them perished and the rest were scattered, bringing the circle and their era, but not their 
influence, to a close.
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CHAPTER 5: THE PERSONAL AND THE POLITICAL: FEMINISM, NAZISM, AND THE 
VISTNYKIVTSI, 1926-1939 
 
  
 Under Dontsov’s leadership, Literaturno-Naukovyi Vistnyk (LNV) became an outlet 
chiefly for integral nationalist literature that matched his own political convictions and aesthetic 
tastes. One of the journal’s disgruntled authors observed that the editor “led the journal 
according to his own will and pleasure,” collaborating with the likeminded and rejecting the 
rest.1 The directives that Dontsov proclaimed for the publication in 1922, when he became editor 
in chief of the revived LNV persisted; “the formation of the national idea” and the spiritual 
transfiguration of Ukraine from an “object of history” into a “subject of history” found 
expression on the pages of LNV in the forms of reactionary modernist prose, poetry, and political 
philosophy explored in chapter 3. The once large number of eminent writers actively 
contributing to LNV gradually dwindled to a hardcore of younger writers who were impressed 
with Dontsov and more or less committed to his brand of Ukrainian integral nationalism. Still, 
the editor did offer LNV as a platform to assorted Hetmanites, such as Dmytro Doroshenko and 
Iaroslav Okunevs’kyi (1860-1929), to polemicize with his enemy, Viacheslav Lypyns’kyi (this 
had the added advantage of sowing dissension in the monarchist camp). The journal also 
showcased relatively apolitical articles by esteemed academics, including the historian of 
medieval Ukraine Myron Korduba (1876-1947), the philologist Stepan Smal’-Stots’kyi (1859-
1938), and the literary scholar Iaroslav Hordyns’kyi (1882-1939). The group of émigré writers 
                                                
1 Namely, the bibliographer and translator Volodymyr Doroshenko (1879-1963). Doroshenko, “Literaturno-
Naukovyi Vistnyk,” 53-54. 
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most loyal to Dontsov—the Vistnykivtsi, consisting of Iuryi Lypa, Ievhen Malaniuk, Leonid 
Mosendz, Olena Teliha, Oswald Burghardt (pseudonym: Iuryi Klen) (1891-1947), Oleh 
Ol’zhych, and, to a lesser extent, Ulas Samchuk—got their start publishing in LNV.2 In the years 
leading up to and during World War II, the Vistnykivtsi each followed his or her own path; some 
remained loyal to Dontsov while others became disillusioned with him, and sought to escape his 
influence or challenge his authority. This led to various schisms, rivalries, and conflicts within 
the circle, which began to pull apart during the 1930s. Prior to this, however, the group remained 
close intellectually, aesthetically, professionally, and intimately. Its members’ personal relations, 
which ranged from extreme antipathy to adoration, were entangled with their political and 
aesthetic commitments, including their reactions to two ascendant phenomena in East Central 
Europe: Nazism and feminism.    
The adoption of pronatalist and eugenics policies throughout 1930s Europe provided the 
backdrop for Ukrainian nationalists’ debates about the ideal woman, the ideal man, and the 
proper relation between them and with society as a whole. Scientifically racialist, social 
Darwinian, and reliant upon deeper intrusions of the state and the medical profession into the 
private lives (and bodies) of citizens, the proponents of these policies sought to improve the 
biological qualities and reproductivity of nations by sterilizing or “euthanizing” those deemed 
mentally or physically unfit, and by encouraging or compelling supposedly stronger, healthier 
individuals to have as many children for the fatherland as possible. To this end, interwar 
European governments implemented new restrictions and prohibitions of abortion and divorce, 
criminalized homosexuality, and promoted culturally “conservative” gender roles as necessary 
for the improvement of the nation’s welfare and military preparedness. The regimes and 
                                                
2 Other regular contributors to Dontsov’s journal who are sometimes counted as Vistnyivtsi include the literary critic 
Mykhailo Mukhyn (1894-1974) and the poet, sculptor, and civic activist Oksana Liaturyns’ka (1902-1970). 
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ideologues behind these programs clashed with movements fighting for the social, political, and 
personal liberation of women. Nazi Germany was but one, albeit the most radical, instance of 
this trend. As historian Claudia Koonz argues, despite Nazism’s generally misogynistic 
subordination of women to men, German women were sometimes supporters and activists, as 
well as opponents and victims, of Nazi policies on family, sexuality, and gender.3 Hoping to 
carve out a sphere of female autonomy, some pro-Nazi women accepted second-sex status in the 
party and in society. Soviet politics also followed the continent-wide drift toward authoritarian 
pronatalism. The Soviet Family Code of 1918 had radically liberalized marriage, divorce, and 
abortion laws. Bolshevik activists originally urged women to leave the domestic sphere, join the 
work force, and become more politically active. They sought to replace the “bourgeois family” 
with state-public child rearing, to end prostitution, and to usher in the proletarian sexual 
revolution envisioned by the Bolshevik feminist leader Alexandra Kollontai. But cultural and 
economic realities did not keep pace with these efforts. The birthrate declined while the number 
of unwanted pregnancies and orphans rose owing to lack of access to birth control. Fathers and 
husbands took advantage of simplified divorce procedures to abandon mothers and wives, 
leaving the latter to search for jobs in short supply and preferentially given to male workers. 
Even women who worked outside the home were expected to continue shouldering the burden of 
domestic labor. Meanwhile, traditional patriarchal structures and practices went largely 
unchallenged in rural areas. The Soviet Family Code of 1936 reversed the social and legal 
reforms propounded in 1918 to match the “traditionalist,” pronatalist zeitgeist.4 Responding to 
                                                
3 See Claudia Koonz, Mothers in the Fatherland: Women, the Family, and Nazi Politics (London: Jonathan Cape, 
1987). 
 
4 See Wendy Z. Goldman, Women, the State, and Revolution: Soviet Family Policy and Social Life, 1917-1936 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993). 
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Soviet and Nazi approaches to the “women’s question,” Dontsov and the Vistnykivtsi were less 
interested in specific questions of family law and policy, such as divorce or abortion, than they 
were in ideal notions of nationalist masculinity and femininity as represented in and promoted 
through literature. They sought to reconcile those forms of modern female empowerment 
deemed beneficial to the national cause with patriarchal values and traditionally “Ukrainian” 
gender roles. As we shall see, the result was paradoxical and contested, drawing them into 
conflict with one another and with the Ukrainian women’s movement.    
 
Vistnyk between Hitler and Stalin 
 Almost from its inception, the revived LNV was marred by economic trouble and 
conflicts between the editor, the Ukrainian Publishers’ Union, headed by the Ukrainian Military 
Organization (UVO) leaders Osyp Navrots’kyi and Iurii Polians’kyi, and the Union of 
Journalists and Writers, based in L’viv. Members of the latter had opposed the appointment of 
Dontsov from the beginning, but gave into pressure from Konovalets’ and the UVO, which put 
up badly needed funds for the periodical. The Ukrainian Publishers’ Union constituted a check 
on Dontsov’s editorial freedom that he resented greatly. “These people are barbarians,” he 
complained to Mariia.5 On the third anniversary of the founding of LNV, 1925, Dontsov drew 
attention to the publication’s difficult situation:  
Material conditions allow only for the exceptional payment of labor at 25 zloty per 
printed page, and for the editor's pension—barely a quarter of the cost for a decent 
printer; the publisher does not have any funds for the subscription to even one foreign 
journal. . . . If one adds to this that under the given circumstances the publisher is unable 
to afford a length per issue of more than six pages (instead of the prewar twenty), then 
you will begin to get a full picture of the conditions under which the editorship must 
work.6  
                                                
5 August 24, 1927. TsDAVO, f. 3849, op. 1, spr. 16, ark. 150. 
 
6 Dontsov, “Try roky vidnovlenoho,” 333-34. 
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 Dontsov struggled to make the journal profitable. Initially, LNV’s circulation was not 
large at 800-1,200 copies, which generally went directly to individual readers, but under his 
editorship the number of subscribers rose to 1,500 and the circulation grew to 1,800 copies, 
reaching Eastern Ukraine, Czechoslovakia, the US, and Canada.7 These gains, however, were not 
enough to pull the publication out of the red. Concerned that the quality of the journal was 
declining, hemorrhaging respectable readers and contributors despite the growth in subscribers 
overall, the governing board of LNV called Dontsov in for review in 1928.8 Lashing out against 
the board’s critiques, the editor in chief accused personal enemies, the Soviet state, the center-
right Ukrainian National Democratic Alliance (UNDO), and the Union of Journalists and Writers 
of conspiring to undermine him.9 The board reappointed him editor anyway, but the L’viv-based 
Ukrainian Publishers’ Union, which was financially responsible for LNV, closed soon thereafter 
in 1932, threatening to take the journal down with it. Dontsov’s supporters launched a campaign 
to save the journal, with readers and contributing authors writing letters in support. The 
Vistnykivtsi believed in their mission, and hoped for the journal’s survival. Malaniuk, Samchuk, 
Ol’zhych, and Mukhin wrote to Dontsov on March 18, 1932: “Preparing a literary evening on the 
occasion of the ten-year anniversary of the neo-LNV in the common feeling of unity—we send 
you a warm hello from Prague. We hope that LNV will powerfully repel the strike of the united 
Little Russian front.” Ultimately, however, Dontsov chose the path of financial independence, 
________________________ 
 
7 Halyna Svarnyk, “Dmytro Dontsov iak redaktor ‘literaturno-naukovoho vistnyka’ (1922-1932) i ‘Vistnyka’ (1932-
1938) u L’vovi,” Ukrains’ka periodyka: istoriia i suchasnist’. Dopovidi ta povidomlennia Druhoi Vseukrains’koi 
naukovo-teoretychnoi konferentsii, L’viv-Zhytomyr December 21-22, 1994, 153-56. 
 
8 Among the board’s members were: Volodymyr Doroshenko; the political and cultural leader in the UNDO 
Mykhailo Halushchyns’kyi (1878-1931); Ievhen Konovalets’; and the anthropologist and zoologist Ivan Rakovs’kyi 
(1874-1949). 
 
9 BN, DD, Mf. 82671, 69, 71. 
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restarting the publication near the end of 1932 as a fully independent operation under the name 
Vistnyk: Misiachnyk literatury, mystetstva, nauky, i hromads’koho zhyttia (Herald: A Monthly of 
Literature, Art, Science, and Civic Life).  
 More ideologically homogenous and radical than its predecessor, Vistnyk existed under 
Dontsov’s sole editorial discretion from the beginning of 1933 to the outbreak of World War II. 
His longtime assistant Mykhailo Hikavyi managed the business side of things, while students 
helped with deliveries in exchange for free subscriptions.10 To support the venture, Dmytro and 
Mariia Dontsov started their own publishing house, Vydavnytstvo Dontsovykh. The couple relied 
on Mariia’s mother, Ol’ha Bachyns’ka, to get permission from the L’viv city authorities (the 
starostwo) to create and operate the journal itself. Ol’ha Bachnys’ka’s name thus appeared on 
this official documentation as the owner and publisher of Vistnyk. Despite being the actual editor 
and ideological mastermind behind the project, Dontsov’s name was not listed.11 Years later, 
after Dontsov’s death, Hikavyi recounted the editor’s typical workday in the 1930s: he would 
rise at seven in the morning and go straight to work, taking coffee at the café “Videnka,” where 
he caught up on the latest events; he prepared all the materials for Vistnyk himself, typing out 
submitted manuscripts, making corrections, and arranging everything for the printers, his next 
stop. From there he would go to the journal’s administrative office in the afternoon, pick up any 
mail that had arrived for him, then return to the “Videnka” for debates with friends and 
acquaintances. Hikavyi described Dontsov as “friendly with everyone, but taciturn.” In the 
                                                
10 Svarnyk “Dontsov iak redaktor,” 154. 
 
11 Instead, the managing editor of the journal was initially indicated as “Ivan Ustianovych,” then, from January 
1933, as “Bohdan Obkysh.” I have been unable to locate information about either person. Dzvinka Vorobkalo, 
“‘Mystetstvo dlia natsii’ vs ‘Mystetstvo dlia mystetstva’,” zbruc.eu. http://zbruc.eu/node/60625 [accessed March 10, 
2017]. 
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evenings Dontsov would go home, write another article, and read late into the night. He left 
L’viv for vacation each summer, in July and August, leaving the journal in his wife’s care.12  
 In 1934, the Dontsovs’ publishing house began initiated a separate, quarterly series of 
books, Knyhozbirna Vistnyka (Library of the Herald). In circulations of up to 5,000 copies, 
Knyhozbirna Vistnyka issued Ukrainian translations of selected works, such as Niccolo 
Machiavelli’s The Prince, previously little known in Ukraine, as well as hagiographic 
biographies of leaders of the modern European Right (e.g. Hitler, Mussolini, the Spanish general 
and dictator Francisco Franco, Portuguese fascist theorist Antonio de Oliviera Salazar, the 
Belgian Nazi collaborator and Catholic nationalist Leon Degrelle, and others).13 Dontsov’s 
contribution to the series, under the pseudonym “D. Varnak,” was a biography of the 
considerably less controversial Irish political leader Daniel O’Connell (1774-1847). Dontsov 
also prepared prefaces for every book. The other authors included the racialist, anti-Semitic 
anthropologist Rostyslav Iendyk (1906-1974)—a lifelong devotee of Dontsov who wrote an 
admiring biography of Hitler and, after the war, a pro-Dontsov brochure.14 Renamed Kvartal’nyk 
Vistnyka (Quarterly of the Herald) in 1936, the series also ran original book-length works by 
Dontsov. One gets a sense of their contents and the problems that motivated them from the titles: 
Taiemnytsia orhanizatsii (The Mystery of Organization, 1936), Durman sotsializmu (The Idiocy 
of Socialism, 1936), Zavdannia novoho pokolinnia (The Task of the New Generation, 1937), 
Partiia chy orden: Ob’iednannia chy roz’iednannia? (Party or Order: Unification or 
Dissolution? 1933), Patriotyzm (Patriotism, 1936), De shukaty nashykh istorychnykh tradytsii? 
                                                
12 Mykhailo Hikavyi, “Den’ doktora Dmytra Dontsova,” Visnyk OOChSU, no. 3 (March 1974), 299. 
 
13 Rostyslav Iendyk, Dmytro Dontsov. Ideoloh ukrains’koho nationalizmu (Munich: Ukrains’ke vydavnytstvo, 
1955), 88. 
 
14 Iendyk, Dmytro Dontsov; Rostyslav Iendyk, Hitler (L’viv: Knyhozbirna Vistnyka, 1934). 
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(Where to Find Our Historical Traditions? 1938), and Masa i provid; Kil’kist’ chy iakist’? (The 
Masses and Leadership; Quantity or Quality? 1939). Dontsov’s column, “Z presovoho fil’ma” 
(From the Press Reel), published under the cryptonym “M.L.,” provided a concise overview of 
the international press, including the Soviet, on Ukrainian matters. The column, cosmopolitan in 
spirit, intended to set Ukraine into a global, or at least continental, context. Working in the 
shadow cast by the Third Reich, Vistnyk and its quarterly espoused the anti-Communist, 
antiliberal, and, increasingly, pro-Nazi, racist, anti-Semitic, and conspiracy-theoretical 
worldview of its owner and editor.  
 Dontsov’s enthusiasm for Nazism began in 1933. Given his longstanding Germanophilia 
and Austrophilia, which we explored in chapters 1 and 2, and his approval of and fascination 
with Italian Fascism, the decision to start hailing Hitler as soon as the latter became chancellor 
was natural for the Vistnyk editor. The rise of the Third Reich represented a triumph for the ideas 
that Dontsov had been espousing for years: nationalism, voluntarism, militarism, 
authoritarianism, statism, anti-Marxism, anti-Semitism, palingenetic mysticism and reactionary 
modernism, xenophobia and the rhetoric of a racial-civilizational conflict between “the East” and 
“the West,” between the “Aryans” and the rest—all of this achieved its apotheosis and most 
radical expression in Nazism. Developments in Germany radicalized Dontsov, deepening his 
obsession with international Jewry, Masonic conspiracies, “scientific” racism (Rassentheorie), 
and an apocalyptic war to crush Muscovy once and for all. Hitler’s vision of a Europe cleansed 
of the “Judeo-Bolshevik” menace to Western civilization strongly appealed to Dontsov.  
 Dontsov broadcasted his increasingly Nazi-inflected ruminations in print as well as 
private correspondence. His deepening anti-Semitism was on display in a 1933 article, “The 
Twilight of Marxism,” which touched on the Nazi Party’s program to remove the Jewish 
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population from Germany: “Outrageous? Perhaps. But do the Jews have a moral right to fly into 
a rage about this: when they deported, for example, not foreigners, but autochthonous Ukrainian 
people (to Solovki15 and Siberia) in order to facilitate foreign, Jewish colonization? Some 
[participated in this] directly (Radek,16 Trotsky), others indirectly, such as the German and 
American Jews, supporting the Jewish colonization of Ukraine morally and materially.”17 Like 
the Nazis, Dontsov laid the crimes of the Soviet state at the feet of Jews worldwide, whether 
Communist or capitalist, whom he accused of seeking the degradation or destruction of Europe’s 
“autochthonous” nations. In his preface to Rostyslav Iendyk’s biography of Hitler, Dontsov 
wrote about the double benefit of Nazism for the Ukrainian national movement: firstly, it was the 
archenemy of Marxism and the Soviet Union; secondly, it promised “to put in order the everyday 
Jewish problem [which is] irritating for us.18  
 Dontsov’s correspondence with the newest member of the Vistnykivtsi, Oswald 
Burghardt, who began publishing poetry in Vistnyk under the pen name Iuryi Klen in 1933, is 
evidence of this early admiration for Hitler and Hitlerism. Klen was a Volksdeutscher (a 
descendant of German colonists in Eastern Europe) from the small village of Serbynivtsi in 
western central Ukraine, near the city of Vynnytsia. He studied poetry at Kyiv University, 
graduating in 1915. During World War I, the tsarist state deemed Klen sympathetic to the 
German enemy on account of his ethnicity, exiling him to the far northern Arkhangelsk region of 
                                                
15 An infamous prison camp on the Solovets Islands in northern Russia. 
 
16 Karl Radek (1885-1939), a leading Marxist, originally from L’viv, who was active in the Social Democratic 
parties of Germany and Poland before moving to the Soviet Union, becoming an important official in the 
Communist Party. He was killed in the Great Purge. 
 
17 Dmytro Dontsov, “Sumerk marksyzmu (Tardie — Hitler — Stalins’ka opozytsiia — i my),” Vistnyk, no. 4 (1933), 
305. 
 
18 [Dmytro Dontsov], “Peredmova,” Iendyk, Hitler, 3. 
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Russia. Freed by the Revolution in 1917, Klen returned to Ukraine, only to be arrested again, this 
time by the Bolsheviks, in 1921. While in prison, he witnessed the executions of non-
Communists. The esteemed writer Volodymyr Korolenko (1853-1921) secured Klen’s release, 
but the experience permanently altered the latter’s worldview, contributing to his development 
into a convinced anti-Bolshevik, anti-Semite, and Russophobe. Eventually, Klen became one of 
the core five members of the Neoclassicists—a Soviet Ukrainian literary movement that 
emphasized high art, rejected the politicized “mass art” favored by the Bolshevik mainstream, 
and thus sided with Khvyl’ovyi in the Literary Discussion discussed in chapter 4.19 In 1931, Klen 
escaped the UkrSSR before the Soviet police could arrest him again, as the rest of the 
Neoclassicists were during the Stalinist terror. Immigrating to Germany, Klen later taught Slavic 
literature in Innsbruck, Austria, Münster, and Prague, and wrote epic and lyric poetry in 
Ukrainian and German that displayed a high degree of technical mastery and erudition.20  
                                                
19 The other four were Maksym Ryl’skyi (1895-1964), Pavlo Fylypovych (1891-1937), Maykhailo Drai-Khmara 
(1889–1939), and Mykola Zerov (1890-1937), the group’s leader. Only Ryl’skyi survived the 1930s, though he too 
was arrested and forced to recant his apolitical poetical aesthetic. Klen’s emigration likely saved his life. 
 
20 “What an unexpected appearance! Is this really a new and young author, or a developed, highly experienced 
master?” Ol’zhych wrote to Dontsov about Klen after the latter’s poetry began appearing in Vistnyk: BN, DD, Mf. 
83985. Letter of Oleh Ol’zhych to Dmytro Dontsov, February 2, 1934. 
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Figure 5.1: The Neoclassicists: sitting (l-r), Iuryi Klen, Pavlo Fylpovych, B. Yakubs’kyi, 
Maksym Ryls’kyi; standing V. Petrov, Mykola Zerov. Source: Internet Encyclopedia of Ukraine  
 
 Dontsov invited Klen to publish in Vitsnyk in the summer of 1933 on Malaniuk’s 
recommendation, explaining that the journal’s orientation—anticonservative, anti-Bolshevik, 
anticlerical, and antiliberal—was countercultural and politically nonconformist in relation to the 
Galician Ukrainian world. Vistnyk welcomed Klen’s contributions, preferably under his real 
name, Burghardt, since this would entail a complete break with his Soviet past (even though it 
would probably mean endangering his relatives there).21 Burghardt insisted on being known only 
by his pseudonym to Vistnyk’s readers. He reported to Dontsov from Munich on his favorable 
impressions of Nazi meetings, encouraging him to publish an essay comparing Hitler’s 
dictatorship with Stalin’s.22 Klen would have done it himself, but expressed fear that doing so 
                                                
21 Dmytro Dontsov to Iuryi Klen, July 28, 1933. In Halyna Svarnyk,  "'Naimolodshyi z 'piatirnoho hrona’—Osval’d 
Burghardt (Iuryi Klen). Lysty do Dmytra Dontsova,” Ukrains’ki problem, no. 1-2 (1999): 177-219. 
 
22 Ibid. Klen to Dontsov, September 19, 1933. 
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would bring harm to his sister still living in Soviet Ukraine. Instead, he suggested that he write a 
series of essays on the German nationalist philosopher and historian Oswald Spengler—one of 
the key intellectuals behind the Conservative Revolutionary movement and National Socialism.23  
 Contrary to the Dontsov’s view in 1926—that the Jews were not “guilty of everything,” but 
only of serving Russian imperialism and Bolshevism24—the language he and Klen used in their 
correspondence suggested that, they were now imagining Jews as the real masterminds behind 
the evil in the world, while the Russians, knowingly or unknowingly, were doing their bidding. 
Klen, for example, lamented the harm done to the Ukrainian press and literature by “Muscovite 
shabbas goys, who work for the Jew on Saturday.”25 He blamed them for the attacks on his 
writer colleagues in Kyiv: “It is understood that this is a drive to wipe out the last cultured 
Ukrainians or force them to emigrate to Moscow beforehand. . . . If there is an action against 
them, then obviously I must step out from behind the visor in [their] defense. In the time of the 
worldwide shabbas goy. . . . There is a need to give a more thorough rebuff to every bastard who 
failed to put an end to this mockery.”26 Klen complained about the dearth of information from 
Soviet Ukraine available to him for mounting such a defense, blaming the Jewish-controlled 
media for the cover-up of Communist atrocities. When Dontsov sent a copy of the pro-Mussolini 
brochure produced by his publishing house to Klen, the latter expressed hopes that a biography 
                                                
23 Despite his public reservations about and critiques of the Third Reich after 1933, Spengler contributed to the 
intellectual foundations of Nazism as a member of the Conservative Revolutionary movement (discussed in chapter 
3). His pessimism about Europe and skepticism about Nazi racial ideas led to his ostracization in Hitler’s Germany, 
but the Nazi propaganda minister Joseph Goebbels acknowledged his debt to Spengler. In addition to his most 
famous work, The Decline of the West (1918), Spengler advocated a non-Marxist, nationalist socialist 
authoritarianism in Prussiandom and Socialism (1920). 
 
24 See the discussion of Petliura’s assassination and the Schwartzbard trial in chapter 4. 
 
25 A “shabbas goy” is a gentile who does work forbidden for Jews on the Sabbath. It is a term of opprobrium in Klen 
and Dontsov’s lexicon. Klen to Dontsov December 3, 1933. Svarnyk, “Naimolodshyi.” 
 
26 Klen to Dontsov, January 29, 1934. Svarnyk, “Naimolodshyi.” 
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of Hitler would soon follow. (It did: Klen received a few copies for Christmas that year).27 On 
March 22, 1934, Dontsov assured Klen that the Vistnykivtsi backed “Mussolini and Hitler, the 
world of creative (and brutal) individuality, the world of work and dedication, [that is] hostile to 
those who made politics and literature into a business, to the scoundrels, careerists, and cowards 
who searched everywhere for compromises.”28  
 Above all, Dontsov and Klen embraced Nazism because it was the archenemy of 
Bolshevism. Klen welcomed Nazi Germany’s threat to the Soviet Union:  
With regard to politics, we have the impression here that Germany will again become the 
invincible force that it once was. Were it not for the Parisian shabbas goys with their 
ruckus [gvalt], then ultimately, perhaps, it would skin the carcass of the brontosaurus in 
the east [the Soviet Union –TE]. This would be the best outcome for humanity and for 
civilization. In any case, it is a great consolation that Germany refused to engage in 
bargaining with that gang. This was spoken of widely and with pride in Berlin, and it is 
no wonder that they became agitated in Moscow.29                 
 
Horrified by news of the suppression of the Neoclassicists and other Ukrainian writers and 
artists, Klen produced one of his best poems, Prokliati roky (Cursed Years, 1937), which drew 
upon his own experience of arrest during the Russian Civil War. In a letter to Dontsov on 
January 24, 1937, he described the poem as a requiem for the past and present victims of 
Bolshevik tyranny, more a chronicle than a call to action—to which the reader will in any case 
be moved emotionally. The combination of Russophobia, anti-Communism, anti-Semitism, and 
Aryanism that Nazism represented came naturally to Klen, who contributed a poem inspired by 
Vikings and Rassentheorie—his reply to Alexander Blok’s poem “Skify [Scythians], or, if you 
like, Skity [cattle]” (Klen made this dehumanizing pun central to his critique) “from the 
                                                
27 Ibid. Klen to Dontsov, March 5, 1934, and December 31, 1934. Iendyk, Hitler. 
 
28 Shkandrij, Ukrainian Nationalism, 95-96. 
 
29 Klen to Dontsov, April 12, 1935. Svarnyk, “Naimolodshi,” 194-95. 
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Ukrainian perspective.”30 In October 1937, he reported to Vistnyk about his positive impressions 
of the “Degenerate Art” (Entarte Kunst) exhibition, which pilloried “Jewish” modernism in the 
fine arts, presented alongside of quotes from Goebbels and Hitler, and damning excerpts from 
the works of Jewish art theorists.31  
 Speaking of Goebbels, Klen once flattered Dontsov with the suggestion that he had what 
it took to become Ukraine’s version of the Nazi propaganda master. Dontsov replied on 
September 14, 1936: “What you say is true; I could be a Goebbels. But there is no Hitler. No, the 
problem is not that there is no Hitler, but that there are no Hitlerites, and it is unclear whether 
they will appear, because without them [there can be no] Hitler.”32 At roughly the same time, the 
Soviet authorities arrested Klen’s sister along with 240 other Volksdeutsche seeking to 
immigrate to Germany. The Kyiv GPU released her only after three and a half months in a 
cramped wooden cell, deprived of sleep and air. In 1938, Klen related his sister’s ordeal for 
Vistnyk readers, publishing the exposé of Chekist tortures under his birth name. He also 
described the large transports of impoverished Germans arriving in Berlin from the “Soviet 
paradise,” where half of them had reportedly been in work camps, all eager to avenge their 
mistreatment and “take [such] medieval methods to the Bolsheviks!”33 Dontsov and Klen hailed 
Nazi Germany as Europe’s champion against Bolshevik despotism, racial degeneration, and 
cultural decay.          
 Dontsov came to view anti-Semitism as a Ukrainian tradition in the 1930s. As we saw in 
chapter 4, Dontsov criticized Petliura, after his assassination, for being too soft on the Jews in 
                                                
30 Ibid., 203. March 2, 1937. 
 
31 Ibid., 206. 
 
32 Quoted in Shkandrij, Ukrainian Nationalism, 96. 
 
33 Ibid., 207-8. December 28, 1937. 
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Ukraine. In 1937, Dontsov published an article, “Nerozryta mohyla” (The Unopened Grave), 
extending this critique. He faulted the Ukrainian leadership of the years 1917-1921 for failing to 
take advantage of the Judeophobic sentiments of the Ukrainian masses: “Popular wisdom 
intuitively anticipated that, to this people [the Jews —TE] among us, equality of rights means the 
whip and the revolver in the hands of Trotskys and Kuns34 for us. That they understand freedom 
for themselves in Ukraine as the forced expulsion of our peasants from it, as the creation on our 
black-earth of another Palestine—with a disenfranchised majority and a usurping minority.”35 
Noting the peasantry’s supposedly innate and reasonable fear and distrust of Jews, Dontsov 
declared that the Ukrainian “revolution should have captured the complex of feelings of 
superiority slumbering inside the national soul in a bright program in order to make a movement 
similar to Hitlerism. But the leadership of our revolution did not create this program.”36 As 
Zaitsev observes, by the spring of 1939 Dontsov was repeating all of Hitler’s anti-Semitic 
slanders:37 “international Jewry,” evil and monolithic, allegedly brought ruin and decay to the 
once “heroic” art, literature, politics, states, and economies of European nations, undermining the 
pride and patriotism of entire nations with a poisonous “cosmopolitan spirit.” Fortunately, 
Dontsov affirmed, Hitler and the Third Reich were destined to exterminate this “bacilli” along 
with their leftist accomplices.38  
                                                
34 Béla Kun (1886-1938 or 1939), the Hungarian Communist revolutionary, immigrated to the Soviet Union after the 
fall of his Soviet Republic in Hungary. He took an active role in the Red Terror in Crimea in 1920-21. Kun was 
accused of Trostkyism and executed in the Great Terror. 
 
35 Dmytro Dontsov, “Nerozryta Mohyla,” Vistnyk, no. 4 (1937): 283-302. 
 
36 Ibid. 
 
37 Zaitsev, Ukrains’kyi integral’nyi natsionalizm, 196. 
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 Such biological metaphors were no longer just metaphors for Dontsov, who increasingly 
turned to racial explanations of reality, decrying the Jews as a “parasitic” race that endangered 
the health and existence of the “national organisms” unfortunate enough to serve as its hosts. He 
attributed Bolshevism and the nature of the Russian state and society to a combination of Jewish-
Masonic plots and the miscegenation of ostensibly inferior “Asiatic races” that gave rise to 
Muscovy.39 Dontsov considered the fascist movements inspired by Hitler and Mussolini a 
wholesome, cleansing force, which was bringing about the restoration of the spiritual and racial 
health of Europe’s nations,40 including Ukraine, in a direct and opposite reaction to Bolshevism: 
“For us the most important thing in Hitlerism is the will to a decisive struggle with Marxism. It is 
important that a regime has finally appeared in Europe that has decided to deal with the 
Bolsheviks in a Bolshevik manner [po bol’shevyts’ky]. This is a most reassuring phenomenon, 
which will not go unanswered anywhere in the world that the Soviet gangrene has penetrated.”41  
 While denying that there was “any such thing as a law of international solidarity of 
fascist movements,” Dontsov considered Ukrainian nationalism to be a manifestation of the same 
“all-European movement,” and, so long as Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy were enemies of the 
Soviet Union and of Russia, then they were friends of Ukrainian nationalism.42 He regarded 
fascism as an elemental pan-European force that had declared war against Ukraine’s enemies 
(“socialists, radicals, Bolsheviks, Masons, Jews, and shabbas goys”),43 and thus stood 
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inadvertently to bring about Ukraine’s “liberation” as a part of Hitler’s new order in Eastern 
Europe.44 Instead of the internationalist, proletarian revolution, Dontsov claimed that Mussolini’s 
and Hitler’s “rightwing revolutionism” had “affirmed the great value of the village [i.e. the 
peasantry —TE] and of the third estate in general, which wanted to make socialism into manure 
for itself.” “Instead of the anarchistic ideals of ‘humanity’ and ‘the sovereign individual,’ Hitler 
presented the ideal of the organic community, whose name is the nation.”45  
 Dontsov also admired the internal hierarchical and authoritarian organization of Nazism 
and Fascism, the principle of “Order [orden] with its symbol of faith, tactics, and virtues,” 
instead of “compromising partisanship” (zmyrshaviloho partiinytsva).46 In Partiia chy orden 
(1933), Dontsov asserted that the Ukrainian nationalist leadership should organize itself on the 
same antidemocratic, disciplinarian principles, often turning to Hitler’s Mien Kampf for wisdom 
and quotations.47 The spiritual and organizational essence of Mussolini and Fascist Italy were 
just as exemplary for the Vistnyk editor: “In the name of this discipline the Italian ‘avant-
gardists’ take an oath ‘to go without a word behind the commandments of il Duce [Mussolini] 
and serve the fascist revolution with all of their powers and, where needed, their blood as 
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well.’”48 If only Ukrainians had a leader behind whom they were willing to rally and grow 
zealous in the same way, they might stand a chance of surviving the return of war between 
“Russia” and “Europe,” emerging at the end of it with their own state.  
 The sole positive and affirmative (as opposed to negative and critical) aspect of 
Dontsov’s post-1933 ideology, openly modeled after his understanding of fascism, was the 
discovery or cultivation of new elite capable of leading: “Why fascism? In order to defend 
society before the trickery of alien ideas from abroad and within, in order to conduct a selection, 
because only a chosen minority can lead society.”49 Dontsov hoped to bring all of this about 
through Vistnyk, despite his own lack of the requisite organizational and leadership abilities. 
Nevertheless, he managed to popularize Fascism and Nazism among Western and émigré 
Ukrainians,50 as evidenced by the appearance of groups such as the “Path of the Future” Society 
of Fascist Studies (Tovarystvo Fashyzmoznavstva “Shliakh maibutn’oho”), founded in 1935 in 
Paris by Prince Jan Tokarzhevs’kyi-Karashevych (1885-1954).51 Initiates into the group had to 
swear an oath, stating that “Fascism, as a worldview, fully corresponds with certain historical 
traditions, as well as modern Ukrainian intellectual currents, whose initiator and propagator is 
Dr. Dmytro Dontsov.”52 Members had to accept the “principles of the Roman doctrine, which 
appeared in the corporative system of Mussolini, the universal coordinating force”—a reference 
                                                
48 Ibid., 122. 
 
49 Dontsov, “Vony i my,” 382. 
 
50 Zaitsev, Ukrains’kyi integral’nyi natsionalizm, 232-33. 
 
51 Kentyi, Zbroinyi chyn, vol. 1, 95. Tokarzhevs’kyi-Karashevych, like Dontsov, had served as a diplomat of the 
Ukrainian People’s Republic (UNR), and there were rumors that the two had joined the Ukrainophile Archduke 
Wilhelm von Habsburg (nom de guerre, Vasyl’ Vyshyvanyi) to form a nationalist “Imperial Order of St. George.” 
The rumor had been started by the OUN leader in Rome, Ievhen Onats’kyi, in an article in the paper Ukrains’ke 
slovo (The Ukrainian Word). Dontsov sharply denied the existence of such an order. I know of no evidence that it 
ever existed. Dmytro Dontsov, “Z presovoho fil’mu,” Vistnyk, no. 11 (1937): 837-40. 
 
52 Quoted in Zaitsev, Ukrains’kyi integral’nyi natsionalizm, 233. 
 
  343 
to the social and economic policies of Fascist Italy that sought to harmonize industry and labor, 
subordinating both to the state—and to “study in detail the doctrine and real achievements of 
Fascism, of this unbreakable antithesis of Bolshevism and the political front aligned with it.”53 
Self-declared Ukrainian “fascists” considered Dontsov the creator of a native Ukrainian fascism, 
which had developed independently from its Italian and German counterparts, in accordance 
with its own national traditions and character, but shared the same essence and spirit as the other 
fascist movement and was united with them in a pan-European crusade against Russian 
Communism and Soviet power.                            
 
Romance and Rivalry at the Salon Dontsova 
 Dontsov successfully proselytized Mussolini and Hitler’s “ersatz-religions”54 through his 
publications, but Vistnyk and its quarterly would not have been possible without the funds 
provided by the family of Dontsov’s wife, the poet and activist Mariia Dontsova. “Mariika,” as 
she was more affectionately known, proved indispensable to the day-to-day operations of LNV 
and Vistnyk. Although her mother was the official owner and publisher of Vistnyk, providing 
capital to get the venture started, the journal had to be a self-sustaining enterprise. Mariia 
recounted how the journal and the publishing house struggled to stay in business in the early 
years: they could not afford subscriptions, so she and Dontsov had to read the foreign press in 
cafes that put out copies of papers and magazines for customers; on several occasions she had to 
pledge her personal belongings to afford the print run and keep the journal alive.55 Eventually, 
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Vistnyk started to make a small profit and the publishing house began funding itself. Dontsova 
specialized in translations from the German press, corrections, dealing with letters from the 
public and submissions, and taking over as editor when Dontsov was away for business or 
pleasure. Just as important was her contribution to the morale at Vistnyk: she and her mother, 
sister, and niece (Ol’ha, Lesia, and Nana Bachyns’ka) “created a family atmosphere for the 
journal’s staff and contributors that somewhat softened Dontsov’s authoritarian work methods as 
editor.”56  
 An influential writer and publicist in her own right, Mariia Bachyns’ka-Dontsova headed 
Soiuz Ukrainok (the Union of Ukrainian Women)—the largest women’s organization in Galicia, 
boasting as many as 60,000 members at its height in the 1930s—and led its expansion into 
neighboring Volhynia in 1926-28. Despite this achievement, she was voted out of the position 
after just one year of service;57 apparently, her marriage to a radical rightwing ideologue was the 
decisive factor in the feminist union’s election. Soiuz Ukrainok faced the same choice as the rest 
of Western Ukrainian politics: the Dontsovian revolutionary ultranationalism of the OUN, or the 
traditional democratic parliamentarianism of the UNDO? Soiuz Ukrainok chose the latter course, 
rejecting Dontsova as a woman tainted by association with the former. Yet Dontsova’s own 
views on the women’s movement and its potentially utopian implications for humanity were 
entirely at odds with her husband’s grim, social-Darwinian nationalism. “[We] must realize,” 
Dontsova wrote in 1928, “that we do not have to adapt to the old social order, but must become 
the generator of new life, bringing into it new values where the slogan will not be homo homini 
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lupus est,58 but ‘humans come to the support of each human.’”59 Instead of Dontsov’s doctrine of 
hypermasculine national egoism and conditioning through ruthless competition, Dontsova 
preached feminine, nurturing altruism and peaceful, international cooperation.  
 With regard to moral and political philosophy, the couple could scarcely have been more 
at odds. One can adduce from historian Martha Bohachevsky-Chomiak’s account that Dontsova 
explained this stark difference of opinion in terms of gender essentialism: “Dontsova, avoiding 
the taboo word ‘feminism,’ argued that by their very make-up and innate interests women were 
social creatures to a far greater degree than men. They ‘were innately driven to civic work for the 
common good.’” Bohachevsky-Chomiak writes that Dontsova “saw women of the world, united 
in their goal of equal rights, searching for means to break out of the stifling ‘mold of social 
drones that had been fashioned for them by men, and recreating themselves as citizens.’”60 This 
was a mainstream, classical feminist position that emphasized differences between men and 
women, highlighting the relative virtues (e.g. altruism, compassion, kindness, temperance) of the 
latter as just cause for expanded civic rights and responsibilities. Dontsova and Dontsov both 
adhered to some form of voluntarism, calling for a transvaluation of values and a transcendence 
of conventional politics, but her egalitarianism and humanitarianism clashed with his 
authoritarian elitism, contempt for “the weak,” and hatred for the enemy.61 “Dontsova,” 
Bohachevsky-Chomiak argues, “considered conventional politics corrupt, dirty, and demeaning. 
She had a loftier vision: philanthropic work, which she felt to be traditionally women’s work, 
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would be elevated into a higher form of civic work and would replace politics.”62 Dontsova had 
access to the considerable Bachyns’kyi family fortune with which to fund her philanthropic 
activities. Ironically, were it not for this same wealth, Dontsov’s efforts to make Ukrainians 
misanthropic may well have foundered.   
 The Dontsovs’ home in L’viv at 11 Kurkovyi street (today named Lysenko), apartment 9, 
served as a literary salon for the Ukrainian nationalist writers of the day.63 Charismatic and 
gregarious, Mariika made certain that they were well taken care of during their stays there. The 
young poet and physician Iuryi Lypa, for instance, found a haven at what he warmly referred to 
as the “palais de ‘Donzow’.”64 A follower of Dontsov’s ideas, Lypa, who had been publishing 
nationalist poetry in LNV since 1922, became infatuated with Dontsova. She offered him loving 
support in the form of sweets and baked goods from L’viv while he studied medicine, French, 
and English in Poznan. The two met in person in 1924 and soon grew close. “Your greeting 
could have made me rejoice greatly,” Lypa wrote to her: “Creative cookies, fragrant paska-
breads—this is too much. But the package contained only a slip of paper with ‘Dontsova’ written 
on it—this is too little. In any case I will never forget this. At least as long as I continue eating it. 
. . . P.S. Madame Mariika, I am grateful to you for your attention, for your support, for the 
expedited present, but—could you not do this in some other way?” He updated her regularly—
about literature, tennis, dancing with “healthy girls,” the stresses of medical school, and so on.65 
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Soon, their correspondence turned flirtatious. “I think you could be close to me, but I have left 
many and will leave many more,” he once wrote to her.66 She responded with an invitation to a 
vacation with her in the Carpathian Mountains, “without any consequences!” to which Lypa 
eagerly agreed.67 As literary scholar Myroslav Shkandrij concludes: “In Mariia Dontsova [Lypa] 
appears to have found a sophisticated and graceful modern woman who acted both as friend and 
courtly lover.”68  
 Though married, Dontsova was free-spirited and coquettish when it suited her; though 
childless, she cut a matriarchal figure among the Vistnykivtsi. Independent, empowered, and 
sexually liberated, she was precisely the kind of woman whom Lypa celebrated in his late 1930s 
writings.69 Wedding nationalism and feminism, Lypa praised Ukrainian marriage traditions as a 
“union of equals.” He extolled heroic women from Ukraine’s past, allowing the female 
characters of his fiction to be Amazons, seductresses, wives, mothers, patriots, and muses all at 
once. Lypa honored Ukrainian women as creators, builders, and protectors—forthright, close to 
nature, and driven by elemental passions. He promoted machismo as well, depicting sex and 
sexuality with minimal sentimentality, especially in times of war, as a powerful expression of 
biological vitality, but without women’s strength, endurance, and wisdom, victory would forever 
elude Ukrainian men. Like Dontsova, Lypa nevertheless insisted on the distinctiveness and 
complementarity of men and women, equal yet opposite in the joint task of building the national 
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state, culture, and economy.70 He expressed these views in the official journal of Soiuz 
Ukrainok—Zhinka (Woman).  
 Lypa and Mariia’s relationship offers a window onto a community of writers whose 
private lives were neither prudish nor conventional. Evidently, the affair in no way distressed 
Dontsov, who was known for his own extramarital infatuations, and soon became romantically 
involved with another one of the young Vistnyk poets: Olena Teliha. Born Olena Shovheniv on 
July 21, 1907—goddaughter of the transgressive Silver Age poet Zinaida Gippius—Teliha spent 
her childhood among the Russian intelligentsia of early twentieth-century St. Petersburg. After 
1917 she and her family left, following her father, Ivan Shovheniv, a high-ranking official in the 
former Russian Empire, to Kyiv where he served in the UNR. Fleeing the Bolshevik invasion 
shortly thereafter, they made their way to Poděbrady, Czechoslovakia, one of the main hubs of 
the interwar Ukrainian emigration. While her older brother Serhii continued writing Russian 
verse, Teliha had her conversion experience from “imperial chauvinist” to Ukrainian patriot.71 
After this, she spoke and wrote Ukrainian exclusively. In 1922 she became friends with the 
literary critic Leonid Mosendz, who facilitated her Ukrainization and development as a 
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nationalist poet and intellectual.72 She married Mykhailo Teliha (1900-1942), a Ukrainian civic 
activist and folk musician (he played the bandura—a traditional stringed instrument), and moved 
with him to Warsaw in 1929. Around the same time, Olena began sending her poetry to Dontsov 
for publication in LNV. Initially, the editor responded with constructive (albeit condescending) 
criticisms, offering reading suggestions and words of encouragement, and imploring her to hone 
her craft and submit more poems to the journal.  
 Like the other Vistnykivtsi, Teliha drew her themes from the legends of yore and sought 
to convey fiery emotions rather than picturesque realism, let alone intellectual acuity. Whereas 
other émigré writers tried to impress readers with their knowledge of foreign words and obscure 
historical references, she wanted to write poetry with “spirit.”73 Mosendz, who held women’s 
poetry to an extremely high standard, lavished her verses with praise in his letters to Dontsov. He 
asserted that her writing was not “womanish” (po-babs’kyi), but “androgynous in the Platonic 
sense.”74 The editor agreed with Mosendz’s sexist, yet positive, assessment of Teliha’s work, 
publishing her first poems in LNV in the years 1928-1932. Hereafter, Teliha’s fame grew quickly 
on the Ukrainian literary scene in Warsaw. She cultivated an intense, magnetic persona, dressed 
impeccably, and earned many admirers.  
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Figures 5.2-3. Olena Teliha and Natalia Livyts’ka-Kholodna. Source: Internet Encyclopedia of 
Ukraine 
 
 The well-known poet and socialite Natalia Livyts’ka-Kholodna (1902-2005)—daughter 
of the former head of the UNR’s government-in-exile, Andrii Livyts’kyi (1879-1954), and a 
regular contributor to LNV—befriended “Lena” Teliha, took an interest in her career, and 
arranged for her to meet Dontsov in person. Livyts’ka-Kholodna related the encounter in her 
postwar memoir dedicated to Teliha. On the morning of January 20, 1933, Dontsov arrived in 
Warsaw, whereupon Livyts’ka-Kholodna introduced him to Teliha and the three went to see a 
film. Afterward, Natalia went home, leaving Dmytro and Lena to dine alone together at a 
restaurant. The next day, Dontsov gave his lecture on “Sancho Panza and Don Quixote”—the 
ideologue’s signature metaphors for the cowardly, plebeian vices of the materialist and the 
fanatical, knightly virtues of the idealist, respectively. Livyts’ka-Kholodna invited Dontsov to 
dinner at her father’s home in Warsaw, as she always did when he visited the city to give his 
“always very interesting” talks.75 (As one observer recalled after attending such a lecture for the 
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first time in 1930s Warsaw: “Then I understood the electrifying influence Dontsov had on 
people. . . . He finished, bowed slightly, and left. No questions, no discussions. Everyone sat in 
silence.”)76 At dinner, Livyts’ka-Kholodna sat Dontsov and Teliha next to one another, and 
herself opposite of them. The attraction between the latter pair was already apparent:  
From this visit to Warsaw began his infatuation [zakhoplennia] with Lena. This 
captivation was for us entirely understood. For one, Lena was truly charming and this not 
from some kind of physical beauty, but from a kind of special, individual, spiritual 
charm. Secondly, because Dontsov was known for his frequent infatuations. But, perhaps, 
because he was somewhere close to sixty, and Lena was twenty-six, this captivation of 
his lasted the longest, and possibly, was his last.77                     
 
 
Figure 5.4. A 1936 caricature of Dontsov depicting him as Don Quixote—a character he often 
invoked as a symbol of the chivalrous idealism and resolve that he implored Ukrainians to 
develop. I am not sure whom the vaguely Hitlerian “Sancho Panza” figure in the background is 
supposed to represent. Source: Sofiia, “Humor po-l’vivs’ky.”  
 
________________________ 
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 Livyts’ka-Kholodna suggested that Teliha’s attraction to Dontsov might have been 
attributable to the estrangement from her father that followed his marriage to a woman with 
whom she did not get along, but conceded that Teliha would have denied this. Rumors quickly 
spread that, more than platonic sympathies, erotic feelings might also connect the editor and the 
young poet.78 For many, Teliha’s publications in 1933 confirmed these suspicions. Her poem 
“Kozachok” (Cossacks), for example, was deemed “too erotic” by the Greek-Catholic monthly 
Dzvony (Bells),79 referring to lines such as: “But the soul, drunk with dissolution / Drinks up the 
golden poison of grief / O, take me, take me, my beloved / I so want to be near you!” Someone 
behind the cryptonym P.B. accused her and the journal Vistnyk of promoting “free love and 
marital infidelity.” The critic asserted that Dontsov taught his followers to disregard 
conventional morality in the pursuit of their “sexual passion.” Another one of Teliha’s poems, 
“Podorozhnyi” (The Traveler), which she dedicated to Dontsov, fueled the gossip. She shared the 
poem with him during another one of his visits to Warsaw in May 1933. He quite liked it and 
offered to publish it in Vistnyk, but Teliha had already promised Livyts’ka-Kholodna that she 
would publish it in a competing journal: My (We, 1933-39). Before treating Teliha’s love poems 
to Dontsov and his public and private responses to them, an account of My’s origins and the 
conflicts that it manifested in the Vistnyk circle is needed.  
 Fissures between the Dontsovs and the members of the Vistnykivtsi began to appear in 
1929, when the nationalist writer Andrii Kryzhanivs’kyi (1907-1950, pseudonym: Sviatoslav 
Dolenga) created the literary-artistic union Tank (Tank) in Warsaw, setting himself up as 
Dontsov’s competitor on the nationalist cultural scene and attempting to draw Vistnyk writers 
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over to his side.80 Tank was to serve as the core of a new periodical that would advance the cause 
of Ukrainian independence and cultivate a modernist nationalist idiom of its own, freed from 
Dontsov’s oversight. Like a growing number of the other contributors to LNV, Kryzhanivs’kyi 
resented Dontsov’s imperious editorship and restrictive ideological and aesthetic prerogatives. At 
roughly the same time as Tank’s creation, Kryzhanivs’kyi submitted a short story to LNV that 
Dontsov rejected, condescendingly explaining to the author that “heroes have to want something 
and aim for something, and not accept the world’s blows passively. When heroes do not exert 
themselves, there is no action. When there is no action, there is no novel, no story.”81  
 Iuryi Kosach (1908-1990)—Lesia Ukrainka’s nephew, Olena Pchilka’s grandson, and a 
talented writer in his own right—also broke with Dontsov in 1929 after years of contributing to 
LNV. Kosach quickly became disillusioned with Tank for its “Petliurist slant,” reportedly despite 
Lypa’s assurances of its “independence from all political conceptions,” but he informed Dontsov 
of the rebellion forming against him there:82 “When I asked Malaniuk and Lypa, why not take 
the most natural path, which is to say, put Tank to the good use of LNV? Lypa said that this is not 
advantageous because the materials would go through the prism of the pan doctor [i.e. Dontsov 
—T.E.].”83 Tank recruited Lypa and Malaniuk, both of whom expressed dissatisfaction with 
Dontsov’s stifling authority. The two poets produced an artistic manifesto for Tank, which 
                                                
80 Sherekh, “Skarby, iakymy volodiiemo,” 147-64. 
 
81 Dmytro Dontsov to Andrii Kryzhanivs’kyi, January 30, 1930. BN, DD, Mf. 82672, 108. 
 
82 Instead, Kosach joined another new competing publication, Novi shliakhy (New Paths, 1928-32), founded and 
edited by yet another defector from LNV, Antin Krushel’nyts’kyi (1878-1937), who, being a prominent 
Sovietophile, decided to emigrate with his family to Soviet Ukraine in May 1934. Just months after their arrival his 
two sons were arrested and shot. Arrested along with what remained of his family and sent to the Gulag, 
Krushel’nyts’kyi died in a prison camp on the Solovets Islands in 1941. 
 
83 Iuryi Kosach to Dmytro Dontsov, March 31, 1929. BN, DD, Mf. 83983, 287-88. 
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Dontsov categorically refused to publish.84 In private conversation, Malaniuk called Dontsov an 
“exploiter of literature,” but backed off the criticism to avoid provoking the editor’s wrath.85 
Ol’zhych got into conflicts with Dontsov over the proofing and altering without approval of his 
poems in Vistnyk.86 Angered at the latter’s suggestion that he stick to writing poetry, Lypa 
dismissed the editor’s critiques: “Unfortunately, I have to state that I look to you for advice 
concerning my literary work as little as you, for example, look to me concerning your political 
work.”87 Following this episode, Lypa did not resume corresponding with the Dontsovs until 
three years later, at the founding of Vistnyk.88  
 Dontsov and Dontsova took personal offense at Lypa’s choice to join the Warsaw circle, 
regarding it as a betrayal and a sign of ingratitude, but Lypa insisted that Tank was in no way 
intended to harm LNV; on the contrary, Tank was created to continue LNV’s work in the event of 
its demise, which appeared likely in 1929.89 Lypa shared his discontent with Dontsov in his 
                                                
84 Omelchuk, Literaturni idealy, 7. 
 
85 Shkandrij, Ukrainian Nationalism, 138. 
 
86 “The last LNV brought me a lot of grief,” Olzhych wrote to Dontsov: “It is the right of every editor to print that 
which he considers to be for the good, but it is an inalienable right of the author to publish only that which he 
himself wrote. The author of a poem that took six months to hatch selects all the associations that every word 
invokes, observes every pause, but the editor after a moment’s reflection takes a pencil and… corrects [it]. In poetry 
the author alone is responsible for everything. For some reason you are frightened by the word revolution (even 
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period after ‘orchid,’ and added a comma with a dash, thereby changing the meaning, which [went] nowhere further. 
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pinno’ and ‘ne stane - neznane’ as printing errors in the next edition of LNV. Dontsov made the corrections. BN, 
DD, Mf. 83985, Oleh Ol’zhych to Dmytro Dontsov, April 2, 1932. Ol’zhych left Vistnyk over similar, 
nonideological disagreements before the journal’s demise in 1939, taking Mukhin with him. Svarnyk, “Chy 
isnuvala,” 93. 
 
87 Iuryi Lypa to Dmytro Dontsov, March 20, 1929. BN, DD, Mf. 83984, 118. Shkandrij’s translation. 
 
88 They began working together again only to fall into a hostile polemic in the mid to late 1930s, on which more 
below. 
 
89 Iuryi Lypy to Nataliia Livyts’ka-Kholodna, 23 March 1929, in Dzherela do novitnoi istorii Ukrainy (New York: 
Ukrainian Academy of Arts and Sciences, 1992), 335. 
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letters to fellow Tank poet, Livyts’ka-Kholodna, who was one of the leading members and 
organizers of the group, not to mention Malaniuk’s lover. She invited her friend Teliha and the 
belle-lettrist Leonid Mosendz to join Tank. This led to only minor disagreements with Dontsov 
until 1933, when the Warsaw group started its own publishing house Variah (Viking) and a 
flagship literary journal, the quarterly My. My tended to support the UNR’s government-in-exile, 
and advocated freedom of expression and a modernist, “European” aesthetic. It challenged the 
integral nationalism of Visntyk, and directly competed with it for authors and subscribers. At 
roughly the same time, the bimonthly Nazustrich (Rendezvous, 1934-1939), a relatively 
apolitical competitor of Vistnyk offering literary and art criticism, and a monthly journal 
featuring young nationalist writers named Dazhboh (1932-1935) after the benevolent sun deity of 
Slavic paganism, also appeared in L’viv and published contributions from members of the 
Vistnykivtsi.90 Acknowledging the heightened competition, Ol’zhych told Dontsov to take heart: 
“When the monsters of the intellect and of national morality so activate and unify for the 
storming of the journal and of your person, then this cannot cause anything but satisfaction.”91  
 Once Kryzhanivs’kyi became My’s editor in 1934, the journal took a more aggressive 
stance, launching public attacks against Dontsov and his followers, and materially competing 
with Vistnyk for subscribers and the right to shape interwar Ukrainian émigré opinion. He 
accused Dontsov of failing to understand that literature, in order to have real value, must 
preserve its autonomy from politics. The ideologue of Vistnyk exploited literature for the vulgar 
purposes of his ultranationalist rhetoric, refusing to argue in good faith with his opponents, 
________________________ 
 
90 The editors of Dazhboh were the literary scholar Ievhen Pelens’kyi (1908-1956), the poet Bohdan Ihor Antonych 
(1909-1937), and the poet Bohdan Kravtsiv (1904-1975), who also contributed to Vistnyk. 
 
91 BN, DD, Mf. 83985. Oleh Ol’zhych to Dmytro Dontsov, March 31, 1938. 
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misrepresenting their opinions, and engaging in personal attacks. Writing to Kosach on April 10, 
1934, Kryzhanivs’kyi compared Dontsov to the Russian Communists and bemoaned his 
influence on the Ukrainian emigration: “Dontsov’s methods and his style are beginning to 
gangrene on our body. One is really inclined to think that he has been ‘spiritually numbed’ by the 
tactics and methods of Bolshevism. His frequent attacks on them and continual interest in their 
(Soviet) life have been fatal. Such things happen. That’s why doctors in mental asylums go 
insane themselves.” Kryzhanivs’kyi considered Dontsov a symptom of the times: “Really 
honorable elements are dying off completely in our life. The stage is being taken over by 
modernized Ivan Karamazovs92 dressed up as Hitler.”93 He returned to this subject in another 
letter to Kosach, dated January 28, 1935: “You write that you are infuriated by Dontsov, Don’t 
be. Dontsov’s actions are becoming baser and baser. He walks through the Galician world like a 
simple, snub-nosed Mephistopheles. The poor man has forgotten the ancient truth that even 
‘great people’ must recognize their time to die. And here is galvanizing himself in a Hitlerian 
manner entirely foreign to him.”94  
 Kryzhanivs’kyi published a sharp critique of Vistnyk and its authors, including Teliha, in 
the second edition of My in 1934, and four years later he produced an anti-Dontsov brochure that 
deployed anti-Semitic stereotypes against the anti-Semitic ideologue and his circle, comparing 
the loyal Vistnykivsti to a “nationalist ghetto” of isolated, sectarian, and closed-minded 
“Wunderkinder” (i.e. Teliha, Malaniuk, Ol’zhych, Mosendz, Klen, etc.), blindly devoted to their 
                                                
92 One of the main characters in Dostoevsky’s famous novel, The Brothers Karamazov. Ivan represents the typical, 
politically radical, atheistic Russian intellectual, who is corrupted and driven mad by Satanic arrogance. 
 
93 TsDAVO, f. 4462, op. 1, spr. 4, ark. 44-44b. Letter to Kosach January 28, 1935. Quoted in Shkandrij, Ukrainian 
Nationalism, 138-39. 
 
94 Ibid., 45-45b. 
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faultless “rabbi” who brooks no dissent, and to his incorruptible “Talmudic wisdom.”95 While 
happy to ridicule Dontsov as a man with a much-too-high opinion of himself (writing 
sarcastically about the ideologue’s agelessness, unsurpassed command of the Ukrainian 
language, and so on), Kryzhanivs’kyi had a personal, not an ideological, problem with Dontsov:  
We rise, not against the ideas that Dontsov peddles on our ground, but against Dontsov 
himself, against his harmful temperament, against the Dontsov who endeavors to put 
himself on the pedestal of a leader through his own self-advertising and the simultaneous 
humiliation of all so-called ‘competitors,’ against the Dontsov ‘hyena’ (to use his 
vocabulary), who beats up on political corpses (Drahomanov) and the dead 
(Hrushevs’kyi), against Dontsov the blind, who can see nothing positive in Ukraine and 
who wants to lead the great and deep Ukrainian question into the shameless formula: 
‘Ukraine c’est moi.’ And, lastly, we rise against Dontsov the speculator who, like a 
Persian shah and his orders, issues patents for nationalists and patriots, blackens or exalts 
people, solely by virtue of the fact that he happened to become the owner of a journal.96  
 
Kryzhanivs’kyi emphasized the many “errors”—which is to say, changes of opinion, allegiance, 
and identity—that Dontsov had made in the course of his life.97 How dare he claim to be perfect 
and accuse others of heresy and impurity?  
 The line had been drawn: My or Vistnyk, Kryzhanivs’kyi or Dontsov? The latter 
successfully pressured Malaniuk into ending his collaboration with My, which Dontsov 
denounced as “an organ of kleptomaniacs.”98 Lypa chose a more independent path, rejecting 
both My and, as we shall see, Vistnyk. Teliha and Mosendz, however, chose Dontsov, and 
remained fiercely loyal to him throughout the 1930s. The attempts by Livyts’ka-Kholodna and 
My to pull Teliha away from Vistnyk angered Dontsov, who clearly held the latter in the highest 
esteem. He expressed his frustration in a letter to Livyts’ka-Kholodna on March 27, 1933: “I 
                                                
95 Sviatoslav Dolenga, Dontsovshchyna (Warsaw: Variah, 1938), 4-5. 
 
96 Ibid., 77. 
 
97 Specifically, being a Marxist, serving Skoropads’kyi and the Germans, and promoting Polish-Ukrainian 
rapprochement; covered in chapters 1, 2, and 3, respectively. 
 
98 Svarnyk, “Naimolodshi,” 190. 
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only regret that the editors of the collection terrorized the Dear Creative [Myle sotvorinnia, one 
of his terms of endearment for Teliha] and took her verses, [which were] promised to Vistnyk 
(‘O, women, women,’ Socrates said, and had reason).”99 Under pressure from Dontsov, Teliha 
ultimately decided to publish “Podorozhnii” in Vistnyk instead of My.  
 There were several reasons behind her decision. Whereas Dontsov valued her poetry, the 
acting editor of My, Malaniuk, considered Teliha a neophyte and did not care for her work. Her 
personal feelings for Dontsov also appear to have influenced her decision, which led to the 
cooling of her relationship with Livyts’ka-Kholodna, especially after Kryzhanivs’kyi’s attacks 
on Dontsov and Vistnyk, which ended her association with Tank altogether.100 On June 8, 1933, 
Teliha wrote to Livyts’ka-Kholodna:  
Perhaps, the greatest number of arguments and misunderstandings between us have been 
over Dontsov. But, Natusenka, you cannot imagine how dear he is to me. I can see you 
laughing (‘a pathological phenomenon’). Maybe it is ‘pathological,’ but it is undeniably 
strong and very sincere. I cannot define what it is: love, adoration, friendship, or 
infatuation, or none of these, but this feeling is so deep, that you, if you love me, must 
once and for all reconcile yourself and not treat it lightly, because otherwise I could not 
be completely open with you.101  
 
Despite assurances that their friendship was unbreakable, Teliha withdrew from Livyts’ka-
Kholodna and the rest of the Warsaw circle, aligning herself with Dontsov. Teliha’s 
“Podorozhnii” appeared in Vistnyk alongside an anonymous poem entitled “Bez prysviaty” 
(Without a Dedication), which contemporaries recognized as Dontsov’s work:102 “You were 
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frightened by no sensation / And on our very first night of solitude / You tipped the chalice 
without hesitation / With sweet poison at the bottom.” Commentators have agreed that the poem 
was Dontsov’s reply to “Podorozhnii.”103  
 In response, Olena published another poem, “Bez nazvy” (Untitled), in Vistnyk that year, 
this time expressly dedicated to the journal’s editor, “D. D.”: “Not love, not tenderness, and not 
passion… / But a heart—an awakened eagle! / Drink the splashes, fresh and sparkling / Of 
unnamed joyful sources!”104 In Dontsov’s Warsaw archive one can find an unpublished “strictly 
private” poem from May 5, 1933, which was, as Shkandrij asserts, “almost certainly an answer 
to Teliha’s ‘Bez nazvy.’”105 The final stanzas read: “And here it is. / The platform and that 
straight figure / A hand raised in parting . . . Only a moment. / But the chaos is already 
disappearing. / And I can see the shore again. / And someone’s narrow hand / Smooths my tired 
brow again . . . / Once more something pulls and draws me / To dive headlong into / Another 
whirlwind. / Soit benie, ma petite, / Merci, I will come again.”106 Contradicting Livyts’ka-
Kholodna’s assertions that Teliha was simply flirting, Shkandrij argues that these poems, which 
link “romance, biology, and the warrior’s need for revived energy and replenished force,” 
strongly suggest that Teliha and Dontsov’s relationship was more than Platonic,107 adding:  
A second poem in Dontsov’s archive, which is dated 25 March 1933, mentions various 
meeting places: Luxembourg, Lac Leman, Lago di Garda, and the committing of a ‘dark, 
spring-time sin!’ It contains the lines: ‘Wherever life’s predictable fate took me, She 
appeared with the spring wind! Whatever name they gave Her, She and the spring were 
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always together!’108 Both of Dontsov’s poems construct woman as the inspirer of male 
desire and the accomplice of nature. The tone of both is brutal and taut; they suggest that 
lurking beneath the surface lies the attraction to physical passion. Both poems leave little 
space for female agency but do indicate the power of women to inspire. In the first poem 
Dontsov shows his disdain for the common herd that is incapable of understanding his 
thoughts and feelings or, perhaps, his sexual morality. He was apparently supremely 
indifferent toward anyone who censured his extramarital affairs.109      
 
Shkandrij connects this libidinal nonconformism to Teliha and Dontsov’s common background 
in the countercultural milieu of the early twentieth-century symbolists and decadents in St. 
Petersburg.  
  
Figures 5.5-6. Olena Teliha and Dmytro Dontsov in Warsaw in the 1930s (left) and on vacation 
in Vorokhta in the summer of 1935 (right). Source: Teliha, O kraiu my, 263.  
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Figures 5.7-8. Dontsov and Teliha in L’viv, 1930s. Source: Denys Koval’ov, “Muza ta 
natkhnennytsis ideoloha ukrains’koho natsionalizmu.” initiativenational.blogspot.com. 
http://initiativenational.blogspot.com/2012/02/blog-post_21.html [accessed March 9, 2017].  
Olena and Mykhailo Teliha (her husband). Source: Teliha, O kraiu my, 229. 
 
 Shkandrij does not, however, consider Mariia Dontsova’s take on the situation, or why 
Teliha would “cheat” on her young husband, Mykhailo, whom she had married just a few years 
prior. Olena Teliha suffered from the realization that, despite all the love (liubov’) and respect 
that she had for him,110 she did not feel romantic love (kokhannia) for Mykhailo. For her part, 
Dontsova dismissed the rumors of an affair between her husband and Lena, whom she admired 
greatly. She wrote to Dontsov on July 7, 1934:  
Talia said that Natusia [i.e. Natalia Pyrohova-Zybenko111 and Natalia Livyts’ka-
Kholodna –TE] asserted that the reason why Kryzhanivs’kyi attacked you . . . was Lena! 
‘Because she is always running around all of Warsaw telling gossip!’ I ask Talia ‘what 
kind?’ ‘Let’s see [her] letters [to] Dontsov,’ I say: ‘Unless in these letters there is 
something unpleasant and impermissible.’ ‘No!’ she answers, but through them Lena 
(again Lena, and Lena is now to blame for everything!) created a correspondingly hostile 
                                                
110 Teliha, Lysty. Spohady, 146-47. 
 
111 A friend of Teliha, Dontsova, and Livyts’ka-Kholodna, Pyrohova-Zybenko (1903-1995) wrote under the 
pseudonym Natalia Iakhnenko, and contributed to Vistnyk. 
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atmosphere, alleged that they are undermining Vistnyk, and so on. I say: ‘If Lena says 
this, then she says the truth and repeats my thoughts, because I think that My is materially 
damaging Vistnyk. (Think now, Hikavyi says, that in the bookstores My is being sold for 
low prices (a discount is already given for 1.5 zloty for a half year). Is this not 
competition?! But this is typically Ukrainian: but I didn’t make a noise, and I will not 
give in. Ugh, let them!112  
 
When Dontsov went with Olena to the spa town of Vorokhta for leisure in the Carpathian 
Mountains, leaving Dontsova to run Vistnyk in her husband’s absence, Dontsova wrote to the 
pair joking about the scandalous rumors: “Congratulations, Ms. [pani] Lena! Go to Burkut!113 
All is well. . . . Ms. Lena’s husband was here in L’viv, but he did not come to me, which made 
me angry.”114 Dontsova devoted one of her warmest memoirs, written after the war, to Teliha.115 
The Vistnykivtsi specialist Halyna Svarnyk has argued that these reactions from Mariika, “known 
for her jealous character,” demonstrate that there was, in fact, nothing unseemly going on. 
“Unfortunately,” Svarnyk writes, “we too often now observe the resurrection of the ‘fantastic 
dreams’ of young and inexperienced literary critics, and, in particular, journalists, about the 
private life of Olena Teliha, who make attempts to explain nearly all her relations with male 
colleagues from the point of view of the mutated Freudianism now fashionable in Ukraine.”116 
Svarnyk especially takes issue with Iuryi (Sherekh) Shevel’ov’s cruel characterization of 
Teliha’s love for an unknown fatherland and the editor of Vistnyk as “a patri-erotic fascination 
with an abstract Ukraine and a very concrete Dontsov.”117 Svarnyk writes that Shevel’ov, in 
                                                
112 Quoted in Halyna Svarnyk, “Dusha v chervonii Amazontsi, (do 100-richchia vid dnia narodzhennia Oleny 
Telihy)” Sicheslav, no. 9 (July-September 2006): 118-23. 
 
113 A small village in Ivano-Frankivs’k oblast’. 
 
114 Quoted in ibid., 201-2. Mariia Dontsova to Dmytro Dontsov, July 17, 1934, 
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confusion, “sought to prove that the patriotism of the émigrés and their grief for an unreachable 
fatherland were elements of artificiality, abstractness, illusion.”118 On the contrary, the 
Vistnykivtsi were deadly serious about what they wrote, prepared to be killed for what they 
believed in, and aware that their involvement in the “romantic” world of Ukrainian nationalism 
was likely to put them in a situation where their resolve would be tested on this. Teliha embraced 
the ideal of self-conscious martyrdom that Dontsov described in his 1922 work on Lesia 
Ukrainka. As Teliha wrote in her poem, “Lyst” (A Letter), dedicated to Mosendz: “And in the 
web of crisscrossed colors / I ardently dream of the early morning / For God to send me the 
greatest gift: / A hot death, not a wintry expiration. . . . Let life stray and depart / Like a ship in 
glowing flames!”119     
 
The “New Woman” and the “New Europe” 
 Certainly, Teliha deserves to be taken seriously as an artist and a political activist. My 
aim in the foregoing has not been to engage in prurient speculation, but to draw attention to the 
interplay of the personal and the political in the lives and works of the Visnykivtsi. For instance, 
Teliha’s enthusiasm for Nazism and Fascism throughout the 1930s is directly attributable to the 
influence of Dontsov. According to Livyts’ka-Kholodna, Teliha began to idolize Dontsov as if 
he were a Ukrainian “Mussolini” (to which Livyts’ka-Kholodna retorted that Dontsov was 
capable of criticism, not action, seeing only the failings of Ukraine’s struggle for liberation but 
remaining blind to its “tragic heroism” and “national heroes”).120 As Dontsov’s loyal student, 
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Teliha hailed Nazism as a model for Ukrainians in one of her few political essays, Syla cherez 
radist’ (Strength through Joy), on Nazi Germany’s state-administered public recreation and 
tourism program of the same name—Kraft durch Freude.121 Presenting the essay in a speech to 
the Ukrains’ka Students’ka Hromada (Ukrainian Student’s Society) in Warsaw on June 15, 
1937, she spoke of Kraft durch Freude as a youth organization that enjoyed the widespread 
support of the German people. Her ideas about a new type of woman and mother, racial hygiene, 
the synonymy of struggle and life, the revitalizing power of pleasure and humor, and the 
overriding imperative of devotion to a singular goal, reflected Dontsov’s voluntarism and his 
growing appreciation for Nazi theorists, such as Alfred Rosenberg (1893-1946).122 Teliha quoted 
the latter’s thoughts on the subject of gender, race, and nation in her article on Ukrainian 
womanhood, “Iakymy was pahnete?” (How Do You Desire Us?):  
But is the woman-mother and only the mother really the ideal of fascism? No! Alfred 
Rosenberg, one of the leading representatives of Hitlerism, in his book Blood and Honor: 
The Struggle for the German Rebirth, does not keep woman under lock and key in the 
house. He says that ‘the preservation of our race lies in the hands of woman.’ Of the race 
and not just of children and the family. She does not dare to give birth to the children of 
foreigners. She should teach her children ‘not to consider a Syrian on Kurfürstendamm123 
a compatriot and a possible husband for [her] daughters.’ She should take care that her 
land is not settled by physical or spiritual janissaries. . . . True, Rosenberg seeks the 
________________________ 
 
121 Olena Teliha, “Syla cherez radist’,” Vistnyk, no. 9 (1936): 649-59. in Teliha, O Krait mii, 97-108. Her first 
biographer, Iuryi Boiko writes: “The weakest of her publicistic [works] was Syla cherez radist’. Here she is still a 
student of Dontsov, his sincere, inflammatory apologist, who received the Ukrainian spiritual life of the nineteenth 
and beginning of the twentieth centuries through his lens. . . . And all the same we read the article with interest, not 
only as a catalog of mistakes of the young poetess, but because, in her own mistakes, Olena also burned, overflowed 
with anger all around, and was also beautiful in her childish naivety. This was a volcano of dynamics and desire to 
live better, more heroically, than [her] predecessors lived. Thus, we take Syla cherez radist’, not as a publicistic, but 
as an artistic work of fulminating [and] still unconquered internal energies.” Teliha, Zbirnyk, 406-7. 
 
122 A Baltic German, Rosenberg wrote The Myth of the Twentieth Century (1930) and other works expounding 
central Nazi doctrines: biological racism and anti-Semitism, Lebensraum, “Positive Christianity,” Aryan mysticism, 
and “degenerate art.” Unlike Hitler, he favored the creation of a Ukrainian buffer state and the encouragement of 
anti-Communist, preferably non-Russian, nationalism, but did not object to the ruthless conquest and colonization of 
Russia proper. Rosenberg was the Reich’s minister for the occupied eastern territories, and was found guilty and 
executed for his crimes at Nuremberg. 
 
123 A famous boulevard in Berlin. 
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emancipation of women from women’s emancipation, but again he does not want her in 
the kitchen and the bedroom. ‘Woman must live the general life of the nation. All paths 
to education must become wide open to her. Every opportunity for the application of her 
power should be wide open to woman.’124   
 
 Teliha contrasted this fascist ideal of woman to the narrow roles afforded Ukrainian (as 
opposed to Western) women in contemporary Ukrainian literature. She listed three such roles: 
the “slave” (housewife) and the “vamp” (seductress), who do not inspire respect, and the 
“amazon” (feminist), who does not inspire love and adoration. All three fail the nation: the first, 
the “Andromache,” by refusing to sacrifice her men in war, staking everything in the survival of 
her family without regard for the nation as a whole; the second, by degrading women and 
exposing them to the cynicism and brutality of a false masculinity;125 and the third, by ignoring 
procreation, motherhood, and the inspiration of the nation’s men altogether. She challenged her 
fellow Visntykivtsi—Malaniuk and Mosendz—for the demeaning slave/vamp image of the 
Ukrainian woman and of Ukraine itself found in their poetry. Teliha especially objected to 
Malaniuk’s conception of Ukraine as a chaotic “feminine nation” in which men and women were 
psychologically switching places in defiance of the natural order of things, much to the detriment 
of the nation’s health.126 While her ideal woman was capable of both love and camaraderie 
toward men, Teliha rejected Lypa’s more permissive ideas about Ukrainian gender roles and 
sexuality as “erotomania,” extolling women capable of ascetic self-discipline, self-sacrifice, 
strength, and patriotic sublimation of the libido in times of crisis, as well as “tenderness and 
humor during leisure.” The Ukrainian woman, she wrote, “wants to be a Woman. A woman who 
                                                
124 Olena Teliha, “Iakymy nas prahnete?” Vistnyk, no. 10 (1935): 735-74. In Teliha, O kraiu mii, 80-91, 86-87. 
 
125 Teliha alleges that this cruel attitude toward women predominates in the writing of Kryzhanivs’kyi and 
Vynnychenko, comparing it unfavorably to the strong, well-rounded women in Anglo-Saxon and Nordic literature. 
 
126 Ievhen Malaniuk, “Zhinocha Muzhnist’,” Nova khata, no. 12 (1931). 
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differs from a man yet is his equal, a faithful ally of men in the struggle for life, and, above all, 
for the nation.”127  
 Teliha personified and represented the Ukrainian integral nationalist counterpoint to the 
powerful Western Ukrainian women’s movement. Unable to reject women’s rights, since this 
would have alienated the tens of thousands of educated women who read Zhinka, yet fearful of a 
perceived international feminist threat to the nation’s unity and masculinity, the OUN and 
Vistnyk seized upon Teliha’s conception of gender equality, which subordinated feminism to 
nationalism and insisted upon the preservation of “traditional” gender roles. Championing her 
position, Teliha initiated a polemical yet mutually respectful debate with Soiuz Ukrainok and its 
head, Milena Rudnyts’ka—the charismatic orator, activist, UNDO leader, and Sejm member—
who argued that national and women’s liberation were perfectly compatible, interdependent 
goals. Teliha and others at Visntyk charged that Rudnyts’ka and the Ukrainian feminists were 
guilty of “liberalism” and sentimental love of humanity, which sapped the nation’s strength and 
resolve.128  
 The ideal woman of Dontsov and the Vistnykivtsi was to be proud, courageous, 
emancipated, modern, strong, severe, intelligent, warlike, and sexually empowered, yet 
emotionally disciplined, traditional, submissive to her own menfolk but contemptuous of foreign 
men, self-sacrificial, sexually altruistic, physically beautiful, and dedicated to wifely and 
                                                
127 Teliha, “Iakymy.” Quoted in Shkandrij, Ukrainian Nationalism, 183. Shkandrij notes that Teliha had to turn to 
Soviet Ukrainian literature to find male writers who wrote female characters of this sort, citing Agalaia in Mykola 
Khvyl’ovyi’s novel Valdshnepy (Woodsnipes). 
 
128 Omelchuk, Literaturni idealy ukrains’koho visnykivstva, 198. Meanwhile, the OUN attacked the Soiuz Ukrainok 
for undermining families, deforming the nation’s morals, and promoting pacifism and internationalism. Yet, even 
integral nationalist leaders, such as Andriievs’kyi, Konovalets’, and Onats’kyi, conceded that Rudnyts’ka, who 
regularly denounced the OUN’s tactics and totalitarian ideology, was in reality an invaluable representative of 
Ukrainian interests to the West. Diaduk, Ukrains’kyi zhinochyi rukh, 127, 133-34, 138. Onats’kyi, U vichnomu misti, 
43, 139. 
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motherly duties. Teliha’s ideal woman was similarly contradictory—“hard, yet soft,” depending 
on what the moment called for. The Vistnykivtsi celebrated the apocryphal Judith, who, the story 
goes, used her feminine wiles to penetrate the enemy Assyrians’ camp and decapitate their leader 
in his sleep, thus saving Israel. Another favorite was Joan of Arc, the legendary heroine who 
inspired martial courage and masculinity in the men of France by acting it out herself, suffering 
martyrdom for it, but in a distinctly feminine way.129 Dontsov fêted the Ukrainian writer Olena 
Pchilka, Lesia Ukrainka’s mother, as a Ukrainian exemplar of womanhood—“a woman-patriot 
different from tender [nizhni] lovers, sisters, and wives,” yet “full of womanly charm and 
beauty.”130 As literary scholar Olesia Omelchuk explains:  
The critical texts of Dontsov and the artistic texts of Malaniuk exhibit fantasies about 
proud, sexually and creatively active female figures. Dontsov called such women 
‘sanguinary’ [kryvavymy], and the metaphor of blood in this context referred not to a 
racial or national sense of ‘blood,’ but to an archaic, vampiric, sexual essence that lies 
hidden within women. At a time when Teliha was rejecting women-vamps, Dontsov was 
obsessed with them, and Malaniuk and Livyts’ka-Kholodna introduced women from 
whom a sexual energy radiates, capable of conquering a man’s will, into their poetry. For 
Dontsov, the desired femininity was also passionate and active; heroic femme fatales 
occupied his imagination.131  
 
Susan Sonntag has highlighted the combination of lasciviousness and idealization in Nazi art, 
distinguishing it from the puritanical aesthetic of its Russian Communist counterpart.132 
Omelchuk argues that much the same can be said of Dontsov, who thought of erotic attraction 
                                                
129 Omelchuk, Literaturni idealy ukrains’koho visnykivstva, 199. Dmytro Dontsova, “Olena Pchilka (Sproba 
reabilitatsii),” LNV, no. 5 (1931): 439-52, 441; Dmytro Dontsov, “Zhanna d’Ark (Istoriia i legenda),” LNV, no. 6 
(1929): 545-56. 
 
130 Quoted in Omelchuk, Literaturni idealy ukrains’koho visnykivstva, 199. 
   
131 Ibid., 207. 
 
132 “In contrast to the asexual chasteness of official communist art, Nazi art is both prurient and idealizing. A utopian 
aesthetics (identity as a biological given) implies an ideal eroticism (sexuality converted into the magnetism of 
leaders and the joy of followers). The fascist ideal is to transform sexual energy into a “spiritual” force, for the 
benefit of the community. The erotic is always present as a temptation, with the most admirable response being a 
heroic repression of the sexual impulse.” Susan Sontag, “Fascinating Fascism,” New York Review of Books 
(February 6, 1975). http://www.nybooks.com/articles/1975/02/06/fascinating-fascism/ [accessed March 15, 2017] 
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and sex between men and women as a wholesome, beautiful manifestation of the living national 
organism. The Vistnykivtsi combined the ideal of the “New Woman”—emancipated, modern, 
provocatively dressed, and admired for her evermore public, evermore spectacular creativity, 
sexuality, and physicality—with their own ideas of radical patriotism, will power, youth, 
violence, and vitality. “The fascination with ‘demonic’ women,” Omelchuk writes, “was a 
consequence of the aestheticism and individualism of the Vistnykivtsi.” This was a vision of 
unfettered personal expression, for women as well as men, so long as the individual artist 
voluntarily devoted his or her creative works to the greater good of the nation.  
 Nazism, Fascism, and Ukrainian integral nationalism were avowedly antifeminist and 
patriarchal movements, in theory and in practice. The French feminist philosopher Simone de 
Beauvoir interpreted Nazism and Fascism as phenomena that reduced women to their 
reproductive capacity, motherhood, denying them freedom and an erotic existence. So too has 
the Ukrainian feminist scholar Mariia Bohachevsky-Chomiak in her analysis of Ukrainian 
integral nationalism.133 Yet, the striking prominence of female artist-celebrities in the 
propaganda of both Ukrainian integral nationalism and German National Socialism suggests a 
more complicated reality. There were points of contact between the interwar European far right, 
evolving conceptions of womanhood, and the expanding opportunities for women to move into 
roles previously reserved for men. “Lena” Teliha and “Leni” Riefenstahl134 cultivated public 
personas couched in lofty, rebellious, steely heroism and sexual feminine mystique, producing 
poems and films, respectively, that revel in the cult of will, idealism, purity, physical health, the 
                                                
133 Mariia Bohachevs’kyi-Khomiak, Hendernyi pidkhid: istoriia, kul’tura, suspil’stvo (L’viv: VNTL-Klasyka, 
2003), 177. 
 
134 The leading propagandist of the Third Reich, and a close friend of Hitler and Goebbels, Riefenstahl (1902-2003) 
survived the war and was “de-Nazified,” spending her postwar years much like Dontsov did: trying to cover up her 
past, whitewash her creative legacy, and salvage her reputation.    
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muscular (especially male) human form, erotic imagery or symbolism, the resurrection of mythic 
communities, violent struggle, and the heroic martyrdom of superior tribes and individuals.  
 Dontsov celebrated the “active nationalist” ideal of femininity, embodied by Lena, in his 
tribute to her, Poetka vohnenykh mezh (Poetess of the Fiery Limits), published after the war in 
1953. Teliha, he wrote, “renewed the mystic-warrior spirit of old Kyiv in our literature.”135 Like 
a Ukrainian Joan of Arc, there was “nothing of the plebeian in her, nothing of the whimpering 
poetry of the early twentieth century, with its oppressed sentimentalism.” Teliha united 
seemingly opposite virtues in her person as well as her poetry. She was “sometimes tender and 
womanly, but, when needed, tough and proud.” Dontsov linked her physicality and youthfulness 
to her creative work: “As elegant in her verses as in her stature, like a ‘swift Diana’136 (an all-
around woman, Shevchenko says), defiant in her approach to life, she left us a vision of authentic 
noble poetry in the best sense of the word—poetry devoid of everything vulgar [and] 
churlish.”137 Dontsov emphasized the vibrancy of her colors, and the violence of her imagery: 
“She paints the setting sun like a bloody wound; pain with dense, red hues.”138 He called her 
poetry “a hymn to the instinctual, unrestrained ecstasy of life, a hymn to the stormy joy of life, of 
growth, of awakened youth. This was the accumulated excess of vital energy. The dynamic élan 
vital which rumbled like a volcano and exploded into the sky.”139 He spoke of her “burning, 
pulsating desire to live”—a desire that transgressed all boundaries and conventions. “Either the 
drunk champagne of adoration, infatuation, love; or a dancing whirlwind, an adventure, a rash 
                                                
135 Dmytro Dontsov, Poetka vohnenykh mezh: Olena Teliha (Toronto: Vydannia O. Tiazhoho, 1953), 7. 
 
136 The ancient Roman goddess of the hunt, the moon, nature, and wild animals. 
 
137 Ibid., 8. 
 
138 Ibid., 9.  
 
139 Ibid., 12. 
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deed, the strike of a whip, a word of rebuke, or a clanging bell. Nothing from an idyll!”140 Her 
works, Dontsov felt, celebrate the “physical pleasure” of the biological drive and the amorality of 
nature.141 Such passages can be interpreted as further evidence that Dontsov and Teliha were on 
intimate terms in the 1930s.142 Whatever the nature of their personal relationship, they shared a 
worldview that hailed the arrival of both the “New Woman” and the “New Europe.”    
 Like the other Vistnyk authors, Teliha considered Bolshevism to be far worse than 
Nazism, assuming an affirmative attitude toward what she could discern of Nazi ideology and 
practice.143 She followed Dontsov in approving of Hitler’s power-consolidating action, the Night 
of the Long Knives (July 2, 1934), in which the SA (Sturmabteilung: the militia of the Nazi 
Party) and its leader Ernst Röhm were executed without trial on the pretext of plotting a revolt.144 
Evidently, the vision of an absolute führer presiding over a flock of devoted vassals appealed to 
her. She even compared Hitler to Jesus Christ, who was willing to strike “with a bloody whip” at 
even his closest brothers, his own race, for the sake of an idea, for “our party.”145 Teliha drew 
these comparisons between Dontsov, fascist leaders, and other messianic figures in her defenses 
of the Vistnyk editor from the criticisms of his erstwhile disciple, Iuryi Lypa.  
 
                                                
140 Ibid., 
 
141 Ibid., 13. 
 
142 As Shkandrij notes, “the other women in [Dontsov’s] pantheon—Lesia Ukrainia and Olha Basarab—are not 
allowed such biological drives, or even the suggestion of an erotic life. They are constructed as images representing 
pure will and fanatical devotion to the cause. Teliha is the exception.” Ukrainian Nationalism, 186. 
 
143 One should bear in mind that this was several years before the Nazi regime had committed its worst atrocities in 
World War II and the Holocaust. At this point, 1937, Stalin’s government was already responsible for the deaths of 
millions of Ukrainians. 
 
144 Dmytro Dontsov, “Ukrains’ke vacuum i ridna kul’tureniia,” Vistnyk, no. 2 (1934): 137-46. Olena Teliha, 
“Review of the Iuryi Lypa, Ukrains’ka doba,” Vistnyk no. 8 (1936): 613-16, in Teliha, O Kraiu mii, 92-96. 
 
145 Ibid. 
 
  371 
Disagreements in the Family 
 
 The starting point of the polemic between Dontsov and Lypa was literature and its 
relation to the national movement—the subject of a more general debate in interwar Ukrainian 
culture. As we saw in chapter 3, Dontsov’s positions on literature in the 1920s were modernist, 
avant-garde, and cosmopolitan, drawing inspiration from contemporary German, French, 
Russian, and Italian examples of futurism, symbolism, and expressionism. By the mid 1930s, 
however, Dontsov and the Vistnykivtsi had turned against modernism and aestheticism (art for 
art’s sake). They rejected modernism as too cosmopolitan—not “Ukrainian” enough—and too 
imitative of the sorts of Western European trends that undermine their own national cultures. 
They rejected aestheticism and formalism as too abstruse and disconnected from reality to be of 
any use to the national liberation struggle. The chief criteria for the judgment of art should not be 
aesthetic, but ideological and political. But Vistnyk’s slogan—“Art for the Nation” (mystetstvo 
dlia natsii)—said little about this art would look like. It was understood that Ukrainian art and 
literature should belong to and serve the nation, expressing its essence and encouraging the 
development of the qualities that Dontsov had described in Natsionalizm, but what would its 
content and style be?  
 Dontsov enlisted artist, set designer, and playwright Natalia Gerken-Rusova (1897-1989) 
to give an answer to this question in Vistnyk. Arguing for a “traditionalist,” Hellenic, classical 
aesthetic—a “heroic theatre” that would be the carrier of a “concrete national idea”—Gerken-
Rusova dubbed her ideal “warlike art” (voiovnyche mystetstvo). “Warlike art” would express the 
“spirit of the nation,” promoting an ethos of “dynamism, energy, expansion”; it would be 
edifying for a new elite capable of leading the nation and destroying its enemies. The opposite of 
“warlike art”—“humane art” (liudiane mystetstvo), or “the art of the herd”—was capable only of 
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expressing the “soul of the people.” Saccharine and sentimental, it sapped the strength of the 
nation. Emotional aestheticism and formalist interpretations of reality, she argued, are incapable 
of inspiring action, in part because most people cannot understand or relate to abstract, unusual, 
or conceptually challenging paintings, novels, and music. Ukrainians needed art with 
“Ukrainian” content, a nationalist agenda, and a positive, external, militarizing effect on the 
nation itself. Gerken-Rusova nevertheless insisted that “warlike art” or “art for the nation” would 
not be primitive or subservient to “public taste.” Rather, it would develop in harmony with 
artistic ideas and aesthetic and technical innovations while promoting the development of the 
nation and expressing its inner feelings. She denied the very possibility of “art for art’s sake,” 
and called for a campaign “to cultivate the artist’s ethics, educate the public, form a respectable 
art criticism, [and] begin national-cinematic activity.”146 Dontsov and the Vistnykivtsi (especially 
Ol’zhych, Teliha, Klen, and Mosendz) promoted the same neoclassicist vision in literature, 
prizing clarity, perfection of form, conciseness, order, discipline, heroism, monumentality, 
supreme confidence, and historical-mythological themes.147 The transgressive, antibourgeois 
militarism of futurism persisted, but now the Vistnykivtsi eschewed modernist experimentation as 
superfluous, anarchic, and self-indulgent, subordinating their creative endeavors to the perceived 
demands of the national movement as a whole.148 Dontsov turned away from the modernist 
rebellions of futurism and expressionism toward the discipline of classicism, calling for the 
establishment of “a series of dogmas, rules, axioms in all fields of collective life, sharply 
delineated, clearly opposed to all others, uncompromising.” The great task of this art and 
                                                
146 Natalia Gerken-Rusova, “Aktsiia heorichnoho teatru,” Vistnyk, no. 4 (1938): 739-756, and “Zavdannia i 
organizatsiia heorichnoho teatru,” Vistnyk, no. 3 (1938): 567-91.  
 
147 Bohdan Rubchak, “Sertse nadvoie rozderte (Frahment)” in Mykola Ilnyts’kyi, ed. Poety praz’koi shkoly: Sribni 
surmy: Antolohiia (Kyiv: Smolokyp, 2009), 703. 
 
148 Shakndrij, Ukrainian Nationalism, 154. 
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literature would be “to create and raise a new ruling caste,” and “to inflame the masses with an 
all-encompassing faith that regards all other gods as pagan idols.”149   
  
Figure 5.9. Natalia Gerken-Rusova. Source: Internet Encyclopedia of Ukraine 
 
 The journal Nazustrich, edited by the literary critic Mykhailo Rydnyts’kyi (1889-
1975),150 opposed Dontsov and Vistnyk with the ideal of a Ukrainian art and literature that is 
autonomous, independent from political ideologies and projects, and evaluated above all on the 
basis of aesthetic criteria. The editorship of Nazustrich argued that the best way to make art and 
literature serve the nation was to permit artists and writers to experiment freely, to encourage 
them to stay abreast of the latest innovations in high culture worldwide, and eventually produce 
internationally recognized leaders and innovators of their own.151 It should be oriented toward 
                                                
149 Dmytro Dontsov, Ob’iednannia chy roz’iednannia (1938), in Dmytro Dontsov, Khrestom i mechem, 129, 131.  
 
150 Rudnyts’kyi was the brother of Milena Rudnyts’ka, head of Soiuz Ukrianok.  
 
151 Pavlo Kovzhun, “Budenna i mystets’ka diisnist’. Za kulisamy VII-oi vystavky A. N. U. M.,” Nazustrich, no. 21 
(1936), 2; Mykhailo Rudnyts’kyi, “Pliany,” Nazustrich, no. 1 (1934): 1. 
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Western European modernism, yet develop from a purely national basis, which was not to be 
understood literally as art that contains only Ukrainian themes or forms, but as the stylistically 
diverse expressions of Ukrainian artists responding to Ukrainian reality using whatever methods 
they choose. Nazustrich’s advocacy for the idea of Ukrainian art that might take “non-Ukrainian” 
forms and is not obliged to serve the national interest provoked a polemic with Dontsov and the 
Vistnykivtsi.152  
 
Figure 5.10. This contemporary caricature by E. Kozak depicts Rudnyts’kyi laughing at Dontsov 
in the dentist’s chair in the top panel, and the reverse in the bottom panel. The caption reads: “At 
the dentist one might encounter the two ‘friends’ Dr. M. Rudnyts’kyi and Dr. D. Dontsov. –Dr. 
Rudnyts’kyi: ‘Ha-ha-ha! I see a wisdom tooth has already gone rotten for you! –Dr. Dontsov: 
‘Ha-ha-ha! You think that an artificial wisdom tooth will help you somehow?’” Source: Sofiia 
Lehin, “Humor po-l’vivs’ky, abo 10 vidomykh mistian u vitsakh ta karikaturakh,” photo-
lviv.in.ua http://photo-lviv.in.ua/humor-po-lvivsky-abo-10-vidomyh-mistyan-u-vitsah-ta-
karykaturah/ [accessed March 11, 2017]    
________________________ 
 
152 Vorobkalo, “‘Mystetstvo dlia natsii’ vs ‘Mystetstvo dlia mystetstva.’”  
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 Dontsov denounced Nazustrich for betraying the Ukrainian national culture and 
movement in favor of a rootless, cosmopolitan aestheticism and modernism, but he himself faced 
accusations of disparaging Ukrainian traditions and offering nothing positive to replace them but 
the imitation of foreign models. Lypa produced the most forceful articulation of this critique. His 
cultural and political works—Bii za ukrains’ku literaturu (The Battle for Ukrainian Literature, 
1935), Ukrains’ka doba (The Ukrainian Era, 1936) and Pryznachennia Ukrainy (The Destiny of 
Ukraine, 1938)—which secured his reputation as a Ukrainian nationalist ideologue on par with 
Dontsov, signaled his final break with the latter and the Vistnykivtsi.153 Bii za ukrains’ku 
literaturu angered Dontsov because the majority of its contents were articles previously 
published in Vistnyk. In December 1935 Lypa submitted an article to Vistnyk, but received a 
rejection letter from Dontsov:  
In Vistnyk’s three years, fourteen of your articles have appeared and not one of them lied 
around as long as some of the articles of other authors. Does this mean that the standards 
of Vistnyk are too high for you? Only two pieces were not accepted—one, of memoirs of 
Ivan Lypa [Iuryi Lypa’s deceased father —TE]—the second, of memoirs about Ivan 
Lypa. I think this does not give you the right to assert that the journal is doing you some 
kind of wrong. . . . Not one of the contributors to Vistnyk can boast of having such a high 
percentage of material published. . . . Perhaps you have a plan to move to My? Perhaps 
they are pulling you there? Then I would ask them to openly and bravely say this, and not 
search for pretexts for the justification of such a step. But if this is only gossip and if you 
have nothing in common with uncultured people . . . if you will write to me that you now 
as ever condemn the word of My—then I will be the first take pleasure in this.154   
 
Lypa answered that where he chose to publish his writing was none of Dontsov’s business, but 
denied having any intentions of going over to My. The conflict between the two worsened when 
Lypa gave a speech at a meeting of the anti-Soviet club “Prometei” (Prometheus) in Warsaw, in 
                                                
153 He followed these up with two influential geopolitical works during World War II: Chornomorska doktryna (The 
Black Sea Doctrine, 1940) and Rozpodil Rosii (the Partitioning of Russia, 1941). 
 
154 Dmytro Dontsov to Iuryi Lypa, January 11, 1936. Quoted in Svarnyk, “Iuryi Lypa i Dmytro Dontsov,” 220. 
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which he called for an end to the sectarianism and internal strife to which Dontsov’s teachings 
and behavior had allegedly given rise. Dontsov responded to Lypa in his 1936 article, “Vony i 
my” (Them and Us). He summarized Lypa’s position against him as a rejection of “cliquishness” 
and “dissension” in a time of national catastrophe when “agreements in the family should reign.” 
Dontsov countered that the time for such agreements had long since passed.155 Lypa opposed the 
divisive language of “ours” and “not ours,” preferring a positive attitude toward anything so long 
as it is Ukrainian, which he found lacking in Dontsov and his ilk. The latter expressed surprise at 
Lypa’s betrayal “in a time of malicious attacks against Vistnyk”: 
Strange as it may seem, an unexpected voice from one of the leading contributors to 
Vistnyk has joined the choir of my opponents—that of Dr. Iuryi Lypa. . . . According to 
him, my ideology is only ‘polemical,’ and has nothing ‘positive’ in it. He asserts that 
cliquishness denies Ukrainians their greatness. That the positive will be built, not only 
with ‘our own,’ but all the forces of the nation. . . . With this speech Dr. Iuryi Lypa 
showed that the ideas of the opponent of our journal [Vistnyk] are closer to him than the 
ideas disseminated in Vistnyk by its contributors. Thus, he alone placed himself outside 
the group of these contributors.156  
 
Lypa’s “loving heart” was of no use when the situation called for vituperative “dynamism.”    
 The polemic between Dontsov, the remaining Vistnykivtsi, and their supporters on one 
side, and Lypa, My, Nazustrich, and their supporters on the other, continued until the eve of 
World War II. Dontsov’s Nasha doba i literatura (Our Era and Literature) was an answer to 
Lypa’s Bii za ukrains’ku literature. Kryzhanivs’kyi, who called Lypa’s book “one of the most 
significant documents of our epoch of rebirth,” thought that the conflict between Lypa and 
Dontsov started because the latter felt threatened by it.157 Taunting his former master, Lypa 
struck back with a 24-page brochure, Ukrains’ka doba (The Ukrainian Era), in which he assessed 
                                                
155 Dontsov, “Vony i my” in Dontsov, Vybrani tvory, vol. 4, 151-64, 152. 
 
156 Ibid., 160. 
 
157 Dmytro Dontsov, Nasha doba i literatura (L’viv: Kvartal’nyk Vistnyka, 1936). Andrii Kryzhanivs’yi, “Review 
of Ukrains’ka doba,” My (Spring 1935), 175. 
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the Dontsov phenomenon as having had a detrimental effect on Ukrainian culture and politics. 
He criticized Nasha doba i literatura and its author for his ostentatious rhetoric, unbefitting a 
serious political thinker, whose chief concern should be facts and lucidity. “Verses and poems 
pale before his articles. Perhaps he really is the greatest poet of Ukraine? Perhaps his doctrine is 
simply the axis of his own literary creativity, his personal creative expansion?” Lypa 
sarcastically remarked.158 He repeated the accusations that Dontsov lacked a “positive doctrine” 
and merely sowed discord among Ukrainians, promoting hatred of some foreigners and 
undignified, inauthentic mimicry of others, while rejecting of homegrown traditions.  
 Other Ukrainian nationalists of the integral and liberal varieties proffered similar 
critiques of Dontsov. My and Nazustrich sided with Lypa, relishing his defection, which was 
embarrassing for Vistnyk. Dmytro Paliiv, formerly Dontsov’s coeditor at Zahrava and cofounder 
of the Ukrainian Party of National Work (see chapter 3), founded a rival movement, dubbed 
“creative nationalism” (tvorchyi natsionalizm), replete with its own organization, the Front of 
National Unity (Front natsional’noi iednosty, FNE), in L’viv in 1934. The FNE differed from 
the OUN and Dontsov on several points. It regarded Jews as a greater threat to Ukrainians than 
Russians and Bolsheviks. They alleged that Polish Jews had caused or worsened Ukrainian 
poverty and unemployment during the depression. Paliiv published “black lists” of Ukrainian 
lawyers who hired Jews and Poles in his journal, Novyi chas (New Times, 1922-1933). Defenses 
of Nazi Germany’s discriminatory policies toward its Jewish population appeared in the Front’s 
other organ, Peremoha (Victory, 1933-1936), which regularly incited hatred of Jews.159 
                                                
158 Iuryi Lypa, Ukrains’ka doba (Warsaw: Narodnyi stiah, 1936), 15. As Lysiak-Rudnyts’kyi observes: “The young 
publicists-dilettantes undertook the solution of so-called global problems in their self-confidence. Characteristic was 
the style of these writings: pathos, high-flying words and tendencies toward poetic cliche. . . . This literature did not 
serve knowledge of the world, but had the purpose of creating a certain emotive atmosphere.” Ivan Lysiak-
Rudnyts’kyi. Mizh istoriieiu i politykoiu (Munich: Suchasnist’, 1973), 243. 
 
159 Zaitsev, Ukrains’kyi integral’nyi natsinalizm, 360. 
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Rostyslav Iendyk, one of Dontsov’s most loyal supporters and Vistnyk authors, also contributed 
his racially anti-Semitic commentary to Peremoha.160 The FNE concurred with Dontsov on the 
harmfulness of the centrist Ukrainian National Democratic Union (UNDO), using similar 
metaphors, such as the superiority of “organic” national unity over “mechanical” tribal 
(pleminna) unity, which echoed Dontsov’s critiques of provincialism.161  
 But the FNE’s ideologues also produced critiques of Dontsov and Vistnyk that anticipated 
or reflected Lypa’s charges of divisive sectarianism and demoralizing negativity. Among them 
was Mykola Shlemkevych (1894-1966, pseudonym M. Ivaneiko), who attacked Dontsov directly 
in his 1935 book Tvorychyi natsionalizm iak filosofiia militans (Creative Nationalism as a 
Militant Philosophy).162 Shlemkevych asserted that the Vistnyk editor, far from being the 
antithesis of Drahomanov, was the continuation and final result of the latter’s ruinous criticism 
of his fellow Ukrainians and native predecessors.163 “Creative nationalism rejects demagoguery 
on the spiritual plane. It is decisively opposed to both of [demagoguery’s] consequences. It is 
aware that in this way it does truly European work, spiritually combatting the genuinely 
Muscovite dilemma: lawlessness in anarchy [Drahomanov] or lawlessness in despotism 
[Dontsov]. It is the spokesman of Ukrainian spiritual law.” Shlemkevych thus turned Dontsov’s 
criticisms of Russian despotism and Ukrainophilia back against him.164 The problem with 
Dontsov’s anticolonialism, Shlemkevych averred, was that it left open the possibility of 
________________________ 
 
160 See, for example, Rostyslav Iendyk, “Rasa v modernim natsionalizmi,” Peremoha, no. 4 (1933): 10-12. 
 
161 See the discussion of Natsionalizm in chapter 3. 
 
162 As Zaitsev notes, Shlemkevych’s biography mirrored Dontsov’s: Both started out Marxists in the USDRP, but 
opposed the Bolsheviks. Both studied philosophy in Vienna. Shelmkevcyk contributed numerous articles on the 
subject of Ukrainian spirituality to LNV under Dontsov’s editorship. 
 
163 M. Ivaneiko, Tvorchyi natsionalizm iak filosofiia miltans (L’viv: n.p. 1935), 10-11, 15. 
 
164 Especially as expressed in Pidtsavy nashoi polityky (1921). See chapter 3. 
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colonization from the West. Ukraine’s “spiritual liberation” from “old Europe,” represented by 
liberal France, in favor of the “New Europe” of national revolutions, represented by Fascist Italy 
and Nazi Germany, was also needed.165 He rejected Dontsov’s conception of Ukraine’s national 
mission to serve as the bulwark of Europe against the encroachment of Asiatic despotism, 
arguing that this defense was not necessary—“either Europe defends itself, or it is not worth 
defending.”166 Rather, Ukraine should focus on self-perfection as a representative of Slavic 
culture, becoming a “spiritual metropole” in its own right. FNE publicists also rejected 
Dontsov’s anti-intellectualism, amorality, and uncritical imitation of foreign thinkers, such as 
Sorel and Nietzsche.167 The FNE extended these critiques to the OUN, condemning the latter’s 
terrorist methods and Dontsovian cult of violence as immoral, counterproductive, and 
responsible for the pointless “self-immolation” of Ukrainian youth.  
 OUN émigré leaders echoed Lypa’s critique of Dontsov, arguing that the latter’s 
worldview lacked a practical plan of action or organization apart from abstract talk about a new 
breed of violent, amoral, and fanatical nationalists. Dontsov demoralized Ukrainians with his 
scornful, dismissive overview of their history and traditions. The OUN ideologue Volodymyr 
Martynets’ published a brochure, Zabronzovuimo nashe mynule! (Let Us Bronze Our Past!), in 
which he called for a new national autobiography, filled with edifying images and great victories, 
instead of the chronicle of humiliating defeats and decline found in Dontsov’s writings. 
Martynets’ asserted that “only bright images from our past and contemporary times, only heroes 
and great characters, only great acts and passions are educational tools,” urging his compatriots: 
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“Do not create black myths but instead bronze our past!”168 Ideologues of Dontsov’s type were 
giving Ukrainians an inferiority complex, just as a constantly berated child grows up to become 
an “ignoramus and a good-for-nothing.”169 Exasperated by what he saw as the media’s unfair and 
relentless persecution of Vistnyk and “the denseness of our general public,” Dontsov complained 
directly to Konovalets’: “I am so sick of fighting all those idiots in Nova zoria, Hromads’ki 
holos, Dilo, Ukrains’ki visti [Ukrainian News], and so on. Maybe a ‘Führer’ is exactly what this 
country needs?”170        
 But Dontsov also had supporters in his debate with Lypa and the other “bronzers,” 
especially among young Galicians: the Ukrainian Students’ Society, for example, carried a 
resolution in his favor in 1936, while Mosendz and Teliha both wrote exceptionally harsh 
reviews of Lypa’s Ukrain’ska doba for Vistnyk.171 Given her devotion to Dontsov and previous 
closeness to Lypa, the tone of Teliha’s review is especially personal, scornful, and mocking: 
Lypa, being “unprincipled” and “confused,” betrayed his colleagues and mentors at LNV and 
Vistnyk, to whom he owed so much, suddenly and inexplicably abandoning all the ideas that he 
had hitherto ardently supported. What Lypa did not appreciate, Teliha asserted, was the necessity 
of distinguishing between “us and them,” “ours and yours.” Fanatical loyalty to “our party” and 
the service of its idea alone was needed for success, as “Loyola, Mussolini, Hitler and the 
Bolsheviks” have demonstrated. Although Lypa accused Vistnyk of emptiness and negativity, he 
himself had failed to endow the modifier “Ukrainian” with any content. Lypa called for the 
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perfect unity of the Ukrainian nation, but contradicted himself by supporting the same 
cliquishness that he complained of in Dontsov’s circle. According to Teliha, Lypa opposed 
liberalism and socialism because “reality” had destroyed these things, but it was Vistnyk, not 
reality, that had driven them out of (Western) Ukrainian life. Responding to Lypa’s charge that 
the Vistnykivtsi ape Hitlerism even though they call Nazism a “product not for export,” Teliha 
pointed out the Dontsov had been a fascist since at least 1923, when Zahrava appeared. Lypa 
praised fascism’s traditionalism, claiming that Ukrainian tradition is denigrated in Vistnyk; 
Teliha countered:  
Was it not Vistnyk that built a cult of Slova o polka Ihoria [The Lay of Igor’s 
Campaign],172 of the period of kings [i.e. Kyivan-Rus’ —TE], Mazepa? . . . Then who, if 
not Vistnyk, raised the youth, and at one point Lypa as well — in the greatest respect for 
the blood spilled for the fatherland. Where, if not in Vistnyk, do all the poems, articles, 
[and] memoirs call for the honor of struggle for the fatherland, for the honor of blood 
already spilled, for the honor of future sacrifices?173  
 
Lypa accused Dontsov of harmful, indiscriminate iconoclasm, but Teliha insisted that some 
Ukrainian traditions must be rejected without hesitation, just as some Ukrainian individuals must 
be rejected, no matter how authentically “Ukrainian” they might be. Noting that Lypa protested 
Dontsov’s overbearing style as an editor despite contributing to LNV and Vistnyk for fourteen 
years, Teliha asked: “Does Dontsov really not suffer individualities? No, he suffers only 
individuality. Rather, he does not tolerate people who have forty thoughts and forty convictions 
without delineating a single one. Do all contributing authors reject Vistnyk? No, the greater part 
of them were rejected by Vistnyk itself for their lack of principle, as happened with Lypa.” Teliha 
accused Lypa of being shallow, materialistic, fearful of not making it to the promised land yet 
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unwilling to change himself in order to reach it. She defended Dontsov’s preoccupation with 
attacking the negative in Ukrainian life because there was so much that needed to be purged, 
even if it was unpleasant for readers: “No one knows as well as Dontsov that we will succeed in 
building something only with our own powers, not those of foreigners, but these powers need to 
be extracted. And one cannot extract them with the sweet-sluggish system of Lypa.” The latter 
opposed “exclusivity” (vyniatkovist’), but the exclusion of incompatible ideas and individuals 
was essential to the success of the national revolution.174     
 Given Mariia Dontsova’s intimate history with Lypa, she suffered his betrayal as a deeply 
personal offense. She wrote to Dontsov after a series of arguments with Lypa at their home in 
L’viv on July 17, 1937: “One conversation was very heated: I told him all about Bii [za 
ukains’ku literaturu], about the disloyalty to Visntyk, and the rest. He did not confess the reason 
for his behavior to me, but began to justify himself, [saying] that he relates to our work 
positively, that he did not go to My, and neither has Malaniuk. . . . That you predicted much, 
even the fall of Russia, and so on.” She reports that Lypa took great offense at Dontsov’s 
unwillingness to publish his father’s memoirs and proverbs. He stayed a few nights and was 
productive in his room, so she suggested that he publish what he had written in Vistnyk. At first, 
Lypa went for the idea: “You can tell Talia [Pyrohova-Zybenko]175 that Lypa gave me a lecture 
owing to which I have become convinced that despite his declamations about nobility and 
chivalry, he is either hysterical, or uneducated, or maybe both at once. I would really like it if she 
told him this herself because I did not say goodbye to him and today I have a Katzenjammer.176 
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But I survived, ambiguously, and I will endure Lypa’s slight.”177 Now in his mid thirties, Lypa 
had grown from the Dontsovs’ novice protégé into a rival ideologue who carried himself with the 
cockiness befitting a rebellious apostate.       
 Tensions between Lypa and the Dontsovs flared up again after the appearance of 
Pryznachennia Ukrainy (The Destiny of Ukraine) in 1938. Lypa devoted several paragraphs to 
his former guru in this work: “Dontsov’s book Natsionalizm is a brilliant lyrical reaction to the 
passivity of Ukrainians, [but] without deep, Ukrainian, synthetic thought. This is properly, 
international nationalism, very similar to his conception toward Marxism. . . . Now, as Moscow 
begins to build the ‘Soviet Man,’ Dontsov does not himself have any ‘Ukrainian Man’ to oppose 
to it: his role is not that of a builder.”178 In effect, Lypa accused Dontsov of cosmopolitanism and 
rootlessness. Rejecting both Stalinism and Hitlerism, Lypa instead looked to centuries-old 
cultural and legal traditions as the basis for an expanding Ukrainian identity and a new 
“Ukrainian era,” in which a “Pontic Ukrainian race” would take its place alongside the Anglo-
Saxon, German, and Roman “races.” His definition of the latter term was political, not 
biological: “Race is a great spiritual community in the moral and emotional dimension.”179 As 
Shkandrij argues, Lypa viewed Ukraine as a cultural, psychological, and historical fusion of 
many ethnicities into a stable identity that was capable of resisting both Nazi racial and Soviet 
social engineering. He nevertheless argued that “Ukrainian” (Indo-European) genes were distinct 
from and stronger than “Russian” (Finno-Mongolic) genes, citing research on blood groups.180 
Unlike Dontsov, Lypa’s faith in the oppressed masses’ will and strength to fight and elevate 
                                                
177 Quoted in Svarnyk, “Iuryi Lypa i Dmytro Dontsov,” 221. 
 
178 Lypa, Pryznachennia Ukrainy, 278. 
 
179 Ibid. Quoted in Shkandrij, Ukrainian Nationalism, 209. 
 
180 Shkandrij, Ukrainian Nationalism, 210. 
 
  384 
themselves, with or without authoritarian leaders, suggests that the nineteenth-century 
Ukrainophiles and the Ukrainian National Communists were admirable, inspiring figures in light 
of their difficult circumstances.181 He also acknowledged the historical importance of Jews in 
Ukraine, criticizing the Russian Black Hundreds and the imperial Russian state for poisoning 
Ukrainian-Jewish relations with the infamous forgery The Protocols of the Elders of Zion, and 
reminding Dontsov of his supportive attitude toward Jews during his Social Democratic past—in 
1906 the latter had taken part in the organization of Jewish self-defense groups in Kyiv, and in 
1911 he defended Jews from Ukrainian nationalists.182  
 Positive, time-hallowed myths that ennoble the oppressed people, build solidarity, and 
express their yearning for freedom are needed. But Dontsov’s doctrine was, like Bolshevism, 
purely hate-driven, detrimental for the race, and foreign to Ukrainians, whom the Vistnyk editor, 
Teliha, and Malaniuk pointlessly berate with “Nietzschean bombast” for failing to abandon their 
good nature, love of beauty, and conservatism in favor of the invented traditions and runic 
humbug of “Baltic mysticism” (Nazism).183 Rather, Lypa argued, the native Ukrainian past must 
be honored and preserved if Ukraine is to have a bright future. Authoritarian, sullen, iconoclastic, 
and intolerant, Dontsov and the Vistnykivtsi were out of step with the Ukrainian people. The 
latter exemplified voluntary association, “true individualism,” and stubborn resistance to 
hierarchies, exploitation, and state regimentation. Lypa cited Ukraine’s traditions of spontaneous 
peasant rebellions (the Green and Black armies), underground schools and universities, trade 
unions, and farming cooperatives.184 The Ukrainian führer that Dontsov hoped for was a 
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contradiction in terms.185 Ukraine had developed organically and unconsciously, drawing its 
strength and vitality from the bottom up, from instinctual, spontaneous order, from accumulated 
experience; forcefully imposing an alien, “mechanistic,” “collective ideal” upon it would only 
harm the nation and incite resistance, just as Bolshevism had done.186  
 Lypa’s book infuriated Dontsov, who coauthored the scathing review of it that appeared 
in Vistnyk with the anthropologist Rostyslav Iendyk and the art critic Oleksandr Lahutenko.187 
“Everything in [Pryznachennia Ukrainy] pleases the Little Russian soul: the size (300 pages!), 
the fluidity and superficiality of exposition, the muddledness and inexpressiveness of the 
assertions, and the tepid, purely Little Russian patriotic tramtadratsiia.”188 The reviewers blamed 
Lypa’s purported Russophilia on his “Russian upbringing”: “For, evident throughout Iuryi 
Lypa’s book, is a great respect for Soviet scholars and ill will at moments toward everything that 
smells of Europe.”189 They doubt his expertise in anthropology, geopolitics, economics, history, 
archaeology, and biology, accuse him of careless research, “chaotic thinking,” uncertainty, 
inconsistency, and self-contradiction, especially in his evaluations of Nazism, Fascism, 
Bolshevism, and Ukrainian nationalism.  
But Iuryi Lypa has a ‘worldview.’ And it is known to us as the old-Ukrainophile, 
‘Prosvita’ worldview of eclectic, ‘philanthropic,’ democratic Drahomanovism, which 
desperately defends its demolished positions. The basis of this ‘worldview’—an appeal to 
the East and an organic, dedicated hatred toward the West, not to Hitlerism or Fascism—
statements against these are just a pretext—but toward the West as a force that disciplines 
________________________ 
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thought and action; as a strict school of hardening; as something lucid, planned, and 
brilliant; and, generally, as a fairy-tale country of vivid individualities with a distinct 
sense of right and duty, something delineated, strong, formed.190                                                     
 
The authors rejected Lypa’s opposition to Fascism and Nazism as “foreign doctrines,” alleging 
that his approval of the socialists Marx, Rousseau, and Fourier shows his actual disinterest in the 
origins of an idea, so long as it contributes to the decline of “Europe.” Dontsov, Iendyk, and 
Lahutenko attacked Lypa’s “anarchistic,” “fellahist”191 (felakhstvo) ideal of statehood as a 
spontaneous order of voluntary associations, contrasting it unfavorably to something along the 
lines of the Nazi jurist Carl Schmitt’s “decisionism,” which defines sovereignty as the power to 
“command,” and extols the moment of decisive, unfettered action by the leader in times of crisis 
and emergency, ideally in dictatorial contravention of the “law.”192 The approach to nation- and 
state-building favored by Lypa and Drahomanov, derived from the French anarchist Pierre-
Joseph Proudhon’s theory of mutualism, was to blame for the decline, conquest, and oppression 
of Ukraine by foreigners who rejected libertarian teachings. Concerning Lypa’s critique of 
Dontsov’s Natsionalizm as a source of “hatred and the internal ruin of the race,” the reviewers 
cited Shevchenko’s harsh critique of his fellow Ukrainians as “slaves with cockades on their 
heads.” “But Shevchenko was the proponent of an ideal strikingly opposite to the ‘ideal’ of 
Lypa, the proponent of an ideal of the Cossack against the ‘ideal’ of ‘millions of swineherds’,” 
and Dontsov carried on the same tradition of unsparing national self-critique.193 Of course, 
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Iendyk, Lahutenko, and Dontsov lamented, “our socialist-liberal press is enamored with Lypa’s 
book because there is not a trace of ‘voluntarism’ in it,” citing reviews in Nazustrich and the 
popular weekly Hromads’kyi holos (Community Voice, 1892-1932) that praised Lypa’s 
resistance to Dontsov and Visntyk’s “demoralization of nation.”194 In the final analysis, Vistnyk 
dismissed Lypa as yet another quietist Ukrainian “Buddhist” who wants to withdraw into an idyll 
and trusts that “providence” will sort everything out, as if Ukrainians needed only to “become 
themselves” and they would emerge as the fourth great race of Europe.  
 
Conclusion: In Search of Allies on the Eve of the Final Battle 
 In the 1930s, Dontsov’s opponents accused him of being both iconoclastic—for attacking 
Hrushevs’kyi, Drahomanov, and the majority of the inherited idols and traditions of modern 
Ukrainian life—and authoritarian—for not tolerating intellectual pluralism, individuality, or 
creative freedom in his (or any) camp. The editor of Visntyk faced charges of both crude 
xenophobia and the excessive imitation of foreign ideas and institutions, above all Russian 
Communism and, less convincingly for a “Moskal’” such as Dontsov, German National 
Socialism. Dontsov’s combative behavior, negative philosophy and attitude, siege mentality and 
fear of internal dissent, and inability to imagine a new type of Ukrainian that was not an 
awkward imitation of the “Soviet Man” or Hitler’s “master race” drove some of the Vistnykivtsi 
away. But Dontsov was convinced that he was moving in the opposite direction—toward a more 
“authentic,” “traditional” Ukrainian politics and culture—one oriented toward the needs of the 
national struggle and the creation of a new elite on the basis of the forgotten virtues of the 
Cossacks and Kyivan-Rus’.  
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 The contemporary historian Mykhailo Antonovych (1910-1954) assessed Dontsov’s 
initial success and eventual attrition of supporters in the 1930s: “His brilliant articles, normally 
studded with numerous quotations from European thinkers, gave the impression of depth, 
erudition; they thrilled and fascinated the ordinary public [. . .], the more so since what he 
proposed seemed such an effective break with the past, something completely new.”195 Yet, by 
the eve of World War II, “deeper and more thoughtful natures were no longer satisfied with his 
brilliant phrases, his firework-like quotations, and began to turn away from Vistnyk. Moreover, at 
this time Dontsov’s negative qualities became prominent: an inclination to gangster journalism, 
dirty tactics such as publishing private letters, and a sort of hysterical, abusive tone, aptly noted 
by Dolenga that demonstrated his main fault: lack of a positive program, the dominance of pure 
negation.”196  
 Others, however, reaffirmed their commitment to Dontsov. Personalities were as 
important as ideological convictions in making the decision to stay or go; as we saw with Teliha, 
Dontsova, and Lypa, love affairs, friendships, personal rivalries, and ambitions shaped the public 
stances of the Vistnykivtsi at least as much as the reverse. Intuitively cognizant of the 
inextricability of the political and the personal, Ukrainian nationalists’ varied responses to 
feminism and the women’s movement were linked to their views on Nazism and Communism, 
literature and history, the national revolution and the national ideal, as well as their “private” 
notions of gender, sexuality, and reproduction. The writers who remained committed to 
Dontsov’s ideals of self-sacrifice, radical commitment to the nation, and redemptive violence 
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prepared themselves for the final battle, joining the OUN with hopes of destroying the Soviet 
Union and carving out a place for an independent Ukraine in Hitler’s New Europe.  
 Just as he had a quarter of a century earlier, on the eve of World War I, Dontsov eagerly 
anticipated a great war between “Europe” and “Russia” after 1933—this time in the form of Nazi 
Germany and a coalition of fascist nations against the Soviet Union. Like World War I, this new 
conflict would give Ukrainians an opportunity to build an independent state under the aegis of 
German civilization and military might. Ukrainian nationalists stood a chance of succeeding, 
Dontsov believed, but only if they were willing to reject the failed idols of nineteenth-century 
Ukrainophilia and imbibe the spirit, worldview, and (a)morality of the new fascist era, which 
also understood itself to be a resurrection of primordial unities, barbarian health, racial instincts, 
ancient traditions, and medieval values. Dontsov believed that good things would come of 
Hitler’s plans for “the East,” invoking the Nazi leader’s vision of a German conquest and 
colonization of Russia in Mein Kampf,197 and tried to convince himself and others that Alfred 
Rosenberg’s talk of building an “independent” Ukraine as a bulwark against Russia would 
become the official policy and strategy of the Reich.198 Omelchuk argues that Dontsov was 
aware that the Nazi idea of Lebensraum threatened Ukrainians as much as Russians and other 
Slavic “Untermenschen” (subhumans)—that the “Bolshevik methods” adopted by the Nazis 
would be used not only against the Bolsheviks but also against their victims.199 But Generalplan 
Ost—the Nazi vision for a new racial order in Eastern Europe and Russia that called for the 
genocide or enslavement of the Slavic, Jewish, and otherwise non-Aryan populations of the 
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region to make way for German colonists—appears not to have dissuaded Dontsov from 
welcoming Nazi armies on their Drang nach Osten. As Omelchuk argues:  
The Vistnykivtsi became willing participants in their own subjugation. They not only 
served the new ‘gods,’ but also enthusiastically sacrificed their own mental stability (the 
aesthetics and ethics of nationalism requires total and permanent struggle from an artist), 
their individual voice, their biography and creativity. This is exactly why Dontsov 
disregarded Hitler’s plans concerning Eastern Europe, about which he certainly knew: 
doubts were sacrificed on the altar of a desired, aestheticized reality, which is to say one 
of his own imagining.200  
 
The Vistnyk editor published articles hailing Hitler with each eastward expansion of Nazi 
Germany over the course of 1938—the Anschluss with Austria, the annexation of the 
Sudetenland, the conquest of Czechoslovakia—calling it “the great path from Europe to the East, 
the path of giants, which Alexander, Napoleon, England walked, upon which the third German 
empire has set out.”201 He attributed the führer’s success to the “gigantic attractive force of an 
idea.”202 Despite the protests of France, which Dontsov dismissed as hypocritical, “Hitler had 
already dreamt his dreams of power, already crafted his plan of German expansion 
systematically and gründlich  [thoroughly] through all the obstacles that to others seemed as high 
as the Eiffel [Tower], but which in his eyes had already crumbled in ruin. Not recognizing 
defeat, he had then already committed to impregnate his people with the explosive, dynamic 
force of the idea that he carried in himself.”203 In the same article, Dontsov described the 
spectacular mass rallies at Nuremberg in glowing terms, presenting Hitler’s actions—which had 
fatally undermined the “superstitions” of international law, democracy, European solidarity, the 
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inviolability of boundaries and minority rights, and pacifism—as a vindication of the “active 
nationalism” promoted on the pages of Vistnyk.204 Given Dontsov’s descriptions of Hitler as “the 
real Messiah” and similarly emotive language, the Vistnyk editor’s enthusiasm for the German 
chancellor went beyond a rational acknowledgement of and desire to replicate the achievements 
of Nazism.205 The Third Reich, Dontsov felt, represented glorious salvation. 
 There were warnings that Hitler was disinterested in Ukrainian independence before the 
beginning of World War II, but Dontsov refused to heed them. Following the Munich Agreement 
(September 1938), which formalized Germany’s acquisition of the Sudetenland from 
Czechoslovakia, Carpatho-Ukraine, a short-lived Ukrainian state occupying a small region of 
Czechoslovakia in what is today the westernmost part of Ukraine (Zakarpattia oblast’), declared 
its autonomy. The subsequent German invasion of Bohemia and Moravia and the collapse of the 
Czechoslovakian state inspired Carpatho-Ukraine to declare its independence on March 15, 
1939. Acting with Berlin’s approval, Hungary invaded and annexed Carpatho-Ukraine the 
following day. Dontsov urged that “the tragic fate of Zakarpattia,” which “displayed the heroic 
characteristics of our race to the world,” not be taken as cause for “hysterics” and “doubts about 
Germany’s intentions of risking a conflict with the USSR over Ukraine.”206 Dontsov insisted that 
Germany would inevitably return to its plans, first attempted in 1918, to destroy the Russian 
empire by creating a strong, independent Ukraine. “Dnieper Ukraine will not be a satellite of any 
empire,” Dontsov asserted: “It has its own idea and this alone is inscribed upon its banner. The 
forces about which I spoke above [i.e. Germany and its Western opponents —TE] and whose 
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collision in Ukraine is possible in the near future, should themselves realize this.”207 Whether 
Ukraine will gain an ally in its struggle for independence depends upon Ukrainians alone, but 
they should only collaborate with a power, “that unambiguously stands for our point of view: the 
destruction of the Russian empire, and the creation of an independent Ukraine.”208  
 In a spring 1939 article on Nazi Germany, “Zahadka III-oi imperii” (The Mystery of the 
Third Empire), Dontsov again made his enthusiasm for Hitler’s leadership clear.209 The 
“mystery” of the Third Reich was this: how did a vanquished and demoralized nation, such as 
Weimar Germany, transform itself into such a formidable power so suddenly? Dontsov asserted 
that the answer lay in the ideas and qualities of great men such as Hitler and Rosenberg, and the 
fanatical “initiative minority” that had gathered around them, barraging the reader with 
quotations from the two ideologues, making his case that if the right group of Ukrainians were to 
grasp the power of unfettered authority, intolerance, and fanaticism from studying the Nazi 
example, they might undergo a similar transformation and lead the Ukrainian people to victory. 
Dontsov expressed only a single reservation about what Nazism might have in store for Ukraine 
at the end of his essay: “It is not known what roads the new Germany will take in the future. It is 
an open question whether, on this new path that takes it into Central and Eastern Europe, it will 
find an idea that will be as persuasive to this Europe at it is to itself (the idea of German 
Lebensraum is not such an idea).”210 It is unclear how one squares this meek appeal to a German-
Ukrainian understanding with Dontsov’s axiom, also accepted by Nazi ideology, that force 
decides everything and no sympathy, tolerance, or kindness is owed to foreigners.  
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 In the final issue of Vistnyk for September 1939, Dontsov reacted to news of the 
Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact—the short-lived “nonaggression agreement” between Nazi Germany 
and the Soviet Union.211 Secret clauses of the pact provided for the division of East Central 
Europe into Nazi and Soviet “spheres of influence”: over the course of the same month, the 
former took western Poland, while the latter took eastern Poland, including the western regions 
of what became Soviet Ukraine and Soviet Belarus, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and, 
unsuccessfully, Finland. The alliance triggered World War II and ended the post-1918 
independence of Poland, which was partitioned yet again, this time between two totalitarian 
empires, and of the Baltic States, which became Soviet republics and underwent Stalinization. 
The pact lasted until June 1941, when Nazi Germany and its allies invaded the Soviet Union with 
the intention of obliterating it—as Dontsov and his followers fervently hoped it would. Prior to 
that, however, the Molotov-Ribbentrop agreement perfectly contradicted Dontsov’s geopolitical 
conviction that Nazi Germany and Soviet Russia, as the manifestations of two antithetical 
principles—Europe and Muscovy—were destined to fight a war of annihilation that would 
decide the fate of Ukraine and the world. Clearly baffled by the pact (the article is a rambling 
series of questions and conjectures), the editor wondered if Hitler had changed his mind about 
carving out German Lebensraum in Stalin’s empire, if he was serious about his claims to have 
entirely lost interest in Ukraine, or if he was simply being deceptive. Dontsov fell back on the 
reassuring claim that no matter what happened internationally, the Russian imperial system had 
been collapsing since 1917 and the fate of Ukraine ultimately rested in the hands of Ukrainians 
alone, with or without German support. Nevertheless, making his pro-Nazi outlook perfectly 
clear as war loomed, Dontsov wrote “Zhydivs’ke pytannia i natsional’sotsializm” (The Jewish 
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Question and National Socialism), also published in the final issue of Vistnyk. The stated aim of 
the piece was to popularize Hitler’s teachings in Mein Kampf about the dangers of the Jews for 
the Aryan race.212 A follow-up piece on the practical implementation of Nazi ideas on the Jewish 
question was planned, but the outbreak of war in Poland brought the journal to an end.213         
 On September 1, 1939, the day Germany’s invasion of western Poland began, the Polish 
authorities arrested Dontsov and his loyal assistant, Mykhailo Hikavyi, permanently shuttering 
Vistnyk. The editor was imprisoned in the Bereza Kartuska concentration camp (located in 
present-day western Belarus), alongside the OUN(B) leaders Stepan Bandera, Mykola Lebed, 
Roman Shukhevych, and others.214 Evidently, Dontsov’s pro-Nazi articles and presumed 
connections to Ukrainian integral nationalist organizations, such as the OUN, made him enough 
of a security risk to warrant incarceration under the circumstances. His time at Bereza Kartuska 
was brief, however, as the prison’s staff abandoned it overnight upon learning of the Soviet 
invasion of eastern Poland on September 17 and the collapse of the Polish state. Freed, Dontsov 
fled west via Krakow to Berlin, without returning home to L’viv, which had already fallen under 
Soviet occupation and was therefore an extremely dangerous place for a famous anti-Communist 
such as himself.215 The OUN member Mykola Klymyshyn (1909-2003) met Dontsov at the OUN 
headquarters in Berlin’s Wilmersdorf locality in September or October 1939.216 According to 
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Klymyshyn’s memoir, Dontsov gave the impression of being “haggard, but in good health” upon 
his arrival at the meeting, which, as Golczewski notes, threw the oft-repeated claim that the OUN 
and Dontsov had nothing to do with one another back into question.217 But Dontsov, who quietly 
resented the Reich’s pact with the Soviet Union, did not remain in the German capital for long, 
and there is no evidence that he began cooperating with the OUN at this point. He did, however, 
stick to his guns when it came to Nazism, at least until Germany’s defeat seemed assured.
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CHAPTER 6: FROM POLITICS TO MYSTICISM: DONTSOV’S FINAL BATTLE AND THE 
FATES OF THE VISTNYKIVTSI, 1939-1973 
 
 
 World War II ended Vistnyk and scattered the Vistnykivtsi. Some joined the OUN and 
perished on the frontlines of the struggle for an independent Ukraine, acting out Dontsov’s 
“romantic” ideal of martyrdom. The rest took refuge in other parts of wartime Europe. Those 
who survived typically left the Old World for Canada and the US, starting new lives on a new 
continent rather than face “repatriation” to the Soviet Union. Emerging from the war unscathed, 
Dontsov took the second path. Between 1939 and 1945, he resided chiefly in Bucharest and 
Prague, making several short visits to Berlin. His creative output dropped off in these years, but 
he did manage to found a short-lived journal, Batava (Phalanx), in Bucharest. Dontsov 
underwent the final intellectual evolution of his lifetime as the editor of Batava, as the concepts 
of “caste,” scientific racialism, and traditionalism moved to the center of his revised worldview, 
which he expounded in his 1944 work, Dukh nashoi davnyny (The Spirit of Our Antiquity). 
While in Prague he wrote for the press of the SS-operated Reinhard Heydrich Institute, then fled 
the Czech capital for the American zone of occupation in southern Germany as the Red Army 
advanced into Central Europe in early 1945. He made his way via Paris, London, and 
Philadelphia, to Montreal, where he settled and sought citizenship in 1948.  
 Dontsov’s reputation suffered in light of the defeat of the Axis Powers and the exposure 
of their crimes, which discredited the fascistic ideas that he had spent decades promoting, and in 
light of his less-than-principled, even craven and irresponsible behavior during the war. 
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Ukrainian émigré writers, including surviving members of the Vistnykivtsi, banished Dontsov 
from their collective literary and political life in the late 1940s. He wrote on increasingly 
mystical and religious themes, repackaging his teachings for Christian fundamentalist audiences 
in the Cold War West at the height of McCarthyism, while studiously avoiding the anti-Semitic 
and pro-German statements that had been de rigueur on the pages of Vistnyk. Rebranding himself 
as a pious Cold Warrior, Dontsov tried to efface his spiritual and practical alignment with 
Nazism in the world he had left behind by republishing his works with the offending passages 
excised, but there is little evidence that he had a genuine change of heart. As we shall see, each 
step of Dontsov’s journey in the final thirty years of his life gave rise to scandal and controversy, 
from the newspapers to the Canadian Parliament, pitting his fervent acolytes against his no-less-
adamant opponents. The latter denounced Dontsov as a sympathizer and collaborator of Nazi 
Germany—a scoundrel who should be tried and sentenced, not shielded and honored. His 
supporters countered that he was a brilliant and heroic anti-Communist who deserved the full 
support of “the Free World” in its struggle against the Soviet empire. Ultimately, the latter 
carried the day; the Canadian authorities exonerated Dontsov of the charges and permitted him to 
take up permanent residence in Quebec province, where he lived and worked until his death in 
1973. The debate over his biography, works, and legacy did not die with him, for no one doubted 
that, for better or worse, he had been one of the most influential Ukrainians of his era. In this 
final chapter of his life, Dontsov embodied the dilemmas of “de-Nazification” and the 
intersection of roots, religion, and anti-Communism in the postwar Ukrainian immigration to 
North America.    
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The Sundering of the Vitsnykivtsi 
 The documentary record on Dontsov is considerably thinner for the period from his arrest 
in L’viv in 1939 to his emigration to North America in 1947. The timeline of his Warsaw archive 
terminates in September 1939. Probably fearing for his safety, he published relatively little in the 
chaos of the next five years. His letters and other papers from this period are scattered or lost. 
Thus, barring new archival discoveries and further research, only an impressionistic account of 
Dontsov’s public, personal, and intellectual life during World War II can be reconstructed. It is 
unclear, for instance, what led Dontsov and Dontsova to get divorced at the outset of the war. 
Historian Iryna Shlikhta has suggested that Livyts’ka-Kholodna’s recollection that Dontsov “was 
known for his affairs,” including his ongoing infatuation with Olena Teliha, may have had 
something to do with it.1 But, as we have seen, Dontsova either did not (or claimed not to) 
believe the rumors, or did not take them seriously. Even if she did, why would she wait six years, 
until the outbreak of war, to divorce Dontsov if this were the issue? Shlikhta points to friction 
between the couple about financial issues as another possible cause, but this also fails to explain 
the timing of the separation.2 The decision may have been a measure to protect Dontsova, given 
the fact that she stayed in Galicia for a time after the Soviet occupation of the region had begun, 
and her connections to Dontsov put her at risk. Association with Dontsov had already gotten his 
relatives into trouble with the Soviet authorities, including his estranged brother, the old 
Bolshevik Vladimir Dontsov. The two met for the last time in 1920 and did not write to one 
another thereafter, but Vladimir and his son Petr, whom the NKVD arrested in Moscow in March 
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1938, and accused of “anti-Soviet agitation,” spying for Germany, and connections to a “fascist 
organization” in Berlin via Dmytro. Vladimir confesed to trumped-up charges of having recently 
met with Dmytro on Khimkinskii Bridge in the eastern suburbs of Moscow to plot against the 
USSR, and was executed the following month for espionage. Also charged with anti-Soviet 
agitation, Petr Dontsov died in a labor camp in April 1943.3 According to the memoirs of her 
friend, Natalia Iakhnenko (Zybenko-Pyrohova), Mariia Dontsova had attempted to emigrate in 
the three-day grace period during which the Germans kept the new border open to allow Polish 
citizens to leave the Soviet zone of occupation. Unfortunately, still recovering from an illness, 
she was unable to carry her luggage across the border checkpoint, the porter ran off with her 
belongings, and she was forced to remain in Galicia.4 In 1941 Mariia—now (again) 
Bachyns’ka—left with her brother Volodymyr for Kovel (a town in the neighboring region of 
Volhynia). While in Kovel, Nazi police arrested and briefly imprisoned her in the course of an 
antipartisan operation in 1943. After her release, she made her way to Prague, and then to 
Germany, where she participated in Ob’ednannia Ukrain’skykh Zhinok v Nimechchyni (the 
Union of Ukrainian Women in Germany, not to be confused with Soiuz Ukrainok), where she 
edited the last three issues of the union’s paper, Hromadianka (Woman Citizen). In 1950, 
Bachyns’ka (Dontsova) emigrated to the United States. She settled in New York City, joined 
Soiuz Ukrainok Ameryky (the Union of Ukrainian Women of America), and wrote for the émigré 
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press (her articles appeared in the reputable publication Svoboda [Freedom]). Mariia Bachyns’ka 
died on December 30, 1978.5          
 After 1939, Dontsov’s life path separated entirely from that of his former wife. Instead of 
staying in Berlin and attempting to drum up support in German circles for the idea of Ukrainian 
independence, as he had done during World War I, he traveled to Bucharest, Romania—a neutral 
country at the outset of World War II where Dontsov could count upon the support of his friend 
and colleague, the biologist Yuryi Rusov (George Roussow). Romanian dictator Ion Antonescu 
(1940-1944) brought the ultranationalist Iron Guard party and paramilitary movement into the 
government in September 1940. The Iron Guard launched a campaign of horrific violence 
against Romania’s Jewish population and attempted to seize power in Bucharest, but was 
suppressed and dissolved by Antonescu’s army in 1941. Dontsov did not voice his opinions on 
the Iron Guard movement, but its anti-Semitism, ultranationalism, and radical Christian 
Orthodoxy was close to his own, especially during World War II. Rusov headed the National 
Zootechnical Institute in Bucharest, and had written for the Visntyk quarterly. While living in the 
Romanian capital, Dontsov worked with Rusov to create and edit the short-lived Ukrainian 
nationalist monthly, Batava (Phalanx).6 Self-advertised as “the journal of national 
traditionalism,” Batava ran for just seven months, and featured a small number of authors, who 
often used cryptonyms. The journal sought readers among the 120,000 Ukrainians then living in 
Romania, but its print run was somewhere beneath 2,000. Apart from Dontsov, only Rusov and 
the latter’s wife, Natalia Gerken-Rusova (artist, designer, playwright, and one of the chief 
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theorists of Vistnyk’s positions on art), are known to have regularly published in it.7 Batava 
signaled an intensification of Christian mysticism, conservatism, the cult of aristocracy, and 
antimodernism in Dontsov’s thinking, which, as we saw in chapter 3, had recently passed 
through an anticlerical, morally nihilistic, and avant-garde phase.8 Sosnovs’kyi notes the change 
in emblem between Vistnyk and Batava; instead of the former’s silhouette of a wolf’s head 
bearing its fangs—a symbol of nature in all its ferocity, representing “active nationalism’s” 
social Darwinian ethos—the latter’s imprint is a Cossack saber and a quill in the sign of a 
cross—symbols of old Ukraine.9 Gerken-Rusova, who was also fascinated by the myths and 
legends of Kyivan-Rus’, designed the new emblem, which is reminiscent of Christian 
monarchical insignia. To this was added the Latin slogan: Deus, Patria, Dux (God, Fatherland, 
Leader).  
 The ideology undergirding Batava was a synthesis of Dontsov’s “active nationalism” 
with the Hetmanites’ ideology, to which Rusov and Rusova were also connected.10 Thanks to 
Rusov, Dontsov met with Pavlo Skoropads’kyi several times during World War II, and began 
contributing to the Hetmanite organ Ukrains’kyi robitnyk (Ukrainian Worker), which Rusov 
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edited.11 Under the latter’s influence, Dontsov began to idolize the Ukrainian Cossack religious 
philosopher Hryhorii Skovoroda (1722-1794).12  
 Trained in biology, Rusov also contributed to Dontsov’s growing interest in scientific 
racialism. According to Rusov, and now Dontsov, Ukraine’s population comprised four racial 
types—“Nordic,” “Mediterranean,” “Dinaric” (dynars’ka) and “Oriental” (ostiis’ka)—in 
“descending” order. This typology came from German race researcher and eugenicist Hans F. K. 
Günther’s (1891-1968) theory of “Nordicism,” which divided the Aryan race into a masterly 
Nordic and lesser Mediterranean, Dinaric, and Eastern (Baltic) subtypes of varying qualities, 
each with hidden “biological potentialities.”13 The Batava circle attributed the state-building 
element in Ukrainian history since Volodymyr the Great (958-1015) and his Viking forebears to 
the Nordic element. The Mediterranean element supposedly brought achievements in the arts and 
appreciation for beauty. Batava’s writers esteemed the “Dinaric” race, thought to be predominant 
in Central and Southeastern Europe, as adept in combat and manual labor, while the “Oriental” 
race, imagined as a Tartar-Mongol-Russian mix, offered the least of value to Ukraine, corrupting 
the Ukrainian gene pool with slavish, disorderly traits. Such ideas had become a commonplace in 
Europe thanks to the rise of Nazism in Germany.  
 Dontsov and the Rusovs used Batava to develop the notion, only suggested in the 
former’s 1930s writings, of a new Ukrainian ruling “caste” derived from the exemplars and 
traditions of the medieval and Cossack periods of Ukrainian history, as well as this 
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anthropological-racial theory. He presented these ideas in “Holovni prykmety providnoi kasty” 
(The General Features of a Ruling Caste)14 and “Kasta ne partiia” (Caste, not Party), expounding 
them more fully in his book Dukh nashoi davnyny (The Spirit of Our Antiquity, first published in 
1944), to which we shall return later. “What is a caste?” Dontsov asks:  
We are not speaking here about the castes in India, which have a specific meaning. This 
word is intended in a broader sense . . . [as] specific strata in a hierarchically constructed 
society. The ruling stratum distinguished itself from others through its special social 
duties and privileges, even its own separate morality and customs. . . . The caste is also 
elevated by the extreme severity of the laws that govern membership within it, as well as 
by the principle and lifestyle of a strict separation from other strata or castes of society. 
Precisely in this sense, castes are a powerful element in the duration and stability of 
society.15  
 
Dontsov’s definitions of “the nation” and of Ukraine had changed yet again: now he conceived 
of the nation as an unbroken tradition—a “duration” (tryvalist’)—maintained by the vigilance of 
a ruling caste comprised of “better people” (luchchi liudy).16 The latter had to exhibit certain 
traits, above all “superiority” (vyshchist’)—a psychological-racial characteristic derived from 
blood and breeding: “The leaders truly designated by a higher power, which they feel within 
themselves, whose voice they obey and to whom they devote themselves, experiencing it as their 
calling, like an unstoppable force, to unite, inspire, order, lead. Chosen by a higher power, such a 
person is of a different race, molded from different clay, from which Fate carves heroes, 
demigods.”17 Ukraine, then, was a conglomeration of races, which, in the modern period, have 
tragically fallen out of their ideal proportions and proper hierarchical order. This reversal of 
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natural authority was the supposed source of Ukraine’s decline as a nation, which the Soviet 
Union accelerated with its genocidal behavior and forced population transfers.  
 In Batava, Dontsov expanded his critique of “party-mindedness” (partiinstvo), as 
opposed to the ideals of a caste and an order (orden’), implicitly targeting the OUN, which 
underwent a schism in 1940 (see below). “A party has a program, [but] a caste [has] a credo.”18 
To belong to a caste is not a matter of personal conviction or “party discipline,” which the “party 
nationalists” rely upon because they lack the internal organizing principle of a caste—namely, 
the innate racial, spiritual, traditional, and psychological traits that its initiates hold in common.19 
Reflecting on the same topics, Rusov wrote a series of installments, “Materiialy do national’-
derzhavnytstva” (Contributions to National-Statehood), appearing in each issue of the journal, 
and Gerken-Rusova contributed an article, “Pro Kastu kavalieriv i haspydiv” (On the Caste of 
Cavaliers and Serpents). Given these common interests, methods, and historiosophical, political, 
aesthetic, moral, religious, and anthropological agendas, the Batava group might be considered a 
new “school.” It combined elitist, theocratic, and ultratraditionalist ideas allegedly drawn from 
the distant past with the latest theories and practices of “scientific” racialism and eugenics. This 
was Dontsov’s last intellectual turn—all of his subsequent writing centered on the same themes.                   
 The final issue of Batava appeared in November 1941, ceasing publication once Dontsov 
moved to Prague via Berlin, just months after the Nazi invasion of the Soviet Union. He later 
claimed that the Nazis forced him to relocate against his will, forcing him into hiding or putting 
him under house arrest, but it is more plausible that the German authorities either facilitated or 
did not care to interfere in Dontsov’s travels. Commencing on June 22, 1941, Operation 
                                                
18 Dmytro Dontsov, “Kasta—ne partiia,” Batava, no. 5 (1941): 2-7, 5. 
 
19 Ibid., 4. 
 
  405 
Barbarossa, which quickly brought the whole of Ukraine under German control in the wake of a 
panicked Soviet retreat, restored Dontsov’s faith in Hitler’s anti-Russian, anti-Bolshevik agenda. 
The strategy was intended prevent a repeat of the hunger-induced collapse of morale on the 
German home front by extracting Ukrainian grain and labor. In possession of the Ukrainian 
black earth region and the oil of the Caucasus, the Third Reich and its satellite states 
(Mitteleuropa) would be autarkic and invulnerable to Allied blockades. As we saw in chapter 2, 
the German war machine had already attempted this near the end of World War I by maintaining 
a Ukrainian puppet state, the Hetmanate, in which Dontsov served. This time, however, the 
Germans proved to be hostile to the idea of Ukrainian statehood and independence, as the 
volatile wartime relationship between the Nazis and the OUN demonstrates.  
 The May 1938 assassination of Ievhen Konovalets’ by an NKVD-rigged exploding cake 
in Rotterdam led to a succession crisis and a schism of the OUN into two hostile factions in 
August 1940: the first, the OUN(M), led by Andrii Mel’nyk, represented the older, more 
conservative leadership of the OUN abroad (the Provid), which kept a certain distance from 
Dontsov’s voluntarist, antidemocratic ideas; the second, the OUN(B), led by Stepan Bandera, 
comprised the younger, more radical cadres in Galicia who had been freed from prison following 
the collapse of the Polish state and who refused to recognize Mel’nyk’s authority. The OUN(B)’s 
leaders were enthusiastic followers of Dontsov’s doctrines of amorality, the initiative minority, 
and creative violence.20 Like Dontsov (and the Nazis), the OUN(B) regarded Jews as agents of 
Bolshevism and enemies of Europe’s nationalists. Also like Dontsov, the OUN(B) regarded an 
alliance with Nazi Germany in its crusade against the Soviet state as the best available path 
toward independent statehood. The outbreak of World War II intensified their anti-Semitism and 
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hostility toward minorities. Practically and ideologically, the OUN(B) moved closer to the Nazis, 
upon whom they depended, taking an active role in the large-scale violence against Jews and 
Poles in German-occupied Galicia and Volhynia between 1939 and 1944.21  
 At the outset of the war, the Nazi regime approved and sponsored the OUN(B)’s 
formation of the Nachtigall and Roland Battalions under the auspices of the German Abwehr 
(military intelligence). Intended as the kernel of a future Ukrainian army, the two units 
participated in the invasion of Soviet Ukraine. After their arrival in L’viv on June 30, 1941, the 
OUN(B) proclaimed Ukraine’s independence, with a future capital in Kyiv, Iaroslav Stets’ko 
(1912-1986) as prime minister, and Stepan Bandera as supreme leader. Hoping that the Germans 
would appreciate their dependence upon Ukrainian support in the ongoing war against Soviet 
Russia and acquiesce to this fait accompli, the OUN(B) declared its willingness to rule Ukraine 
in accordance with Nazi interests and wage an unrelenting struggle against the “Muscovite-
Bolshevik enslavers.” The proclamation’s third point thus read: “The newly formed Ukrainian 
state will work closely with the Nation-Socialist Great Germany, under the leadership of its 
leader Adolf Hitler, which is forming a new order in Europe and is helping the Ukrainian people 
free itself from Muscovite occupation.”22 There were voices in favor of tolerating or even 
promoting Ukrainian statehood for practical reasons—Alfred Rosenberg, most prominently, and 
military commanders, who were more concerned with winning the war in the east than Hitler’s 
conviction that Ukrainians and other Slavs were racially inferior to Aryans and therefore 
unworthy of self-government. But the plan to depopulate Ukraine, reduce the survivors to helots, 
                                                
21 On the OUN’s role in the anti-Jewish pogroms that followed the German conquest of L’viv, see Himka, “The 
L’viv Pogrom,” and Carynnyk, “The Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists.” 
 
22 “Akt proholoshennia ukrains’koi derzhavy,” Samostiina Ukraina, no. 3 (July 10, 1941, Stanislaviv), 1. 
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and colonize it with militarized German farmers won out.23 In response to the OUN(B)’s action, 
the Nazi authorities launched a crackdown on the group, imprisoning or executing most of its 
leaders, and forcing the rest of the organization underground. The OUN(B) nevertheless 
continued to operate, dispatching clandestine expeditionary groups into Eastern Ukraine to 
inspire and organize nationally conscious Ukrainians, participate in the extirpation of the Soviet-
Russian system and its hidden supporters, and lay the groundwork for independent statehood. 
The OUN(M) also cooperated with Nazi Germany, included members who adhered to fascist and 
Dontsovian ideas, and sent expeditionary groups into formerly Central and Eastern Ukraine 
behind the advancing Wehrmacht.  
 Oleh Ol’zhych and Olena Teliha participated in the first OUN(M) expedition to Kyiv at 
the outset of the Nazi-Soviet war. We have so far said little about Ol’zhych (real name, 
Kandyba), whom Teliha hailed in 1936 as “the most brilliant representative of today’s young 
poetry”; a heroic, vibrant figure, for whom “life and struggle are synonyms.”24 Like Teliha, 
Ol’zhych took a romantic view of martyrdom for the nation, expressing this in his poetry: “How 
magnificent that we shall not be given the chance / to live to thirty!” “Oh, believe the bright fire 
of courage, / And you will throw off, like a torn rag, / the weakness, the doubt and the vanity of 
life.”25 Anarchaeologist by profession, Ol’zhych graduated from Charles University in Prague in 
1929, wrote his dissertation on the Trypillian culture of the Neolithic period in Galicia, and 
                                                
23 As John Armstrong explains, “the Nazis preferred to play off the scorned Slavic elements against each other, 
rather than risk giving the Ukrainians a free hand.” Despite their treatment under Nazis rule, the OUN proved 
willing to collaborate with the Germans again in 1943, since it meant weapons, training, and support in its fight 
against the greater Polish and Russian enemies. Armstrong, “Collaborationism in World War II,” 409. Also see 
Timothy Snyder, “The Causes of Ukrainian-Polish Ethnic Cleansing, 1943,” Past & Present 179 (May 2003): 197-
234. 
 
24 Teliha, “Syla cherez radist’,” 102. 
 
25 Quoted in Shkandrij, Ukrainian Nationalism, 204-5. 
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participated in digs across Eastern Europe. He drew inspiration from the prehistoric and ancient 
world for his poetry and politics, which—despite following Dontsov’s lead in rejecting 
democracy, liberalism, socialism, communism, conservatism, materialism, and pacifism—was 
skeptical of Nazism. His archaeological work challenged the notion that prehistoric “Aryans” 
were the source of civilization in Ukraine.26 A leading member and cultural spokesmen of the 
OUN since 1929, Ol’zhych wrote extensively on Ukrainian culture and nationalism, focusing on 
its continuities with ancient myths and folklore, the mystical power and beauty of the distant 
past. He reimagined the Slavic pagan gods, Dazhboh and Japheth, as the divine ancestors of the 
Slavic nations; the basis for a myth of warlike vitality, idealism, expansionism, and unity for 
modern and future Ukrainians.27 Yet, his aesthetic and political vision was modernist, 
voluntarist, and forward-thinking; he praised his fellow Visntykivtsi as representatives of a 
“militarized neoclassicism,” rooted in heroic medieval values, oriented toward European high 
culture, and capable of inspiring great strength, faith, love, and hate.28 He placed Ukraine on the 
avant-garde of a new European civilization that would overcome the decadence and chaos that 
had been unleashed by World War I.29 On the eve of Operation Barbarossa, Ol’zhych wrote a 
paean to war and premodern tradition that was close to Dontsov’s thinking at the same time: 
“Militarism is a universal worldview and a morality that forms an individual and a people. It 
does not see in the enemy a criminal or a monster, but another human being, placed in an 
                                                
26 Liubomyr Vynar, Oleh Kandyba-Ol’zhych: Doslidzhennia ta dzherela (New York: Ukrains’ke Istorychne 
Tovarystvo, Natsional’nyi Universytet “Ostrozka Akademiia,” 2008), 41-42, 77. 
 
27 Shkandrij, Ukrainian Nationalism, 203-4.  Oleh Ol’zhych, “Natsionalistyncha kul’tura” (1940) and “Ukrains’ka 
Kul’tura” (1942). 
 
28 Shkandrij, Ukrainian Nationalism, 201-2. 
 
29 Oleh Ol’zhych, “V avanhardi heroichnoi doby,” (1938) in Oleh Ol’zhych, Poeziia, Proza (Kyiv: Vydavnytstvo 
imeni Oleny Telihy, 2007), 263. 
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adversarial position by the profound, creative, and tragic wisdom of life. This is how knightly 
ethics and virtues originate. A militaristic worldview ennobles life, calling forth courage, 
steadfastness, soldiery camaraderie, a sense of higher duty and honor.”30 Armed with this martial 
fatalism, Ol’zhych, Teliha, and their comrades went to German-occupied Kyiv with an anti-
imperial gospel.     
 
Figure 6.1. The 1941 OUN(M) expeditionary group: sitting (l-r), Oleh Ol’zhych, Olena Teliha, 
and Ulas Samchuk; unidentified comrades standing. Source: Internet Encyclopedia of Ukraine 
    
 Like Dontsov, Ol’zhych and Teliha were enthusiastic about the achievements, aesthetics, 
and ethos of Italian Fascism and German Nazism, but they were independent thinkers and 
political actors—serious artists who lived out the Spartan worldview rhapsodized in their 
writings. Their defiant nationalism put them in direct conflict with the nascent Nazi empire. 
Ol’zhych played an active role in the abortive independence of Carpatho-Ukraine, and opposed 
the schism in the OUN, but sided with the Mel’nyk faction, serving as its second-in-command. In 
1939-1940, he headed the cultural activities of the Leadership of the Ukrainian Nationalists 
(PUN), together with Teliha, in Krakow. Their OUN(M) expeditionary group, under Ol’zhych’s 
                                                
30 Oleh Ol’zhych, “Ukrains’ka istorychna svidomist’,” (1941), quoted in Shkandrij Ukrainian Nationalism, 202. 
 
  410 
direction, reached Kyiv in September 1941, began publishing a newspaper, Ukrains’ke slovo 
(Ukrainian Word), and founded the Ukrainian National Council (Ukrains’ka natsional’na rada), 
a political and civil body intended to serve as the basis for a future Ukrainian state. In Kyiv, 
Teliha edited a literary weekly, Litavry (Kettledrums), a subsidiary of Ukrains’ke slovo, which 
had a press run of over 20,000 copies and disseminated Ukrainian nationalist views. The 
publication ran for just a few months, however, running afoul of the Nazi occupation authorities 
who opposed its pro-independence stance. The Germans shut down Ukrains’ke slovo, arrested its 
staff, and replaced it with the strictly pro-Nazi, anti-Semitic, and anti-Ukrainian independence 
Nove ukrains’ke slovo (New Ukrainian Word) in December.  
 Refusing to cooperate, Teliha had a chance to flee Kyiv before facing arrest, but chose to 
remain in the city. “There has to be someone who looks death in the face and does not retreat,” 
she said.31 On February 21, 1942, Olena Teliha, her husband Mykhailo, and over forty other 
OUN activists were shot at Babyn Iar, a ravine on the edge of Kyiv where the Nazis killed tens 
of thousands of Jews and others. Ol’zhych went underground, leading the OUN(M)’s operations 
in Ukraine until his arrest by the Gestapo on May 25, 1944, in L’viv, where he was discovered 
with a collection of documents describing Nazi crimes that he had been compiling.32 Since the 
beginning of the war he had become disillusioned with the Nazis, whom he called “a mob of 
racists, cutthroats, and gangsters.”33 Imprisoned at Sachsenhausen, Ol’zhych was tortured by 
Nazi interrogators until his death by execution or suicide on June 10. The deaths of Ol’zhych and 
Teliha demonstrated the resolve behind their premonitions of personal martyrdom. Both 
                                                
31 Quoted in Shkandrij, Ukrainian Nationalism, 176. 
 
32 Vynar, Oleh Kandyba-Ol’zhych, 175-88. 
 
33 Quoted in Shkandrij, Ukrainian Nationalism, 199. 
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subsequently achieved cult status in the Ukrainian nationalist pantheon, proving themselves more 
committed to Dontsov’s doctrine than he himself was, even in his youth.  
 The latter’s rebellious former disciple, Iuryi Lypa, also took the heroic path of a resolute 
“active nationalist,” joining the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA)—the military wing of the 
OUN—as a physician and propagandist. Instead of retreating west with the Germans, Lypa 
returned to his hometown of Odesa, despite its recapture by Soviet forces, in the summer of 
1944. The NKVD arrested him on August 19. Two days later his mutilated body was discovered, 
dumped in the garbage pit at the edge of town. NKVD agents had tortured and castrated him.34  
 But Dontsov, who had inspired Ol’zhych, Teliha, Lypa, and many other young 
Ukrainians with a morbid ethos of fanatical violence, self-sacrifice, and courage, was nowhere to 
be found in Ukraine at its darkest hour. After World War II—in which one in every six 
inhabitants of Ukraine, over five million individuals, perished—Dontsov created a monument to 
only one of them: Teliha. His eulogy to the martyred Olena, Poetka vohnenykh mezh (which we 
touched on in chapter 5), hailed her as “the poetess of the fiery limits, on the path of a new epoch 
of our civilization, an epoch that she heralded and in the struggle for which she laid down her 
head.”35 “In our ‘progressive’ age, in the age of the triumphant boor, in the age of the herd, of the 
degradation of all individuality, of the brilliant and the brave—one’s gaze stops with pride on the 
figure of Olena Teliha.”36 She possessed the “mentality” of a Ukrainian ruling caste, the 
mystique of the word and a combative spirit,” a true militant who wanted to “beat plowshares 
into swords with a prophetic word.”37 As a woman and as a poet, Teliha was warlike, fanatical, 
                                                
34 Iuryi Lypa, Vseukrains’ka trylohiia, vol. 2 (Kyiv: Mizhrehial’na akademia upravlinnia personalom, 2007), 2, 388. 
 
35 Dontsov, Poetka vohnenykh mezh, 7. 
 
36 Ibid. 
 
37 Ibid., 34. 
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overflowing with the will to life and power. Wrapping himself in her glory, Dontsov exalted her 
as the most perfect embodiment of his ideals in their time. He praised her “tragic optimism” and 
willingness to suffer and die for a great cause, her depth of faith and love for Ukraine. “Her love 
was not a sweet and shallow emotion, it was a courageous love, severe, and merciless toward 
herself; not a powerless compassion but a sacrificial act.”38 Dontsov concluded his eulogy with a 
call to arms, in the spirit of this Ukrainian Joan of Arc, but his war cry rang hollow. After all, it 
was the already defeated Nazis, not the Bolsheviks, who had destroyed the young poetess, while 
he was still a committed acolyte of Hitler. What sacrifice had Dontsov made? What selfless 
severity and courage had he shown in his love for her?       
 Despite the execution of Olena Teliha—whom he loved, to all appearances—Dontsov 
carried on collaborating with the regime that had killed her, espousing pro-Nazi views until the 
end of the war. It is not clear when he found out about her death, but word of such an event 
would surely have traveled fast in Ukrainian nationalist circles. The deaths of millions of other 
Ukrainians, murdered by the soldiers and police of Nazi Germany and its allies, incited no 
protests from Dontsov’s pen. Instead, he quietly deepened his cooperation with Hitler’s empire 
after 1941. Once the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact was scrapped, the Third Reich presented 
opportunities for pro-Nazi intellectuals from Eastern Europe such as Dontsov to apply their 
expertise on the politics, history, and culture of “the East” in the service of Germany’s war 
against the Soviet Union and its “Jewish-Masonic” agents abroad. In Nazi-occupied L’viv in 
1941 there appeared a second edition of Dontsov’s book, De shukaty nashykh istorychnykh 
tradytsii (Where to Seek Our Historical Traditions, 1938), in which he repeated the pro-Nazi, 
pro-Hitler line that he had taken up in 1933, reassuring Ukrainians that “Germany never did 
________________________ 
 
38 Ibid., 57. 
 
  413 
anything against our national unity.”39 But he published next to nothing in the years 1942-1943, 
leaving scant evidence of his day-to-day life behind. Meanwhile, in accordance with 
Generalplan Ost, Nazi soldiers and death squads terrorized his homeland, leveled its cities and 
villages, massacred, starved, and enslaved its people.  
 The hopes that many Ukrainian nationalists had had about Hitler’s New Europe in the 
summer of 1941 had become untenable by 1943—there would be no independent Ukraine under 
the aegis of Nazi Germany, from which Ukrainians should instead expect genocidal treatment as 
bad as anything they had suffered under Stalin. The OUN(B) began to revise its platform in light 
of this disillusionment with Nazism as well as at least three other factors: 1) the formation of the 
Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA)40 in the spring of 1943 and the consequent recognition of the 
need for a strategy that would prioritize military considerations, i.e. preparing for a war with the 
Red Army, the Wehrmacht, and/or Poland (whichever triumphs and seeks to dominate Ukrainian 
lands); 2) the outreach efforts of both OUN factions among Eastern Ukrainians, who were 
formed by the Soviet system and thus less receptive of radical, Dontsovian ideas; and 3) the 
growing likelihood, given the declining fortunes of the German war effort after the Soviet 
victory at Stalingrad in February 1943, that Ukrainian nationalists would have to rely on the 
liberal-democratic, anti-Communist Western powers in their struggle for independence after the 
Nazi-Soviet war. At the Third Extraordinary Grand Conference of the OUN(B), August 21-25, 
1943, the organization adopted a considerably more liberal, pluralistic platform, promising 
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40 The UPA took shape through the OUN(B)’s violent consolidation, under its exclusive authority, of OUN(M) 
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minority rights for non-Ukrainians living in Ukraine. This was a reversal of the “Ukraine for 
Ukrainians” stance taken at the OUN(B)’s Second Conference in February 1943, which set the 
agenda behind the UPA’s subsequent massacres of the Poles in Volhynia and Galicia—an 
outburst of ethnic cleansing that continued into 1944, resulting in the deaths of tens of thousands 
of Polish civilians.41 Nevertheless, the Third Conference expressly condemned “fascist and 
national-socialist programs and political concepts,” as well as internationalism, and “Russian-
Bolshevik communism,” outlining a social democratic program for a future independent state. 
The OUN(B) changed its command structure from one-man rule (Bandera was imprisoned at 
Sachsenhausen at this point) to an elected triumvirate, creating the Ukraine Supreme Liberation 
Council (Ukrains’ka holovna vyzvol’na rada, UHVR), intended as a nonpartisan coordinating 
committee of all pro-independence Ukrainian forces, which also adopted a democratic platform 
in July 1944. The changes were not, however, accepted by the entire OUN(B). Conflicts arose 
between Bandera and his lieutenants abroad—who remained committed to the antidemocratic 
Dontsovian ideals of hierarchy, elitism, dogmatism, and uncompromising fanaticism—and the 
leadership in Ukraine (Roman Shukhevych, Mykola Lebed, Zynovyi Matla, and others), which 
was directly engaged with the insurgency and recruitment. 
 Unwilling to openly denounce the brutal treatment of his fellow Ukrainians, Dontsov 
nevertheless managed to criticize these ostensively democratic 1943 revisions in his 
                                                
41 The killings peaked in July and August 1943. An early 1944 OUN order stated: “Liquidate all Polish traces. 
Destroy all walls in the Catholic Church and other Polish prayer houses. Destroy orchards and trees in courtyards so 
that there will be no trace that someone lived there. . . . Pay attention to the fact that when something remains that is 
Polish, then the Poles will have pretensions to our land.” Quoted in Mark Mazower, Hitler’s Empire (New York: 
Penguin Books, 2008), 506-7. The methods used were extremely brutal and sadistic; presumably, Dontsov would 
have applauded the cruelty, intolerance, and fanaticism that inspired the men who carried out these massacres. Many 
of those who participated in the violence were former police men for the Reichskommissariat Ukraine, and therefore 
had training and experience in the genocide of the Jews. They deserted the police with their weapons en masse on 
the orders of the OUN(B) command in March-April 1943. It is thus important to note that the Nazi occupation of 
Ukraine, which turned mass death into an everyday reality, deliberately exacerbated and encouraged this Ukrainian-
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correspondence with the OUN(B) ideologue and member of the UHVR Iosyp Pozychaniuk 
(1913-1944). Dontsov especially took exception to the absence of anti-Semitic and xenophobic 
rhetoric in the new platform: “There is no echo of Ukrainian historical traditions, social, 
material, or political, in the program. And not only of the traditions of Cossackdom, but also of 
the recent traditions of the insurgent movement in 1917-1921, with their xenophobia against the 
newcomers from the north, with anti-Semitism, religiosity, and private-property tendencies.”42 
The OUN’s public stance, Dontsov thought, should “recognize that the mentality and politics of 
world Jewry are harmful to the Ukrainian nation and statehood. The struggle against Jewry is in 
the interests of and traditions of the Ukrainian nation.” He added that “the OUN should stand 
against imperialist powers, including Jewry, but not against imperialism [as such].”43 
Pozychaniuk, like a number of OUN(B) members as of late 1943, regarded support of anti-
Semitism and Nazism as counterproductive because public association with these increasingly 
unpopular doctrines harmed the organization’s reputation. Moreover, the Jewish question had 
already ceased to exist in Ukraine; the Nazis had killed most of the Jews who were living in 
Ukraine at the beginning of the war, and many of the rest had fled to safety. Pozychaniuk replied 
to Dontsov that “one would have to be a political infant not to understand that regardless of our 
traditions with regard to the Jewish question, now, for a slew of reasons, we must disavow even 
the slightest shade of Hitlerism.”44 This correspondence ended by December 1944. Taken 
together, Dontsov’s comments on the OUN(B)’s Third Conference imply that he still regarded 
                                                
42 Quoted in Volodymyr V’iatrovych, Stanovlennia OUN do evreiv: formuvannia pozytsii na tli katastrofy (L’viv: 
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Nazi imperialism as a positive force in Ukraine and Europe, and thought of anti-Semitism as a 
time-hallowed Ukrainian “tradition,” a corollary of Ukraine’s similarly traditional Christianity, 
Russophobia, and rejection of socialism.  
 
Caste, Race, and the Nazi-Soviet War: Dontsov and the Reinhard Heydrich Institute 
 Apart from this private intervention in the deliberations of an organization that he 
steadfastly refused to join, Dontsov laid low in the relative safety of Prague while activists in the 
Ukrainian nationalist underground risked lethal encounters with the Gestapo and the NKVD in 
order to put his “worldview” into bloody practice. What was the sixty-year-old ideologue doing 
in the Czech capital, the eye of the storm? What did Dontsov do during his brief visit to Berlin in 
early 1942? To whom did he speak? Nazi officials? OUN agents? Well-connected colleagues? 
This is not known. It is clear, however, that he became involved in a major new Nazi academic 
project during his time in German-occupied Prague: die Reinhard-Heydrich-Stiftung (the 
Reinhard Heydrich Institute).  
 Originally founded as die Reichsstiftung für wissentschaftliche Forschung (the Imperial 
Institute for Scientific Research) on July 25, 1942, at Charles University45 in Prague, the institute 
was named after the high-ranking Nazi hardliner, Reinhard Heydrich (1904-1942), one month 
after his assassination by British-trained Czech and Slovak fighters in Prague. In search of an 
effective and ruthless agent of German hegemony in the Czech lands, Hitler had named Heydrich 
Reichsprotektor (Reich-Protector) of the Nazi Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia in 
September 1941. In this capacity, Heydrich, one of the chief architects of the Holocaust, earned a 
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reputation as “the Butcher of Prague” and “the Hangman of the Third Reich.”46 Under his reign, 
the Nazi campaign to “Germanize” the Czech lands accelerated, claiming many victims. True to 
the legacy of its namesake and subordinated to the SS, the research conducted at the Reinhard 
Heydrich Institute—its “exploration of the ethnic, cultural, political, and economic conditions of 
Bohemia and Moravia, as well as the people of Eastern and Southeastern Europe”—was 
expected to serve the aims of Nazi empire-building.47 These included the genocide or 
sterilization of undesired populations (especially the Jews and Roma), the promotion of the 
supremacy of the “Aryan race” and German culture in all spheres, the “denationalization” and 
“neutralization” of non-Germans and the assimilation of those deemed racially suitable, and the 
annihilation of the Soviet state and its supporters.48 After the organization of the Heydrich 
Institute was completed in 1943,49 it supported the research into social anthropology and the 
“ethnobiology” (Volksbiologie),50 Eastern European intellectual history (Geistesgeschichte),51 
                                                
46 One of the darkest figures in Nazi officialdom, SS-Obergruppenführer (Senior Group Leader of the SS) and Chief 
of Police Heydrich headed of the Reichssicherheitshauptamt (Reich Main Security Office), which oversaw the 
Reich’s notorious intelligence and secret police forces, including the Gestapo and the Sicherheitsdienst (Security 
Service). He organized Kristallnacht—the coordinated anti-Jewish violence against German and Austrian Jews on 
November 9-10, 1938; formed the Einsatzgruppen—the SS paramilitary death squads that operated in the German-
occupied territories of Eastern Europe, shooting more than two million Jews, Communists, Gypsies, and others; 
chaired the Wannsee Conference in January 1942, at which Nazi leaders formalized “the Final Solution to the 
Jewish Problem”; and spearheaded the “Germanization” project in the Czech lands. Fred Ramen, Reinhard 
Heydrich: Hangman of the Third Reich (New York: Rossen, 2001). 
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York: Cambridge University Press, 1988). 
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50 Directed by Karl Müller (1896-1963), who specialized in Nazi racial doctrine, conducted psychological and social 
studies of Czech police and schoolchildren, and sought evidence of racial and cultural inheritance from Germans 
among contemporary and historical Czechs. Wiedemann, Die Reinhard-Heydrich-Stiftung, 63-66. 
 
51 Austrian historian Eduard Winter (1896-1982), a specialist in Church history and the history of Christianity, 
headed this section. During his tenure at the Heydrich Institute he had published a book on the struggle between 
Catholicism and Orthodoxy in Ukraine, which presented itself as instructive to the Nazi war effort in the east. 
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German law in East Central Europe, Czech language and literature, folk music, the history of 
Bohemia and Moravia, and European ethnology and “ethnopsychology” (Europäische 
Völkerkunde und Völkerpsychologie). The latter department was headed jointly by the Nazi 
psychologist and race scientist Rudolf Hippius (1905-1945) and the historian and SS-
Hauptsturmführer Hans Joachim Beyer52 (1908-1971), who worked together to combat and 
reverse the assimilation (Umvolkung) into Slavic cultures of Germans living in Eastern Europe. 
To do this, they developed a taxonomy of racial and psychological types with practical 
applications for the Nazi regime’s conquest and ethnic remolding of the populations of Bohemia, 
Moravia, and Eastern Europe as a whole.53 The Heydrich Institute also promoted histories of 
Eastern Europe that were instructive for military purposes and emphasized the purportedly 
German-Nordic-Aryan origins of all civilizational achievements among the Slavic peoples.  
 After the Wehrmacht’s advance encountered stiff resistance, came to a halt in Soviet 
territory, and began losing ground in 1943-1944, the Heydrich Institute’s primary directive 
shifted away from research in support of Germanization to the study of Bolshevism 
(Bolschewismusforschung) and the peoples of the Soviet Union. The SS deemed such research 
________________________ 
Eduard Winter, Byzanz und Rom im Kamp um die Ukraine (Leipzig: Harrassowitz, 1942). Wiedemann, Die 
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more useful to the war effort.54 The Nazi leadership acknowledged the need for a mobilization of 
anti-Soviet fighters drawn from the nationalities of the Soviet Union for the defense of “Europe” 
from the advancing Red Army. Berlin resumed its collaboration with the OUN factions by the 
fall of 1944, releasing Bandera, Mel’nyk, and other Ukrainian nationalist leaders from the 
Sachsenhausen concentration camp, where many of them had been imprisoned for most of the 
war, and providing them with resources to carry out rearguard actions against the Soviet forces in 
Ukraine.55  
 For the purposes of disseminating the Heydrich Institute’s research to its target 
audience—the German military, especially students at the front and officers in the Waffen-SS—
Rudolf Hippius founded and edited a paper, Volkswissenschaftliche Feldpostbriefe (Ethnological 
Dispatches), in March 1944. Information on the situation in Ukraine, which had already grown 
dire for the Wehrmacht, was one of the central concerns of the publication. The first issue 
featured an introductory article on “The Four Disguises of the Muscovite World Revolution” by 
Hans Koch (1894-1959), a L’viv-born German historian of Russia and Ukraine and an advisor to 
the Wehrmacht and Abwehr in occupied Ukraine, where he oversaw the establishment of Nazi 
contacts with the OUN.56 Volkswissenschaftliche Feldpostbriefe showcased anti-Bolshevik, pro-
Nazi experts on Ukrainian affairs in residence at the Heydrich Institute. The front-page story of 
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the May 1944 issue was an essay on “The Development of National-Political Thought in 
Ukraine” by an otherwise unidentified “Dr. D. Donzow.”57 
 It is unclear just how active Dontsov was at the Heydrich Institute and whether he 
collaborated with it for the entirety of his stay in Prague (the end of 1941 to early 1945), or only 
briefly, around the time that his writing appeared in Hippius’s paper.58 His contribution to 
Volkswissenschaftliche Feldpostbriefe offered a history lesson to SS officers as they retreated 
back across Ukraine and Soviet forces regained control of the country. Much as he had during 
World War I, Dontsov presented an account of the Ukrainians that emphasized their traditional 
affinity for Germany and their antipathy for Russia.  
 He divided his lesson into six stages. In the first, 1782-1825, there was the last gasp of 
the old, heroic “Atlantis” of the Ukrainian Cossacks and their allegedly antidemocratic and 
hierarchical way of life, which was snuffed out by Russian imperialism and the decadence of 
modernity.59 During the second stage, 1825-1855, the Romanticism of the German philosopher-
poets Herder and Novalis arrived in Ukraine, reawakening the traditions of its people, and 
counteracting the encroachment of cosmopolitan, democratic ideas from the French Revolution, 
which predominated in the Ukrainian national movement of the nineteenth century. Dontsov 
dismissed the Brotherhood of Sts. Cyril and Methodius for its democratic, pacifistic utopianism, 
and its false doctrine of Slavic brotherhood, but praised Taras Shevchenko, who was associated 
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with the Brotherhood, for his “politically nationalistic, reactionary, predemocratic, old-
traditionalist position, which paid homage to the idea of national independence above all else.”60 
The Ukrainian national poet harkened back to the golden age of “the dangerous, struggle-seeking 
[kampflustigen], heroic life of the Grandfathers, the struggle for great ideals and noble goals, the 
struggle for a new, ennobled, and heroic, not plebeian person.”61 Stage three, 1855-1870, brought 
the Great Reforms of Alexander II, which encouraged the naive belief that Ukrainians could be 
liberated without violence and struggle. Dontsov alleged that the Ukrainian national movement 
focused exclusively on cultural matters and the education of an idealized peasantry during these 
years.  
 However, in the fourth stage, 1870-1900, Ukrainian activists became increasingly 
disillusioned with ineffective peaceful resistance, and learned to appreciate the need for a 
political, not just cultural, struggle. Dontsov divided this period into two tendencies: 1) the 
socialism, Proudhonism, Russophilia, and nihilism of Mykhailo Drahomanov, who advocated the 
decentralization and federalization of the Russian Empire, as well as the freedoms of speech, 
assembly, the press, and the individual (mere attenuations tsarist absolutism in Dontsov’s 
reckoning); and 2) the traditionalist, patriotic, anti-Russian attitude of the populist historian and 
archaeologist Volodymyr Antonovych (1834-1908), professor at Kyiv University, who 
supposedly planted the seeds for a genuinely nationalistic movement. Dontsov’s account of the 
fifth stage, 1900-1917, praised the “nationalist, anti-Jewish” writings and activities of Mykhailo 
Mikhnovs’kyi and Olena Pchilka,62 favorably distinguishing them from Hrushevs’kyi, the 
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USDRP, and the other socialists. Naturally, Dontsov omitted his membership in the latter camp 
at the time. He invoked the Union of Russian People and the Black Hundreds as manifestations 
of “a type of Russian fascism” “sixteen years before [Mussolini’s] March on Rome,” 
emphasizing the Russians’ desire to grow their empire and oppress other nations. The 
implication was that fascist empire-building at the expense of Russians would be just retribution. 
Advancing to the sixth and final stage of the development of Ukrainian national political 
thought, 1917-1939, Dontsov returned to the subject of Petliura and the Schwartzbardt Trial. 
“Social Democratic, antimonarchist, a proponent of democratic freedoms and the republican 
form of constitution, absolutely not anti-Jewish-minded,” Petliura came to appreciate the need 
for a military struggle against the Russians and Bolshevism only in the course of the Ukrainian 
Revolution. “In person,” Dontsov explained to his German military audience, “[Petliura] was of 
an honorable and noble nature, brave and ready for sacrifice, as later became clear when the 
Bolshevik Jew Schwartzbardt shot him on a Paris street in 1926.”63 The crimes against 
Ukrainians committed by the Soviet state precluded the possibility of cooperation with 
Bolshevism for virtually all Western and emigre Ukrainians. All of this was intended, 
presumably, to assure German soldiers that patriotic Ukrainians supported their just and heroic 
struggle against a hated common enemy—the Jewish-Russian-Bolshevik cabal.  
 In his concluding remarks, Dontsov condescended to make a few positive remarks about 
Lypyns’kyi and the Hetmanites. The latter advocated a “Ukrainian state, whose foundation 
should not be the democratic masses and the déclassé intellectuals, but the Ukrainian 
conservative nobility and the conservative Ukrainian village.”64 However, the Hetmanites were 
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guilty of supporting an alliance of Ukraine, Muscovy, and Belarus rather than national 
independence (as evidenced by Skoropads’kyi’s declaration of federation with Russia at the end 
of World War I),65 while the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic conservatives (Osyp Nazaruk, Bishop 
Hryhorii Komyshyn, and Metropolitan Andrei Sheptyts’kyi) were guilty of holding 
internationalist, pro-Polish opinions. Dontsov himself, and he alone, had formulated a Ukrainian 
nationalist ideal worthy of German support. His own doctrine, he wrote, “was antisocialist and 
antidemocratic, as well as anti-Russian:”   
[Dontsov’s] nationalism, propagated since 1922, broke away from the half-measures of 
the democratic program of federalism and the illusions of a peaceful understanding with 
Moscow. He preached a total spiritual transformation of the Ukrainian psyche and the 
return to the hard virtues of the past, advocated a ‘Western orientation’ for Ukraine, 
battled the Russian spirit and Russian culture as civilization-destroying forces. He 
struggled against the four Ms—Moscow, materialism, Freemasonry, and Marxism—for 
the virtues of Ukrainian traditionalism, for the idea of a new leading stratum, formed 
from a stricter vetting . . . of a new caste of ‘better people.’66      
                                           
 Addressing Ukrainian audiences, Dontsov attempted to explain what this “caste of better 
people” looked like in his work, Dukh nashoi davnyny (The Spirit of Our Antiquity)—his final 
noteworthy treatise on ideology, and the last major revision of his worldview—which he 
published in Prague in 1944. Written in the spirit of the Batava group, Dukh nashoi davnyny 
promised answers to a series of burning questions for Ukrainians: How did we lose our land? 
Why have Ukrainians become helots and slaves? What has brought about these apocalyptic 
times? Invoking the critique of modern society and the rise of the “mass-man” in Spanish 
philosopher Ortega y Gasset’s The Revolt of the Masses (1930),67 Dontsov called for a return to 
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hierarchy: “Selections [dobory] not elections [vybory].”68 It was the demoralization and loss of 
Ukraine’s elite that was to blame for the modern decline of the nation. Ukraine had lost its 
“apostles, ascetics, martyrs, and heroes,” such as the Cossacks once produced. In the absence of 
a strict power vertical, capped by a ruling stratum endowed with a sense of commitment to its 
mission, an “egoism of the parts”—parties, classes, individuals, etc.—filled the void, leaving the 
nation primed for defeat.69 Dontsov argued that the Polish and Bolshevik oppression of 
Ukrainians were manifestations of the “wrath of God,” visited upon them for their sinful lack of 
faith, their pride, skepticism, and materialism, which deprived them will and a sense of higher 
justice.70        
 A caste—from the Latin castus, meaning pure, clean—is defined by its segregation from 
other castes. Dontsov believed that “without castes, society does not exist,” and the “fish rots 
from the head.”71 Invoking Plato’s notion of “gold,” “silver,” and “bronze” castes in The 
Republic, he warned against the ruinous consequences of alloys.72 The Cossacks once constituted 
a proper aristocracy, but the entry of inferior peasant elements into its ranks and the rise of 
democratic notions changed its “psychology.” Tainted by “swineherds” (svynopasy)—they 
became hedonistic, scholarly, and Russified. They began to shun war—their raison d’etre—
________________________ 
himself resolved to impose his opinions. That was the novelty: the right not to be right, not to be reasonable: ‘the 
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losing their pride, courage, desire to rule, and love of glory.73 The “Little Russian intelligentsia” 
that emerged from this racial-spiritual deterioration gave way to “Marxist-Democrats” who were 
so obsessed with equality that they forgot about liberation—freedom and self-government: “This 
was the era when the poison flower blossomed and the weeds of democracy, Freemasonry, and 
Marxism, with an impure admixture [domishka] of Judeophilia, grew among us; the era of the 
greatest decline of the Ukrainian national movement.” Answering critics who charged that he 
attacked Ukrainian traditions and imitated foreigners, contributing to the unmooring and 
demoralization of his countrymen, Dontsov insisted that he was the real traditionalist, while the 
Ukrainian intelligentsia from the nineteenth century forward were the rootless iconoclasts, who 
smeared and negated the former glory of Kyivan-Rus’ and the Cossack period.74 The great 
prophets of the Ukrainian idea—Shevchenko, Koltliarevs’kyi, Skovoroda—were “rooted in the 
Cossack, knightly [lytsars’kyi] (not in the democratic) era, far removed from Marxism, 
democratism, cosmopolitanism, humanism, and the other ‘virtues’ of the populist elite.”75 
Dontsov listed the three characteristics of this long-lost caste: nobility (shliakhetnist’), including 
courage, extreme dedication, hatred for Russia and the Moskals; wisdom (mudrist’), or 
“recognition of the law of a higher moral force than oneself, faith in God, recognition of the 
superiority of the general over the particular, love of the fatherland, respect for the ancestors”; 
and courage (vidvaha), “the heroic warrior spirit.” All “values opposite to those that rule the 
democratic intelligentsia,”76 which celebrated a “cult of the masses,” suffered from an 
“inadequacy of environment, race, and blood,” and “tore away from the spirit of the ruling castes 
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of our great historical epochs and their traditions.”77 The problem, thought Dontsov, affected not 
only Ukraine, but all of modern Europe, which needed to look backward to the moral, political, 
and cultural ideals and practices of medieval Christendom for the way forward.78 A new 
Crusade, this time against Russian Communism, would give the reemergent ruling castes of 
Europe a great cause to serve.  
 Dontsov used biological metaphors to describe the composition of societies. Nations are 
organisms, and their constituent classes are organs. The development of strict hierarchies is an 
unavoidable natural phenomenon—the question is only whether the rulers will be supplied from 
within or from without, by foreign conquerors. Like the Batava circle, Dontsov invoked the race 
science of Hans Günther and Eugen Fischer (1874-1967)—two major influences on German 
National Socialist thought and practice, especially with regard to the idea of a pure Aryan society 
and the eugenical and genocidal methods used to achieve it—to flesh out his account of castes.79 
According to Dontsov, the Nordic type exhibits the greatest “biological potential” and “might 
occupy the highest wrung on the ladder of the various human types.”80 Once spread across 
Ukraine and well represented in the Viking-derived nobility of old Kyivan-Rus’, Nordic blood 
was now rarely encountered there. The more common of the “form-giving” racial types in 
Ukraine was the “Pontaic, Mediterranean.” Far more common were the lesser “Oriental” 
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(ostiitsia) and “Dinaric” (dynartsia) types—the alleged anthropological essence of the 
“peacefully submissive” Ukrainophile democrats, whose racial makeup determined their 
“psychology,” their “orientation toward life,” their politics and “understanding of beauty.”81 
Short-limbed, small-statured, flabby, stooped, timid, effete, lazy, cautious, conformist—neither 
heroic and adventurous, like the Nordic, nor cheerful and artistic, like the Mediterranean—the 
unrefined “Oriental’s” “single dream in social and political life is state assistance, hence his love 
for state posts, pensions, for a bureaucratic socialism, in which everyone is a state worker.”82 He 
hates all who stand apart from the crowd, individuals of exceptional talent and genius; he thinks 
in narrow terms (obsessed with home and hearth, hence the endemic nepotism); he is sheep-like 
and collectivistic, with a “pathological yearning for oneness [sobornist’] and unity 
[ob’iednannia], even at the price of slavery.”83  
 Dontsov maintained that this race arrived in the form of Russian colonists in Eastern 
Ukraine, and now predominates there. “Dinaric” racial traits, by contrast, supposedly reigned in 
Western Ukraine.84 According to Günther, the Dinaric type descended from ancient Alpine tribes 
spread across Southern and Central Europe. “Strongly built,” “healthy and muscular,” carnal, 
cheerful, hedonistic, expansive, loud, undisciplined, [and] musical, Dinarics possess “a feeling of 
dignity, courage, a sense of honor, [and] are warlike (in defense).” Though lacking the Nordic’s 
“boldness” and “clarity of thought,” Dinarics are supposedly “natural warriors.” Prone to 
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outbursts of temper, they are nevertheless good-natured and warm.85 The Ukrainian Cossacks, 
Dontsov averred, were undeniably Dinaric, as were Makhno and his anarchist followers. But the 
Mediterranean and Nordic types alone are born to rule; thus, Dontsov asserted, Ukraine’s future 
ruling caste must be drawn from them. He left it to the reader to infer that the German invaders 
then marauding across Eastern Europe might be the “better people” he had in mind.                        
 Beyond the “zoological,”86 another aspect of the national organism is spiritual, 
nonmaterial, vital (in the Bergsonian sense), and embodied in the ruling caste, which breathes 
“form” and “creative energy” into society, like fire and kindling. History and tradition, no less 
than biology, are the source of this aristocratic élan vital: “The spiritual face of a nation, like the 
physical, depends above all on its racial substance, but the universe of its historical traditions 
also leaves its mark on the face of the nation.” He compares the few who lead to birds of prey; 
the masses who serve to peaceful herbivores.87 Stoic, ascetic, unwavering, fearing neither pain 
nor death, the ruling caste focuses only on the good of the whole organism, and is willing to 
sacrifice everything for an abstract idea.88 All parts of society must be directed toward a single 
end: the internal order, strength, and preservation of the nation as a whole. “Heretics” should be 
killed. “Cruel punishments” should be handed down to individuals who challenge the leadership 
and the sacred beliefs and traditions that ensure the nation’s perseverance.89 Xenophobia and 
isolationism are signs of national health. The “apostles” of the ruling castes should spread their 
fate among unbelievers with “the sword.” They should learn “to be hard and unforgiving toward 
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oneself in order to be hard and unforgiving toward enemy communities, the forces of the external 
world, and toward one’s own society.”90 In the modern world, every human failing is blamed on 
“environment,” sins are tolerated, and “the Devil” thus triumphs everywhere.91 The nation that 
rejects domination, hierarchy, violence, coercion, and discipline within itself will receive these 
instead from a foreign nation.92 Dontsov called for “swords, not ploughs,” for the defense of a 
sacralized territory; Ukraine’s steppe is a site of war and death, not peaceful fields—a sacred 
terrain to be defended, not a row to plough.93                 
 Dontsov’s commentary on events had been voluble and incessant before the war, but he 
ventured to take a public stance on the situation in Europe only once during World War II, in the 
conclusion to Dukh nashoi davnyny:  
Central Europe reacted to the democratic chaos and the threat of Bolshevism in our times 
with such movements as the National Socialism of A. Hitler, the Fascism of B. 
Mussolini, and also the Falangism of General Franco, which in Italy in 1922, in Germany 
in 1933, and in Spain in 1936, prevailed over Communist movements. Liberating public 
life from the influences of Jewry, National Socialism (together with the two other just 
mentioned and akin tendencies), in opposition to democracy, to the Western-Jewish 
Communism of Karl Marx and the Eastern-Russian Communism of Lenin—created its 
system, which, over the course of several years, significantly altered the hitherto structure 
and face of the German (and, in part, the Latin) world, strongly hindering the further 
evolution of our continent.94           
 
Dontsov rationalized Fascism and Nazism as a natural and necessary reaction to Bolshevism, 
while conceding that they had done great damage to Europe, impeding its progress.  
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 Dontsov compiled and republished many of his works after the war, excising pro-Nazi 
comments that had been discredited by the outcome of World War II and the growing realization 
of the extent of Nazi war crimes and crimes against humanity. But in 1944, Germany might still 
conceivably have won, and Dontsov had clearly thrown his lot in with it. Dontsov removed the 
passage from his second edition of Dukh nashoi davnyny in 1951 (by which point he was living 
in Montreal).95 The sections on race science, however, reappeared, suggesting that Dontsov 
never abandoned Günther’s teachings. The melodramatic closing points of Dukh nashoi davnyny 
mark a turn toward the apocalyptic mysticism and the occult that dominated Dontsov’s 
worldview for the last thirty years of his life.96 Like many other “literary fascists”97 then and 
since, he invoked the “Kali Yuga,” the Hindu concept of a period of decline during which 
everything falls into “anarchy and ruin” at the end of a cosmic four-stage cycle. The modern 
world, descending deeper into chaos through the erosion of hierarchy, tradition, and faith, will 
eventually give way to a new age, in which clean and unclean, Aryan and non-Aryan, will return 
to their proper, i.e. separate and unequal, station and rank.98  
 But Dontsov’s preferred source for religious imagery was the Christian tradition. The 
modern era is the “epoch of the anti-Christ” foretold in the Book of Revelation. Dontsov’s 
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remedy: a ruling caste with “burning faith” in “its own truth and God,” the will to kill and die for 
it, to prosecute a relentless struggle against the Bolshevik “kingdom of Satan,” to punish the 
ungodly and the followers of other idols. The new caste must fight democracy, carrying within 
them the “fear of God . . . not the fear of man, judgment, torture, and death.”99 Above all, they 
must be “apostles of truth” and “have a deep sense of their apostolic calling” to serve the “spirit 
of traditionalism” against the catastrophic “cult of matter.” Dontsov closed the book with a call 
to arms on Europe’s eastern frontier. Ukraine was the first to resist Bolshevism with its 
“knightly, martial spirit”; forged in the fire of this struggle, painfully conscious of the evil 
essence of Russian Communism, Ukraine was poised to lead a holy pan-European crusade 
against the “gangrene of Bolshevism, Jewry, and Freemasonry.”100  
 Dontsov’s new of blend radical traditionalism, racism, nationalism, and mysticism was 
perfectly compatible with Nazism, provided only that the latter soften its line regarding the status 
of the Slavic nations in Hitler’s empire, granting statehood and a measure of independence to 
Ukrainians so that they, too, could revive the best of their native traditions and racial qualities, 
becoming an indispensable ally to the Third Reich in the process. It may have been naive of 
Dontsov to hope that Hitler and his henchmen would have a change of heart and reach out to the 
Ukrainians as respected partners, but the dire situation on the Eastern Front compelled some 
Nazi German intellectuals to call for a new policy toward some Slavs. In March 1945, Hippius, 
Beyer, and other members of the Heydrich Institute formed a working group for the “study of the 
Bolshevik danger” to offer the SS strategic insights into the history and psychology of the 
population of Ukraine. The group argued that a new line was needed in order to gain the 
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desperately needed support of the Slavic peoples in the war.101 They advocated the abandonment 
of the Nordic Herrenmensch (master race) idea in favor of a more pluralistic, inclusive vision for 
a German-led Europe that would also value the unique qualities and contributions of non-Aryan 
European nations and races. (Dontsov, we will recall, had parenthetically suggested that Nazi 
Germany abandon this rhetoric as alienating to potential non-German allies on the eve of the 
war.)102 Hippius and Beyer tried to repackage Nazi foreign propaganda with the concept a 
“European civil war” against both “the Bolshevik horde of Asians” and “Americanism,” in 
defense of a diverse yet united family of indigenous European cultures and states. This notion 
would replace the idea of German Lebensraum, which held no appeal for the non-Germans 
whose existence, freedom, and prosperity were incompatible with it. Nothing came of the new 
proposals, however, as the Heydrich Institute ceased to exist at the end of April, after Soviet 
forces had driven the Nazis out of the Czech lands. Nazi Germany capitulated to the Allies the 
following month, bringing World War II in Europe to a close. Dontsov fled Prague for the 
American zone of occupation in southern Germany.                                
  
Born Again: A Cold War Epilogue  
Dontsov joined a Ukrainian diaspora that grew substantially in the aftermath of World 
War II. The war had killed one in six of Ukrainse’s inhabitants and left another ten million 
homeless who had either been deported into Germany as Ostarbeiter (“east workers”) or fled the 
return of Soviet rule for the Western zones of occupation, as merchants, peasants, intellectuals, 
and political activists such as Dontsov did. Having struck an agreement with Stalin at Yalta, the 
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Western Allies permitted the vast majority of these people to be forcibly repatriated to the Soviet 
Union where they faced precarious futures, arrest and deportation to harsh labor camps in the 
USSR’s interior, and in some cases execution at the hands of the NKVD. Only about 250,000 
Ukrainians succeeded in making it to the West as displaced persons (DPs), resettling in Canada 
(38,000), the US (80,000), and Australia (21,000), as well as the UK and various countries in 
South America.103 Their salvation was thanks in large part to the governmental lobbying and 
social organizational efforts of the Ukrainian diaspora in North America.104  
However, the newcomers—especially fervent nationalists such as Dontsov—also 
introduced internal conflicts into the already fractured diaspora. The postwar émigrés’ 
experiences in wartime Europe and in the OUN-dominated DP camps had radicalized and united 
them. The efforts of diaspora organizations such as the Ukrainian Canadian Committee and the 
Central Ukrainian Relief Bureau (CURB) to rescue Ukrainian DPs and bring them to the West 
galvanized Ukrainian patriotism and cohesiveness in the diaspora. Heated differences of opinion 
reigned within and between the latest wave of immigration and those already well established in 
Canadian, American, or British society. The two groups came to resent one another, clashing 
over who had the right to lead the national struggle—those who had firsthand experience in the 
oppressed old country, or those who best understood how to navigate politics in the New World. 
Socialists and Communists in the Ukrainian diaspora distrusted the DPs, denouncing them en 
bloc as war criminals, anti-Semitic collaborators, and dangerous carriers of anti-Soviet opinions 
and damning memories of Soviet crimes. Indeed, politically active DPs such as Dontsov joined 
or created Ukrainian nationalist organizations in the West that set out to expose Soviet human 
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rights abuses, and undermine the Soviet Union from within by fomenting national revolutions 
there. The nationalists strongly opposed the Ukrainian left, which went into decline after the 
fallout from the crushed Hungarian revolution in 1956, but they too failed to create a united front 
of their own, as the OUN(B)-OUN(M) split persisted and additional rifts formed. Conflicts 
between religious denominations—Protestants, Catholics, and Orthodox—also divided the 
Ukrainian diaspora, as did economic class and social station. How one understood the real, 
imagined, or remembered “homeland” and the “good” Ukrainian’s proper relation to it—whether 
to fight for Ukraine’s liberation from, or to accept and even praise, Soviet rule—put Ukrainian 
émigrés in irreconcilable yet sometimes redundant camps, sapping their strength and alienating 
potential new recruits (especially among the younger generation born abroad). Moreover, the 
support of their newly adopted states and societies was by no means guaranteed, and Ukrainian 
immigrants to Canada, the US, and the UK faced intense scrutiny over their loyalty and their 
potentially checkered pasts. As we shall see, Dontsov was no exception to this scrutiny, while his 
presence and activities in the West proved divisive for all parties concerned.     
 Dontsov’s behavior during World War II alienated the former Vistnykivsti who survived 
it. Dontsov’s perceived hypocrisy, cowardice, and faithlessness to the young poets of Vistnyk, his 
disciples, appalled Leonid Mosendz, a devotee of the editor and a close friend of Teliha’s before 
1939. Vasyl’ Ivanys,105 Mosendz’s mentor, commented on the latter’s disillusionment with 
Nazism and Dontsov by 1945:  
I discovered this in a letter from L.M., in which he wrote: ‘the spiritual creator of an 
ideology at the decisive moment deserted the youth that had been enthralled by him. 
Dontsov is a corpse. I have written this to him and will have no more to do with him.’ 
[…] And he kept his word. In 1945 in the cafe Beranek in Prague he accidentally met 
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Dontsov sitting at a table, but asked not to be introduced and left. In all his letters he 
often recalled this leader [vozhd] of his with disdain.106  
 
Unlike Teliha and the scores of other young Ukrainians who, inspired by Dontsov, had taken 
action and, in many cases, made the ultimate sacrifice, the aging publicist had fled to safety and 
opportunistically submitted to the Nazis.   
 Most of the other former Vistnykivtsi broke ties with Dontsov, distancing themselves 
from his worldview immediately after the war as members of the émigré Ukrainian literary 
organization Mytets’kyi ukrains’kyi rukh (MUR, Artistic Ukrainian Movement). Formed on 
September 25, 1945, in Fürth, West Germany, MUR was created to bring together Ukrainian 
writers displaced by the war, assist in the publication of their works, and provide a forum for 
discussion. Its ideologically and artistically diverse membership included Ulas Samchuk (the 
head of the organization), Iuryi Klen, Ievhen Malaniuk, Iuryi Kosach, and Iuryi (Sherekh) 
Shevel’ov. Kosach and Shevel’ov spearheaded efforts to purge Dontsov’s influence from 
Ukrainian culture, to atone for the excesses that it had helped to inspire, and to lead the way back 
to the humane European values that Vistnyk had undermined. MUR was, however, unified by a 
Ukrainian liberationist, anti-Bolshevik agenda. Kosach, who published in LNV but never in 
Vistnyk, rebuked Dontsov, not for his avowed “traditionalism,” but for his iconoclasm of 
humanism—one of the core traditions of Ukrainian and European literature.107 The Dontsovian 
nationalist paper Orlyk (Eagle, 1946-48) based in Berchtesgaden, West Germany, responded 
with constant attacks on MUR. Joining MUR in and of itself signaled a rejection of Dontsov, but 
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Klen went further, expressing his disenchantment with militarism, expansionism, and 
authoritarianism in his final works.108 As a German citizen, Klen had been conscripted into the 
Wehrmacht and served as a translator on the Eastern Front, witnessing the Germans’ brutality 
toward Eastern Europeans firsthand. Contrite over his role in the crimes of Nazism, Klen found 
solace in classical, medieval Christianity, but in a way opposite to Dontsov, who did the same. 
Klen’s Christianity was a religion of humility, tolerance, suffering, peace, restraint, and love of 
one’s enemies, not one of inquisitions, warrior elites, and crusades against infidels.109  
 
Figure 6.2. MUR members, 1947: sitting (l-r), Ievhen Malaniuk and Iuryi Shevel’ov; standing 
Vasyl’ Barka, Ulas Samchuk, Ihor Kostets’kyi. Source: Internet Encyclopedia of Ukraine 
 
 Samchuk also turned away from Dontsov. During the war, Samchuk had edited Volyn’ 
(Volhynia, 1941-43), a newspaper in the western Ukrainian city of Rivne that toed the pro-Hitler, 
                                                
108 See his “Pro henezu poemu ‘Popil imperii’” (On the Genesis of the Poem Ashes of Empire), and “Pryhody 
arkhhangela Raphaila” (The Adventures of Archangel Raphael), in Iuryi Klen, Tvory, 4 vols. (Toronto: Fundatsiia 
imeni Iuriia Klena, 1957). Iuryi Klen died young, on October 25, 1947, in Augsburg, Germany, before he could 
complete these works. 
 
109 Shkandrij, Ukrainian Nationalism, 244-52. 
 
  437 
anti-Semitic, anti-Polish line.110 The paper nevertheless ran a few pieces that were perceived as 
critical of the Germans, alarming the authorities. The Gestapo arrested much of Volyn’s staff, 
and later executed six of them. The SD arrested Samchuk in February 1942, but released him 
after two months.111 Having survived, Samchuk felt guilt about his acquiescence in the face of 
the murderous Nazi occupation of Ukraine and the death of Olena Teliha. Unlike him, she had 
refused to cooperate with the Nazis. Samchuk and Ol’zhych both expressed guilt about their role 
in encouraging her to represent the OUN(M) in Kyiv.112 Samchuk’s postwar works and 
leadership of the anti-Dontsovian MUR testify to his rejection of Dontsov’s calls to violence, 
monomania, self-sacrifice.113 Samchuk immigrated to Toronto, Canada, in 1948, after which 
MUR ceased to exist.     
 The most effective critic of Dontsov and Vistnyk produced by MUR during its brief life 
was Shevel’ov, one of the best-known Ukrainian literary critics of the second half of the 
twentieth century. His essay, “Dontsov khovaie Dontsova” (Dontsov Buries Dontsov), published 
in the 1948 collection, Dumky proty techii (Thoughts against the Current), charged that “Dontsov 
does not polemicize, he calumniates, and does not fight with ‘legitimate methods,’” 
misrepresenting his opponents’ positions, deceptively ripping their statements out of context, 
deploying sarcasm and inflammatory language to hypnotize his readers into ignoring the 
baselessness and irrationality of his claims. Dontsov accused his opponents of precisely the same 
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things that they accused him of: promoting “amorality,” atheism, bestiality, political and 
ideological opportunism, affinities for Bolshevism, Russophilia, and hostility toward 
Ukrainians.114 All of this, according to Shevel’ov, was Dontsov projecting what he knew to be 
true about himself onto others. Shevel’ov offered a damning critique of Dukh nashoi davnyny. 
Instead of a nuanced reconstruction of the medieval Ukrainian worldview that it promises, the 
latter volume offered the ravings of an out-of-touch, curmudgeonly old cynic and a stream of 
falsified quotations. Dontsov’s “Christianity” is a “religion of the anti-Christ and a god of curses, 
cruelty, and misanthropy.”115 His “comical” notion of an ideal “caste”—a group of “führer-like 
thugs”116—arose from a paradox: “Dontsovism grew from an inability to understand the people 
and find a common language with them. Preaching fanatical strength grew from a feeling of 
tragic weakness.”117 Thus, “it is easy to understand why the Bolsheviks love to make use of 
Dontsov’s name in their anti-Ukrainian propaganda: their propaganda can invent nothing more 
compromising for the Ukrainian national movement and the Ukrainian national idea than this 
hysterical man who has lost all connection with the soil, with the people, and wants to make up 
for this with the cynicism of an executioner, the fatalism of a caste of ‘apostles’—
inquisitioners.”118 What Dontsov advocated was indistinguishable from Bolshevism in practice, 
and useful to it in the press.  
 Most importantly, Dontsovism and the Vistnyk school of literature were no longer 
relevant, healthy, forward-thinking: “Everything in the world has its time. The time of 
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Dontsovism has ended. The greatest harm to Dontsov in our day is done by Dontsov himself. 
The harm is that, by not understanding and not wanting to understand that the Ukrainian 
liberation movement has moved to a new and higher stage, he pulls this movement back to the 
preceding stage.”119 Vistnyk had played an important role in the 1930s, but the war changed 
everything, forever discrediting ideas that had been responsible for carnage and ruin in Ukraine 
and the scattering of its people, Dontsov and MUR included. As of 1947, all of Ukraine’s regions 
had been united under the hammer and sickle, and were experiencing a wave of Stalinist terror to 
“purify” the country after its extended Nazi occupation and the ongoing resistance of the OUN 
and UPA.120 “The stage of Vistnyk-ism has passed in our common life. And the struggle of the 
epigones of Vistnyk-ism against the conception of MUR means, objectively speaking, the 
weakening of the Ukrainian national front, and thus the support of the enemies of the Ukrainian 
movement [ukrainstvo], and above all the main enemy, Russian Bolshevism.”121 Shevel’ov 
conceded only that Dontsov might still be instructive reading for Ukrainians living in the USA or 
Canada, those who lacked firsthand experience with the horrors of Soviet reality and thus failed 
to recognize Bolshevism as the greatest evil facing their people.122     
 Moving to Canada and offering his well-honed brand of Russophobic anti-Communism 
to the powers of the West in the Cold War was precisely what Dontsov decided to do. He 
traveled from West Germany to Paris as a political deportee in 1945, to London at the beginning 
of 1946, and on to New York in December 1947, publishing dozens of vehemently anti-Soviet 
calls to arms in the Ukrainian press, including the Philadelphia-based Catholic newspaper 
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Ameryka (America), for which he was London correspondent, and the London-based, pro-OUN 
Ukrains’kyi klych (Ukrainian Call).123 By 1947 he was living in Montreal, and attained 
permanent-resident status in Canada the following year.  
 True to form, Dontsov courted controversy as soon as he had arrived in Canada on a 
tourist’s visa from the US, launching a public investigation into his past that jeopardized his 
application for Canadian citizenship. He took his 1948 brochure Khrest proty dyiavola (The 
Cross against the Devil) on a speaking tour across Ontario.124 Dontsov gave talks at Plateau Hall, 
organized by the Ukrainian Canadian Committee in Montreal on January 25, 1948, and at 
Massey Hall in Toronto on February 22, on the invitation of the local Ukrainian Canadian 
Committee and Ukrainian Protestants, and as sermons to assemblies of the Ukrainian Greek-
Catholic Church and of the Ukrainian Greek-Orthodox Church, to which Dontsov belonged, in 
Montreal.125 This speaking tour, which outraged and alarmed large sections of the already settled 
Ukrainian diaspora on the left and right, was probably a response to a similar outreach effort at 
the same time among the Ukrainian DPs in Canada undertaken by the OUN(M) leader Dmytro 
Andriievs’kyi (whom we last encountered in chapter 4).126  
 Dontsov’s rhetoric had taken a Biblical, millenarian turn, but he could not shake his pro-
Nazi past so easily. His high-visibility emergence on the scene with a virulently anti-Soviet 
lecture circuit provoked widespread protests against him. The issue of his citizenship application 
turned into a public debate on the postwar immigration into Canada of Europeans with dubious 
                                                
123 LAC, MG31 D130, vol. 1, file 31. 
 
124 Dmytro Dontsov, Khrest proty dyiavola: vidchyt vyholoshenyi v Massei Hal v Toronto, 22. II. 1948 (Toronto: 
n.p. 1948). 
 
125 LAC, MG31 D130, vol. 1, file 18. 
 
126 Andriievs’kyi urged them to join already established Canadian-Ukrainian groups rather than starting their own. 
Luciuk, Searching for Place, 442-43. 
 
  441 
wartime histories. Ukrainian Canadians on the far left reportedly spearheaded the denunciation 
of Dontsov as a fascist and a Nazi collaborator, calling for his expulsion from Canada. Their case 
was soon taken up by major media sources. On March 13, 1948, “Sean Edwin’s Sound Track,” a 
sardonic political column in The Montreal Gazette issued the following “Memo to the RCMP”—
the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, charged with guarding Canada’s borders:  
Nazi propagandist Dmitri Dontzow, an old school Ukrainian fascist, is in Ourtown in a 
St. Kay east walk-up. (His address is available at his office.) During the war years, 
Dontzow turned the crank for Hitler’s propaganda machine in the Ukraine. . . . As 
Mussolini and Hitler became more powerful, he lauded their methods and objectives, and 
was particularly vituperative against parliamentary government. When others died in the 
ovens after Hitler’s mob walked in, Dontzow lived in luxury as a Nazi pet. At the 
moment he shields himself under the anti-communist cloak. The commies reverse this 
protective coloration, but it doesn’t fool very many. Right now, Dontzow isn’t fooling 
anyone.127    
 
In follow-up attack one week later, “Sean Edwin” he called for the deportation of Dontsov, “the 
one-time Hitler-Mussolini bootlicker” who sneaks around “polluting the Canadian atmosphere.” 
“Thousands of decent starved Europeans are being kept out of the Dominion through quota 
restrictions, and we take a dim view of this jerque [sic] being allowed in.”128 After offering an 
incriminating quotation from the July 1936 issue of Vistnyk,129 the outraged Edwin asked: “What 
about it? When’s he going to get the boot?”     
 The controversy surrounding Dontsov’s residence in Canada reached Parliament in 
Ottawa, which took up the matter when John Diefenbaker (1895-1979), Progressive 
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Conservative MP from Saskatchewan in the House of Commons and future prime minister of 
Canada (1957-63), opened an official query into Dontsov’s past.130 In a speech before the house 
on May 14, 1948, Diefenbaker insinuated that the Ukrainian publicist was a Nazi sympathizer 
demanding answers to the following questions: “When was Dontsov, then residing in Montreal, 
admitted to Canada?”; “What was he doing doing during the Second World War, and in what 
countries was he working and for whom?”; “Is he now engaged in work for the government? If 
so, what?”131  
 Dontsov rushed to defend himself from the allegations in the press, writing (in halting 
English) a letter to the editor of The Montreal Gazette demanding a full retraction. Meanwhile, 
Dontsov’s supporters rallied behind him, contacting Diefenbaker directly and writing to the 
Canadian Immigration Commission to clear his name. They underscored his innocence in World 
War II, the unfairness of the Communists’ smears against him, his longstanding anti-Communist 
credentials, and his abilities. The esteemed Canadian scholar of Eastern Europe, pro-Ukrainian, 
and anti-Communist crusader Watson Kirkconnell (1895-1977)132 praised Dontsov, with whom 
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he was only familiar from having read a few issues of Vistnyk, in his letter to the immigration 
authorities as a “a man of marked intellectual gifts and strong religious power, whose crusade 
against Communism on religious grounds led to incessant attacks on him by communists.”133 
Eugene Dudra, a concerned Ukrainian Canadian citizen in Toronto, wrote to his representative in 
Parliament, Larry Skey (1911-1977), urging him to speak with Diefenbaker, who had clearly 
been misled by Communists concerning Dontsov. “Mr. Diefenbaker’s comments are 
disconnecting,” Dudra wrote. “But why should an anti-Communist, Mr. Diefenbaker, who no 
doubt shares with Donzow the same dislike of Communism and the same sentiments and 
Western ideals, who has himself been called a ‘fascist’ by the Communists, fall for the 
Communist line and voice their protests against Donzow?”134 Dudra added that the Ukrainian 
Progressive Conservative Club in Toronto would be sending a complaint to Skey as well. 
Another member of the House of Commons, Anthony Hlynka (1907-57), a strong advocate for 
the opening of Canada to Ukrainian immigrants after World War II, and the publisher of a 
strongly anti-Communist paper, Klych (The Call),135 protested Dontsov’s treatment by 
established leaders of the Ukrainian diaspora in the UK and Canada.136  
________________________ 
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 According to Dontsov, he and Hlynka met in London in 1946. Dontsov was in conflict 
with the head of the Central Ukrainian Relief Committee (CURB), Bohdan Panchuk, who 
allegedly regarded the USSR as an ally and therefore disliked Dontsov. CURB described itself as 
an apolitical relief organization dedicated to opposing the forced repatriation of displaced 
Ukrainians to the Soviet Union. In vain it sought recognition from the British and Canadian 
authorities, which were concerned that CURB might stoke nationalism among the DPs it claimed 
to protect or upset relations with the Soviet Union. One of CURB’s associates, Rev. Wasyl 
Kushnir—head of the Ukrainian Canadian Committee, established by the Canadian government 
to represent Canadian Ukrainians in 1940—supposedly disliked Dontsov for similarly political 
reasons. W. Galan, the former head of the Ukrainian Relief Committee in the US also disliked 
Dontsov, purportedly because he had previously stolen 100 dollars from him. Fearing the 
political repercussions of association with Dontsov, Panchuk removed him from the CURB relief 
house at 218 Sussex Gardens in London shortly after his arrival there in Feburary 1946. Dontsov 
had CURB’s secretary Stanley Frolick (born in 1920) to thank for his brief asylum in the UK. 
(Frolick, who joined the OUN(B) during the war and was closely associated with the Banderite 
Ukrainian Information Service and Homin Ukrainy in London, came into conflict with Panchuk 
for his publicly radical positions and was removed from CURB in late 1946.) CURB’s move to 
send Dontsov packing sparked denunciations from Hlynka at Panchuk’s treatment of Ukrainian 
DPs in general.137 Dontsov alleged that established, relatively assimilated Ukrainians in the 
diaspora feared competition from new arrivals such as himself. Further complicating Dontsov’s 
application was an open investigation into his past being conducted by Scotland Yard, to which 
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he claimed to have been denounced by personal enemies—OUN(M) members in the UK who 
resented his refusal to join them.  
 Several Ukrainian Canadian religious leaders entered the fray to disabuse the Canadian 
public and government of the “Communist slander” that Dontsov had a pro-Nazi past. The 
Ukrainian Greek-Orthodox priests of Toronto and Montreal (Revs. Sluzar and Samez) reportedly 
came to his aid, as did Greek-Catholic and Protestant Ukrainian Canadians.138 Representing the 
latter, the Ukrainian Evangelical Alliance of Canada and the US declared their intentions of 
offering Dontsov employment—a typical requirement for permanent residence status in 
Canada—noting that he would be “a tremendous boost to our Protestant movement and a 
welcome addition to the ranks of all those freedom-loving people who have no wish to succumb 
to Communist spiritual and political enslavement.”139 Rev. Michael Fesenko (1900-2003), 
minister of the Presbyterian Church in Canada and a prominent figure in the Ukrainian 
community in Toronto, also wrote on Dontsov’s behalf, emphasizing his political and spiritual 
usefulness, and providing assurances that the publicist had never been pro-Nazi or a Nazi 
collaborator, but was, in fact, a victim of Nazism:  
He is an outstanding statesman, editor, and writer. . . . All the leftist[s] whom he exposed 
without mercy hate him and are afraid of him. I think that Dr. Donzow could do a great 
deal of good in Canada exposing communism. . . . When Dr. Donzow came to Canada 
they [the communists —TE] became alarmed and attacked him in the press and [at] their 
meetings. . . . Usually Communists call all their opponents fascists. Now they are trying 
hard to represent Dr. Donzow as one. Dr. Donzow during the war was under German 
surveillance. He never took part in any Nazi propaganda. He also was not allowed to go 
to Ukraine. . . . He never belonged to any Ukrainian groups that favored Nazis and they 
often attacked him. . . . I am certain that Dr. Donzow will be a good Canadian and I think 
that we need [men] like this.140    
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Dontsov published several articles on religio-political themes in Fesenko’s Toronto-based 
newspaper, Ievanhel’s’ka pravda (Evangelical Truth, 1939-2002).141 This new source of support 
for the publicist, who just fifteen years prior had considered himself “anticlerical,” allowed him 
to address a new, evangelical Protestant audience. Accordingly, he switched the emphasis of his 
rhetoric to the role of Western Christianity in the Cold War.   
 Naturally, Ukrainian nationalist papers (Ukrains’ke slovo, Homin Ukrainy, and others) 
backed Dontsov’s cause, as did the New Jersey-based Organization for the Defense of the Four 
Freedoms of Ukraine (ODFFU, Orhanizatsiia Oborony Chotyr’okh Svobid Ukrainy).142 The 
latter wrote on his behalf to the US Bureau of Immigration and Naturalization, which was 
depriving Dontsov of a certificate of return pending further questioning in Montreal, on April 17, 
1948.143 The ODFFU claimed to have “not found anything pro-Nazi or pro-Fascist” in Visntyk. 
“It is true that [Dontsov] treated Nazism and Fascism, not in a ridiculous way, but as very strong, 
dynamic and dangerous forces, but he did not foster their approval.” The ODFFU asserted that 
Dontsov was a fugitive and a victim of the Third Reich during World War II:  
With the outbreak of war, he removed himself completely from public life, as such life 
would necessitate some direct or indirect connections with Nazi authorities. For the most 
part he kept himself in hiding, since the Nazis wanted to arrest him. His niece, a young 
woman of 25, pregnant at the time, Nana Holubetz, and her mother, were murdered by 
________________________ 
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Figures and Ideas of Literary Ukraine) as a part of its library. 
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the Nazis for their alleged connections to the [UPA] that at the time was fighting 
Nazis.144  
 
In conflict with this account, Dontsov elsewhere insisted that Nazi authorities had forcibly 
removed him from Bucharest, to which he had fled at the outbreak of war, transported him to 
Berlin, where he was kept under close surveillance, and then, for reasons unstated, shipped him 
to Prague for the remainder of the war.145 The subject of Dontsov’s publication for the Reinhard 
Heydrich Institute, of which even his rivals seem to have been unaware, was not broached in any 
of these recriminations.  
 In any event, the investigations of the US Department of Justice, Scotland Yard, and the 
RCMP into Dontsov’s past turned up nothing damning and he was granted permanent residence 
in Montreal, Canada. Responding to this outcome and the angry letters from Dontsov and his 
supporters, The Montreal Gazette ran a retraction on April 24, 1948. “Sean Edwin” 
(McCormick) admitted that he had gotten his tip “from the Reds,” writing that Dontsov had “a 
sweet-smelling bill of health from the RCMP”; “the commies” had slandered the publicist with 
“nasty stories” for opposing them, but he was guilty of no wartime crimes. On June 19, 1948, 
Kirkconnell reported to Dontsov on a private consultation with Diefenbaker, who had “clarified 
his attitude” toward the Ukrainian publicist; now the future PM “spoke most favorably” of 
Dontsov.146    
 Indispensable to Dontsov’s transition to life in North America was Batava colleagues, Iuryi 
Rusov (whose name in Canada was George Roussow) and Natalia Gerken-Rusova, who helped 
him settle in Montreal and find a professorship in Slavic literature at the University of Montreal, 
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145 Dmytro Dontsov to Watson Kirkconnell, July 31, 1946. LAC, MG31 D130, vol. 1, file 23. 
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  448 
where Rusov was teaching biology.147 Thus, like the researchers behind the Reinhard Heydrich 
Institute, Dontsov’s wartime activities—writing for an institution named in honor of one of the 
chief architects of the Holocaust—did not prevent him from securing a respectable academic 
post.148 Appalled by this turn of events, the Toronto-based Communist paper Ukrains’ke zhyttia 
(Ukrainian Life) taunted Dontsov for his self-imposed exile in Canada, ridiculing the notion that 
he had been a “victim” of the war.149 But he was there to stay. Dontsov taught in Montreal until 
1952, then retired and took up residence at a country home in Lac-Supérieur, Quebec. This 
withdrawal from city life did not end his writing and publishing, which continued, albeit at an 
ever-slower pace, until his death in 1973. His articles appeared in the Banderite-controlled 
LVU’s organ Homin Ukrainy (Echo of Ukraine), and other nationalist publications, including 
The Ukrainian Review (London), Vyzvol’nyi shliakh (Path of Liberation, London), Ukrains’kyi 
samostiinyk (Ukrainian Independentist, Munich), Shliakh peremohy (Path of Victory, Munich), 
and ABN-Correspondence, the paper of the Anti-Bolshevik Bloc of Nations (ABN). He wrote on 
anti-Russian and anti-Communist themes, drawing comparisons between the Soviet Union and 
its erstwhile “ally,” Nazi Germany, exposing Stalinist crimes against Ukrainians and the 
persistence of Russification and human rights abuses in the UkrSSR, and covering the responses 
of religious communities and institutions in the West to developments in the Soviet Union.   
                                                
147 The lecture notes for Dontsov’s courses on Russian and Ukrainian literature, for those capable of deciphering 
them, are kept in the Library and Archives of Canada, along with the rest of his postwar papers. LAC MG31 D130, 
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 The ABN was headquartered in Munich, a major hub for the gathering of anti-
Communist forces, including German expellees from Eastern Europe and Eastern European 
nationalist émigrés, in the early years of the Cold War. Munich also attracted the Reinhard 
Heydrich Institute leaders Hans Joachim Beyer and Hans Koch; on February 1, 1950, the latter 
founded the Munich East Europe Institute (Müncher Osteuropainstitut), which Beyer joined, 
using it as a platform for his ongoing work on Eastern European history and anti-Russian, anti-
Communist themes.150 The mass expulsion or flight of Germans from Eastern Europe that 
followed World War II flooded Munich and other West German cities with refugees embittered 
and radicalized by their harrowing encounters with the Red Army. “De-Nazified” specialists on 
Russia, such as Koch and Beyer, already despised the USSR, but could now set their activities in 
a humanitarian light—providing assistance to German civilians abused by Communism. 
Similarly, the OUN(B) and the ABN recruited among the more than two million Ukrainians who 
found themselves in the dozens of displaced persons camps that appeared in West Germany. All 
but 200,000 of the Ukrainian DPs were repatriated back to the UkrSSR in 1946. Reasonably 
fearing persecution there, those who refused to return to the Soviet zone generally stayed in West 
Germany, then emigrated to the US or Canada in the late 1940s.151 The Banderivtsi attempted to 
monopolize the profoundly anti-Communist, nationalistic mood in the Ukrainian DP camps, 
starting turf wars with the Mel’nykivtsi, the Hetmanites, and other groups that became endemic to 
the politics of the Ukrainian diaspora. Formed in 1946, the ABN was OUN(B) leader Iaroslav 
Stets’ko’s project to coordinate anti-Communist nationalist émigrés from the Soviet Union and 
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other socialist countries.152 The ABN enjoyed the support of the US intelligence community 
(CIA, Army Intelligence, etc.),153 and established links with Estonian, Lithuanian, Belarusian, 
Georgian, Croatian, and Latvian nationalists, as well as with delegates from East Asian countries 
in the World Anti-Communist League (WACL). In this sense, the ABN was a “cosmopolitan” 
venture, however nationalistic in form and intent; its slogan may well have been: “Anti-
Communists of all countries, unite!” Dontsov also promoted the idea of an anti-Bolshevik 
coalition of all non-Russian nations. Taking inspiration from the anticolonial movements of 
Africa in the late 1940s and 1950s, the ABN advocated armed insurrection of the captive nations 
of the Soviet Union against Russian domination as an alternative to another world (and probably 
nuclear) war. It organized anti-Soviet rallies, demonstrations, and press conferences, producing 
and distributing anti-Soviet propaganda. Though distrustful of the governments of the West, 
which were not interested in getting into a conflict with Moscow over the independence of 
Ukrainians or any other Soviet minority, the ABN claimed to defend the “European ideals” of 
“heroic Christianity,” “human dignity,” and “national independence,” and sought the 
“psychomoral, political and ideological revolutionization of all strata of society” in the non-
Russian societies of the USSR.154 
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While Dontsov generally aligned himself with pro-Bandera groups such as the ABN and 
the League for the Liberation of Ukraine (LVU), the various OUN factions contested his status 
and that of his doctrine. These internal disagreements were rooted in the 1943 revision to the 
OUN(B)’s program, which Stepan Bandera and his supporters resisted implementing because 
they considered it too close to socialism. After Bandera’s assassination by a KGB agent at his 
Munich apartment on October 15, 1959, Stets’ko assumed control over the OUN(B). Prior to 
this, in December 1956, the more moderate members of the Bandera faction had split off to form 
the OUN “abroad” (za kornodu), or OUN(z), whose leaders, Zynovyi Matla (1910-1993) and 
Lev Rebet (1912-1957)—also assassinated by the KGB in Munich—sought to distance the 
OUN(B) from Nazism and Dontsovism, instead aligning the organization’s positions with those 
of the generally liberal-democratic West and Ukrainian diaspora.155 Postwar OUN(M) theorists 
also attempted to update their ideology for the changing times. Iuryi Boiko (1909-2002) (real 
name Blokhin), for instance, rejected both the OUN(B)’s tenacious Dontsovism and Shevel’ov’s 
critiques thereof.156 A leading member of the OUN-M in postwar Munich and professor of 
literature at the Ukrainian Free University,157 Boiko conceded that Dontsov’s influence had had a 
pernicious effect on Ukrainian literature and politics, but disagreed with Shevelov’s position that 
all literature with a political agenda, such as that of the Vistnykivtsi, is inherently inferior to 
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nonpartisan literature that is more sophisticated in form.158 In his 1951 work, Osnovy 
ukrains’koho natsionalizmu (Foundations of Ukrainian Nationalism), Boiko called for a rejection 
of Dontsov’s elitist contempt for “the masses,” his refusal to appreciate the historical agency of 
common people, and his view of human individuals as “mechanical little soldiers” to be 
ruthlessly sacrificed for the sake of great ideas.159 Boiko accused the Vistnyk editor of intellectual 
dilettantism, negativity, and superficiality, offering hyper-emotive myth-making instead of in-
depth research and cool-headed exposition.160 Nevertheless, Boiko acknowledged that Dontsov 
had made some positive contributions to the development of Ukrainian nationalism. Moreover, 
Boiko took a similar turn toward a more theological conception of nationalism, linking it to 
religion and faith as powerful sources of conviction, unity, and resolve that are exempt from 
rational scrutiny.161  
Petro Mirchuk, one of the first “official” historians of the OUN, called Dontsov the most 
important ideologue of interwar Ukrainian nationalism.162 Mirchuk dismissed the categorization 
of Ukrainian nationalism as “fascism” as slander by outsiders, insisting that Dontsovism 
expressed the thousand-year-old traditions of Ukrainian statehood. Others sought to distance 
historical and contemporary Ukrainian nationalists from Dontsov and his influence, despite their 
connections and indebtedness to him, effacing the controversial publicist from their collective 
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past.163 Nevertheless, Dontsov’s influence on non-Soviet Ukrainian political and cultural life had 
been considerable, inspiring a wide array of both positive and negative criticisms and 
interpretations. Historian Mykhailo Lahodivs’kyi (pseudonym Mykhailo Demkovych-
Dobrians’kyi) contended that recognition of Dontsov’s uniqueness and stature is necessary to 
any understanding of interwar eastern Galicia, but decried the ideologue’s influence on 
Ukrainian nationalism as pernicious mass propaganda. Dontsov’s ideology, Lahodivs’kyi argued 
in 1947, was hostile toward free thought and deliberately provoked the basest animal instincts (a 
European-wide phenomenon between the World Wars).164 The Ukrainian nationalist theorist 
Antin Kniazhyns’kyi regarded the heavy-handed emotionalism in “active nationalism” as a 
stifling influence on national progress, but favorably evaluated Dontsov’s purported evolution 
away from materialism after 1941.165 Perhaps the most profound critique of Dontsov was that of 
the FNE ideologue Mykola Shlemkevych in his 1954 work Zahublena ukrains’ka liudyna (The 
Lost Ukrainian Person), which maintained that Dontsov’s concept of the “strong man” (syl’na 
liudyna) constitutes the most radical antithesis of the free spirit to come out of modern Ukrainian 
thought. Shlemkevych attributed the rise and fall of “active nationalism’s” appeal to regressive 
imbalances in Ukrainian society.166  
The Ukrainian diaspora engaged in dynamic, emotional, and partisan debates about 
Dontsov and his legacy, particularly after his works became more widely available in new 
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editions following his postwar emigration to North America. On the occasion of Dontsov’s 
seventy-fifth birthday in 1958, roughly coinciding with the fifty-year anniversary of his debut as 
a publicist, some of his admirers proposed republishing his works, but the project never 
materialized.167 The Canadian-Ukrainian émigré author and nationalist Pavlo Shtepa produced a 
bibliography of the ideologue’s oeuvre in 1958,168 but interest in Dontsov, increasingly out of 
touch, began to fall off in the 1960s after the Soviet state had publicly condemned the “excesses” 
of Stalinism and set a course of normalizing relations with the West. During the Thaw, a period 
of increased US-Soviet dialogue and the relaxation of censorship and repression under Premier 
Nikita Khrushchev, anticommunist Ukrainian nationalism began losing its relevance and urgency 
for the Ukrainian diaspora, whose members continued settling into new lives and identities in the 
West. Ukrainian émigré student and academic societies did organize several conferences themed 
around Dontsov’s life and thought in the decade or so following his death.169 His works 
eventually entered republication, but he and the publishers had furtively abridged them to match 
the changing mood of the Ukrainian diaspora and the political orthodoxies of the postwar West, 
sanitizing his ideology with falsified texts.170  
Still, Dontsov’s worldview still commanded the loyalty of the OUN(B) and the ABN 
under Stets’ko’s leadership. The Central Committee of the ABN empowered Dontsov to act as 
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its representative before the Canadian authorities,171 and he wrote extensively for the OUN(B)-
affiliated press during the Cold War. Boiling these writings down to their essence, Dontsov made 
four main arguments between 1945 and 1973: 1) the Soviet (Russian) empire is fatally weakened 
because it follows a bankrupt ideology and its oppressed nationalities are resisting; 2) 
nevertheless, it threatens to start a third world war against the West at any moment—a violent 
conflict is inevitable; therefore 3) the powers of the West should strike first and destroy “the 
forces of the anti-Christ” gathered in Moscow; and 4) the Cold War should become a “holy war” 
or a “war of religions,” in which the nations of the West match the fanaticism of the Bolsheviks 
with an equally fanatical belief in their divine mission, as Christians, to spearhead a crusade 
against the “Satanic” Soviet Union.  
Dontsov also published compilations of revised versions of his previously published 
works, excising the overtly pro-Nazi and anti-Semitic comments from his writings of the 1930s 
and early 1940s, but did not stray from the highly authoritarian, traditionalist, mystical, and 
racialist worldview expressed in Dukh nashoi davnyny.172 He did not undergo any significant 
ideological evolutions in his sixties, seventies, and eighties, but carried on repeating the same 
ideas that he had held since World War II; on the nature of “Russian messianism,” the need for a 
new elite, the power of the will and irrational conviction, the cult of violence, etc. Despite his 
efforts to purge his oeuvre and biography of connections to Nazism, Dontsov maintained a keen 
interest in anti-Semitic conspiracy theories, judging from the heavily underlined brochures in his 
personal papers.173 He refrained from publishing overtly anti-Semitic views, but frequently noted 
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when his opponents in the media were of Jewish origin, underlining their names in his newspaper 
clippings and scribbling “Jew” in the margins.174 The elderly Dontsov attempted to purify his 
legacy, representing his tortuous political and intellectual journey as a forward march, with no 
deviations in principle from his mature worldview. 
 The ideologue’s old friend and assistant Mykhailo Hikavyi visited him for a month in the 
summer of 1964. Hikavyi recalled that Dontsov, then eighty, still got up at seven in the morning, 
and constantly read and wrote without glasses despite his advanced age. “He was just as he had 
been back in L’viv,” Hikavyi wrote. “He loved to joke and to talk about the past and plans for 
the future. The late Dontsov was a deeply religious and uncompromising man. In conversations 
he sharply condemned ‘meetings’ with Muscovite emissaries, ‘cultural exchange,’ and 
coexistence with the Bolsheviks—with Communists who cause the demoralization of our 
emigration.”175 Hikavyi’s description of Dontsov as a man who “loved to joke” might seem 
surprising in light of what we have seen of his public persona through the years, but this was a 
side of him that does not come across in the sources, his caustic sarcasm notwithstanding.  
 Further evidence of the elderly Dontsov’s outwardly deepening piety—or at least his 
conviction that militant Christianity was the best answer to the religion of Bolshevism, the “Red 
Islam”—can be found in his essay Der Geist Russlands (The Spirit of Russia), published in 
Munich in 1961.176 It also appeared in London as “The Spirit of Russia,” in the collection The 
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Real Face of Russia (1967), which also included essays by Stets’ko, Ievhen Malaniuk, and 
Dontsov’s erstwhile critic in the OUN(M), Iuryi Boiko, all in English translation.177 The latter 
volume came with a foreword by J. F. C. Fuller (1878-1966)—Major General in British Army, 
military historian, strategist, and noted theorist of the “Blitzkrieg” approach to mechanized 
warfare. As one of the first disciples of the famous English poet, ceremonial magician, and 
esotericist Aleister Crowley (1875-1947), Fuller adhered to the voluntaristic “Thelemite”178 
philosophy and wrote a number of works on the occult and mysticism.179 He was openly 
enthusiastic about Fascism and Nazism in the 1930s, collaborating with Oswald Mosley, the 
British Union of Fascists (BUF), and the Nordic League.180 Fuller attended Hitler’s fiftieth 
birthday in 1939 as a guest of honor, and urged his countrymen to make peace with the Third 
Reich thereafter.181 Dontsov could boast the complete sympathy of Fuller, who wrote in his 
forward to “The Spirit of Russia”:  
This is a profound and fundamental work surpassing all publications on the world crisis 
that I have read so far, in that it represents the core of the problem which has been 
disturbing the old world for centuries and still today continues to disturb the entire world. 
________________________ 
war. It was known for trivializing or denying Nazi war crimes. The paper’s modern successor is the rightwing 
National-Zeitung (Munich).  
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. . . What are the components of the Muscovite Messianism, the spiritual nomadism, 
which today threatens to extinguish Western culture and with it the Western way of life? 
We find the answer in this scholarly and fascinating book. Dr. Donzow has most 
thoroughly investigated and explained here the factors of which this Messianism 
consists.182  
 
The ringing endorsement indicates something of Dontsov’s entanglement with the weirder, 
occult-dabbling fascist trends in the West.183  
 Mystical and supernatural themes permeated Dontsov’s final works. The USSR, for 
Dontsov, was an incarnation of Satan himself; despite being godless materialists, Russian 
Communists were literally Devil-worshippers—the purest evil on earth. Only a “new elite” and a 
“new chivalry” could “defend the sacred values and traditions of Christian civilization 
successfully.” Western materialists were powerless to stop it. “These sophists, economists, and 
calculators184 will never possess the necessary nobleness of soul, wisdom of intellect, far-
sightedness and will-power to kill the Apocalyptic Dragon of Moscow”:  
It is this same incapacity on the part of the present leading circles of the West to assert 
themselves as the champions of a great, uncompromising anti-Russian idea, that makes 
them indifferent, if not hostile, to the only saving watchword of today, to that of the 
nations of Central and East Europe who are fighting for their independence—namely the 
destruction of the monstrous colonialist power, the disintegration of the barbarous 
Russian empire, the empire of slavery, of godlessness, of genocide and of ignominy.185  
 
In the age of the atomic bomb, Dontsov sought solutions to the problems of national liberation 
from Russian imperialism and an answer to the Communist threat to Western civilization in 
idealized notions of the political, spiritual, aesthetic, and moral universe of tenth-century 
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Kyivan-Rus’. At a time when most people, especially Ukrainians, were weary of war and ready 
for the peaceful reconstruction of shattered lives, Dontsov longed for the next clash of the titans. 
Fantasies of mythic beasts, sacred orders, warrior elites, and a crusader’s redemptive death in 
combat permeated his postwar writing. Dontsov had been susceptible to such romanticism ever 
since his antimaterialist turn circa the First World War, but now it was especially fitting: an 
elderly recluse, shaped in a bygone era on a darker continent, Dontsov withdrew from worldly 
politics and the present day. He took comfort in the thought—contrary to the gritty, anticlerical 
voluntarism and amoralism that he had trumpeted in his younger days—that the eternal forces of 
good and evil, God and Satan, would decide everything. Westerners, he insisted, need only 
regain their faith in this otherworldly struggle to reclaim the earth from the unholy tide of 
Russian messianism.  
 Dontsov lived a long life, suffering from few ailments, but his health inevitably 
deteriorated. In October 1972 he visited the doctor with complaints of jaundice, bouts of profuse 
vomiting, worsening vision, weak legs, backaches, gallstones, and biliary disease.186 He died at 
St. Mary’s hospital in Montreal on March 30, 1973, at eighty-nine years of age. The autopsy 
determined cause of death as septicemia (blood poisoning); in other words, old age.187 In his 
final will, he left his properties and belongings to the Rusovs.188 He had no family and no next of 
kin in North America; his ex-wife Mariia was living in New York, but the two had not been in 
contact for years. On April 4, 1973, they buried Dontsov at St. Andrew’s Ukrainian Orthodox 
Cemetery in South Bound Brook, NJ—a place intended for the mortal remains of prominent 
                                                
186 LAC, MG30, D130, vol. 2, file 4.  
 
187 Ibid., file, 6. 
 
188 Ibid., file, 2. 
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Ukrainian artists, political leaders, and members of the Orthodox clergy in the diaspora.189 
Iaroslav Stets’ko presided over the wake, which was attended by Mykola Lebed’, Mykhailo 
Hikavyi, Mykhailo Sosnovs’kyi, Catholic and Orthodox religious leaders, UPA veterans, and 
scores of representatives from other Ukrainian diaspora organizations, including the League for 
the Liberation of Ukraine, the World Congress of Free Ukrainians, the Ukrainian Canadian 
Congress, the Organization for the Defense of the Four Freedoms of Ukraine.190 Citing health 
problems, the eighty-six-year-old Mariia Bachyns’ka-Dontsova, then living in New York City, 
was unable to attend the proceedings.  
 The obituaries that followed offered mixed assessments of the deceased life and legacy. 
The Central Committee of the ABN hailed him as “the most distinguished thinker and ideologist 
of Ukrainian nationalism, an uncompromising fighter for an Independent Sovereign Ukrainian 
State, inspirer of the fighters of the OUN, Cassandra of the idea of a common anti-Russian front 
of the subjugated nations, author of numerous basic works about the spirituality of the Ukrainian 
nation and the foundations of Ukrainian politics, profound student of Russian imperialism,” as 
well as “a brilliant Ukrainian publicist, a prisoner of Russian and Polish prisons and 
concentration camps, an extraordinary figure in the history of Ukraine.”191 The nationalist paper 
Meta (The Aim) featured an only slightly critical eulogy by Rostyslav Iendyk, who underscored 
                                                
189 The Vistnykivtsi Ievhen Malaniuk, Oksana Liaturyns’ka, and Mykola Mukhin, and the editor of Dazhboh Bohdan 
Kravtsiv are also interred there. The church itself was built as “a symbolic tombstone over the millions of unknown 
graves of those who died in the struggle for their faith, their church, their people, their Homeland; they died on the 
fields of glory in the armed contests—they also ended their life being tortured in concentration camps, prisons, even 
in their home villages, during the Great Famine, in which Moscow was destroying Ukraine and the innocent victims 
of war.” This is according to the website of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the USA, headquartered in South 
Bound Brook. http://www.uocofusa.org/cemetery.html [accessed March 6, 2016]  
 
190 Stets’ko’s eulogy, which hailed Dontsov as one of “the greatest Ukrainians of the century,” was published 
alongside a description of the funeral and wake in Homin Ukrainy 16 (April 14, 1973). 
 
191 “Dmytro Dontsov, Ideologist of Ukrainian nationalism, Dies at 89,” ABN-Correspondence, no. 3 (May-June 
1973), 1.  
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Dontsov’s uncompromising combativeness, ideological purity and militancy: “This creative 
temperament did not hesitate to thrust aside his own followers if they voiced even the slightest 
deviation. In this regard, Dontsov was by nature an often solitary figure to his own detriment.”192 
Iendyk urged Ukrainians to recognize everything positive that Dontsov, for all his negativity, had 
left to posterity, citing the latter’s injection of “Western European ideas” into Ukrainian life. The 
Ukrainian Canadian nationalist youth publication Avanhard (Avant-Garde) declared that 
Dontsov’s ideas had “dominated the past sixty years of Ukrainian political and spiritual life,” and 
would continue to do so long into the future, providing “national criteria for the evaluation of 
social phenomena and the literary trends of our young generations.”193  
 In contrast to these tributes, Iuryi Kosach published a damning obituary in the pro-Soviet 
Edmonton-based paper Ukrains’ki visti (Ukrainian News).194 Dontsov’s rival since the early 
1930s, Kosach denounced him as a “political chameleon and a routine hater, not only of any sort 
of progress, but of the Ukrainian people as a whole.”195 Kosach sneered at the hyperbolic 
honorifics bestowed on the late Dontsov by his admirers: “Truly, one must efface not only 
national ethics, but also common decency in order to call D. Dontsov ‘the creator of an epoch,’ 
‘an epochal figure in the history of the Ukrainian people,’ ‘the Messiah (!) of the Ukrainian 
nation, ‘a giant of our spirituality,’ and a type ‘such as were T. Shevchenko, I. Franko, Lesia 
                                                
192 Rostyslav Iendyk, “Dmytro Dotsov (1883-1973),” Meta, no. 4 (April 1973). 
 
193 “Dmytro Dontsov vidiishov y vichnist’,” Avanhard, no. 2 (April 1973). 
 
194 Kosach was living in New York City at this time. He had taken pro-Soviet stances, joined collaborative efforts 
with Soviet writers, and sharply criticized the anti-Communist Ukrainian émigrés in his journal Za synim obriiem 
(Behind the Blue Horizon). 
 
195 Iuryi Kosach, “Kinets’ shchelkopiorovshchyny,” Ukrains’ki visti (April 12, 1973), 7. Ukrains’ki visti advocated 
Canada’s recognition of Soviet Ukraine as a sovereign state. Canadian officials rejected this idea (noting the 
specious constitutional status of the UkrSSR), but also dismissed Ukrainian nationalist interpretations of the 
Ukrainians’ international situation as of the early 1960s. Bohdan S. Kordan and Lubomyr Y. Luciuk, A Delicate and 
Difficult Question: Documents in the History of Ukrainian in Canada, 1899-1962 (Kingston: Limestone Press, 
1986), 171-73.  
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Ukrainka’ (!), ‘the mortal remains of whom will be transferred to the Pantheon of the Ukrainian 
nation in Kyiv.’”196 “Either the ‘spirituality’ of the Dontsovian panegyrists is so negligible that 
they have destroyed all criteria for the recognition of worth,” Kosach asserted, or they had 
internalized Dontsov’s contempt for them as a “herd,” “a race of helots and slaves,” and thus 
“deliberately mock themselves over him, preparing obituaries for ‘the thinker’ in the form of 
idiotic parody.” Kosach rejected the notion that Dontsov—“a man of dubious talent, of foreign 
‘wisdom’ stolen from everywhere, of unprincipled eclecticism, of virtual political equilibrium 
and chronic ‘reorientations,’ an apologist for the most reactionary ‘ideologies,’ the eternal 
hireling of the dark powers of a foreign land [i.e. Germany –TE] whose sole aim was the 
oppression and genocide of the Ukrainian people, a common opportunist”—somehow belongs in 
Ukraine’s “Pantheon.” From socialist atheist to fascist bigot, Dontsov had been a “pan-
Germanist” since World War I, and hailed Hitler, the butcher of millions of Ukrainians, as “a 
cross-bearing Messiah.” Facing the righteous anger of the Ukrainian people after the war, 
“Dontsov fled like a mouse under a broom, reoriented himself at once, and, with the cynicism of 
a perpetual renegade, [disguised himself] as a pious carrier of ‘the Cross against the Devil,’ [and] 
of Anglo- and Americanophilia.” Kosach asserted that Dontsov shamelessly trumpeted America’s 
destructive global role in the Cold War, praising its “strong hand” in Korea and Vietnam, and 
advised his followers “to pray for the atomic bomb to destroy two thirds of Ukraine that the 
remaining third might have its own state.”  
 In death, as in life, Dontsov remained a polarizing figure. He was either one of the 
greatest Ukrainian patriots to ever live, a sagely gadfly, “the Cassandra of a united anti-Russian 
front,” or a lifelong traitor to his country, a shape-shifting careerist, a lackey of German and 
Polish tyrants, and a man so full of hatred that he fantasized about the nuclear annihilation of his 
                                                
196 Ibid. Kosach refers to the obituary in ABN-Correspondence. 
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own countrymen, promoting whatever political forces promised to bring this about. More 
levelheaded assessments of the ideologue would have to wait.    
 
Figure 6.3. Dontsov near the end of his life. Source: LAC, MG30 D130, vol. 28, file 42.  
 
 
Conclusion  
 The reverse of the title of one of Dontsov’s key later works, Vid mistyky do polityky 
(From Mysticism to Politics, 1957),197 is a fitting description of his last thirty years; the aging 
publicist took the opposite course, from politics to mysticism, abandoning the hard struggle of 
resisting Russian hegemony from within the Ukrainian lands in favor of solitary reflection on 
medieval esoterica, apocalyptic dragons, Christian faith, life and legacy—all from the safety of a 
Quebecois ski-resort town. Many of his fellow Ukrainian nationalists distanced themselves from 
his extremism and dealings with “former” Nazis, sought atonement for their own regrettable 
words and deeds, and subjected him to a substantive critique via MUR, but Dontsov was capable 
                                                
197 Dmytro Dontsov, Vid mistyky do polityky (Toronto: Spilka vyzvolennia Ukrainy, 1957). 
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of changing only the outward form, not the content of his belief system, despite the dramatic turn 
of events that had forced him to cross the Atlantic in search of asylum. Similarly, the OUN(B) 
split into those who wanted a new, liberal-democratic image, reputation, and platform, and those 
who stuck to their Dontsovian guns but dropped the Nazi dross in favor of pure anti-Communism 
and Russophobia (Stets’ko, the ABN, and the OUN[z]). The Cold Warriors of the West who 
happened to know about Dontsov valued the ideologue, helping him to secure a comfortable 
existence in Canada and take up his pen-sword in defense of the decidedly internationalist idea 
of (capitalist) Christendom. His anti-Soviet credentials overshadowed the plain fact that he had 
been on the “wrong” side in World War II. There were plenty of Western spiritual leaders, 
politicians, academics, and military men willing to look past or deny whatever sins he may have 
committed. The pressing need for anti-Communist man- and brainpower overruled the outcry at 
Dontsov’s appearance in Canada. At least three Western security services—the US Department 
of Justice, the “Mounties,” and Scotland Yard—as well as influential members of the Canadian 
Parliament (Diefenbaker), scrutinized Dontsov’s biography, but none found anything 
incriminating, accepting the contradictory accounts of his wartime experience of unexplained 
hideouts, house arrests, and forced movements. In reality, he was openly pro-Nazi throughout the 
1930s and World War II, moved freely in Hitler’s New Europe (though he dared not set foot in 
Ukraine), and enjoyed a platform at the Reinhard Heydrich Institute. This fit the general pattern 
of Western governments offering amnesty to “de-Nazified” individuals who might prove useful 
in the global struggle against Communism.198 Like many of his wartime German and Ukrainian 
colleagues, Dontsov shed his entanglement with Nazism like an old skin, stepping into a 
                                                
198 The most famous case of this was the Western cooptation of German nuclear physicists for the development of 
the atomic bomb.      
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respectable post in a Canadian university, and carrying on his work as a journalist and 
propagandist in the same anti-Communist register.   
 Dontsov was a cosmopolitan ultranationalist to the end. Settling in Canada, taking a 
professorship at the University of Montreal, embedding himself in the religious and nationalist 
communities of the Ukrainian diaspora in new country—all of this seems to have come 
remarkably easy to the ideologue, despite his advanced age and the controversy that his mere 
presence, let alone his public appearances, courted. His immigration became a flashpoint in the 
broader postwar debate over who of the millions of DPs and political refugees should be allowed 
into Canada, Britain, the US, and other countries. What war criminals, “cryptofascists,” and other 
unsavory people might be hiding among these masses of uprooted humanity seeking new homes? 
How guilty was Dontsov himself? His writing doubtless contributed to the popularization of 
Nazism among Ukrainians in the 1930s, but he played no direct role in the OUN(B)’s crimes, let 
alone those of the Third Reich, and made only a minor contribution to the Nazi propaganda 
machine during the war. For some, this was enough to warrant barring him from entry, especially 
since so many desperate folks with untarnished pasts were waiting in line. Others probably 
favored imprisoning or hanging him like the convicts of the Nuremberg trials. Dontsov realized 
that he would have to clean up his image and his corpus in order to be a respectable Westerner 
and a Canadian citizen, so he made one final mutation into a latter-day Christian prophet, an 
apostle of anti-Communism, and the harbinger of an apocalyptic holy war against Soviet 
Muscovy. Using hyperbolic religious rhetoric and anti-Soviet conspiracy theories to conceal 
fringe agendas (e.g. anti-Semitism, neo-Nazism, and white supremacy) was typical of far-right 
figures in the West during the Cold War. But the real heart of Dontsov’s worldview was not anti-
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Communism so much as anti-Russianism, and he collaborated with the Cold Warriors in Ottawa 
for the same reasons that he had collaborated with the Nazis—to destroy Muscovy. 
 An iconoclast even with regard to his own past, Dontsov republished much of his life’s 
work, but excised everything that he felt might expose him as the fascist modernist, the acolyte 
of Hitler, the atheist, the moral nihilist, or the Marxist who he once was. He wanted to be 
remembered as a man of unwavering principle who never strayed from the worldview that he 
held on his deathbed. His former devotees knew better; if they survived the war, they abandoned 
Dontsov as the opportunist, hypocrite, and coward who inspired Teliha, Ol’zhych, and countless 
other bright young Ukrainian patriots to become martyrs, but pledged himself to the Nazi 
behemoth that tortured and murdered them. Mosendz, Klen, and Samchuk felt pangs of guilt at 
the contributions they had made to the horrors of World War II and the Holocaust in Ukraine, 
seeking, through literature, to atone for their intoxication with Nazism, anti-Semitism, and the 
Dontsovian variety of nationalism that hallowed any offense in service of the cause. But 
Dontsov, never one to admit that he was wrong, acted as though there was nothing to explain, no 
cause for self-critique, nothing for which to atone. He refused to acknowledge any connection 
between the warlike, misanthropic, totalitarian ideas that he preached and the carnage that had 
beset Europe, and especially Ukraine. An authoritarian deprived of his authority, in search of a 
new god to serve, more estranged from his Ukrainian homeland and its cultural and political life 
than ever, Dontsov found refuge in religion, wrote his outré parting works, pruned his legacy, 
and awaited a quiet, “wintry expiration” in exile. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
 
The aim of this dissertation has been to examine each step of Dontsov’s journey “on its 
own terms” and in situ. I have made three central arguments: 1) Context matters—Dontsov’s 
origins in late imperial Russia, his experience in the “borderlands” of cosmopolitan East Central 
Europe, his exile from Ukraine, and post-1945 emigration from Europe had a decisive impact on 
his intellectual development, from youth to old age; 2) Despite the commonplace that 
nationalism is a “feeling,” a contravention of rationality, that lacks “grand thinkers,”1 the 
intellectual currents of Dontsov’s time also matter, as does the intellectual content of his 
evolving worldview, the responses to it, and his personal encounters with various individuals and 
their writings; and 3) Beneath the surface of these changing contexts and influences there are 
some common threads—what I term “iconoclastic authoritarianism” and “cosmopolitan 
ultranationalism.”  
I have attempted to push the historiography in a new direction: away from sterile debates 
about what label best fits Dontsov’s “ideology,” as if it were anything so static, systematic, and 
singular—and toward a more nuanced, diachronic, personal, and transnational approach that asks 
why he thought and felt what he did when he did, as much as how “active nationalism” ought to 
be categorized in retrospect. Instead of lionizing or maligning Dontsov (as most have done), I 
                                                
1 Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism (New York: 
Verso, 2006), 5. I am not disputing the “philosophical poverty” and “incoherence” of much of Dontsov’s thought—
the explicit rejection of “overly” rational, systematic thinking was a cornerstone of his thought after the early 
1920s—but the moral, aesthetic, and geopolitical concepts that he developed and popularized had a tangible impact 
on the cultural production and methods of political struggle of his enthusiasts. 
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have tried to convey his humanity, and his emotional and intellectual reactions to specific 
moments and relationships, in the hope that this will make the traditions with which he has been 
most closely associated—those of the OUN, the Vistnykivtsi, and their descendants—less 
obscure and more comprehensible. Unlike previous studies of Ukrainian integral nationalism, 
this dissertation examines the full trajectory of its existence as a potent force in Ukrainian 
politics, from its roots in the Russian Revolutions of 1905 and 1917 to the early Cold War. 
Foregrounding Dontsov’s early years in the Russian revolutionary milieu and his critical 
engagement with Marxism and the Ukrainian Left before and during World War I, it 
demonstrates the importance of ideas that preceded and opposed Italian Fascism or German 
Nazism in the development of Ukrainian nationalism, but it also grapples with the “Nazification” 
of Dontsov and his enthusiasts in the 1930s and World War II, and their “de-Nazification” 
thereafter. Few researchers have traced the appearance and evolution of Ukrainian integral 
nationalism within its broader European, Eurasian, and Transatlantic contexts, leaving Dontsov, 
the OUN, and the Vistnykivtsi secluded in time and space, seemingly aberrant or entirely 
derivative. I have sought to remedy this, elucidating what made twentieth-century Ukrainian 
nationalist intellectuals and organizations typical or idiosyncratic in light of the 
contemporaneous ideas, individuals, and movements with which they interacted worldwide.  
Eschewing stereotypes of Ukrainian nationalists as provincial, narrow-minded fanatics, I 
have argued that Dontsov’s formative experiences in the Russian-Ukrainian and Polish-
Ukrainian borderlands, his cosmopolitan interests and aspirations, and his transnational life path 
were paradoxical yet necessary factors in the development of his worldview and its resonance in 
Ukrainian politics and literature. From the maelstrom of World War I forward, the forced 
disentanglement of Ukrainians, Poles, Russians, Germans, Jews, and others in the name of 
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national self-determination generated crises in the intellectual and geographic spaces in which 
Dontsov lived and worked. His liminal origins and lifelong proclivity for travel made his efforts 
to forge an unmixed, inassimilable national identity in himself and in others a source of constant 
anxiety, but they also made him exceptionally capable of adapting and delivering messages to 
broad, diverse audiences. He crossed the national boundaries—geographic, linguistic, and 
cultural—that he claimed to regard as sacrosanct with remarkable ease, switching codes and 
tailoring his persona to new environments, publics, and geopolitical realities. Dontsov not only 
moved through these contexts, but changed them as well, forcefully articulating a view from 
within the borderlands of Eastern Europe that epitomized the dilemmas of collaboration and 
resistance, and of imitation and opposition, faced by those who lived between the two most 
ideologically virulent and murderous states of Europe’s twentieth century. Too often ignored or 
marginalized, perspectives such as Dontsov’s help us to understand the definition and 
redefinition of nations and borders in interwar Eastern Europe as the people who were most 
directly affected by this bloody process saw it.  
Dontsov’s formative experience was revolution and its inexorable corollary, war. As 
historian Arno J. Mayer argues, “there is no revolution without violence and terror; without 
foreign and civil war; without iconoclasm and religious conflict; and without collision between 
town and country.”2 Mayer calls this cycle of escalating violence “the Furies of revolution,” 
invoking the chthonic deities of vengeance, the Erinyes, who ascend from the depths of hell to 
spur retribution against criminals and the countries that harbor them. As Mayer suggests, 
revolutionary and counterrevolutionary violence and terror was “singularly fierce and merciless” 
                                                
2 Arno J. Mayer, The Furies: Violence and Terror in the French and Russian Revolutions (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2013), 4. 
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because it was “fear-inspired, vengeance-driven, and ‘religiously’ sanctioned.”3 The Furies 
unleashed by the Russian and Ukrainian revolutions pulled the rest of Europe and eventually the 
world into their vortex. Dontsov found himself, at least momentarily, on all sides of the ensuing 
conflict. He was for, but then against, the Russian (socialist) revolution, and against, but then for, 
the Ukrainian (national) revolution. He defended the peasants of the Ukrainian countryside and 
their conservative, religious outlook against the secular Russian- and Jewish-dominated cities in 
their midst, but only after espousing an atheistic positivism and moral relativism born of his 
study of Marx and Darwin, whose influence he never entirely escaped. Collaborating with the 
German Empire, the Second Polish Republic, the Third Reich, and the anti-Communists of the 
Cold War West, Dontsov took part in the internationalization of the “domestic” conflict between 
Ukrainian nationalists and Russian Bolsheviks, welcoming the new extremes of violence caused 
by foreign intervention. His ideology came to reflect the resultant crescendo of violence, cruelty, 
quasireligious fanaticism, and authoritarianism to which the Furies of social and national 
revolution gave rise, welcoming such things as necessary to found a “utopia”—or to prevent 
someone else from doing so. The more resistance and terror the Ukrainian national idea 
encountered, the more extreme Dontsov’s prescriptions became. In the second half of his life, he 
exhibited a pathological hatred of Russians and openly fantasized about genocidal vengeance 
against them, no matter the cost to “his own” people. Ultimately, Dontsov’s vendetta and took on 
a life of its own, crowding everything else out, save resentment, negativity, and antipathy.      
 
 
 
                                                
3 Ibid., xvi. 
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Reactive Nationalism: Nietzsche contra Dontsov  
 The philosophy of Friedrich Nietzsche—the thinker whom Dontsov most admired, 
misunderstood, imitated, bastardized, and vulgarized—also offers some of the best concepts for a 
diagnosis and critique of Dontsov, as modern man and as theorist of “active nationalism.” 
Despite Dontsov’s efforts to put Nietzsche to use for Ukrainians—to articulate the “Faustian” 
“master morality” and “will to power” that would replace their “Buddhist” “slave morality” and 
thereby deliver them from captivity—Dontsov actually represents an extreme case of what 
Nietzsche termed “ressentiment,” “slave morality,” the triumph of “reactive forces,” and 
“nihilism.”  
A psychological phenomenon, ressentiment is characterized by the “spirit of revenge,” 
impotent hatred, boundless envy, jealousy, rancor, mistrust, perpetual accusations, 
recriminations, denunciations, and judgments against others. It seeks “to sanctify revenge under 
the name of justice—as if justice were at bottom merely a further development of the feeling of 
being aggrieved—and to rehabilitate not only revenge but all reactive affects in general.”4 This is 
“slave morality” and the “triumph of reactive forces.”5 According to Nietzsche, anti-Semitism, 
nationalism, romanticism, socialism, and Christianity are all manifestations of ressentiment. The 
reactive type, the slave, is a “dyspeptic” “who cannot ‘have done’ with anything.”6 His opposite, 
“the noble,” “knows how to forget.” But “experiences strike too deeply” and “memory becomes 
                                                
4 Friedrich Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of Morals and Ecce Homo, trans. Walter Kaufmann (New York: Vintage, 
1989), 73-74. 
 
5 “Consciousness merely expresses the relation of certain reactive forces to active forces which dominate them. 
Consciousness is essentially reactive; this is why we do not know what a body can do, or what activity it is capable 
of. And what is said of consciousness must also be said of memory and habit. Furthermore we must say it of 
nutrition, reproduction, conservation and adaptation. These are reactive functions, reactive specializations, 
expressions of particular reactive forces.” Gilles Deleuze, Nietzsche and Philosophy, trans. Hugh Tomlinson, (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1962), 41. “What is active? Reaching out for power.” Friedrich Nietzsche, The 
Will to Power, trans. Walter Kaufmann and R.J. Hollingdale (New York: Random House, 1968), 657. 
 
6 He cannot “let go” of past injuries and misfortunes, forgiving or, more importantly, forgetting them. Ibid., 58. 
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a festering wound” for the man of ressentiment.7 Incapable of love, respect, or admiration for 
friends and enemies alike, he is venomous, hateful, and depreciative, taking revenge on the 
external world for his own inability to be rid of the painful imprint of experience, to forget the 
past, take action in the present, and create a brighter future. He thus resents the good and the 
beautiful.8 If people do not love him, this is proof of their malice and conspiracies against him. 
He possesses a great capacity for disparagement, and conceives of all misfortunes as “someone’s 
fault” (certainly not his own). Constantly imputing wrongs and distributing blame, he needs 
sinners—mere criminals will not do. His recriminations replace genuine aggressions (the 
purview of stronger types). He leaves the struggle for liberation and creative achievement to 
others, yet “considering gain as a right, considering it a right to profit from the actions that he 
does not perform, the man of ressentiment breaks out in bitter reproaches as soon as his 
expectations are disappointed. And how could they not be disappointed, since frustration and 
revenge are the a prioris of ressentiment?”9 The slave’s formula is simple: “You are evil, 
therefore I am good.” First he posits a malevolent Other, a hostile world, then defines his 
goodness, his morality, as its negation.10 At bottom, the man of ressentiment is capable only of 
negation. He cannot affirm life and lacks amor fati (love of fate). He longs to be unburdened of 
existence; he craves self-destruction, death, and nothingness. His fantasies are morbid and 
spiteful: young martyrs, new inquisitions, apocalyptic wars, and eternal damnation for the 
                                                
7 Ibid., 230. 
 
8 Cf. Dontsov’s ridicule of the “kalos kagathos” in Natsionalizm 
 
9 Deleuze, Nietzsche, 118-19. 
 
10 The master’s formula, by contrast, takes a positive affirmation as its premise: “I am good, therefore you are evil.” 
The good “looks for its antithesis only in order to affirm itself with more joy.” Nietzsche, Genealogy, 36-39. 
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wicked in Hell.11 His desire for annihilation is an expression of “the hatred of the misdeveloped, 
needy, underprivileged [one] who destroys, who must destroy,” because all of existence 
“outrages and provokes him.” His creations come from “the tyrannic will of one who is seriously 
ailing, struggling, and tortured . . . who as it were revenges himself on all things by impressing 
on them . . . and burning into them his image, the image of his torture.”12  
The description matches Dontsov remarkably well. Dontsov projected all the worst 
qualities of the resentful “slave” onto the Russian masses and his fellow Ukrainians, but 
exhibited the same traits to the highest degree, pseudo-Nietzschean ruminations notwithstanding. 
He did not understand that Nietzsche’s notion of the slave is not to be taken literally as someone 
who is socially, economically, culturally, or politically dominated by someone else. Similarly, 
the master is not necessarily someone who commands, tyrannizes, or exploits others (what 
Dontsov tried to become as the editor of Vistnyk). In societies where the regime of domination is 
characterized by the victory of “reactive forces,” the rulers are no less slavish than their subjects 
because they too are incapable of self-mastery, nonconformity, and creative action, of new 
directions and new interpretations, of transformation. They may conquer entire continents and 
vanquish whole classes and races, but their “will to power”—another concept that Dontsov 
misunderstood—remains negative and reactive: the desire for power of those who resent their 
lack of it, the desire for power over others, but not over oneself. The totalitarian states of 
twentieth-century Europe that Dontsov extolled were, in this sense, slave regimes par excellence, 
from the supreme leader down to the subjugated masses. Dontsov’s hoped-for “masters”—the 
                                                
11 Nietzsche, Genealogy, 48-49. 
  
12 Nietzsche calls this “romantic pessimism,” citing Schopenhauer’s voluntarism—one of Dontsov’s mainstays—as 
the form it has taken in modern philosophy. Friedrich Nietzsche, The Gay Science, trans. Walter Kaufmann (New 
York: Vintage, 1974), 330. 
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Ukrainian “Hitlerites” who would take “Bolshevik methods to the Bolsheviks”—did not herald 
the triumph of the will, freedom, and independence, but the kingdom of slavery, regimentation, 
leveling, the apotheosis of the “herd,” mindless submission to the “New Idol” (the nation state, 
the Reich), sacrifice of everything (bodies, minds, loved ones, and honor) for the sake of “the 
demon of power.”13 “Active nationalism” is a misnomer, perhaps even an oxymoron; “reactive 
nationalism” is more fitting. 
Evidently, when Dontsov read “you should love peace as a means to new wars—and the 
short peace more than the long”14 and “it is the good war that hallows any cause,” he failed to 
appreciate that Nietzsche was speaking metaphorically. In this particular context, “war” refers to 
the quest for knowledge that Dontsov, a consummate anti-intellectual, considered to be a 
fundamental part of the problem. The misunderstanding persists when Nietzsche speaks of literal 
war, which he classed with the “altruism of the weak who find in it an escape from their hard 
task of self-perfection.”15 Dontsov could conceive of no higher perfection than death in combat 
or some other martyrdom, though he characteristically left this to others.  
Dontsov’s geopolitical conception—Russia contra Europe—and his notion of a ruling, 
warrior caste to save the latter also bore a superficial similarity to Nietzsche’s. Consider the 
following passage written by the latter in 1886:  
I do not say this because I want it to happen: the opposite would be rather more after my 
heart—I mean such an increase in the menace of Russia that Europe would have to 
resolve to become menacing, too, namely, to acquire one will by means of a new caste 
                                                
13 Friedrich Nietzsche, Daybreak: Thoughts on the Prejudices of Morality, trans. R.J. Hollingdale (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2007), 146 and 220. 
 
14 Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra, 46-48. 
 
15 Walter Kaufmann, Nietzsche, Philosopher, Psychologist, Antichrist, 388. Men “throw themselves with delight into 
the new danger of death because they think that in sacrifice for the fatherland they have at long last that long sought 
permission—the permission to dodge their goal: war is for them a detour to suicide, but detour with a good 
conscience.” Nietzsche, The Gay Science, aphorism 338. 
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that would rule Europe, a long, terrible will of its own that would be able to cast its goals 
millennia hence—so the long-drawn-out comedy of its many splinter states as well as its 
dynastic and democratic splinter wills would come to an end. The time for petty politics 
is over: the very next century will bring the fight for the dominion of the earth—the 
compulsion to large-scale politics.16  
 
It reads like something Dontsov might have plagiarized word-or-word, but appearances are 
deceptive. The future (ideal) Europe, for Nietzsche, is not a place of squabbling, narcissistic 
nation-states pursuing some vulgar, purely reactive, social Darwinian notion of racial purity, but 
of a cosmopolitan transcendence of nationality and nationalism.  
We are not nearly ‘German’ enough . . . to advocate nationalism and race hatred and to be 
able to take pleasure in the national scabies of the heart and blood-poisoning that now 
leads the nations of Europe to delimit and barricade themselves against each other as if it 
were a matter of quarantine. . . . We homeless ones are too manifold and mixed racially 
and in our descent for ‘modern men,’ and consequently do not feel tempted to participate 
in the mendacious racial self-admiration and racial indecency that parades in Germany 
today as a sign of a German way of thinking and that is doubly false and obscene among 
the people of the ‘historical sense.’ We are, in a word—and let this be our word of 
honor—good Europeans.17  
 
Dontsov, too, was an exile, a traveler, a cosmopolitan, a “homeless one,” but he was prepared to 
sacrifice anything for revenge against the power that had, he felt, driven him from his home and 
burned it to the ground (Communist Russia), even if it meant submission to a new power that 
was certain to do the same (Nazi Germany). He thus represents a thoroughgoing bastardization 
of the “good European,” despite having the biography of one and despite modeling his political 
project after aphorisms such as the above, which also calls for a “new slavery,” ridicules 
humanitarianism, “equal rights,” the nineteenth-century positivist notion of “progress,” and 
rhapsodizes “danger, war, and adventure.”      
                                                
16 The Gay Science, aphorism 362. Beyond Good and Evil, aphorism 208. 
 
17 The Gay Science, aphorism 377. 
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For Nietzsche—whom Dontsov called “the prophet” of the modern “age of the masses, 
the age of the mob, which has arrived not only for us, but for all of Europe as well”18—the 
mixing of races and, much more importantly, cultures was the sine qua non of a superior pan-
European breed, the advent of which anti-Semitism and nationalism served only to delay.19 
Whereas Nietzsche believed that “the Germans had entered the line of gifted nations only 
through a strong mixture with Slavic blood,” Dontsov’s trite Nordicism asserted just the 
opposite—that only Germans have brought or could bring form and order to “the East”—
showing his insecurity as a Ukrainian and his obsequious desire to become German, to find a 
niche in “the master race.” Or compare Dontsov’s disparagement of the Russians as a horde of 
slavish automatons to Nietzsche’s observation that “the will” was “strongest and most amazing 
by far in that enormous empire in between, where Europe, as it were, flows back into Asia, in 
Russia.”20 In comparison to the Jews and the Russian Empire, Nietzsche considered Europe’s 
nations artificial and tenuous: “These ‘nations’ really should avoid every hotheaded rivalry and 
hostility!” In the same aphorism he calls for the “expulsion [from Germany] of anti-Semitic 
screamers” (the adherents of proto-Nazi “Teutonism” in Neitzsche’s day). But Dontsov’s 
lifelong hatred of Russians, and of Jews after 1926, was another product of his ressentiment, not 
an honest assessment of their qualities or their role in Ukraine’s history, culture, and politics.  
                                                
18 Dontsov, Dukh nashoi davnyny, 271.  
 
19 “The whole problem of the Jews exists only in nation states, for here their energy and higher intelligence, their 
accumulated capital of spirit and will, gathered from generation to generation through a long schooling in suffering, 
must become so preponderant as to arouse mass envy and hatred. In almost all contemporary nations, therefore . . . 
the literary obscenity of leading Jews to slaughter as scapegoats of every conceivable public and internal misfortune 
is spreading. As soon as it is no longer a matter of preserving nations, but of producing the strongest possible 
European mixed race, the Jew is just as useful and desirable an ingredient as any other national remnant.”   
 
20 “A thinker who has the development of Europe on his conscience will, in all his projects for this future, take into 
account the Jews as well as the Russians as the provisionally surest and most probable factors in the great play and 
fight of forces.” It was, Nietzsche conceded, an open question whether Russia’s overflowing will to power would 
take an active or reactive form. He was certain that the Jews merely wanted to be accepted, assimilated, and 
respected in countries they had inhabited for centuries. Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, 208. 
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“The cultivation of a new caste that will rule Europe”—what Nietzsche called “the 
European problem”—also occupied Dontsov, but here too he took Nietzsche’s metaphors 
literally, setting off in search of “blonde beasts.” Is the goal to regress into bestiality, or to uplift 
and transcend mankind? For Nietzsche, the elevation of some exceptional individuals above the 
mass of humanity, and of humanity above the beasts, was chiefly a matter of the spirit (art, 
religion, and philosophy), not a function of biology (race, the struggle for survival, and so on) as 
it was for Dontsov. While the latter considered culture important (he focused on literary criticism 
at least as much as politics), he subordinated it to the political project of building an ethnically 
purified nation state by any means necessary.21 Dontsov renounced spirit to glorify blood. His 
ideal of a hereditary caste of priests, inquisitors, apostles, and executioners, ruling with an iron 
fist over a cowed mass of ostensive racial inferiors—“slave morality” at its most grotesque, 
masquerading as a creed for “masters”—was his revenge fantasy. So too was the fanatical 
Christianity and ecclesiastical authoritarianism that he envisaged undergirding his totalitarian 
theocracy. Dontsov’s God could only be vengeful, despotic, and bloodthirsty.  
Nietzsche’s concept of “nihilism,” a diagnosis of the modern (European) human 
condition, is also useful for understanding Dontsov’s intellectual biography. Dontsov applied the 
concept to Bolshevism,22 justifiably enough, but his own “active nationalism” was a symptom of 
nihilism too. Indeed, each chapter of his life was another stage in the illness. There were three 
such stages: 1) “the death of God”—the young Dontsov’s atheism and faith in “science” and 
“progress” (positivism, Darwinism, Hegelianism, and Marxism); 2) a crisis of meaninglessness, 
                                                
21 Cf. “Culture and the state—one should not deceive one-self about this—are antagonists: ‘Kultur-Staat’ is merely a 
modern idea. One lives off the other, one thrives at the expense of the other. All great ages of culture are ages of 
political decline: what is great culturally has always been unpolitical, even anti-political.” Nietzsche, Twilight of the 
Idols, 4. 
 
22 Dontsov, Pidstavy, 138.  
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cosmic purposelessness, epistemological failure, value destruction, leading to an “unleashing of 
the beast” (fascism, racism, war, and genocide)—the middle Dontsov’s “amorality” 
(amoral’nist’), but no attempt to transcend morality per se, let alone forge new values; and 3) a 
retreat into mysticism, hollow yet vindictive, rancorous Christianity (certainly not the all-
forgiving, all-forgetful morality of Jesus), and romantic pessimism. “Against all this,” writes 
Nietzsche, “the sick person has only one great remedy. I call it Russian fatalism, that fatalism 
without revolt which is exemplified by a Russian soldier who, finding a campaign too strenuous, 
finally lies down in the snow. No longer to accept anything at all, no longer to take anything, no 
longer to absorb anything—to cease reacting altogether.” Perhaps, with regard to Dontsov’s 
“active nationalism”—a grim vestige from a grim era—one ought to take Zarathustra’s advice: 
“what is falling, we should still push.”23 
 
Which Europe? Dontsov’s Afterlife in Post-Soviet Ukraine  
From socialism to fascism, modernism to traditionalism, atheism to Christianity, Russia 
to Germany, Europe to North America, Dontsov was a chameleon, a man of contradictions and 
paradoxes. But has his posthumous legacy been as adaptable as he himself was in life? Dontsov’s 
works and devotees, formerly confined to the diaspora, returned to an independent Ukraine 
following the disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1991. Times had changed. Russian 
Communism was defeated, not through the bloody crusade of Christian fanatics that the late 
Dontsov had called for, but through the Soviet Union’s own internal structural flaws and reforms 
gone awry. World War II had already discredited fascist, ultranationalist, and “third-way” 
concepts, also depriving imperialism of its moral foundations, and sending the French and 
                                                
23 Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra, 209. 
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British empires further down the long road of decolonization. Now the Russian (Soviet) Empire 
was finally following suit. The expansion and deepening of the European Union (founded in 
1993), with a contrite yet confident Germany at its core, heralded the end of the old system of 
jealously guarded, mutually hostile nation-states and the beginning of a new era of open borders, 
international cooperation, peace, tolerance, prosperity, liberalism, and democracy—or so it 
seemed until recently. Visions of national purity and autarky, wars of conquest and empire came 
to appear immoral and dangerous. Optimistic talk of the final triumph of liberal democracy, “the 
end of history,” and the beneficent incorporation of the former Soviet Bloc into capitalist 
Western civilization filled the air.  
Vestiges of Russian imperialism and nostalgia for the Soviet era notwithstanding, the 
main thrust of Ukrainian politics after 1991 has been in the direction of this European project.24 
Neighboring Poland—a success story of post-Communist transition and EU membership—
offered a beacon for Ukraine to follow. Russia, many hoped, might take the same path, renounce 
its imperial, totalitarian past, and become a partner of the West, economically, diplomatically, 
and even militarily. Fearing a possible resurgence of Russian aggression since the start of the 
millenium, the Baltic countries, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Romania, and Poland 
joined NATO. Ukraine, however, took a stance of neutrality between the US-led alliance and 
Moscow. Hoping to maintain good relations with both sides, Ukraine relinquished its entire 
nuclear arsenal in exchange for security assurances from Russia, the UK, and the US in the 
Budapest Memorandum of December 1994. The nation’s new enemies were not foreign powers, 
but internal diseases—state corruption, organized crime, oligarchy, poverty, and antiquated 
                                                
24 Even pro-Russian political factions, such as the Party of Regions headed by former President Victor Yanukovych, 
paid lip service to the goal of association with and eventual membership in the EU. It was Yanukovych’s decision to 
renege on this campaign promise that sparked the initial protests of the upheaval that led to his downfall. 
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mentalities from the far right to the far left, from the far east to the far west. What relevance did 
the ideologue of “active nationalism” have for Ukrainians now that they had their own sovereign 
state, and a society motivated, on the whole, by such cosmopolitan, peace-loving, liberal-
democratic, and reformist aspirations? Did Dontsov’s authoritarian, warlike teachings and 
damning critiques of Russian messianism and Bolshevism have anything to offer a nation 
striving to transcend the painful legacies of a colonial, totalitarian past in favor of a brighter, 
more European future?  
Addressing these questions, a new circle of writers interested in Dontsov formed around 
the Kyiv-based journal Ukrains’ki problemy (Ukrainian Problems).25 Some of them were not 
convinced that Dontsov had ever had a positive influence on Ukraine’s development. Ukrainian 
historian Heorhyi Kasianov described Dontsov’s sole contribution as a “total critique,” a 
“nihilism” that lacks “any element of a constructive program or a systematic worldview.”26 
Dontsov’s great achievement was laying the psychological groundwork for the appearance of the 
OUN, whose mentality and tactics Kasianov compared to the “Soviet totalitarianism of the 
1930s” and “fundamentalist religious movements,” as well as to fascism.27 What possible appeal 
could such a worldview possess for a country that had suffered so terribly from the two most 
infamous totalitarian regimes of the twentieth century—the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany? 
According to this view, while a familiarity with Dontsov is indispensable for any student of 
Galician and émigré Ukrainian culture and politics, especially in the interwar period, his life and 
                                                
25 The contributors to the journal included Serhii Kvit, Oleh Bahan, V’iacheslav Kyrylenko, Mykhailo Chuhuienko, 
Halyna Svarnyk, and Heorhyi Kasianov, among others. 
 
26 Heorhyi Kasianov, Orhanizatsiia ukrains’kykh natsionalistiv i Ukrains’ka povstans’ka armiia: Istorychni narysy, 
ed. S. V. Kul’chyts’kyi (Kyiv: Naukova dumka, 2005), 448. 
 
27 Heorhyi Kasianov, Ukrains’ka intelihentsiia na rubezhi XIX-XX st.: sotsial’no-politychnyi portret (Kyiv: Lybid’ 
1993); Heorhyi Kasianov, Do pytannia pro ideolohiiu Orhanizatsii Ukrains’kykh Nationalistiv (OUN). Analitychnyi 
ohliad” (Kyiv: NAN Ukrainy, Institut istorii Ukrainy, 2003). 
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thought should be read first and foremost as a cautionary tale: the path of xenophobic hatred, 
irrational fanaticism, contempt for “the masses,” the cult of war, violence, and expansion, led 
and lead only to an abyss of death, ignominy, and, despite it all, domination by foreigners. 
Dontsov’s iconoclasm offered nothing positive, nothing organically, authentically Ukrainian. His 
authoritarian quest for a leader and a ruling caste, for an unquestioned dogma and unquestioning 
followers, resulted in his opportunistic submission to one foreign power or conception after 
another, as well as the attrition of his support, even among like-minded Ukrainians.  
Despite the fact that integral nationalism has been confined to the fringes of post-Soviet 
Ukrainian society and politics, a handful of Dontsov-inspired rightwing nationalist groups have 
nonetheless appeared in the country.28 The OUN quickly resumed operations in Ukraine, 
registering as a political party under the name the Congress of Ukrainian Nationalists in 1993, 
but has had minimal success; dedicated to the attainment of an independent state, it had lost its 
raison d’être. Similarly, the Ukrainian National Assembly (Ukrains’ka Natsional’na Asambleia, 
UNA) and its military wing the National Ukrainian Organization for Self-Defense (Ukrains’ka 
natsional’na Samooborona, UNSO), formed in 1991, never achieved more than one percent in 
Ukraine’s national elections.  
The only Dontsovian political party to pass the five-percent threshold needed to enter the 
Verkhovna Rada (Ukraine’s national parliament) has been the All-Ukrainian Union “Freedom” 
(Vseukrains’ke ob’iednannia “Svoboda”), known as Svoboda. Founded in 1991 as the Social-
National Party of Ukraine (SNA), with a runic Wolfsangel (“wolf hook,” a common symbol 
among neo-Nazi groups) for its emblem, the party changed its name and softened its image in 
                                                
28 Renata Caruso, “Dmytro Dontsov’s Ideology of Integral Nationalism in Post-Soviet Ukraine” in Giovanna 
Elisabeth Brogi, Marta Dyczok, Oxana Pachlovska, Giovanna Siedina, eds., Ukraine Twenty Years after 
Independence: Assessnments, Perspectives, Challenges (Rome: Aracne, 2015), 265-74. Andreas Umland and Anton 
Shekhovtsov, “Ultraright Party Politics in Post-Soviet Ukraine and the Puzzle of the Electoral Marginalism of 
Ukrainian Ultranationalists in 1994–2009,” Russian Politics and Law 51, no. 5 (2013): 33–58.  
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2004. “We base our ideology . . . on Dontsov,” Svoboda’s leader Oleh Tiahnybok declared: “We 
are simply trying to modernize [Dontsov’s ideology] to make it conform better to today’s reality 
and the conditions of life in today’s world.”29 Hailing Dontsov as “not only a man, but a man 
whose thought inspired an entire epoch,” Tiahnybok authored introductions to re-edited works 
by the ideologue and funded their republication.30 Vehemently anti-Communist, Svoboda 
adheres to an ethnic definition of the Ukrainian nation that excludes Russians, Jews, and others, 
yet obscures the more extreme (i.e. racist and anti-Semitic) opinions of its leading members from 
the public.31 Echoing Dontsov’s most consistent stance, Svoboda’s propaganda calls for the 
separation of Ukraine, as a geopolitically pivotal region of Europe, from Russia, as an Asiatic 
threat to Western civilization. The party embraces a version of OUN(B) and ABN leader Iaroslav 
Stets’ko’s idea of permanent dual revolutions—one national and one social—and regards the 
“liberal regime” in Kyiv as an “antinational occupation.” The true (as opposed to “pseudo-”) 
nationalist “must wake up with the idea that he is an iron soldier of the Nation,” opposing 
“democracy and capitalism,” as well as tolerant “all-Ukrainian values” (ukrains’kist’). The 
official ideology of Svoboda, “social nationalism,” as described by party theorist and MP Iuryi 
                                                
29 Oleh Tiahnybok, “Meni b ne khotilosia, shtob moi pohliady i moia pozytsiia nashkody Iushenkovi,” (March 31, 
2004), http://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2004/03/31/2998984/ [accessed March 14, 2017] 
 
30 In August 2011, Tiahnybok spearheaded the republication of Khrestom i mechem (With Cross and Shield) in 
Ternopil’ in honor of the 128th anniversary of Dontsov’s birth. Oleh Tiahnybok, “Dmytro Dontsov—ne prosto 
liudyna—tse syla epokha (August 17, 2011), http://www.svoboda.org.ua/dopysy/analityka/023570/ [accessed March 
14, 2017]  
 
31 Motyl has insisted that Svoboda is neither functionally nor ideologically fascist, comparing them to “Tea Party or 
rightwing Republicans” in the US. This is probably a fair assessment when it comes to the party’s broad support, 
especially at its peak in 2012, but the leadership of the party, including Tiahnybok, Iryna Farion, and Iuryi 
Mykhailyshyn, admire Dontsov and share his anti-Semitic and profascist views. Other political scientists 
specializing in the Ukrainian far right have asserted that Svoboda espouses anti-Semitic, ethnocentric, and 
xenophobic ideas. Alexander J. Motyl, “Experts on Ukraine” World Affairs Journal (March 21, 2014). Tadeusz A. 
Olszański, “Svoboda Party—The New Phenomenon on the Ukrainian Right-Wing Scene,” Centre for Eastern 
Studies 56 (2011), 6. Anton Shekhovtsov and Andreas Umland, “Ukraine’s Radical Right,” Journal of Democracy 
25, no. 3 (July 2014): 58-63.   
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Mykhal’chyshyn, derives from Dontsov’s corpus.32 When Svoboda had an electoral 
breakthrough in October 2012, winning 10 percent of the national vote (38 out of 450 seats in the 
Verkhovna Rada), some warned of a resurgence of the far right in Ukraine. Others dismissed 
such fears as the fruit of alarmist pro-Russian, anti-Ukrainian propaganda, pointing to the 
normalcy of neofascist parties, often with significantly higher levels of support, in other 
European countries.  
The expectation that the Russian annexation of Crimea in February and March 2014, and 
the subsequent “hybrid war” in the Donbas region would move radical nationalist sentiments into 
the Ukrainian mainstream, bringing militaristic, authoritarian, anti-Muscovite ideas such as 
Dontsov’s back into vogue, proved to be exaggerated. Svoboda’s support dropped below the 
five-percent threshold needed to enter the Verkhovna Rada in the elections that followed the 
Maidan Revolution of 2014.33 But Svoboda got one thing that it wanted: Ukraine became the 
focal point in an escalating geopolitical conflict between Russia, Europe, and the US.  
Ukrainian far-right organizations that saw themselves more as paramilitary groups than 
political parties fared better in the wake of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These groups 
mobilized for the confrontation with Moscow-backed Russian separatists, Russian armed forces, 
and Russian “volunteers” from the Russian Federation, many of whom were themselves blood-
and-soil nationalists and neo-Nazis, as well as followers of the neo-Eurasianist movement led by 
virulently anti-Ukrainian ideologue Aleksandr Dugin (1962-). Unprepared for the war (the 
Ukrainian military had been plundered and neglected for years), Kyiv relied on these volunteer 
                                                
32 Iuryi Mykhal’chyshyn, “Aksiomy sotsial-natsionalizmu” Vatra (March 15, 2011). http://www.vatra.cc/sotsial-
natsionalizm/aksiomy-sotsial-natsionalizmu.html accessed March 15, 2017] 
 
33 This lends credence to the view that Svoboda’s spike in popularity in 2012 owed more to anger at the Yanukovych 
regime than a change in Ukrainian society, and that Svoboda, as the Party of Regions’ preferred opponent, the 
specter of a “Banderite” menace to peaceful Russian speakers, enjoyed tacit support from Yanukovych’s 
government (in the form of extra airtime on state television, for example). 
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units to manage the situation in the east. The Azov Battalion, for example, a mostly eastern 
Ukrainian formation, proved itself an effective fighting unit in the early part of the conflict, 
recapturing the key port city of Mariupol’ on the Azov coast in June 2014. With a banner 
featuring a Wolfsangel—which its members claim stands for “the Idea of the Nation” (the letter 
“I” superimposed on “N”)—emblazoned over a background with a “black sun” (another occult, 
Nazi symbol), the Azov Battalion courted controversy. In October 2016 it formed a political 
party, “National Corps,” whose platform calls for the severing of all ties with Russia, the 
restoration of Ukraine’s nuclear power status, and capital punishment for “traitors.” National 
Corps opposes Ukraine’s membership in both the EU and NATO, instead favoring the creation 
of an Intermarium alliance with the Eastern European nations between the Black and Baltic seas, 
just as Dontsov did after World War I. Whether anything will come of the party remains to be 
seen, but if the experience of other far right actors in Ukraine is any indicator, it will probably 
fail to win substantial electoral support.    
Another Dontsovian organization, Pravyi Sektor (Right Sector), has become world 
famous despite its meager numbers. Headed by MP Dmytro Yarosh (1971-), a now well-known 
figure in Ukraine, Pravyi Sektor played a prominent, albeit sensationalized, role in the violent 
clashes between the Maidan protesters and the police of the Yanukovych regime in January and 
February 2014. Yarosh is a student and admirer of Dontsov, known to cite the latter’s ideas in 
interviews with the press.34 Yarosh also leads the Stepan Bandera All-Ukrainian Organization 
“Trident” (Vseukrains’ka orhanizatsiia imeni Stepana Bandery “Tryzub,” founded in 1993). In 
                                                
34 In one case, Yarosh, critiquing Ukraine’s current government, invokes Dontsov’s conception of the characteristics 
of a ruling caste (courage, nobility, wisdom). “Perevorot chy vystava: iak vidreahuvaly narodni deputaty na vystup 
politseis’kykh v Radi,” www.24tv.ua (March 15, 2016). 
http://24tv.ua/perevorot_chi_vistava_yak_vidreaguvali_narodni_deputati_na_vistup_politseyskih_v_radi_n793603/a
utostart [accessed March 15, 2017] 
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May 2014, Pravyi Sektor formed a political party, absorbing UNA-UNSO and other smaller far-
right Ukrainian groups (Patriot of Ukraine, White Hammer, Carpathian Sich, most of which 
subsequently left the organization), but performed poorly in the October 2014 parliamentary 
elections, securing a seat in the Rada only for Yarosh himself.  
Perhaps the most influential of Yarosh’s Tryzub comrades has been Serhii Kvit (1965-), 
who went from rector of the National University of Kyiv-Mohyla Academy to Ukraine’s 
minister of education (2014-2016) in the wake of the Maidan Revolution.35 Kvit has made no 
secrets about his affinities for Dontsov, but has tried to obscure the most controversial aspects of 
the latter’s life and thought. In 2000, Kvit published the first edition of his biography of Dontsov, 
which focuses on the ideologue’s interwar years.36 He devoted the fifth, concluding chapter of 
the book to a defense of Dontsov’s doctrine as “an organic development of the ideology of 
Ukrainian nationalism, which was begun by his predecessors,” Mykola Mikhnovs’kyi and Taras 
Shevchenko.37 Kvit argues that Dontsov was interested in Fascism and Nazism, but did not 
admire them: “Dontsov’s appeal to the totalitarian systems of contemporary Europe needs to be 
seen as a search for examples of a functional organization, and not ideology.”38 Nevertheless, 
Dontsov, “like no other, felt and conveyed in his publications that spirit of authoritarianism and 
national mobilization that ruled contemporary Europe, and without which Ukrainians would not 
                                                
35 See Serhii Kvit, The Battlefront of Civilizations : Education in Ukraine (Kyiv: Kyiv-Mohyla Academy Publishing 
House, 2015). 
 
36 The tone of the second edition is considerably less polemical. Specifically, Kvit replaced the final section of the 
first edition, which censures his contemporaries (see below). Also of interest is his new book on education in 
Ukraine. Serhii Kvit, Dymtro Dontsov: Ideolohichnyi portret, 2nd ed. (L’viv: Halytska vydavnycha spilka, 2013). 
    
37 Serhii Kvit, Dymtro Dontsov: Ideolohichnyi portret (Kyiv: Kyivs’kyi universytet, 2000), 115-19. 
 
38 Ibid., 176. 
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have been able to manage on the eve of total war.”39 Kvit sought, unconvincingly, to refute 
charges of anti-Semitism and commonalities with fascism, asserting: “the only point that unites 
Ukrainian nationalism and German National Socialism in the thought of Dmytro Dontsov is anti-
Communism.”40  
Serhii Kvit has advocated the use of Dontsov’s ideas in contemporary Ukrainian 
education, cultural production, and politics. Focusing especially on literature, aesthetics, and 
commonalities with philosophical currents in the West, he approaches Dontsovism as an open-
ended ideology and a quest for answers rather than a closed system. In a 1993 article, he 
reimagined “active nationalism” as a peculiar form of existentialism, which, for geographical and 
historical reasons, took a totalitarian shape in Ukraine unlike in Western Europe.41 Kvit insists 
that Dontsov’s praise of the fanaticism and practices of Bolshevism and Nazism was, in fact, 
mere rhetorical flourish, but he fails to consider what Dontsov and the OUN envisioned 
themselves doing once in power; namely, building an authoritarian state ruled by a caste of 
racially superior warriors devoted to a new religion of the nation.42 He resents the “damaging 
ideological imports” of liberalism and postmodernism, regarding Dontsov’s teachings, or at least 
his method, and the interwar literature of the Vistnykivtsi, as antidotes.  
A public and institutional basis for the advancement of Dontsov’s ideas and legacy has 
also developed in Ukraine. The Dmytro Dontsov Scientific-Ideological Center (Naukovyi-
Ideolohichnyi Tsentr imeni Dmytra Dontsova)—founded in the Western Ukrainian town of 
Drohobych in 2007 under the leadership of Oleh Bahan and Petro Ivanyshyn, with Kvit and 
                                                
39 Ibid., 123. 
 
40 Ibid., 170-77. 
 
41 Serhii Kvit, “Trahichnyi optimizm Dmytra Dontsova,” Slovo i chas, no. 3 (1993), 43. 
 
42 Zaitsev, Ukrains’kyi integral’nyi natsionalizm, 25. 
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Yarosh as “esteemed members”—is the most active. The center’s program declares its task as the 
study, development, and promotion of Dontsov’s ideology. “On this basis we plan to develop a 
modern philosophy of the national idea with which to evaluate political, social, and cultural 
phenomena in Ukraine, that is, to develop the nationcentric analytics and national-existential 
methodology of thought that is desperately needed in our powerfully cosmopolitanized world.”43 
Presenting itself as an academic initiative with a political and spiritual mission, the center 
republishes and disseminates Dontsov’s works, and injects itself into public debates about 
Ukrainian politics and culture.  
Dontsov’s ghost still haunts Ukraine’s cities and universities. Officials have named 
streets in his honor in Dnipro, Zhytomyr, Ivano-Frankivs’k, Luts’k, L’viv, Odesa, Sumy, 
Kherson, Kropyvnyts’kyi, and Dontsov’s hometown, Melitopol’, which has not always 
welcomed the lionization of its native son. The commemorative plaque to Dontsov in Melitopol’ 
stirred up controversy after its unveiling in 2006, but it survived, and remains a gathering place 
for Ukrainian nationalists. Unknown vandals destroyed another commemorative plaque to the 
ideologue in L’viv, located on the façade of the Dontsovs’ former residence at 11 Lysenko Street 
and unveiled by Svoboda leader Iryna Farion in 2013.44 Pravyi Sektor funded the renovation of 
the plaque.45 Despite having a reputation for being bastions of “neo-Soviet” thinking and 
hostility toward “Banderites,” Melitopol’ and other cities throughout eastern and southern 
                                                
43 “Pro Tsentr,” Naukovo-ideolohichnyi tsentr imeni Dmytro Dontsova, http://dontsov-
nic.org.ua/index.php?m=content&d=view&cid=7 [accessed March 15, 2017] 
 
44 “Farion otkryla memorial’nuiu dosku ideologu ukrainskogo natsionalizma: ‘On sozdal novyi geroicheskii tip 
ukraintsia-mstitelia,” tsenor.net  (May 10, 2013). 
http://censor.net.ua/photo_news/255466/farion_otkryla_memorialnuyu_dosku_ideologu_ukrainskogo_natsionalizma
_on_sozdal_novyyi_geroicheskiyi [accessed May 18, 2017] 
 
45 The costs of the damage totaled 17,000 hryvnia (about 650 USD). “‘Pravyi Sektor’ zbyraie koshty memoria’lnoi 
doshky Dmytru Dontsovu,” Natsional’nyi Rukh Derzhnyts’ka Initsiatyva Iarosha ‘Diia’ (November 11, 2015). 
http://yarosh.lviv.ua/uncategorized/pravyj-sektor-zbyraje-koshty-na-vidnovlennya-memorialnoji-doshky-dmytru-
dontsovu/ [March 18, 2017] 
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Ukraine—excluding the separatist strongholds of the Donetsk and Luhansk “People’s 
Republics”—have experienced a Ukrainian nationalist revival in response to the nearby Russian-
Ukrainian conflict.  
A roundtable on the subject of Dontsov “as a spiritual builder of Ukraine in light of state 
independence” took place on August 25, 2016, at Melitopol’ State Pedagogical University. 
Deputies of Svoboda, the president of the university, and assorted academics took part. At the 
meeting, Ihor Moseiko, head of Svoboda in Melitopol’, declared “we need to stop hiding behind 
democracy and human values, repeating the mistakes of the Muscophile intelligentsia of the late-
nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries, and bring linguistic legislation into lines with the needs 
of the titular nation. We must apply to the language question a Ukrainian politics as understood 
by Dmytro Dontsov, the spirit that will be a revitalizing, unifying force of the nation.” Another 
participant lamented the fact that Dontsov’s followers were not yet running the country after 
twenty-five years of independence. The roundtable led to an initiative to construct a monument 
and museum to Dontsov in Melitopol’ and found new center to engage in systematic research of 
the Dontsovian heritage in conjunction with the local university, which will appeal to 
representatives of the Ukrainian diaspora in Canada for the transferal of Dontsov’s archives.46 
Dontsov is taught in philosophy, political science, and philology departments throughout 
Ukraine today. Some consider him a part of the Ukrainian national canon, but others avidly 
dispute this.  
                                                
46 “V melitopole sozdaiut muzei Dontsova i ustanoviat pamiatnik,” IP News (August 26, 2016). 
https://www.ipnews.in.ua/news/zp/111970-v-melitopole-sozdadut-muzej-dontsova-i-ustanovyat-pamyatnik 
[accessed March 18, 2017] 
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Figures 7.1-2: Commemorative plaques to Dontsov in Melitopol’ (left) and L’viv (right). 
 
The post-Maidan Ukrainian government, resuming the efforts of former President Viktor 
Yushchenko (in office from 2005 to 2010) to revise Ukraine’s “official” national history, has 
sponsored efforts to at least partially rehabilitate Dontsov and the Ukrainian integral nationalists 
of the 1930s and 1940s, while also exposing state crimes against Ukrainians during the Soviet 
period.47 Known for his widely panned pro-UPA apologetics, Volodymyr V’iatrovych, director 
of the state Ukrainian Institute of National Memory48 since March 2014, has led the way in this 
                                                
47 See David R. Marples, Heroes and Villains: Creating a National History in Contemporary Ukraine (Budapest: 
Central European University Press, 2007). 
 
48 The institute had been dissolved in 2010 by Viktor Yanukovych only to be reestablished after the Maidan 
Revolution. As director, V’iatrovych oversaw the drafting of legislation that is intended to support the 
“decommunization” of Ukrainian society and politics, promote an official nationalist history of the OUN and UPA, 
and regulate scholarship on the Ukrainian national movement, including controversial laws against “denying the 
legitimacy” of the Ukrainian integral nationalists of the 1920s-1940s as “freedom fighters.” Hastily passed in April 
2015 by the Verkhovna Rada and President Petro Poroshenko, who came to power in the early presidential election 
following the revolution in May 2014, the laws theoreticaly criminalize assertions that the OUN and UPA were 
guilty of pro-Nazi collaboration, anti-Semitism, and the ethnic cleansing of Poles. In an open letter to Poroshenko, 
historians and other scholars specializing on Ukrainian subjects protested the laws as an assault on academic 
freedom and falsification of historical reality: “Open Letter from Scholars and Experts on Ukraine Re. the So-Called 
‘Anti-Communist Law’,” http://krytyka.com/en/articles/open-letter-scholars-and-experts-ukraine-re-so-called-anti-
communist-law [accessed March 25, 2016]. For a reasonable defense of V’iatrovych as a moderating force in the 
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endeavor. While V’iatrovych himself casts Dontsov in an unfavorable light vis-à-vis the OUN 
during World War II (as we saw in chapter 6), Ihor’ Vdovychyn, a member of the Ukrainian 
Institute of National Memory, dismisses claims that Dontsov was antidemocratic or totalitarian 
as baseless defamations.49 Such efforts to reimagine Dontsov as a liberal democrat are not only 
unconvincing, but would probably have baffled and vexed the publicist, who attacked the notions 
of democracy and universal human rights throughout his career.  
Like their spiritual father, the neo-Dontsovists intervene in literature to denounce 
cosmopolitan “postmodernists” who turn a skeptical eye toward nationalist exclusivism, 
authoritarianism, prudery, and conformism. For instance, Yuri Andrukhovych (1960-), one of 
Ukraine’s most prominent living writers, has taken a radically different approach to the 
cultivation of Ukrainian language and literature, and to the spiritual and political renewal of the 
nation after empire. A species of magical realism, postcolonial as opposed to anticolonial, 
Andrukhovych’s writing rejects the negative, authoritarian, “traditionalist” approach to culture of 
Dontsov and his descendants, favoring the affirmative, carnivalesque, and comical, celebrating 
the hybrid, liminal, transgressive, and unbounded.50 Dontsov is an object of fun for 
________________________ 
polarized memory politics of postcommunist Ukraine, working to give Ukrainians what they have long been 
denied—a national narrative of their own—see Alexander J. Motyl, “National Memory in Ukraine: What the West 
Gets Wrong About Liberals and Nationalists,” Foreign Affairs (August 4, 2016) 
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/ukraine/2016-08-04/national-memory-ukraine [accessed August 4, 2016]. I 
do not share Motyl’s view that critics of V’iatrovych are ipso facto exponents of the “neo-Soviet narrative,” which 
has long stereotyped Ukrainians, demonizing and delegitimizing their national liberation movements. 
 
49 Ihor’ Vdovychyn, Svoboda osoby v pratsi politychnii dumtsi (20-30 rr XX st.) (Ivano-Frankivs’k: Misto, 2010). 
 
50 See, for example, his best novel: Yuri Andrukhovych, Perverzion, trans. Michael M. Naydan (Evanston: 
Northwestern University Press, 2005). Andrukhovych renounces the use of “Bolshevik methods” to deal with the 
problematic legacies of Russian imperialism and Soviet Communism, which he nevertheless critiques as thoroughly 
as any Dontsovian. Cf. “Where Europe was just beginning to arise, to grow, to be constructed, at that same instant 
Asia revolted, demanding the establishment of its despotic and simultaneously anarchic status. At this moment I am 
not saying that this is bad. But I am just saying that this is its essence, and this essence vehemently contradicts the 
other essence—the European.” Ibid., 224-25. Also see Yuri Andrukhovych, The Moscoviad, trans. Vitaly 
Chernetskyi (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 2003). 
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Andrukhovych, something that Ukrainian pseudointellectuals and born-again patriots clamored 
for after independence, had to be imported from America,51 and tried to make Ukraine something 
it could (and should) never be—an impenetrable fortress, all “West” and no “East,” a new 
Sparta.  
In 2003, Andrukhovych coauthored a book with the Polish writer Andrzej Stasiuk that 
criticizes binary East/West thinking, relating their perspectives on Europe from the geopolitical 
margins—the borderland of Galicia (Andrukhovych hails from Ivano-Frankivs’k).52 Taking a 
view of his home region as an entangled genealogy, a palimpsest for all sorts of foreign 
schemes—an eclectic place “in between,” never “either/or,” which cannot be reduced to 
ethnicity, nationality, or language—Andrukhovych, who won the Hannah Arendt Prize for 
Political Thought in 2014 (alongside the anti-Putin punk band in-exile, Pussy Riot), sought to 
deconstruct the myth of (Central) Europe. Nevertheless, during the Maidan Revolution, shortly 
after Yanukovych regime’s decision to terminate the freedoms of speech and assembly and 
unleash a wave of violence and intimidation against the protesters in late January 2014, 
Andrukhovych appealed to the conscience of the West and its self-perception as a bastion of 
freedom and democracy: “The Ukrainian people, without exaggeration, now defend the 
European values of a free and just society with their own blood.”53  
                                                
51 “Passing a wide-open gateway you stop. There’s someone there, Martofliak. Light-colored hair, looks like a 
blonde with her back turned. How about that! Maybe I should pat her behind? But the blonde leans forward and 
vomits, and it turns out to be Bilynkevych, who has wandered into this street and is now retching in front of this 
gateway, and then he turns to you and asks ‘Rostyk, will you bring me Dontsov from America?’” Yuri 
Andrukhovych, Recreations, trans. Marko Pavlyshyn (Toronto: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies Press, 
1998), 76. 
 
52 See Stasiuk and Andrukhovych, Moia Ievropa.  
 
53 Yuri Andrukhvych, “Open Letter from Ukrainian Writer Yuri Andrukhvych,” New Eastern Europe (January 24, 
2014). http://www.neweasterneurope.eu/interviews/1061- open-letter-from-ukrainian-writer-yuri-andrukhovych 
[accessed March 18, 2017] 
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Despite being one of his country’s most effective advocates in Europe, Andrukhovych 
has fallen afoul of Pravyi Sektor and Dontsov’s other political descendants. In December 2014, 
Pravyi Sektor denounced Andrukhovych as a “liberast” (a derogatory portmanteau of “liberal” 
and “pederast”) and a “propagandist” of “postmodernist cynicism,” “erotomania” (the same term 
that Teliha used against Lypa), and “homosexuality.” Andrukhovych, Pravyi Sektor charged, is a 
purveyor of the “pornographic” “genital literature” born of the ostensibly decadent liberalism of 
present-day Europe.54 Such vices “might not harm the states of Western nations, but for Ukraine, 
spiritually damaged by the extended Russian-Communist occupation, they had and have 
exclusively ruinous consequences.” Pravyi Sektor accused Andrukhovych of “the total rejection 
of the national idea, the rejection of the experience and tradition of Ukrainian nationalism, 
rejection or ignorance of political elites, of the state-building, person-building, and nation-
building ideas of the Ukrainian classics.” Instead he espouses “anti-Ukrainian cosmopolitan 
ideas of liberalism, pacifism, Russophilism, Little-Russianism, and so on,” which had allegedly 
“led directly to the domination of criminal oligarchic clans, to the affirmation of the antinational 
and criminal Yanukovych regime, and, most importantly, the bloody Russo-Ukrainian war, the 
occupation of Crimea and Donbas by Russia (as Andrukhovych and his liberal followers 
wanted).”55  
                                                
54 ‘”Pravyi sector zvynuvatyv Andrukhovycha u propahandi ruinivnykh idei,” Ukrains’ka Pravda (January 4, 2015). 
https://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2015/01/4/7054134/ [accessed March 18, 2017]  
 
55 The last aside is a reference to Andrukhovych’s comment in 2010 that Ukraine would be better off if Crimea and 
Donbas left, arguing that the two regions are “politically” (not ethnically) “a part of Russia,” and resist all attempts 
to establish a reformist, Western-oriented government in Kyiv. “They do not leave now because they are in power,” 
but they will aggressively suppress any Ukrainian movement, Andrukhovych reasoned. “Andrukhovych vvazhaie, 
shcho krymu i donbasu treba viddilytys’ia vid Ukrainy,” TSN (July 23, 2010) https://tsn.ua/ukrayina/andruhovich-
vvazhaye-scho-krimu-i-donbasu-treba-viddilitisya-vid-ukrayini.html [accessed March 18, 2017] 
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Pravyi Sektor’s obloquy caused a scandal in Ukrainian life, with many public figures 
defending Andrukhovych from the “neo-Stalinist” attack.56 The writer and the militia have also 
locked horns over the question of Ukraine’s foreign policy, with Pravyi Sektor favoring 
isolation, self-reliance, iron discipline, and siege mentality, and Andrukhovych supporting as 
much integration as possible into the structures of the West. In April 2014, the latter criticized 
Pravyi Sektor on national television for its opposition to Ukrainian membership in the EU and, 
more puzzlingly for Andrukhovych, NATO.57 Where Dontsov would have stood on these issues 
is anyone’s guess: he would almost certainly have disliked Andrukhovych’s postmodernist prose, 
but, given his lifelong enthusiasm for Western alliances against Moscow, it is difficult to imagine 
him opposing a sovereign, independent Ukraine joining NATO, or even the EU, despite its 
professed liberal, democratic, and humanitarian values. But latter-day Dontsovists are going over 
to the “euroskeptic” position, citing the West’s alleged indifference to Ukraine’s plight, and the 
perceived evils of Western decadence, cosmopolitanism, globalism, and liberalism.  
By and large, Ukrainians have rebuked the overtures of the Dontsovists. Given the 
circumstances, Ukrainian society and politics have exhibited remarkable restraint. Moreover, it is 
important to bear in mind that one can take Dontsov “a la carte”—given the eclecticism of his 
beliefs and allegiances across his lifespan. It is possible to keep what one finds useful or 
praiseworthy, and ignore the rest. This is what virtually all of Dontsov’s twenty-first-century 
proponents do. His legacy, which is as protean as his belief system was in life, can be made to 
serve many different agendas. Toward Europe—away from Moscow: this much is agreed. But 
which “Europe” is the destination, which “Russia” the obstacle?  
                                                
56 “Intelihentsiia pro naizd ‘Pravoho sektora’ na Andukhovycha,” Ukrains’ka Pravda ((January 5, 2015).  
http://life.pravda.com.ua/society/2015/01/5/187062/ [accessed March 17, 2017] 
 
57 Telekanal ICTV (April 10, 2014) https://www.facebook.com/ICTVchannel/videos/651293941586660/ [accessed 
March 19. 2017] 
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